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World War I had just broken out, but colonial authorities in the Netherlands Indies heaved 
a sigh of relief: The colonial export sector had not collapsed and war offered new economic 
prospects; representatives from the Islamic nationalist movement had prayed for God to bless 
the Netherlands but had not seized upon the occasion to incite unrest. Furthermore, the colonial 
government, impressed by such shows of loyalty, embarked upon a campaign to create a ‘native 
militia’, an army of Javanese to assist in repulsing a possible Japanese invasion.
Yet there were other problem: pilgrims stranded in Mecca, the pro-German disposition of most 
Indonesian Muslims because of the involvement of Turkey in the war, and above all the status 
of the Netherlands Indies as a smuggling station used by Indian revolutionaries and German 
agents to subvert British rule in Asia.
By 1917 the optimism of the first war years had disappeared. Trade restrictions, the war at 
sea, and a worldwide lack of tonnage caused export opportunities to dwindle. Communist 
propaganda had radicalized the nationalist movement. In 1918 it seemed that the colony might 
cave in. Exports had ceased. Famine was a very real danger. There was increasing unrest within 
the colonial population and the army and navy. Colonial authorities turned to the nationalist 
movement for help, offering them drastic political concessions, forgotten as soon as the war 
ended. The political and economic independence gained by the Netherlands Indies, a result of 
problems in communications with the mother country, was also lost with the end of the war.
Kees van Dijk examines how in 1917 the atmosphere of optimism in the Netherlands Indies 
changed to one of unrest and dissatisfaction, and how after World War I the situation stabilized 
to resemble pre-war political and economic circumstances.
Kees van Dijk (1946) has worked as a researcher at KITLV/Royal Netherlands Institute of 
Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies since 1968 and has been professor of the history of 
Islam in Indonesia at Leiden University since 1985. Among his publications are Rebellion under 
the banner of Islam; The Darul Islam in Indonesia (Leiden, KITLV Press 1981) and A country in 
despair; Indonesia between 1997 and 2000 (Leiden, KITLV Press 2001).
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Introduction
Topics of books often present themselves by chance. My dissertation about 
the Darul Islam rebellion in Indonesia was the result of research I had started 
for a book about Guided Democracy in Indonesia. Similarly, while trying 
to trace the origins of groups active in the Netherlands Indies in the 1920s 
which espoused a mixture of Communism and Islam, I became interested 
in the question of what had been the consequences of World War One for 
the Netherlands Indies. Initially I thought, as did almost everyone with 
whom I discussed the subject, that the war had virtually passed the colony 
by. Gradually I began to realize that this was not true and that the war had 
deeply affected the domestic political situation, had temporarily fundamen-
tally changed the relationship between motherland and colony, and had had 
a great effect on the economic performance of the Netherlands Indies. 
In this book, these political and economic developments in the Netherlands 
Indies between 1914 and 1918 and the domestic and international factors 
which influenced them are traced using Dutch- and Malay-language news-
papers published in the Netherlands Indies, contemporary reports and 
books, and archival material. What I wanted to map out was simple: what 
developments in the colony were effectuated, stimulated, curbed or halted 
by a war which was being fought in faraway Europe. The questions I asked 
myself and the realities of the war fought implied that it was impossible to 
concentrate on domestic colonial politics. Much of what happened in the 
Netherlands Indies in those years and many of the perceptions people had 
about their current situation and future were related to the drastic changes 
in the economic circumstances war brought about in the Netherlands Indies. 
A mixture of what appeared to be pressing political, economic, and inter-
national issues defined the response of the Colonial Government and of the 
ordinary Dutch people in the colony to the nationalist movement. 
The Great War broke out at a moment when Dutch people in the 
Netherlands Indies were having to come to terms with a society in which 
a modern nationalist movement was taking shape. All population groups ‒ 
Indonesians, Chinese and Indo-Europeans ‒ demanded social, economic and 
political emancipation and a new ‘modern’ stream of Islam, which stressed 
that Muslim society should attain an equal footing with that of the West 
made its appearance. Dutch people did not have much time to get used to 
these developments. Though such demands had not been completely absent 
in earlier years, the impression was that there was a sudden, unprecedented 
upsurge of nationalist feeling. The contemporary international constella-
tion complicated the Dutch response. Though the international balance of 
power formed a guarantee of Dutch rule, there was a persistent lingering 
fear that one day a mightier nation might invade and seize the Netherlands 
Indies. In the years between 1900 and 1914, the threat posed by such an alien 
enemy had assumed a more concrete shape in the minds of Dutch people. 
The advance of Japan as a great power, since 1902 an ally of Great Britain, 
unnerved the Dutch public. Fear of what Japan might do only intensified 
during the war, providing some of the more radical Indonesian nationalist 
leaders with the ammunition to tease the Dutch. There was apprehension 
that Japan or another of the great powers could use several pretexts to act. 
One was that the Netherlands Indies was too weak to enforce its neutral-
ity in wartime. Another was that the colonial administration neglected the 
interests of the Indonesian population. Remembering the demise of Spain 
as a Colonial Power in Asia, some Dutch people feared that the Netherlands 
might suffer a similar fate if it did nothing to improve the chances of 
Indonesian society. And what if the Netherlands were to actually find itself 
embroiled in the war? 
In this context, Indonesians were more than colonial subjects. Their well-
being or their contentment with their lot were now directly linked with the 
continuation of Dutch rule in the Archipelago. More was at stake than vague 
speculations about the spectre of a foreign power punishing the Netherlands 
for its misrule in the colony. Not ruling out a foreign invasion, and well-aware 
that the Dutch military position in the Netherlands Indies was weak, shortly 
after the outbreak of the war the colonial administration developed plans to 
involve Javanese conscripts in the defence of the colony. Talk of a ‘native mili-
tia’ acted as catalyst: it radicalized but also split the nationalist movement, 
with those not rejecting conscription outright demanding better education 
and more political rights. Their contention was that Indonesians would only 
be willing to participate in the defence of the Netherlands Indies if they were 
imbued with the feeling that they had a motherland to defend, and ‒ but in 
the eyes of the Dutch administrators arguing the opposite amounted to sedi-
tion ‒ that they would be worse off under another colonial overlord.
The debate was staged against the background of worsening economic 
conditions, rising prices, and, in the last years of the war especially the pros-
pect of food shortages and an unruly, if not riotous, population. Throughout 
the war passenger and freight trade was strictly controlled by the Allied 
Powers. Part of the reason for this was that Great Britain and France, work-
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ing out their measures in close concert, aimed at achieving the total economic 
isolation of Germany and Austria-Hungary. But there was yet another reason. 
British India, the Malay Peninsula and the Straits Settlements were the target 
of a twin conspiracy, both coordinated by Berlin. There was a Turco-German 
effort to incite a Holy War and subvert Allied rule in British and French 
colonies (and with respect to Russia directed at the Muslim population of 
the Caucasus and Central Asia). In tandem with this, a second plot evolved, 
an Indo-German conspiracy, in which Germany cooperated with Indian 
revolutionaries to ignite a revolt in British India. In their conspiracy the 
Netherlands Indies served as a kind of stepping stone, an intermediate sta-
tion via which weapons bought in America and the Philippines, money, 
seditious pamphlets, and agents could be smuggled into India, Burma, and 
British Malaya. Consequently all ships entering and leaving the territorial 
waters in the Netherlands Indies were stopped and searched by the British 
Navy. Although the Dutch colonial authorities were unaware of the exact 
nature of the Indo-German conspiracy, they and the other Dutch people 
harboured their own fears. Because Germany was an ally of the Ottoman 
Empire, Muslims in the Netherlands Indies tended to be pro-German and 
anti-British, which led to the suspicion that one day Germany might try to 
seize power in the colony with the help of Muslim Indonesian accomplices.
Even though the prevailing mood in the Netherlands Indies in the first 
months of the war was one of gloom about the economic prospects, the colo-
nial economy did rather well during the first years of the war. Export markets 
in Germany and Austria-Hungary fell away and exports to Holland suffered 
from a British quota system imposed to prevent re-export from Holland to 
Germany, but alternative markets were found, again in the United States and 
Japan. Similarly imports from Germany dwindled, but alternative sources 
of supply were found in the United States and Japan. The redirection of 
foreign trade coupled with problems encountered in the communications by 
mail and telegraph also allowed the commercial and estate community in the 
colony some independence from headquarters in Europe.
The change came in the closing months of 1916 when colonial foreign 
trade began to feel the consequences of Allied demands for ships and ton-
nage. Colonial products could no longer be shipped, and the import of rice 
stagnated. Now faced with the possibility of an acute shortage of food, the 
Governor General of the Netherlands Indies, J.P. van Limburg Stirum, serious-
ly contemplated using the option of forcing sugar and tobacco estates to reserve 
one-quarter of their acreage for the production of rice. The situation seemed 
desperate. The collapse of the export sector was hurting Indonesian producers 
of colonial products and estates might have to dismiss their workforce, with all 
the consequent social unrest this would entail. Moderate nationalists seemed 
to have espoused radicalism, while socialist agitators had fanned discontent in 
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the army and the navy. An increase in the burning of estate crops in the field 
and in sheds pointed to growing rural unrest. Famine would only lead to even 
greater instability. 
Consultation with the Ministry of the Colonies in The Hague had become 
almost impossible. The mail and telegraph communications between the 
Netherlands Indies and Holland either hardly functioned or did not exist at all. 
Communication between the Ministry and the Governor General by mail could 
take weeks, if not months, to reach its destination, communication by telegram 
was also disrupted from time to time. Circumstances had of necessity provided 
the colony with some political independence. In his efforts to solve the crisis 
Van Limburg Stirum turned to the leaders of the nationalist movement. In 
1918, in what came to be known as the ‘November promises’, a change in the 
relationship between motherland and colony and greater political participation 
of the leaders of the nationalist movement were held out as an inducement. 
The Colonial Government also pledged itself to look into working conditions 
and labour relations in the Netherlands Indies and draft labour legislation to 
protect the economically vulnerable. This all proved to be empty words. After 
the war had ended, and the spectre of a socialist revolution in Holland and 
large-scale unrest in the Netherlands Indies which the colonial authorities 
had considered a realistic possibility had passed, the promises degenerated 
into mere prospects which were not realized. No greater degree of economic 
or political independence of the Netherlands Indies was to be granted, while 
instead of closer cooperation with the nationalist movement a period of repres-
sion dawned.
All colonies in Asia experienced the political and economic effects of 
the war in Europe. Even the educational system had to adjust to changing 
circumstances. There is an enormous amount of literature about World War 
One and its warfare at sea and on land but little has been written about the 
consequences of the war in the colonies, except there when the colonies them-
selves became battlefields. One exception is Peter Hopkirk’s Like	hidden	fire;	
The	plot	to	bring	down	the	British	empire,	but in it the emphasis is on ‘the plot’ 
itself, not on the political climate in which such a conspiracy could prosper; 
the rise of a nationalist movement and the upwelling of a new self-confidence 
in the Islamic community. He also pays scant attention to the impact of the 
Turco-German conspiracy in the Netherlands Indies. A colourful personal-
ity like E.F.E. Douwes Dekker, who played a role in the Indo-German plans, 
though admittedly a minor one, is not mentioned. 
In literature about the Netherlands Indies, World War One is usually 
mentioned only incidentally; a few figures in a long series of statistical data 
or a few pages in a detailed study of domestic developments in the colony. 
The war is there, but at the same time it is absent. It is mentioned, but 
not elaborated upon. In a good overview of Indonesia’s economic history, 
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Indonesië, by Palte and Tempelman, only one paragraph is devoted to World 
War One in which its is explained that it halted the robust economic expan-
sion of  the Netherlands Indies (which was not true initially). This formed 
one of the motivations to start this study (Palte and Tempelman 1978:31). 
In another detailed Dutch study of Indonesia’s economic history, Burger’s 
Sociologisch-economische	 geschiedenis	 van	 Indonesia (1975), World War One is 
mentioned only a very few times, and in around half of the cases merely 
serves as a time-marker, to indicate the end of a period before the war or the 
beginning of a trend which commenced after 1918.
Aspects of what happened in the Netherlands Indies during the Great 
War are dealt with by other authors, but part of this literature is in Dutch 
and Indonesian which makes it inaccessible to people who do not read these 
languages. The birth of the Indonesian nationalist movement, which also 
figures prominently in this book has been the subject of many studies. An 
undoubted classic is Robert Van Niel’s The	emergence	of	the	modern	Indonesian	
elite.	It is a political history in which, by definition, the role of international 
economic developments which influenced domestic politics are mentioned 
only in passing and the Great War and its consequences are not dealt with 
as determiners on their own. He mentions that, in the course of the war, 
‘Dutch colonial relations became highly dependent upon the whims of the 
British Mistress of the Seas’, but goes no further than stating that ‘the pres-
sures of war forced the British to curtail and restrict neutral shipping’, not 
mentioning two important other reasons behind the Allied policy to control 
international sea traffic: the economic isolation of Germany and the role the 
Netherlands Indies was assigned in the Indo-German plans to subvert British 
rule in South Asia (Van Niel 1984:10). Similar remarks can be made about 
another important study: Akira Nagazumi’s Bangkitnya	nasionalisme	Indonesia 
(1989).	It concentrates on the formative years of the nationalist organization 
Boedi Oetomo, while the attention of members of Dutch community and 
their fears and disappointment with the turn taken by the nationalist move-
ment is actually primarily concerned with another more radical organiza-
tion, Sarekat Islam. 
By concentrating on the Indonesian society, such studies do mean that 
insufficient light is shed on the discussions among Dutch individuals and 
policy makers about colonial and international events. Sometimes their opin-
ions give only fleeting insights of the paternalistic view held by many Dutch 
people in the colony. In other instances, and World War One when the Dutch 
community in the Netherlands Indies desperately sought answers to what its 
members perceived as serious foreign and domestic threats, is one of these, 
they are highly relevant. One of the examples is the plan to recruit Javanese 
conscripts, which played a crucial role in the Dutch reaction to the nationalist 
movement and provided Indonesian leaders with a good argument to press 
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for their demands. Van Niel and also Larson (1987), in his well-researched 
study of political developments in Surakarta between 1912 and 1942, focus 
on Indonesian opinions about raising a native militia. In yet another classic 
study about the Indonesian nationalist movement in which some of the char-
acters discussed in this book also play a prominent role, Takashi Shiraishi’s 
analysis (1990) of popular radicalism in Java between 1912 and 1926, the 
native militia plan is virtually not touched upon. When Shiraishi does men-
tion it, support for a militia tends to be linked to the ‘loyalist’ nationalist 
organization, Boedi Oetomo. It does not emphasize that leaders of the more 
unruly Sarekat Islam also spoke out in favour of the idea and that the clash of 
opinions within Sarekat Islam was one of the main factors which contributed 
to the rift in this organization and upsurge in personal animosities among its 
leaders. Not discussing the reasons why the Dutch colonial administration 
wanted such an institution, and launched a campaign to drum up popular 
support for it tends to obscure the fact that the idea was born of the relief, 
or may be we should write because of the realization, that nationalists could 
be loyal and royalist colonial subjects and be very concerned with the hard-
ship they were sure people in Holland were suffering after the outbreak of 
war. Moreover, Indonesian nationalists won extra room to manoeuvre, at the 
height of the militia campaign and also again later in the war, because the 
Colonial Government needed their cooperation to keep an alien enemy at 
bay and to maintain domestic law and order. 
Zooming in on the four years of the Great War allows me to encompass 
within one study domestic and international political and economic devel-
opments, providing a broader background against which the militia discus-
sion and other events evolved in the Netherlands Indies. It also illustrates 
how much politically and economically the Netherlands Indies was part of 
a ‘globalized’ world and how much the actual or dreaded consequences of 
war influenced the courses of action taken by Dutch administrators and by 
nationalist leaders.
Taking such an approach also means that the unselfish aspects of the so-
called Ethical Policy, about which so much has been written and said, shifts 
into the background. Many of its Dutch proponents certainly were ‘ethically’ 
motivated. But taking into account perceived foreign threats during the First 
World War and in the years leading up to it, and the prospect of economic 
and political disaster in the later years of the war, allow no other conclusion 
than that many of the concessions and promises made were the expedient 
consequence of Realpolitik; a fact that was well understood by the leaders 
of the Indonesian nationalist movement. This topic has been taken up by 
Jan van Baal. Trying to explain Dutch ‘ethical colonialism’ and its altruistic 
aspects, he likens the Colonial State to a modern enterprise in which prior-
ity is given to the continuation of the company and not to the interests of 
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its shareholders: profit is first and foremost used to ensure the company’s 
preservation and expansion (Van Baal 1976:101-2). Another metaphor for the 
Netherlands Indies in the first two decades of the twentieth century is also 
possible: a company quoted on the stock exchange fearing a hostile take-over 
bid and to prevent this follows a course of action which nowadays is dubbed 
‘winning the hearts and the minds of the people’, in an effort to remove what 
are perceived to be the causes of rebellions and terrorist movements. 
Following this introduction, Chapters I, II, III, IV and V sketch the pre-
war developments which influenced the political climate in the Netherlands 
Indies at the outbreak of the war: the international colonial race; the growing 
strength of the emancipation movement especially among Indonesians and 
Indo-Europeans; the rise of Japan as a contemporary superpower; and the dis-
cussions about the defence of the Netherlands Indies. Chapters VI to IX deal 
with the immediate response to the war by the colonial administration and 
members of European and non-European communities. Chapters X, XI and XII 
discuss two topics which throughout the war were perceived to be markers of 
identity and loyalty: the native militia and the role of Islam. In this section, the 
consequences of the war for the pilgrimage are explored. The following four 
chapters concentrate on the effects of the war on the colonial economy. Matters 
touched upon are the problems encountered in maintaining international 
trade and in keeping open communications between motherland and colony, a 
theme that will re-appear in Chapter XVIII. The radicalization of the nationalist 
movement, the role of  leftist agitation, and the growing unrest among soldiers 
and sailors in the later years are discussed in Chapters XVII, XIX and XX. These 
chapters also deal with how the inhabitants of the Netherlands Indies reacted 
to deteriorating economic circumstances in that period and how the Colonial 
Government coped with the prospect that rice imports might fall away, inevi-
tably leading to food shortages. The response of the colonial administration 
to a revolutionary fervour which reached an unprecedented intensity in the 
Netherlands Indies in 1918 and to the total collapse of the colonial economy 
which seemed irrevocable at that time are the subjects of Chapter XXI. The 
idea that the Netherlands Indies not only resembled a company quoted at the 
stock exchange fearing a hostile take-over but also one fighting labour unrest 
is hopefully conveyed in Chapter XXII in which some post-war developments 
of items discussed earlier are traced.  
Introductions to books are not complete without expressing some gratitude. 
So many people helped me, it is impossible to thank them all. Two exceptions 
have to be made: the staff of the KITLV, which as always has been extremely 





I have drawn a coloured map of the various colonies which surround our Indian 
Archipelago, and when one sees those colours, one has to immediately admit 
that a draughtsman with his wits about him would easily be able to draft a strik-
ing picture of the risk we run. To the left, to the west, one descries the form of a 
snake, these are the English colonies, which lour threateningly from Singapore to 
Sumatra. On the other side is a gaping maw, the shape of Australia, which applies 
the Monroe Doctrine to New Guinea, in the vicinity like a hungry wolf Germany 
also lies in wait for us, and Japan, of which in former days nobody took any notice, 
turns out to have become a Big Power which can pose a real threat, while the greedy 
Yankee, who sticks at nothing, has already appeared in our near vicinity. 
It was a frightening world that the socialist H.H. van Kol unfolded in Dutch 
Parliament in November 904. The message was clear: other powers were 
encroaching on the Netherlands Indies, and might not stop at its borders. 
What was happening had started a number of decades earlier. Since the 
880s anxious Dutchmen had witnessed how mightier nations were carving 
up the world among themselves, and in doing so establishing themselves in 
regions which were uncomfortably close to the Netherlands Indies. The politi-
cal and economic rivalries between the major European states had spread to 
parts of the world which up to that moment had been left untouched. At first 
this was mainly a competition between Great Britain, France, Germany, and 
Russia, though other states such as the United States and Italy then and before 
also figured in the scenarios constructed by Dutchmen about nations which 
wanted to establish settlements in the Dutch sphere of influence in Southeast 
Asia. By the end of the 890s the two contemporary non-European Powers, the 
United States of America and Japan, had joined in. 
Colonies, protectorates, and spheres of influence represented the status 
symbol of a modern self-assured nation. Colonial expansion was considered 
synonymous with the winning of overseas markets and economic growth. 
Even in Austria-Hungary people were caught up in the fever to occupy what 
 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 904-05:207.
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in the European vocabulary of those days was termed ‘empty’ land: regions 
inhabited by what were called uncivilized or semi-civilized peoples, governed 
by their own chiefs and rulers. There was not only the ‘scramble for Africa’, 
but also a ‘grab’ for the Pacific and East Asia, and to a certain extent also for 
parts of the moribund Ottoman Empire. In some instances European govern-
ments had taken the initiative, fearful of the intentions of their competitors on 
the international scene. In other cases the lead had been taken by enterprising 
adventurers, overseas settlers, or commercial firms, turning to the motherland 
to protect their newly acquired wealth and concessions or to block the advance 
of others.
The 870s had already brought home to the Dutch how helpless the Nether-
lands was when other nations were intent on territorial expansion, whether 
this concerned the Netherlands Indies or Holland in Europe itself. The Franco-
Prussian War of 870 had led to the first major scare in decades, in Holland and 
in the Netherlands Indies. An occupation of Holland might very well invite 
other powers to snatch at the Dutch colonial possessions, as had been the case 
in the days of Napoleon when British rule had replaced that of the Dutch. A few 
years later the ‘Borneo Affair’, the acquisition by British merchants of Sabah, 
sent an even clearer message to the Dutch that the Netherlands was in a very 
weak position if it were to become embroiled in a conflict over the boundaries 
of its colonial territory or sphere of influence with stronger adversaries. 
Next came the occupation of the eastern part of New Guinea, the object 
of a mini colonial race between Germany and Great Britain. Initially the new 
German Empire had no colonial aspirations. The 860s and 870s had seen 
various German citizens who had pleaded for overseas possessions, including 
regions in the East Indies Archipelago which were not under Dutch control, 
but their protestations were ignored. Formosa and Indochina had been men-
tioned as were – in a series of article in the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung 
in February 867 – Timor and the Philippines. The Fiji Islands, Samoa and, 
what did upset the Dutch, Sumatra and New Guinea also did not escape the 
eye of the champions of a German colonial venture. Such dreams of overseas 
German settlements were not yet shared by the governments of Prussia and 
the German Empire. Invariably Prince Otto von Bismarck turned down the 
plethora of petitions from German businessmen and consuls abroad asking for 
a German annexation of spots in the Pacific and elsewhere. Had he acceded to 
such suggestions Germany would have become the master of parts of Fiji and 
Samoa, taken possession of Hokkaido in Japan, driven the defeated French 
out of Indochina, and acquired a foothold in China. Germany would also have 
established itself in Borneo, Sumatra, and the Philippines, and would have 
administered colonies in Africa and Latin America.2
2 For the early German plans, see, for instance, Gründer 999:54-63.
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Within ten years Bismarck changed his mind. In February 884 he gave 
orders for the first German protectorate in Southwest Africa to be proclaimed. 
At various points along the coast the German flag was hoisted with due cer-
emony and a proclamation declaring the region a protectorate was read out. 
These ceremonies marked the beginning of an active German Kolonialpolitik. 
In the Pacific one of the spots German attention turned to was New Guinea, of 
which the western half belonged to the territory of the Netherlands Indies. In 
August 884 Bismarck wrote to the Neu-Guinea Compagnie that its exploits 
would be given the same support and protection from the Empire as those 
in Southwest Africa (Von Koschitzky 887-88, II:22). Part of the north of the 
island was declared a Schutzgebiet, a word invented by Bismarck (Gründer 
999:69).
In the Netherlands feelings were ambivalent. There was no ambition to 
extend the administration over East New Guinea, but the prospect of a new 
neighbour, which would not be long in announcing itself now that the world 
had been alerted to the impotence of Holland to prevent a British intrusion 
in Borneo, bristled with anxieties.3 British politicians were also not pleased. 
Australians were adamant that the eastern, non-Dutch portion belonged to 
their sphere of influence. No other country should settle there. The British 
government tended to concur with this position, fearing that if it were not to, 
political complications with the Australian colonies would be the result. In 
London the British statesmen were not yet very used to having Germany as a 
new and, as it turned out, determined colonial rival. They had missed the hint 
that Germany was aspiring to a piece of the colonial cake.
Germany could not be stopped and an agreement over the division of East 
New Guinea was reached on 7 May 885. Now, Emperor Wilhelm I could 
formally put the German territories in New Guinea and the New Britain 
Archipelago under protection of the Empire. Sovereignty over the region, 
which had already been christened Kaiser-Wilhelms-Land in March, was del-
egated to the Neu-Guinea Compagnie. On the same occasion the New Britain 
Archipelago was renamed the Bismarck Archipelago. At the end of November, 
New Ireland became Neu-Mecklenburg, New Britain Neu-Pommern and the 
Duke of York Islands the Neu-Lauenburg group. These names were chosen, the 
Dutch Ambassador in Berlin informed his government, because the most of the 
crew of the ships which sailed to these islands originated from these areas.4
As a Dutch newspaper had written in 880 it be ‘better to have colonial 
rivals as distant friends rather than as immediate neighbours’.5 There was no 
escaping the fact that in the closing years of the nineteenth century such new 
3 De Indische Gids 879, I:778-9.
4 P.P. van der Hoeven to A.P.C. van Karnebeek, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 6-2-885 8.
5 Algemeen Handelsblad, cited in De Indische Gids 880, II-2a:07.
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neighbours were already gracing the scene in Borneo and New Guinea. In both 
cases some Dutch people could still see the bright side. Great Britain taking 
control in North Borneo would preclude adventurers from other nations, who 
were said to pose a much greater danger to Dutch rule – and Germans were 
the chief suspects – being able to colonize parts of North Borneo.6 A similar 
argument was advanced with respect to New Guinea. There were some, and 
the Dutch Consul General in Melbourne was one of them, who argued that the 
German annexation had strengthened rather than weakened the Dutch posi-
tion in West New Guinea. Neither Germany nor Great Britain would allow the 
other to take possession of the Dutch portion of the island.
Had Great Britain become the sole master of East New Guinea sooner or 
later serious problems might well have arisen to harass the Dutch. People 
who adduced these arguments thought that the German expansion in Africa 
and the Pacific had called a halt to what they considered the unbridled colo-
nial appetite of Great Britain, to which the Netherlands Indies or part of it 
could possibly also fall victim. Such opinions were coupled with a certain 
malicious pleasure in seeing Germany outmanoeuvring Great Britain. This 
made it easier to accept the German colonial presence in the eastern portion of 
New Guinea. The appearance of Germany on the colonial stage had checked 
English ambitions also in the Netherlands Indies, and would, it was hoped, 
produce a new colonial balance in which Holland ‘tranquil and calm’ could 
still ‘have pride of place’.7
The ideas among the wider public about the repercussions of the Anglo-
German rivalry over the eastern portion of New Guinea resembled those 
entertained by the Dutch about the colony as a whole. These oscillated 
between fears that a mightier state, its pride wounded by developments else-
where in the world, might look to territorial expansion in the Netherlands 
Indies to refurbish its image counterbalanced by the feeling that international 
rivalries formed a safeguard for the integrity of the Netherlands Indies. 
International rivalry between the powers intensified at the close of the 
century. Berlin embarked on a new phase in German foreign policy in 897: 
the Weltpolitik. Kaiser Wilhelm II enthusiastically took the lead in transforming 
the country from what had been essentially an inland continental power into 
a nation fired with the ambition to play a leading economic and political role 
on the international stage. The prestige of Germany and its emperor had to be 
enhanced. The German Empire should become a World Power and this should 
entail the acquisition of new overseas possessions. Among the regions upon 
which Wilhelm had set his eye were Portuguese Timor, the Sulu Archipelago, 
6 De Indische Gids 882, I:28. 
7 Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indië 889, II:29. 
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one or more of the larger Philippine Islands, the Caroline Islands, and Samoa 
(Gründer 999:90). Spurred by aspirations engendered by this ‘world policy’, 
the acquisition of overseas possessions and the enlargement of the German 
Navy, modestly launched under Bismarck, were now given a fresh stimulus. 
With new rivals arriving on the scene in the late nineteenth century, and 
suspicious of adventurers trying to carve out their own kingdom, guarding 
the Dutch position in the East Indies acquired a new urgency. In the previous 
decades the Netherlands had already slowly but surely added territories to its 
East Indies possessions, expanding the region over which it exercised only de 
jure control. In reacting to the changing situation at the end of the nineteenth 
and the beginning of the twentieth century, the Netherlands contended itself 
with consolidating its hold over the East Indian Archipelago, bringing under 
direct control regions it had left untouched up to then. Parts of Sumatra and 
Celebes, often still virtually unexplored regions which hardly any European 
had yet traversed, were added to the colonial territory. In some instances a 
considerable military force had to be mustered. In others, the threat of force 
sufficed. Other expeditions were sent to the smaller islands of the Archipelago 
to gain the submission of the local rulers who still occupied an independ-
ent position. Underlining its intention naval vessels were ordered to remote 
corners of the Archipelago to show the rest of the world the extent of Dutch 
rule. 
All this was first and foremost a move to forestall an incursion by other 
nations. Regions had to be brought under Dutch rule before anybody else 
could settle there and claim them as theirs. The Dutch administration – in 
The Hague as well as in Batavia – had no aspirations to look for new ter-
ritories or exclusive zones of influence elsewhere in Asia. Even in the East 
Indies Archipelago policy was cautious. An expansion of Dutch rule in the 
Archipelago was an option not all could agree on. Some, Van Kol was one 
of them, argued in favour of the opposite tack: a contraction of colonial pos-
sessions. The Netherlands should concentrate on Java and Sumatra. Less 
seriously it was suggested the Netherlands Indies be made the first prize in 
an international lottery.8 Upset by the difficulties the colonial army was expe-
riencing in Aceh, the mood was far from bellicose. This seems to have been 
the prevailing feeling among the general public, though occasionally when 
military expeditions were being fitted out, the Netherlands went through its 
own spasms of jingoism. In Holland not many citizens seemed to be, and this 
greatly irritated their compatriots living in the Netherlands Indies, interested 
in what happened in the East or understood why military expeditions had 
to be mounted to conquer native states. The expansion of Dutch authority in 
8 De Locomotief, 24-8-900.
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the Archipelago was considered to be ‘a burden or a motive for flaunting and 
showing off’ (Duitschers 885:42).
Among the Dutch in the Netherlands Indies who were well aware of the 
costs, financially and otherwise, of armed expeditions to subdue still inde-
pendent regions in the Archipelago, the mood was also defensive rather 
than offensive. It was encroachments by others, not an enlargement of the 
empire, that first sprung to mind. But this, too, was a matter of interpretation. 
As Borneo had shown, the outside world might have different ideas about 
how far the exclusive zone of Dutch influence extended. Anxiety arose when 
European nations – especially Germany and Great Britain but Russia, France 
and Italy were also hovering on the brink of their consciousness – or their 
citizens contemplated or actually founded new settlements in regions not 
under direct Dutch control, but which might be considered outlying parts of 
the Archipelago.
People were even not completely sure either about the regions where Dutch 
control was apparently entrenched. Were these safe from outside intrusion? 
The appetite shown for the acquisition of new territory and the international 
power game between the larger states in the closing decades of the nineteenth 
century formed a source of many a bleak speculation about the future of 
Holland and its colonies. The negotiations between the World Powers of the 
day and the real or rumoured deals they made to enhance their own position 
baffled and alarmed many an outsider. In the Netherlands this manifested 
itself from time to time in the fear that the Netherlands Indies might well be 
one of the pawns in the international game; the price paid by one government 
to assure the cooperation of the other.
In 900 anxiety mounted when an article which received much attention 
in the Dutch, Netherlands Indies, and British press appeared in a German 
newspaper. The Times even suggested that its contents had been inspired by 
the German government. The article, written by E. von Hartmann, a German 
‘philosopher’, was a plea for a silent annexation of Holland by Germany. It 
contained a double threat: in the Far East the Netherlands would be unable 
to defend its colonial possessions against an attack by a Foreign Power; in 
Europe, Germany could easily disrupt the Dutch economy by imposing high 
import duties and by transferring the transit Rhine-trade to the Ems. Von 
Hartmann suggested that the Netherlands should do what the South German 
states had done some thirty years earlier. It should sign a defensive and offen-
sive pact with the German Empire and enter into a customs union with it. 
Were it to comply, the Netherlands could hold on to the Netherlands Indies. 
As an extra bonus the colony would profit from an influx of German capital 
and manpower.9 Von Hartmann was not the only one who contemplated such 
9 De Locomotief, 22-3-900, 7-4-900; De Indische Gids 900, I:352-3.
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a strategy. Around the same time the Dutch Envoy in Berlin reported that such 
views were shared by the architect of the new German Navy, Admiral Alfred 
von Tirpitz, and other senior German naval and army officers, and by leaders 
of the German business community (Kuitenbrouwer 985:43).
An occupation of the Netherlands Indies continued to linger in the minds 
of those Germans, who aspired to a large colonial empire. The taking over of 
Portuguese colonies was what first came to mind but, as can be concluded 
from the words of the German Chancellor, Th. von Bethmann Hollweg in the 
early 90s, a seizure of the Belgian Congo or the Netherlands Indies was not 
beyond the bounds of possibility (Berghahn 993:32). Germany could well 
claim the Dutch colony as the price for a reconciliation with Great Britain, or, 
if France was in the picture, for a return of Alsace-Lorraine.
In the twentieth century, however, the greatest threat perceived by the 
Dutch did not come from a European Power. It came from Japan, which had 
made its entrance on the world stage as a major power after its war with 
China in 894-895. The victory of Japan established its reputation, inspiring 
fears and hopes in the rest of Asia. To Indonesians Japan was proof that an 
Asian nation could develop and become powerful. The Dutch, and they were 
not alone in this, began to express concern that Japan was ultimately set on 
acquiring the Netherlands Indies, or portions of it; an advance south for which 
Formosa, which Japan had gained from China, was an excellent stepping 
stone. The Philippines would follow; yet another step of Japan in its ineluct-
able march south en route to the Netherlands Indies, making for Borneo and 
Celebes. The speedy build-up of the Japanese fleet in the closing five years of 
the nineteenth century was observed with awe in the Netherlands Indies and 
in Holland. Japan’s ‘formidable Navy’ with its ‘fighting machines’, the ‘float-
ing citadels’, which had a far greater battle capacity than any of the ships of 
the Dutch Navy, inspired simultaneous admiration and anxiety.0
In the perception of the Dutch, Japanese jingoism now assumed a similar 
tone as that of the British. When people in the Netherlands Indies spoke 
about a B.V., a Buitenlandsche Vijand (Alien Enemy) more often than not it 
began to denote Japan, and not a European Power. In the official correspond-
ence between The Hague and Buitenzorg, Japan now also loomed as the 
potential enemy. Initially Japan was just a scribble in the margin of official 
records, whereas the text itself still referred to a European enemy. This, for 
instance, still queried with a question mark, was the case in 903, when the 
reduction of the Indies Military Navy was discussed; that is the smaller flo-
tilla ships with a low battle capacity permanently stationed in the East Indian 
0 De Locomotief, 6--900, 8-3-900.
 De Locomotief, 4-6-898.
The unarmed idealist and the armed assailant. Onze Vloot propaganda. The Idealist: 
‘We should see the Indies not as a commercial but as an idealistic possession’. The 
other: ‘Rightly so right. When he stays  unsuff.’
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waters and employed to impress native coastal states, and not the so-called 
auxiliary squadron, made up of better-armed, faster warships, which would 
be expected to grapple with a foreign enemy and, after a posting to the tropics 
for three years would return to Holland.2
The stepping-stone scenario was soon to be rendered outdated by actual 
developments. It was not Japan that took possession of the Philippines but 
the United States. It did not take long before the American victory was per-
ceived first and foremost as a blessing. With the Americans entrenched in 
the Philippines the chance that Japan would turn south and occupy these 
islands tended to fade into the background, though a Japanese fleet could 
still always sail around the Archipelago. Spain, hampered by its weak colo-
nial army and Navy, had been replaced by a nation with a strong military 
force. The Japanese government would think twice before engaging such a 
formidable foe in war. One of those who voiced this opinion was the corre-
spondent of the Semarang newspaper De Locomotief in Japan. At the end of 
899 he concluded that the Japanese expansion into the Pacific was as good 
as cancelled out by the occupation of the Philippines and Hawai’i by Uncle 
Sam and that of Samoa and the Carolines by Germany. The Americans had 
raised a ‘natural barrier between Japanese chauvinism and the Netherlands 
Indies pie’.3 Later, when it had become plain that the United States planned 
to hold on to the former Spanish colonies, it initially became associated with 
all the wrongs of aggressive colonialism; and consequently was also seen as a 
potential threat to the Netherlands Indies. The United States had shown itself, 
the editor of De Locomotief now exclaimed, a true member of the Anglo-Saxon 
race, which because of its ‘blood- and land-thirsty’ nature was causing trouble 
in every corner of the world: ‘While in Africa this has spilled rivers of blood 
to bring British civilization in the form of cotton fabrics, gin, and beer to the 
banks of the time-honoured Nile, Washington does not gainsay its descent 
and origin’. What the United States had done was unprecedented in history. 
Great Britain, ‘even after its most fortunate war, has never been so voracious. 
Germany’s annexation of Alsace and Lorraine is a child’s plaything compared 
to it.’ It would be best to have the Pacific Ocean and not just the Mindoro 
Sea between the United States and the Netherlands Indies.4 Such voices 
remained an exception, though Roman Catholics sympathizing with Spain 
because of religious sentiments lashed out against the ‘sharks of big capital-
ism’ (Kuitenbrouwer 985:47). People to the left of the political spectrum, no 
disciples of imperialism or the United States for that matter, were equally sus-
picious of American intentions, and would continue to be so. As far as Van Kol 
2 A.G. Ellis, Minister of Navy,  to Idenburg, 25-9-903, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 7-2-903 F9. 
3 De Locomotief, 6--900.
4 De Locomotief, 9--898.
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and other socialists were concerned the American danger remained a reality; 
the more so at those moments when politicians in the United States asserted 
themselves and warned the rest of the world that the United States fleet would 
react immediately wherever injustice was done to an American elsewhere in 
the world.5 The relief with which others had greeted the American annexa-
tion of the Philippines did not last long. Within little more than fifteen years 
when Washington indicated that it wanted to prepare the Philippines for inde-
pendence, a Japanese occupation of the Philippines again returned to haunt 
the Dutch in the Netherlands Indies.
Two international conflicts around the turn of the century influenced Dutch 
perceptions about the weak position the Netherlands was in even more. 
One was the Boer War, the other the Russo-Japanese War. In the shaping of 
Dutch notions about what the strife between the powers of the day might 
mean for the Netherlands and the Netherlands Indies, the significance of 
the Boer War cannot be underestimated. The fate of the Boer republics, the 
South African Republic (the Transvaal) and the Orange Free State, brought 
home to the Dutch, if this was not already been realized, that ‘come what 
may power takes precedence over right’.6 A small nation could not expect 
much benevolence from a mighty neighbour, whose politicians only had their 
own national interests at heart. Or, as a Member of Parliament phrased this, 
‘when one speaks of right and justice, they point at bayonet, sabre, rifle, and 
canon’.7 In the minds of many Dutch people the Boer War unmasked the raw 
imperialism of the British Empire. They were convinced that Great Britain 
had truly become a nation of jingoists, intent on expanding its colonial pos-
sessions and spheres of influence.
The Boer War evoked strong commotions in the world. In the Netherlands 
anti-British public feelings ran even higher than in the rest of the non-British 
world.8 The British Ambassador in The Hague, Sir Henry Howard, was to 
complain in retrospect in November 900 that the previous year had been ‘a 
trying time in regard to tact and temper’. He was looking forward to some 
‘rest and quiet’. A few weeks in Paris, London, and Germany away from ‘this 
Boer atmosphere’ would do him good.9 In the Netherlands Indies the Dutch 
reacted in the same way as their compatriots in the motherland. All over Java 
and in cities and town in the outer provinces where Dutch civilians and sol-
5 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 904-05:207.
6 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 94-5:728.
7 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 904-05:990.
8 See Bossenbroek 996 for a detailed analysis of the the relationship of the Netherlands with 
South Africa and reactions to the Boer War in the Netherlands.
9 Howard to Lansdowne, 6--900, PRO FO 800 36.
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diers were stationed, fancy fairs, benefit concerts, and soirées variées were held 
to raise money. Collections were organized at races and on many other occa-
sions; even on board the ships in the roadstead of Surabaya. In many places 
lists on which people who wanted to donate money could put their names 
circulated.
From time to time, the enthusiasm played tricks. Should there be anybody, 
though this is almost inconceivable, De Locomotief wrote, who supports the 
British jingo policy, then we suggest he not express his sympathies too loudly; 
especially not when there are cavalrymen around: ‘undoubtedly they will 
make it clear to him in a somewhat hard-handed way, that in this case, though 
respecting everybody’s personal conviction, their opinions differ from his’.20 
The streets did not become the scene of brawls between British jingoists and 
the Dutch Boer-lovers. It was in the sociëteit, the private club house, the centre 
of European amusement, where feelings occasionally ran high. In a number 
of such clubs, of which the Dutch as well as British and other Europeans were 
members, the playing – or the not-playing – of the Transvaal national anthem 
occasioned an upsurge of emotion.
Impressed by the reports about the fearless Boers and their initial military 
successes, young and old also started to impersonate the Boers. In tableaux 
vivants and at fancy-dress balls, popular forms of entertainment in those days 
among the European community, the Boer soldiers and their fortunes and 
misfortunes were brought to life. Some really acted it out: riding ‘girded with 
a cartridge-belt, rifle slung over the shoulder, on horseback hill up and hill 
down’, they ‘played Boer’, dreaming for a moment that they themselves were 
the brave warriors.2 Others, who were inspired by reports about the way the 
Boers fought, prepared for a civilian defence of Java. They asked people who 
were interested in participating in a volunteer corps to register and to mention 
whether they owned a mount or not. Such initiatives were inspired by the fear 
that after Great Britain had been kicked out of South Africa, it might turn on 
the Netherlands Indies to compensate for the territories lost and recover the 
self-respect and prestige blemished by the Boer successes. It was feared that an 
additional reason Great Britain might have to act in such a way was the fierce 
anti-British sentiment in Holland and the Netherlands Indies. London might 
want to punish the Netherlands and the Dutch community in the Netherlands 
Indies for their pro-Boer sympathies. Such a doom scenario was occasioned 
not only by a bad consciousness. From time to time, such an act of revenge was 
indeed hinted at in the Straits Settlements.
The Boer War made it clear a government could painstakingly guard 
20 De Locomotief, 25-0-899.
2 De Locomotief, 0-2-900.
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neutrality in its official policy, but that it was not equally easy to assure that 
public opinion did not take sides. In The Hague one overriding concern was 
not to defy the British. The Netherlands could not afford to irritate London too 
much. People were convinced that the British as it were were waiting for any 
act by the Dutch that could be construed as a breach of neutrality to have an 
excuse to invade Java. It was argued that they would do so without a qualm, 
offended as they were by anti-British demonstrations and the Anglophobe 
articles in the Dutch press in Holland and in the Netherlands Indies. Anxiety 
was all the greater as these were days in which there was much talk of an 
impending war in Europe and Asia. Some of the Dutch in the Netherlands 
Indies were convinced that such a war could break out at any moment. A 
Russo-Japanese confrontation was likely to involve other powers as well, 
turning it into a Groote Oorlog. One Dutch author prophesied in 900 that this 
Great War, an ‘enormous struggle, which will stir the whole world’, was prob-
ably only weeks and certainly not more than a few months away (X 900:293). 
Another doom scenario was that Britain and France would soon be at war with 
one another and that for strategic reasons each of the two would attempt to 
occupy the Netherlands Indies; a circumstance in which people were afraid an 
officially declared neutrality would count for nothing.
The Boer War was a foretaste of some of the problems the Dutch were to 
encounter in a far greater magnitude during World War I. The British had no 
hesitation at all in searching ships sailing under neutral flags which they sus-
pected to carry cargo or reinforcements destined for the enemy. Mail, includ-
ing that sent to and from the foreign consuls, was also not immune; it could be 
intercepted, opened, held up, and censored. There was also a great to-do about 
the nationalization of the Dutch-owned railway company in Transvaal and the 
dismissal and expulsion of its Dutch personnel, who made up about half of the 
total number of employees. The company had incurred the wrath of the British 
among other reasons by having a Boer field-gun serviced and repaired in its 
workshops (Pakenham 994:258). The nationalization made a deep impres-
sion. In years to come it was frequently cited to demonstrate what the fate of 
Dutch commerce would be should another nation drive the Netherlands out 
of the Netherlands Indies. Some of those who were dismissed because of the 
nationalization found employ with the railways in the Netherlands Indies. 
There appointment contributed to what was perhaps the first industrial strike 
by Indo-Europeans in the Netherlands Indies. The Indo-European employees 
were piqued by the fact that the Transvaal immigrants were given the better 
jobs, blocking their own prospects of promotion. Relations between the two 
groups were not improved by the habit of the South Africans of calling the 
Indo-Europeans ‘brown Kaffirs’ (Bosma 995:93).
The Boer War also provided unequivocal evidence that Great Britain was the 
undisputed master of telegraph communication. Around 900 communication 
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techniques had reached the stage at which a wireless system was just develop-
ing. The submarine telegraph lines spanning the world were mostly British-
owned. Great Britain could deny others access to the telegraph cables, or at the 
very least control the nature of the messages sent. At the height of the Boer War, 
London reserved the cable between Aden and Zanzibar for official communica-
tions, interfering with commercial intercourse between Portuguese East Africa 
and Germany among other disruptions.22 Were the lines still open Great Britain 
could, as it did during the Boer War, demand that the telegrams were not to be 
sent in a language unintelligible to the British or in code. Control of the cable 
also meant control of the news about the war. Such experiences made people 
in Holland and the Netherlands Indies aware of how vulnerable the lines of 
communication between motherland and colony were. For private citizens 
and government officials alike it suddenly became a matter of great urgency 
to look for a telegraph connection that was not in British hands. This became a 
subject of a plethora of letters to the editor and articles in magazines and news-
papers full of concern about the situation. So serious was the matter deemed, 
that suggestions were made for a public collection of money to finance an 
independent Dutch cable line. A ‘Committee for the Promotion of Telegraphic 
Communication between the Netherlands Indies and the Motherland via Lines 
Independent of England’ was also founded. Its secretary was J.J. le Roy, a lec-
turer at the Koninklijke Militaire Academie (KMA, Royal Military Academy). 
The government, the Dutch Minister of the Colonies well to the fore, turned 
to the Danes, the Germans, the French, and the Americans in order to give the 
Netherlands its lines independent of Great Britain.
As long as such a line did not exist, other precautions had to be taken to 
warn the Governor General in advance of the likelihood of war with Great 
Britain. At the end of 900 a code was developed to be used even before a 
war had been declared, should important messages be no longer forwarded 
by wire from Singapore to the Netherlands Indies in a conflict with Great 
Britain. It was decided that telegrams alerting the colonial administration to 
an imminent war with Great Britain should be of such a nature that even when 
relations had deteriorated, they would still be allowed to be forwarded via 
the cable. The best way to accomplish this was to have the messages look as 
innocent as possible. ‘Mother seriously ill, Corry’ meant that strained relations 
with Great Britain were feared. From ‘Mother worse’, ‘Mother precarious’, 
and ‘Mother hopeless’ the messages reached their final stage in ‘Mother dead’. 
Of course, ‘Mother recovering’ was among the possibilities. The following year 
codes were added for Germany (Willy), France (Marianne), the United States 
(Anna), Japan (Clara), and Portugal (Mina). Initially the telegrams had to be 
22 De Locomotief, 25--899.
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addressed to ‘Paulus ‒ Buitenzorg’ or ‘Mrs Van de Vijver ‒ Batavia’. As the 
recipients of the message were real persons (‘Mr so and so not’ meant that the 
address could no longer be used), the addresses had to be altered a number of 
times; the final occasion being in August 94.23
The authorities were successful in finding a partner for a non-British cable 
connection, though there had been some beads of sweat on brows when it 
leaked out in Java that The Hague was conducting negotiations with Berlin. 
Complication and ‘counter-intrigues’ were expected from the British side. 
It also took some effort to explain to ‘Prussian’ officials that ‘loose-tongued’ 
minor colonial civil servants (a complaint voiced more often by outsiders 
about the colonial administration) had been responsible for the leak.24 An 
agreement to establish the Deutsch-Niederländische Telegraphengesellschaft 
was reached between the German and Dutch governments in July 90. 
The company had a German and a Dutch director. The Dutch government 
welcomed the contract with great relief. It showed its gratitude by decorat-
ing the chairman of the board of Directors of the German counterpart, the 
Norddeutsche-Seekabelwerke. It took three years before the German-Dutch 
Telegraph Company became a fact. On 8 January 905, the cable-vessel, the 
Von Podbielski, bought by the Dutch government left Nordenham to sail to 
the Netherlands Indies to lay the first stretch of the cable connection between 
Manado in North Celebes and Yap, from whence an onward connection led to 
Shanghai and Guam.
The theatre of war drew closer to the Netherlands Indies on 8 February 904, 
when a surprise Japanese torpedo attack on the Russian Pacific fleet at Port 
Arthur signalled the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War. The most daunting 
prospect of the conflict for the Dutch was that the Netherlands could well 
be implicated. Russian warships on their way from Europe to North Asia 
almost certainly would have to traverse the East Indies Archipelago, and no 
steam-propelled warship, however crammed the holds and decks were with 
coal, could sail the entire distance between Europe and North Asia without 
bunkering a number of times. Great Britain controlled its own network of 
coaling-stations stretching into the north of East Asia and was well provided 
for; France, with its Indochinese colony, maybe might, except when its ships 
were confronted with adverse weather conditions, be self sufficient in this 
respect; but Russia and Germany most definitely were not. 
A novel argument for the active pursuit of a policy of colonial expansion 
presented itself. Foreign warships did not necessarily need a coaling-station 
23 Van Heutsz to Fock, 9-2-906, Fock to Van Heutsz, 26-3-906, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 26-3-
906 V7.
24 Dutch Envoy in Berlin to De Beaufort, 9--90, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 22--90 V.
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in the Archipelago. A sheltered spot where coal could be transshipped from 
colliers and repairs could be made would do. It was also not out of the ques-
tion that a Russian fleet, or for that matter a German one, would demand coal 
stockpiled in the harbours of the Netherlands Indies in excess of the amount 
allowed by international law. Under threat of force such a fleet might even try 
to ‘lease’ a coaling-station, copying the tactics the great powers had deployed 
in China, or alternatively occupy an island not yet brought under de facto 
Dutch control, not recognizing Dutch territorial rights, and the Dutch gov-
ernment was well aware of this ever since Berlin and London had disputed 
Spanish rule over the Sulu Archipelago in the early 880s. Many of the islands 
which presented suitable conditions for bunkering were not well guarded 
by Dutch troops or ships, if indeed they already belonged to that part of the 
Archipelago where the Dutch exercised de facto control. In January 905 when 
the Russian Baltic fleet was expected to arrive within a couple of weeks, the 
Governor General ordered frequent visits to islands west of Sumatra, where 
if resources stretched to it a military detachment should also be stationed. He 
feared that the Baltic fleet might anchor there using the pretext that the islands 
were not yet occupied by any European Power. The order was not so easily 
executed. As the Commander of the Navy pointed out, the island and bays in 
the region were many; not to speak of the other portions of the Archipelago 
through which the Baltic fleet, choosing a different route, could sail.
The Russo-Japanese War brought home a number of points: how difficult it 
was with a small fleet to guard the whole Archipelago against transgressions 
of neutrality; that foreign warships and other ships directed to Asia to provide 
them with coal and provisions could easily remain undetected (the Dutch fleet 
in the Netherlands Indies even completely missed the Russian Baltic fleet on 
its way from Europe to the Far East even when it sailed the Straits of Malacca); 
and how difficult it was to draft instructions to maintain neutrality which sat-
isfied both sides in the war and covered all foreseen and unforeseen possibili-
ties in allowing a belligerent fleet to bunker in territorial waters. Throughout 
the Russo-Japanese War, Batavia and The Hague spent a large amount of time 
in developing guidelines on how to prevent a Russian fleet fighting a naval 
battle with ‘Dutch coal’. They and the general public worried about implica-
tions of providing Russian warships with coal, or limiting the amount of fuel 
with which they could be supplied according to international law. A Russian 
squadron might try to seize extra coal by force. It also could not be excluded 
that Japanese warships would try to attack Russian warships bunkering in the 
Netherlands Indies. Finding the right solution was a fiendishly difficult task 
and absorbed great swathes of attention during the Russo-Japanese War, lead-
ing to an almost endless stream of official correspondence, mutual irritation, 
and, as the stakes were high, on occasion to intense rows between Batavia and 
The Hague and in The Hague between the ministries most directly involved: 
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those of Foreign Affairs, of the Colonies, and of the Navy. The matter was the 
more serious because the Russo-Japanese War made The Hague for the first 
time the subject of intense bullying by one of the belligerents in an armed 
conflict. The Japanese government was intent on preventing the bunkering of 
the Russian warships on their voyage round the Cape of Good Hope to Asia 
and made no secret of this. On 5 November, the Japanese Ambassador called 
on the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs and submitted a strongly worded 
caution. It said that the Japanese government was 
convinced that if a neutral Power should permit the Baltic fleet, on its expedition, 
to enter into her territorial waters and to take in coal freely and without restriction 
at a spot where there is no danger of attack from the enemy […] such territorial 
waters of a neutral Power would in effect, be converted into a base of hostile opera-
tions for the belligerent fleet, and her neutrality is seriously violated.25 
This was followed on 2 December 904 by a note which stated the Japanese 
position in no uncertain terms. It was set out unequivocally that for a Russian 
fleet, proceeding to the Far East, it was 
essential to the forward movement of the expedition and the development of its 
full fighting strength, that its scattered units should reunite at some point in the 
vicinity of [the] actual seat of war, in order to recoal, repair, and make final prepa-
rations and arrangements before advancing to meet the naval force of Japan.
Were the commander of the Baltic fleet to choose to use the territorial waters 
of the Netherlands Indies for these purposes, these would become ‘veritable 
bases of warlike operations against Japan’. It was warned that, in that case, 
the Japanese government was left with ‘no other course than to preserve to 
themselves the right to take, within the ports or waters so used, such meas-
ures of self-protection as the situation may demand’.26 All ended well. In 
June 905 the Minister of Foreign Affairs, R. Melvil van Lynden, informed 
Queen Wilhelmina that the previous evening at a dinner with the Japanese 
Ambassador, one of the guests, Prince Arisugawa, had made a ‘lengthy com-
munication’. Its purport was that the Japanese Emperor had instructed Prince 
Arisugawa to convey that he and his government had ‘particularly appreci-
ated the manner in which the Government of Your Majesty had guarded the 
upholding of neutrality, and were very grateful for the effective regulations and 
firm measures taken with regard to this by Your Majesty’s Government’.27
Luckily for the Netherlands there were special conditions in the Netherlands 
25 Note Japanese government, 5--90, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 26--904 E25.
26 Mitsuhashi to Melvil van Lynden, 2-2-904, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 27-2-904 X27.
27 Melvil van Lynden to Wilhelmina, 2-6-905, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. -8-905 L8. 
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Indies which mitigated the threat of a foreign occupation or attack. For stra-
tegic or economic reasons the great powers might well cast an envious eye on 
the Netherlands Indies; for the same reasons they might leave it alone, aware 
that their rivals would never allow them to occupy the whole or part of the 
Archipelago and could react to any such move by employing military force.
The most important of these special features was the international nature 
of the Netherlands Indies. In 872, the last barriers to an open-door policy 
had disappeared. Preferential import and export duties were abolished. The 
Netherlands Indies opened up to German, Austro-Hungarian, French, British 
and other foreign capital invested mostly in the export industries, banking, 
railways, inter-insular cargo shipping, gas and electricity, and in the planta-
tion industry (Burger 975, II:85). The open-door policy removed one of the 
excuses Foreign Powers could have used to mobilize their military might 
against weaker nations. Enforcing or maintaining an open door had been the 
cornerstone of British-China policy and within a few years was the public 
reason given by the Germans in their ostensible support for Moroccan inde-
pendence, opposing an expansion of French influence. A liberal trade policy, 
a Dutch Minister of the Colonies had stressed in 870, was the best defence 
against a foreign assault.28
The diverse origins of foreign investment were reflected in the composition 
of the European population in the Netherlands Indies. The Dutch formed the 
greater part, but people gathered there from all over Europe – most numer-
ous among them the Germans, followed by Belgians, Britons, Swiss, and the 
French – remained clearly distinguishable. Their share was such that in official 
parlance the word Dutchman was ever hardly used, preference being given 
to the term European, which also, formally but not in actual social daily life, 
included the Indo-European population. Not only did foreign nationals come 
along with foreign money; for a long time the Dutch at home in Holland had 
not been very interested in a life in the East. Many employees on the planta-
tions, missionaries, explorers and scholars originated from other European 
countries.
The same could be said about the colonial army. In 900 still almost one-
fifth of all Europeans serving in the army of the Netherlands Indies, some 
3,000 soldiers, were foreigners. In 904, at the time of the Russo-Japanese 
War, the number of foreign soldiers had dropped to 2,400, but proportionally 
their share had remained the same. At that time, fearing the consequences of 
the war for the Netherlands Indies, measures to facilitate the recruitment of 
foreigners for the colonial army were even deemed necessary.29 Only in the 
years thereafter did the colonial army become less dependent on non-Dutch 
28 De Locomotief, 7-0-870.
29 Idenburg to J.W. Bergansius, 7-3-904, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 7-3-904 D6.
The Netherlands Indies and the Great War8
soldiers. In 96 their number had dropped to less than 800, or about 0 per 
cent of the European soldiers; a majority of them – 625 – being of German 
origin.30
Except for the common soldiers and the non-commissioned officers who 
were excluded from them, almost all of the European and American foreigners 
in the Indies had to live within the narrow confines of small European com-
munities; its members depending on each other not only for business contacts 
but also for diversion and entertainment. This was an extra reason for cau-
tion in time of war, when intense feelings of nationalism which ineluctably 
accompanied the confrontations between the powers in the wider world were 
aroused. In view of the diverse composition of the European population, as 
early as 870 not only were the usual proclamations with respect to neutrality 
issued in the Netherlands Indies. Explicitly referring to the many foreigners 
living in the Netherlands Indies the colonial administration made special 
appeals to the newspapers to maintain a strict neutrality in their reporting. 
International competition came to the rescue of the Dutch. The Netherlands 
Indies was too rich a prize and the investments there of each of the main con-
testants in the European struggle for power, especially Germany and Great 
Britain (the French economic and financial interests were much less), too 
valuable for one of them to allow the other to invade and take possession of 
the Netherlands Indies. It was a comforting thought, cherished also by the 
Dutch government, that for economic and strategic reasons none of the power-
ful nations would allow a rival to gain control of the Netherlands Indies. As 
World War I drew closer, foreign economic investments by the countries of the 
Triple Alliance (Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy) as well as of the Triple 
Entente (Great Britain, France and Russia) over the years had become of such 
importance, that the Dutch Minister of the Colonies, Th.B. Pleyte, hoped that 
should a European war break out this would safeguard the colony from an 
occupation by one of the belligerents. The stakes had become too high, and 
economic investments from contesting European Powers too great to let a rival 
power take control of the Netherlands Indies. An unequivocal open-door pol-
icy, Pleyte, stressed in Parliament as late as 98, was one of the prerequisites 
which would allow the Netherlands to remain in the possession of its colony. 
It would, others argued, also be a reason to have the European Powers oppose 
a Japanese occupation of the Netherlands Indies (Teitler 988:293). 
30 Zwitzer and Heshusius 977:2-3; Koloniaal verslag 90 and 905: Bijlage A Tabel 3.
chapter  ii
A new century, a new elan
In 1898 the sudden demise of Spain as a Colonial Power and the parallel that 
could be drawn with the position of the Netherlands as a weak European state 
with a large Asian colony does not appear to have worried many at the time. 
There was a feeling that what had happened to Spain could never happen to 
the Netherlands. Spain had mismanaged its colonies and had been confronted 
with wide-spread popular unrest. This was what had brought about the down-
fall; not the war with the United States. It was argued with a certain degree of 
persistence that the situation in the Netherlands Indies was different. In Java, 
remaining silent about the difficulties the Dutch experienced in other quarters 
of the Archipelago, a military observer had remarked at the time, ‘we can trust 
the native population and their heads to be so devoted to us that even in times 
of war there is no fear of danger’.1 Though his observation did not exactly 
ring true and not everybody was so confident about the pro-Dutch sentiments 
of the Javanese, ‘Remember the Philippines’ became a slogan of the critics of 
colonial policy warning Batavia and The Hague not to alienate the local popu-
lation by their policies and instructions. People’s loyalty, their contentment 
with colonial rule, was the key element to assure the continued presence of 
Holland in the Netherlands Indies, at least of equal importance to the strength 
of its colonial army and Navy, which had the task of repelling a foreign inva-
sion (Egbert 1902:8; Visser 1913:6). It would also pre-empt any invasion of the 
colony under the pretext that the Dutch had ceded their right to rule because 
they had neglected the interests of the population.
To contemporary politicians and statesmen around the turn of the century, 
such reflections may well have been an incentive equally important as moral 
considerations to embark upon what is dubbed the Ethical Policy, defined by 
E.B. Locher-Scholten (1981:112, 176-218) as ‘an active pursuit of the develop-
ment of land and people of the Indian Archipelago, under Dutch rule and 
according to a Western model’. They stressed that the best way to assure the 
loyalty of the population was by demonstrating that Dutch rule was benevo-
lent, and that the Dutch had the interests of the people at heart. It was to 
1 De Locomotief, 3-10-1898; Bootsma 1986:122, note 18.
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Modern articles of clothing as trade mark of a Chinese firm in Kudus selling 
European and ‘native cigars and cigarettes’ (Javasche Courant 1914,  
Trade mark 7075).
remain Dutch government policy in the decades to come, resulting in an atti-
tude towards Indonesian nationalism which many laymen thought was too 
lenient. In the Dutch parliament in February 1918 Th.B. Pleyte explained that 
one of the prerequisites for holding on to the Netherlands Indies as a Dutch 
colonial possession was an ‘unselfish domestic policy’ preparing the popula-
tion for self-government.2 This attitude was given substance by expanding 
educational opportunities, by launching various projects to improve welfare 
and prosperity, and by allowing a modest degree of political emancipation 
and a certain say in administering local affairs; though with respect to the last 
2 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1917-18:1502.
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and the local councils which were instituted after 1905, it was in the first place 
the Europeans and the well-to-do of the other population groups who were 
allowed a say in the governing of local affairs.
Around 1900 life in the colony was changing drastically. These were years 
which must have been looked upon by many Dutch people in the Netherlands 
Indies as a period in which the old familiar society gave way to a new one. In 
contrast, up to the turn of the century when there had been almost no political 
activity at all, within a couple of years it seemed that throughout the length 
and the breadth of the colony people were demanding a radical overhaul of 
colonial society. These upheavals were not easy to ignore. The thoughts that 
were expressed, the demands that were made, the many meetings that were 
held, not to mention the turmoil and enthusiasm that was created by newly 
founded organizations left little doubt that something new was emerging. 
No population group was immune to changes. In 1913 the Dutch Resident 
of Surabaya noted that on all sides ‘among the Natives, even among the 
Europeans and the Foreign Orientals a feeling of anxiety reigns’.3 In the same 
year the Adviser for Native Affairs, G.A.J. Hazeu, stressed that because of the 
rapid modernization, the colonial administration had to come to terms with 
the fact that those who not so long before had been merely called the ‘minor 
civil servants’ or the ‘small people’ had started to realize they were human 
beings too and were demanding a decent treatment.4 Everything happened so 
fast that for the Dutch members of the corps – and many of their compatriots 
– it was difficult to adjust to changing circumstances. Or, as Hazeu, comment-
ing once more on internal developments, remarked in August 1916: 
They may find it difficult but the civil servants must familiarize themselves with 
the undeniable fact that within an unbelievably short span of time, the whole intel-
lectual and political atmosphere here in this country has changed considerably; no 
harsh decisions to banish people will magically make the good(?), quiet days of 
the past return, nor can they stem the rising tide of modern political life, and all 
that pertains to it.5
By the second decade of the century, progress and development had become 
popular catchwords among the non-European inhabitants of the colony. 
Kemadjoean was what counted. It would bring a modern world in which these 
population groups would no longer be treated by the Europeans as inferior 
beings. Education, information, and political strife were the ways to achieve 
this aim. Periodicals were launched for the purpose of providing their readers 
with useful information. Soeloeh Kemadjoean, the Torch of Progress, or even 
3 Sarekat Islam 1975:296.
4 G.A.J. Hazeu to A.W.F. Idenburg, 14-2-1913 (Bescheiden ‘Indische Partij’ 1913).
5 Report Hazeu, 21-8-1916, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 22-11-1916 6.
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more appropriately Progress Information, a periodical started in October 
1913 with Oemar Said Tjokroaminoto as one of its editors, captured the spirit 
of this trend. Many other examples, including special magazines for women, 
can be added to the list.
Lying at the basis of the restlessness which characterized the first and the 
second decade of the twentieth century were racial distinctions. As in other 
colonies race was the principal criterion by which to set people apart. The 
white Europeans were the masters and claimed special rights and special 
treatment. According to the definition decreed in 1906, Europeans (the status 
of United States as a Colonial Power did not change usage) consisted of Dutch 
people and citizens from other European states and their legal or – in the case 
of a concubinage – legally recognized offspring. Others could apply for a 
status equal to that of Europeans. This was no trifling matter. An equal status 
with all the benefits that accrued to it adhered to a person even after death. 
As late as 1914, the reburial was being contemplated of a person from Ambon 
who had come down in the world and, distressed by financial misfortune, had 
lost his mind. A policy officer vaguely recollected that the poor man had been 
equalized during his life and a search for papers to prove this was begun. It 
was an important matter. If the hunch were true, the body had to be exhumed 
and reburied in a European cemetery.6 The rest of the population was divided 
into two categories: Natives, the indigenous population of the Netherlands 
Indies, and Foreign Orientals, that is Arabs and other Asians, including the 
Chinese, but not the Japanese. The latter were legally Europeans. A ticklish 
problem was how Turkish citizens should be treated. They were Foreign 
Orientals, but the law was flawed by an embarrassing loophole. What should 
be done with Turks who claimed that they had been born on European soil, 
in the European part of the Ottoman Empire, for instance in Albania, from a 
Dutch perspective hardly a cradle of civilization?
A different set of legal rules for each of these three groups was in force. 
Penalties also differed. A European could be sentenced to imprisonment or to 
a term in a house of correction. For the same crime an Indonesian would be 
condemned to convict labour, either shackled or not. The inescapable impres-
sion created – not only by the different circumstances in which Europeans and 
non-Europeans had to serve their sentence, but also by the variations in these 
sentences pronounced by the judges – was that the law-giver was more lenient 
towards Europeans than towards the rest of the population. Such an assess-
ment was certainly not unwarranted. In 1914, when the highest legal civil 
servant in the Netherlands Indies, the Director of the Department of Justice, 
had to contest the view that legislation was more severe towards Indonesians, 
6 De Expres, 10-4-1914.
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he could only counter with some trivial exceptions. Europeans were, he wrote, 
threatened with more severe sentences in the bicycle ordinance for Madura 
and Rembang of 1911, the regulation for the ceding for public use of roads, 
squares, and the like in Semarang, the coconut decree of Padang, and the dis-
cipline and cleanliness decree of Batavia.7
From time to time senior Dutch colonial civil servants also complained 
that for similar crimes, and what they often had in mind was the publication 
of seditious or abusive press articles, Europeans were given a lighter penalty 
than Indonesians or were acquitted whereas Indonesians were punished. A 
moral aspect tinged the concern of the colonial authorities raised by such 
court rulings, but it had a practical side as well. Precisely the wish to avoid 
any impression of racial justice – though this was a term which infuriated 
the Dutch authorities when used in public – sometimes made the Attorney-
General hesitant to bring charges against Indonesian journalists, leading to 
trials which invariably attracted plenty of public attention, knowing that a 
conviction only strengthened the idea that Indonesians were being punished 
for something for which Europeans might go scot-free.
In daily life the legal differences were accentuated by codes of dress. For 
centuries Dutchmen had reserved themselves the right to wear European 
attire. Since the early days of the Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC, 
Dutch East Indies Company) it had been decreed that each population group 
should don its own national costume. By law it was forbidden to put on the 
apparel of another race or ethnic group. Javanese had to dress as Javanese, 
Bugis as Bugis, Arabs as Arabs, Chinese as Chinese and so on. Undisputedly 
this was often what the people concerned wanted, but breaches of the rule, 
except in specific instances, were unthinkable. Exceptions were granted only 
to members of the indigenous ruling elites and to Christians. Their assump-
tion of Dutch apparel or items thereof was a clear sign that they had bridged 
some of the distance which set them apart from the foreign overlord.
Around 1900 the dress codes began to be enforced less vigorously, but had 
not yet been abandoned (see Van Dijk 1997). As late as 1904 the head of the 
Chinese community in Semarang requested and was granted permission for 
his wife to wear European ‘national costume’ in public.8 He did this when 
already for a number of years there had been reports from various parts of 
the Archipelago that non-Europeans had begun to adopt Dutch dress and 
habits. One of the culprits for the change in outward appearance was the 
bicycle. To prevent Indonesians in Surabaya from being afflicted by sore feet, 
the Dutch Resident of that city generously allowed them to wear shoes when 
7 Report of the Director of Justice, 17-2-1914, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 15-6-1914 19.
8 De Locomotief, 12-1-1904.
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cycling. Significantly the Javanese Regent was opposed to this. He protested 
that the wearing of shoes by ordinary people was a violation of custom, and 
detrimental to the prestige of Europeans and that of Javanese civil servants.9 
Besides putting on shoes, people began to wear hats, long trousers, shirts, and 
ties, plus other items of cloth associated with the West. They also demanded 
the right to sit on chairs and no longer to have to squat on the floor when in 
the presence of Dutch or their own authorities, and had the nerve to address 
Dutch people in Dutch and not in the vernacular language, a serious breach of 
etiquette leading to reprimands and punishment.
What was frequently to be described by members of the Dutch civil serv-
ice and of the indigenous elite in the decades to come as breaches of polite 
behaviour by Javanese and other people striving for emancipation had reared 
its head. On a less impertinent level, young Indonesians began to develop a 
predilection for Western music and dances. They played marches and other 
melodies, and danced waltzes and polkas at their meetings, a phenomenon 
still unheard of in the very first years of the twentieth century. They did so at 
a moment when a conservative public in Europe still frowned upon the tango, 
‘imitating those ridiculous twistings and contortions of the body of negresses 
and barbarians’, as the Pope chose to describe the dance in 1914.10
The setting in which this all took place was also new. The first decade of the 
twentieth century saw the completion of Dutch territorial expansion. Areas 
which up to then had escaped colonial rule now came under Dutch control, 
giving the territory of the Netherlands Indies its final shape. The hesitancy 
displayed in earlier decades on the part of the Dutch government gave way 
to a deliberate policy of territorial aggrandizement. Fear that other Colonial 
Powers would gain a foothold in the Archipelago as they had done in Borneo 
and New Guinea was the major reason for such a step. National prestige was 
an equally important factor. The Colonial Powers felt they had a special task 
to perform. Expansion was proof of the supremacy of the West, and this was 
also in concert with prevailing moral standards. It was imperative that regions 
be brought under control so that the local population might share some of the 
blessings of civilization and to combat what was denounced as the abuses of 
despotic indigenous rule and non-Christian religions. Colonial aggrandize-
ment was eventually presented by European politicians in the guise of a 
sacred mission. 
The Netherlands Indies was not spared the Western convulsion to export 
the blessings of civilization. In 1904 a parliamentary commission concluded 
that ‘[t]hough the expansion of our authority should be eschewed as much 
9 De Locomotief, 9-6-1898, 19-11-1898.
10 De Expres, 4-3-1914.
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as possible circumstances often leave no choice but to go ahead, because the 
Netherlands cannot shirk the fulfilment of the moral obligations it has taken 
on itself as a colonial Power with respect to the native population’.11 Feelings 
among Dutch politicians about what Locher-Scholten (1981:194-9) has dubbed 
‘ethical imperialism’ were perhaps even stronger than elsewhere in Europe, 
as they were reinforced by a sensitivity to international public opinion about 
how the colony was run, and by the fact that in international politics the 
Netherlands was pretty insignificant. What Holland lacked in political power, 
it could compensate for in the moral field.
Opposition to colonial expansion came mainly from the left; from Van 
Kol and P.J. Troelstra and their political friends in the Sociaal-Democratische 
Arbeiders Partij (SDAP, Social Democratic Labour Party). Proponents of 
aggrandizement were not impressed by their critical observation that the rea-
sons presented to justify Dutch military expeditions in the Archipelago could 
be used equally well by Germany to rationalize an occupation the Netherlands, 
were Berlin for reasons of national defence to deem such a step necessary. 
Their counterargument was that the two cases were completely different. 
Dutch expansion occurred within a clearly defined region which formed a 
political and ethnological unity, of which the boundaries were internationally 
accepted.12 Likewise the argument that the British imperialist exploits were 
generally deplored in Holland, and that the subjugation of new territories put 
the Netherlands in the same class, did nothing to deter the advocates of Dutch 
expansion. By a show of force or at least wielding the threat of it, all remain-
ing independent or semi-independent regions were brought under Dutch rule. 
When there were old contracts acknowledging Dutch sovereignty, these were 
exchanged for new ones which made the rulers who signed them, as was occa-
sionally said by opponents of Dutch expansion, ‘papier-maché monarchs’.13
The expansion of Dutch rule, geographically and administratively, and 
the concurrent economic penetration contributed to a change in the character 
of the Dutch community. For centuries a small group, around 1900 it began 
to grow rapidly. Among the new arrivals were many women, which was 
another new trend. In the past, it had been almost exclusively men who had 
left Europe for the Archipelago, now women joined them. Between 1900 and 
1930 the population of females born in Europe but living in the Netherlands 
Indies grew from 4,000 to 26,000 (Van der Veur 2006:88). This influx of women 
inexorably affected the composition and outlook of the European elite. It 
became less Indonesian and much more Dutch. The presence of Dutch women 
meant it was no longer necessary and indeed even made it reprehensible, for 
11 Handelingen Eerste Kamer 1904-05:101.
12 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1904-05:281-2.
13 De Expres, 13-3-1914.
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Dutch males to take a woman from the local society as wife or concubine. Such 
women, who had given the European society a particularly local colour, were 
eventually denied access to the upper strata of colonial society. 
The role of Dutch women as custodians of European manners was only 
partly responsible for the change in outlook of the colonial elite. The men now 
arriving from Holland to fill the growing number of jobs which required a cer-
tain level of education and special skills also contributed to the trend. Growing 
numbers in themselves already made it easier to preserve Dutch culture in the 
tropics. This trend was facilitated even more by the new type of person who 
now came to the colony. Engineers, technicians, and administrators made their 
appearance in increasing numbers. The nature of the Dutch civil service corps 
inevitably changed. Common people began to predominate. In 1913 a newspa-
per in Surabaya ventured the opinion that this was the reason why, in contrast 
to in the East Coast of Sumatra, an estate region, joining the civil militia was 
not popular in Java. Planters enjoyed drilling and shooting. They found it fun 
and socially agreeable, looking forward to the beer they would consume after-
wards. In the larger cities in Java many of the Dutch community were office 
people who were not particularly fond of physical exercise.14 This assessment 
did not ring completely true, (and to the beer, gin should be added), but it still 
serves to illustrate the changes that were taking place: a bureaucratization of 
society and the higher educational background of the Dutchmen who were 
coming to the colony. One of the consequences of the new situation was that 
the gap between the people and the Dutch civil servants had widened. In the 
same year a senior adviser to the Governor General noted that the new civil 
servants were not always gifted with the necessary ‘knowledge, patience and 
tact’ to maintain friendly relations with the population. The reverse was true. 
They reacted with contempt and ridicule to all kinds of ‘Javanese idiosyncra-
sies’.15 The motor car was another culprit. It had removed the necessity for 
civil servants on a tour the stay overnight in a village.16
The new considerations of status, the influx of people from Europe, and the 
plan to elevate the indigenous population made matters worse for a special 
class of people, whose social plight was somewhat veiled by the fact that race 
was not explicitly used as a legal criterion to distinguish them. They were the 
Indo-Europeans; legally classified as Europeans, but, if they did not already 
belong to the lower strata of society, socially often not accepted as members 
of the colonial elite. As people of mixed race they tended to be moved into a 
marginal position when the status criteria in the colonial elite changed empha-
sizing race and correct European standards of behaviour. Indo-Europeans 
14 Nieuwe Soerabaja Courant, cited in De Locomotief, 3-10-1913.
15 Adviezen 1913:18.
16 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1918-19:2087.
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could escape this, but only by behaving in a Western fashion. The same was 
true of some Indonesians. Adopting Western dress in the 1910s made them 
Europeans; and people, white Europeans included, were more polite and 
friendlier towards them than when under similar circumstances, they dressed 
according to the custom of their own ethnic group. 
For many Indo-Europeans the stark choice was either to identify with 
the white society, and its European appearance, or to submerge in the local 
Indonesian society, no longer having any special status at all. The third alter-
native, holding on to their own culture, meant remaining a member of a group 
whose language, manners, and beliefs were looked down upon and ridiculed 
by white Dutch people; a fact which contributed to the putative hatred of the 
Dutch frequently attributed to Indo-Europeans.
Indo-Europeans as a group also missed out on the special attention the 
Dutch professed to pay Indonesians in their efforts to improve social and 
economic conditions of the latter. When policies were developed to educate 
the people, to better their economic position, or even to improve housing con-
ditions, it was Indonesians and not Indo-Europeans (or Chinese and Arabs) 
whom the planners had in mind. What daunted the most was that not only 
was their culture marginalized, but that economically the Indo-Europeans, 
many of whom occupied lower-ranking clerical positions, were also down-
graded. The opening up of educational opportunities to larger numbers of 
Indonesians threatened their economic position. Imperceptibly the Indo-
Europeans began to lose out in the competition for the lower-ranking jobs as 
a growing number of Indonesians and Chinese qualified for these too and 
were prepared to work for a lower salary. As early as the end of the nineteenth 
century Indo-Europeans had wanted to reserve jobs in the modern sector for 
themselves, jealous of the Indonesians and Chinese who had entered the sec-
tor. A programme of the Social-Democrats in the Netherlands Indies in 1897 
is most specific about the aspirations of the ‘advanced’, as they styled them-
selves. It was the social and economic position of the poor whites and Indo-
Europeans which should be improved, the indigenous population had to play 
second fiddle to that dream. To ‘combat the existence of a proletariat among 
the Indos’, the programme called for ‘fewer natives in the State Railways and 
the Postal and Telegraph Service, appointment of Eurasian girls as telegraph 
operators and ticket-sellers just as in Europe, replacement of native engine-
drivers, chiefs at halts and so forth by Indos and Europeans, because the 
prosperity of the native lies in the cultivation of the Sawah’. Chinese also had 
to be banned from certain jobs – cashiers, an occupation which appeared to be 
one of the preserves of Chinese, had been mentioned as an example – to make 
way for Indo-Europeans (Tichelman 1985:111-2).
Their future as a group seemed to be at stake. To escape that fate farming 
was seen as one way out, but there was one major obstacle. For a number 
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of decades ownership of land had by law been confined to indigenous 
Indonesians. The act had pre-empted complications which had made the 
political situation in Pacific Islands so explosive, but was clearly disadvan-
tageous to Indo-Europeans whose Europeans status prevented them from 
owning land. To change this at least since 1897 Indo-Europeans had pleaded 
in vain they be accorded the right of landownership. A real impasse had 
been reached. E.F.E. Douwes Dekker, their most popular and radical political 
leader, called attention to the dilemma about acknowledging his offspring an 
Indo-European had put to him. Where he to do so they remained Europeans, 
if he did not they could buy land.17 
Because of their background and lack of proper education, many Indo-
Europeans did not qualify for higher administrative posts, for which an 
education in Holland was required. For positions where this did not count, 
Indo-Europeans were convinced that when filling them preference was given 
to persons fresh from Holland rather than to people from their own group 
with the same qualifications. It was an often-heard complaint that people from 
Europe were appointed to intermediate positions, which could equally well 
have been filled by Indo-Europeans.
To make prospects worse, new educational institutions established within 
the framework of emancipating the population were open to indigenous 
Indonesians only and not to Indo-Europeans. This was the case with the 
School tot Opleiding van Inlandsche Artsen (STOVIA, School for the Training 
of Native Doctors), and also loomed large in plans to establish a Law College 
(Van der Veur 2006:152). The educational discrimination was all the more 
vexatious as it happened in a period in which indigenous Indonesians and 
Chinese enthusiastically embraced Western schooling as the major vehicle of 
emancipation and for advancement in life.
It was among these Indo-Europeans, caught between Dutch and Indonesian 
society, that the first radical political movement in the Netherlands Indies 
found a response. Like all other such movements active before and after it, its 
leaders had to operate in a repressive climate. Legislation forbade all associa-
tions or meetings which had a political nature or formed a threat to public 
order. In formulating their demands Indo-Europeans stressed the one point 
that made them different from white Dutch people; the fact that they had been 
born in the Netherlands Indies and intended – or had no other choice than – to 
remain there.
A second group which made its mark at the beginning of the twentieth 
century was the Chinese; presenting indigenous Indonesians with another 
example of political agitation. After the Japanese had been granted European 
17 Nota Douwes Dekker 1913 (II):92-3, 1913 (I):24; Douwes Dekker 1912c:469-74.
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status in 1899, the Chinese demanded the same right, even talking about a 
boycott of European firms discriminating against them.18 Chinese had plenty 
of reasons to call for change. The majority of them was not held in high esteem 
by the white European community, and legislation curtailed their freedom of 
movement. Till 1910 Chinese (and Arabs) were not allowed to travel without 
special permission and had to live in special quarters in the major cities. To 
circumvent such rules, some Chinese converted to Islam (though the fact 
that this allowed them to marry Muslim girls also could have been a reason), 
and claimed native status. A few others acquired Japanese nationality; a 
move colonial authorities were sure was sanctioned, if not promoted, by the 
Japanese government as part of a scheme to increase the Japanese presence in 
the Archipelago in preparation of Japan’s putative thrust southwards.19
The resentment aroused contributed to a re-orientation towards China and 
a renewed interest in Chinese culture. Instead of identifying with the Dutch, 
as some did, or remaining a more or less well-integrated, though in some 
respects clearly distinct, segment of local society, Chinese identity was now 
stressed. This was boasted by the short-lived drive for modernization which 
had manifested itself in China and the Straits Settlements in 1898, coupling 
a selective adaptation of Western ways with a return to traditional, age-old 
Confucian values, undiluted by heterodox accretions and adjustments which 
had been introduced in the course of centuries. The Chinese revival was re-
inforced by the arrival of new immigrants to work as labourers. They added a 
new element to the Chinese community, which for the greater part had previ-
ously been made up of families which had settled in the Netherlands Indies 
generations ago, and had taken over much of the language and many of the 
customs of the indigenous Indonesians in whose midst they lived.
The press also contributed to keeping the links with the country of ori-
gin alive. Besides the Chinese Malay newspapers and periodicals that were 
already being published, new ones appeared, with a few exceptions still writ-
ten in Malay, which catered to the new interest in China and its culture and 
values. The editors and teachers who had come over from China to teach at the 
new Chinese schools were held responsible by the authorities for the spread of 
the Young China Movement all over the colony, and for the fresh worries the 
‘Chinese question’ occasioned them.20
The fall of the Manchu dynasty in 1911 and the founding of the Chinese 
Republic in 1912 stirred up the Chinese community even more. Great enthu-
siasm, which took the colonial administration completely by surprise, and a 
18 Pembrita Betawi, 5-4-1903 refered to in Adam 1995:75.
19 De Expres, 13-3-1914; Adviser Chinese Affairs to Director BB 7-11-1917, NA, Kol. Geheim, Mr. 
298x/17.
20 Adviser for Japanese and Chinese Affairs, 5-6-1913, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 30-8-1915 26.
Trade mark of a Chinese tea trader in Surabaya. The figure holds a Chinese trade 
flag in his right hand and a Chinese war flag in his left hand. (Javasche Courant 1916, 
Trade mark 8094.)
Chinese patriotism. Chinese soldier 
with Chinese war flag. Trade mark 
of a Chinese firm in Batavia selling 
medicines. (Javasche Courant 1914, 
Trade mark 6693.)
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boost in self-confidence were the result. As in China, the symbols of moder-
nity and progress which signified anti-Manchu feelings were embraced. 
The Chinese began to behave like Europeans. They reacted to the news of 
the Chinese Revolution by cutting off their pigtails and donning European 
clothes. In an attempt to calm down stories in the Straits press about large-
scale unrest in the Netherlands Indies the Dutch Consul General in Singapore 
wrote that the Chinese ‘endeavoured to imitate, with more and less success, 
European habits, such as dress, coiffure, calendar, and Sunday rest among 
other things’.21 The Dutch could cope with this. More difficult to swallow was 
the new self-assurance the Chinese displayed. That some treated Europeans 
as their equals was an attitude, it was written with mild irony in De Locomotief, 
they would not have dared to show in the past when they still wore a pigtail, 
‘but, since they wear green, mundane socks, have become republican and just 
as religious Christians want to be called “Sir”, this people stop at nothing’.22 
Judging from a contemporary report a modern way of life must have been 
embraced with great enthusiasm. Pakean Europa, European costumes, and 
shoes model Europa were in great demand.23 
Restlessness manifested itself in various ways. In part this was provoked 
by the colonial authorities who banned the hoisting of the flag of the Chinese 
Republic. On 18 February 1912, on Chinese New Year, disturbances broke out 
in Batavia when the police enforced the ban and hauled down Republican 
flags. In Batavia the situation could be contained. In Surabaya it spun out 
of control, resulting in a tense atmosphere which lasted for more than a 
week. Protests against the refusal of the authorities to allow the hoisting of 
the Republican flag contributed to the tension in Surabaya, but it had all 
started with a ban by the municipal administration on letting off fireworks. 
The Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant deemed this a sensible decision. The roads 
between the city centre and the harbour all ran through the Chinese ward.24 
The newspaper also noted something disquieting. In Batavia and Surabaya 
the ‘usually very quiet, hard-working Chinese element among the population’ 
had taken ‘a rebellious, here and there definitely hostile attitude towards the 
Dutch authority’.25 The blame was put on the new immigrants; not the decent 
ones, but the lowest class among them, people who had nothing to lose. The 
prospect of an unruly Chinese community in the colony did not ease Dutch 
minds. The authority of their traditional allies in the Chinese community, 
the Chinese officers, seemed to be waning. The members of the established, 
21 Report Dutch Consul General in Singapore, September 1913, NA, BuZa, A-dos. 190, box 
452.
22 De Locomotief, 23-10-1913.
23 Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, 3(2?)5-3-1912 quoting Java-Bode, 28-2-1912.
24 Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, 25-3-1912, 1-4-1912.
25 Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, 1-4-1912.
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traditional Chinese elite had to face competition from newcomers and were 
attacked in newspapers in the Netherlands Indies and China for their reaction-
ary behaviour and their involvement with colonial rule. 
A new China was not a prospect to which the Dutch looked forward. 
China was a weak nation but the coming to power of the Republican govern-
ment could herald different times. For some outside the Netherlands such 
a moment had already dawned. One journal, The Islamic Fraternity, writing 
about ‘Dutch officials, to whom the oppression of the Javan people is as natu-
ral as breath to their nostrils’, even reported that Peking had ordered cruisers 
to the Archipelago to punish the Dutch for the killing and maltreatment of 
Chinese, rumours which circulated in Java as well. The Islamic Fraternity added 
that the Dutch government had ‘climbed down and humbly apologizing for 
the occurrence promised to compensate sufferers of Dutch outrage at Java’ in 
suppressing the unrest in Batavia and Surabaya. It was an augury of more to 
come: ‘The energetic action of the Republican government of China has inau-
gurated a new era of life, liberty and pursuit of happiness for the peoples of 
the East. The worm has turned at last, and the first nail is driven into the coffin 
of the European domination of Asia.’26
In the Netherlands and the Netherlands Indies, though still only occasion-
ally, China made its initial appearance as a prospective foreign enemy. Such a 
possibility had already been predicted in 1904 by the then Resident of Batavia. 
Observing the mood in the Chinese community in his station he had pleaded 
for a positive response. Were this not forthcoming the moment China had 
recovered its strength a situation could emerge in which a section of the popu-
lation in the Netherlands Indies would act as the allies of a foreign enemy, and 
become a ‘domestic enemy to be reckoned with’.27 In Holland in 1914 it was 
Van Kol who pleaded for the alleviation of the grievances held by the Chinese 
in the Netherlands Indies before the moment should arrive when China would 
have a powerful army and fleet.28
China came to be presented an example for Indonesian nationalists and 
others detesting Western colonialism of what a people’s movement might 
accomplish. The radical daily De Expres wrote that Chinese revolution had 
proved that the Chinese people also no longer wanted to be a race of slaves.29 
The fear of Holland for China as the ‘foreign enemy in a new cloak’, was a 
theme which was repeatedly taken up in it. True to the conviction of its edi-
tors that striking fear into the heart of the Dutch people was the best way to 
frighten The Hague into concessions, this was sometimes accompanied by 
26 The Islamic Fraternity, May 1912; Handelingen Eerste Kamer 1913-14:241.
27 Bakhuizen van den Brink to Rooseboom, 8-9-1904, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 19-10-04 O22.
28 De Expres, 14-1-1914.
29 De Expres, 13-1-1914.
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exclamations like ‘Fear works; carry on Chinese Brothers [...]’.30
Unrest and unease had spread to the indigenous segment of the colonial 
society. In the vanguard of the early nationalist movement were indigenous 
Indonesians who had received Western secondary and higher education, but 
after graduation discovered that society was not ready for them. Their Western 
style of life was not accepted and the ideals of equality and democracy they 
had read about during their schooldays were far from put into practice in the 
colony. When they embarked on a government career, they discovered that 
jobs were still allocated according to the old standards in which deference to 
superiors was more important than educational background and that for years 
they would be stuck in positions lower than warranted by their schooling. 
Such people came from of a new class of young Indonesians who no longer 
felt in harmony with their social background. They were sons of members 
of the indigenous Indonesian bureaucracy, coloured by its strict hierarchy 
from the higher nobility down to the more humble officials, such as office 
clerks. In word and deed they rebelled against the strict rules and etiquette 
that governed these circles. They found a way out of their social confinement 
by joining the nationalist movement or pursuing a career in journalism; often 
combining the two.
The rise of nationalism among the Javanese and other ethnic groups 
of the Netherlands Indies was facilitated by the dissemination of Western 
notions of democracy and emancipation which became familiar to a growing 
number of Indonesians through an increased distribution of books, newspa-
pers and magazines, and through the Western educational institutions which 
Indonesians had started to attend. Equally important was the introduction of 
a set of ideologies, which made it possible to phrase their aspirations in a new 
terminology and provided new standards by which to judge contemporary 
society. Construed and developed in the course of the nineteenth century in 
Europe and in the Middle East, such ideas acquired force in the Netherlands 
Indies somewhat later, in the years following the turn of the century. Europe 
furnished the ideals of Marxism and Socialism, and the Middle East the mod-
ernist tenets of Islam.
Islamic modernism stressed a revival of Islam. European expansion seemed 
at its peak. It had resulted in the colonization of much of the non-Western 
world and vast regions where the majority or a large part of the population 
consisted of Muslims had already been conquered. The Ottoman Empire 
had maintained its independence but was weak and had to accept European 
economic and political intervention. To close the gap with the West, the neces-
sity of modern education was emphasized, as was a flexibility of thought. 
30 De Expres, 13-1-1914, 17-1-1914.
The Netherlands Indies and the Great War34
This it was argued, Islam, which had once itself inspired a World Power, had 
gradually lost in the course of the centuries. Transforming the Islamic educa-
tional system by incorporating the teaching of secular subjects was part of the 
answer. Giving the Islamic community new strength by inviting Muslims not 
simply to follow the age-old established traditions but to try and find the cor-
rect interpretation which would make Islam compatible with modern times 
was equally important.
In a similar way to all other reformist concepts, the new ideas presented 
carried the seeds of profound social and religious controversies. The reform-
ists in the Netherlands Indies not only were determined to combat Western 
superiority, they also tried to undermine the position of the religious leaders 
who adhered to the old ways. In this, they reserved much of their venom for 
such figures. Established practices were rejected on religious grounds and 
sometimes even ridiculed. Customs which did not originate in Islam, but had 
become generally accepted in the local community as an integral part of reli-
gion, were attacked with the same zeal. 
The reformers could, and especially the more radical of them did so 
frequently, borrow from the vocabulary of the second novel ideology intro-
duced in the Netherlands Indies, that of Socialism. The ideals propagated by 
Socialism, an egalitarian, democratic society cleansed of exploitation – and as 
it often was perceived also without the Dutch and taxes – were highly attrac-
tive.
Both Marxism and Islamic Reformism carried the appeal of offering an 
alternative to the capitalist West and the colonial system to which it had given 
birth. Having identified the evils of capitalism and colonialism, they traced 
out the way to end foreign domination and free Indonesians from their sub-
ordinate position. Even when people did not fully understand the finer points 
of Communism or Islamic Modernism, the two ideologies provided some 
impressive words to create a feeling of solidarity and to identify the enemy 
and those responsible for all the wrongs in society. Worthy of praise were 
either the poor, the people who suffered a miserable fate, and the oppressed, 
or the real or true Muslim, who by arriving at an understanding of the cor-
rect meaning of Islam had dissociated himself from a system which could be 
blamed for the continuation of colonialism. Appeals to uphold true Islam, 
Islam sedjati, were made to inspire people to take their fate into their own 
hands and resist Dutch domination. This went hand in hand with attacks on 
false Muslims (as opposed to the true ones), who would not relinquish ideas 
which had turned Islam into a religion of the weak and meek and who were 
held responsible for the passive acceptance of colonial rule. A true Muslim 
protested against injustice and exploitation; a false Muslim remained silent.
The hardship and suffering of the common people, of the little man – the 
rakjat, wong tjilik, or Si Kromo – had to be grappled. But, paradoxically, their 
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poverty and the discrimination they suffered provided a basis for solidar-
ity, a focus of identification. The ‘oppressed’ were the people who should be 
fought for; and to show that their champions were really touched by their 
wretched conditions noms de plumes such as Eternal Sufferer (Eeuwige Lijder), 
One Handicapped by Life (Een Misdeelde) or Wounded in Body and Soul, and 
significantly, also New Wearer of Suits (Nieuwe Pakkendrager) were used. At 
times such a champion chose to present himself in a deprecatory way; turn-
ing the negative into the positive. The oppressed were only half or quarter 
human; a very popular way to illustrate their fate. They were also the stupid 
ones, Si Bodo. Domoor, the Dutch word meaning idiot or fool also appeared as a 
pseudonym, as admittedly did Si Tjinta-Bangsa, Lover of My People. Only the 
clever ones, Si Pintar, had money and status. It was not just adopting a high 
moral tone, a denunciation of the materialism of the West. Like the clownish 
servants of the hero, who displayed genuine wisdom in the Javanese wayang 
play and in the end are the real winners, the stupid ones saw through the 
tricks and outward pretence, and knew what was amiss. It was the fool who 
had the superior intellect. Later, in a similar vein of irony, the Europeans were 
sarcastically denoted as the bangsa sopan, a tidy and civilized nation.
The growth of the printing industry, which made possible a vast increase in 
the publication of pamphlets, newspapers, and periodicals, acted as a catalyst. 
A plethora of articulate local newspapers emerged, reflecting the rebellious 
mood in sections of the Chinese, Indo-European and indigenous communities. 
It was a circumstance with which the Dutch had never had been confronted 
before. Neither the political organizations which were industriously being 
founded nor some of the newspapers and periodicals affiliated with them 
gave the Dutch much time to reflect. What was said and written did not grad-
ually wax in tone. Within a short span of time, a few years only, they assumed 
a stand that many Dutch people considered to be seditious; a deliberate effort 
to gnaw at Dutch rule and to set the population against the white Dutch com-
munity and against the colonial administration.
Non-Dutch-language journals had been published since the 1850s, but 
these had never been a cause of much concern. By and large they had been 
harmless; copying news items from Dutch-language newspapers and provid-
ing information of use to Indonesians who wanted to improve their social and 
economic position within the framework of colonial society. After the turn of 
the century a political press took shape. Or, as it was phrased in the 1920s, 
only ‘when the twentieth century with its social vehemence and intellectual 
progress had set in, when world traffic had also included these provinces in its 
gigantic network, inevitably that the press, elsewhere such a powerful weap-
on, emerged here as well’ (Later 1923:58). This came as a bolt from the blue. 
In 1906 supervision of the press had been relaxed, ending a period in which it 
had been possible for the colonial administration to exercise preventive cen-
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sorship. There were at that time a number of periodicals written in Malay or 
Javanese, but, prior to 1906, when collisions occurred between the press and 
the colonial administration it had mainly been Dutch-language media which 
had been the culprits.
This changed with the growth of political consciousness among the 
Indonesian, Chinese, and Indo-European population. The increase in the 
number of publications catering to these communities and in particular the 
change in tone had not been expected. What emerged apparently out of 
nowhere were what Dutch administrators called ‘scurrilous rags’, libelling 
and abusing Dutch officials and other people or social groups with whom 
the journalists of these papers did not agree. Among those expressing con-
cern was the Minister of the Colonies in The Hague, J.H. de Waal Malefijt. 
In 1912 – at a time when the Adviser for Native Affairs, D.A. Rinkes, was 
still reassuring the Governor General that the nationalist press might make a 
noise, but did not pose a political threat – he stressed that the way in which 
Indonesian journalists were expressing themselves called for the reinstitution 
of the repressive powers previously wielded by the colonial administration. 
He maintained that it was intolerable that, as one of the civil servants of his 
department had said, ‘the native press did not scruple to preach rebellion in 
overt or covert terms, yea even to incite murder’. Consequently, in June 1913, 
De Waal Malefijt urged Governor General A.W.F. Idenburg to prepare legal 
means which would allow the colonial administration to act against ‘the overt 
preaching of rebellion against Dutch Authority, the outrageous way in which 
suspicion is fastened upon the best intentions of the government and the 
sowing of hatred and discord between the different races’. He considered it 
‘political suicide’ to leave the matter in the hands of the judiciary with its ‘ever-
changing judgements’. The colonial administration should regain the special 
powers it had held prior to 1906. Courts, and this was an almost general mood 
prevailing among administrators in Java and The Hague, could not be relied 
upon to suppress dangerous agitation. Judges were too lenient, and the legal 
proof demanded in a court case against journalists accused of libel or sedition 
was not always easy to provide. 
Only a few senior colonial civil servants did not join in the calls for wider 
powers to be given to the government. One was Rinkes. He denied that the 
Indonesian press was recrimatory, let alone inflammatory. There were excep-
tions, but these papers had only a small circulation; extra proof for Rinkes that 
their influence was easily overrated and that Indonesians were perfectly able 
to distinguish between good and bad, between responsible, well-edited news-
papers and rags. Rinkes coupled his observation with a plea not to overreact 
and to continue to allow the press to function as an instrument of political 
control, essential in a society where the Dutch and indigenous civil servants 
held almost paramount authority. For the ordinary people, newspapers were 
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almost the only place where they could complain about the behaviour of such 
officials without fear of immediate retaliation. Others were less sanguine. 
They lamented a situation in which it was impossible to act against ‘cunning 
demagogues, who, because of [Western] education which is available in ever-
widening circles have learned to recognize fairly big opportunities to slip 
through the net’.31 Yet others deplored the fact that lawyers also played a role 
in this unsettling process by making journalists aware of the limitations of the 
law in taking action against the press.
Tension was almost unavoidable. Society was steeped in racial prejudice and 
stereotypes, while fear of competition for jobs and economic opportunities 
from people of another race was widespread. Indo-Europeans were con-
cerned about the advancing status of Indonesians. On their part Indonesians 
viewed the Indo-Europeans as a group which blocked their access to the 
better-paid but still lower-ranking jobs, and also passionately guarded their 
exclusive rights of landownership, rejecting the granting of the right to own 
land to Indo-Europeans. Both groups saw Chinese as rivals.
Shortly before the founding of the first mass Islamic organization, Sarekat 
Islam, when Muslim traders in Surakarta reacted to the political and eco-
nomic pressure exerted by the Chinese by a boycott of Chinese products. 
This reaction came as a complete surprise. Rinkes observed that such a show 
of solidarity and the use of ‘the modern agitation technique of a boycott so 
much beyond the ken of daily round in old-fashioned Surakarta’ by this ‘nar-
row-minded, backward’ community was remarked upon by many with ‘some 
amazement’.32
Anti-Chinese feelings were not the only reason Muslims started to organize 
themselves. Others factors were also stirring. One was the opening up of Java 
to Christian missions. By allowing this, the Dutch government departed from 
its long-standing policy of discouraging missionary activities in Islamic regions 
in order to avoid social upheaval. The new course of events and the discussions 
in the Dutch parliament and press surrounding the change evoked a strong 
reaction among Muslims. Offence was taken at remarks passed by proponents 
of the opening up of Java to Christian mission that many if not most Javanese 
could hardly be called Muslims because non-Islamic beliefs and customs pre-
dominated their religious life. Insulted by the comments about the religious 
beliefs adhered to by their fellow Javanese and fearful that a Christian offensive 
was in the offing Islamic leaders launched their own drive. An atmosphere in 
which greater stress was laid on correct Islamic behaviour was the result. 
31 Note Department II of the General Secretariat, 3-9-1913, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 17-12-1913 
1.
32 D.A. Rinkes to Idenburg, 24-8-1912 (Adviezen 1913:1).
Inaugural meeting Sarekat Islam in Blitar 1914 (KITLV 3719)
Sarekat Islam became a popular trade mark. In this case used to sell bicycles 
(Oetoesan Hindia 6-8-1914)
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The new mood among Muslims was given concrete expression in 1912 
in the founding of the Moehammadijah, a reformist organization, and of the 
Sarekat Islam. The Sarekat Islam, founded by Oemar Said Tjokroaminoto, 
described in De Locomotief as being one of ‘the highly cultured natives’, was the 
more political in nature of the two.33 It could count on an enthusiast reception, 
first in Java and then in other parts of the Archipelago. An Assistent-Resident 
reported in July 1914 that the words Sarekat Islam had became a battle-cry.34 
There even was a brand of bicycle Sarekat Islam. A few years later people 
could buy Sarekat Islam watches.
In a very short span of time the organization grew into a mass movement 
with branches all over the Netherlands Indies. Muslims of all denominations 
joined, from those who did not pay much heed to the prescripts of Islam to 
the strictest adherents. Pertinently at meetings economic and social demands 
were at least as frequent as calls for a correct religious behaviour. Sometimes, 
as the newspaper De Expres noted, religious topics were not raised at all.35 
Nevertheless, an upsurge in religious life was perceptible. In May 1913 Rinkes 
observed that in dress, forms of greeting, and in dietary habits Muslim cus-
toms were being more widely espoused. The fashion of copying Western 
manners was no longer as pronounced as it had been a few years earlier.36 All 
kinds of economic and political initiatives to improve the living conditions 
of Sarekat Islam members and above all to set up shops and cooperatives to 
compete with Chinese petty traders and shopkeepers were broached.
The emergence of the Sarekat Islam was also expressed in a strong feeling 
of belonging. Pressure was so compelling that people complained that they 
were obliged to take part in funeral processions of fellow members so fre-
quently, they did not have enough time to run their daily business.37
Outsiders were not part of this. Their funeral processions were boycotted. 
Other traditional forms of mutual assistance, at planting time or when building 
a house for instance, were also withdrawn from them. Members of the same 
family landed up in opposite camps, ignoring each other’s existence. Some 
divorces – which were frequent in Java – were blamed on Sarekat Islam.38
The Chinese were a prime target for such acts of solidarity. Just after the 
turn of the century Javanese newspapers had begun to identify the Chinese as 
an impediment to the development of the indigenous population. They had 
33 De Locomotief, 24-10-1913.
34 Feith to Resident Batavia, 26-7-1914, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 9-3-1916 26.
35 De Expres, 6-1-1914.
36 Rinkes to Idenburg, 13-5-1913 (Adviezen 1913:35).
37 Wegener to Resident Surabaya, 26-2-1914, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 7-11-1914 56.
38 Wedana Bekasi to Assistent-Resident Meester Cornelis, 1-9-1914, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 9-3-
1916 26.
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hinted that were the government not to interfere, violence might be inevita-
ble.39 Resentment intensified after the Chinese Revolution. The way in which 
Chinese reacted to the fall of the Manchu dynasty irritated Javanese in the 
same way as it had done the Dutch. Their behaviour was described as haughty 
and rude. The Dutch Consul General in Singapore explained that the ‘violent 
language’ of the Chinese and the ‘ostentatious way’ in which many behaved 
‘caused many conflicts with their own more conservative countrymen, with 
the police, with the Arabs and especially with the natives’.40 He noted that 
the arrogant behaviour of the Chinese had exasperated others, especially in 
Java. He was not alone in this assessment. Pleyte told the Dutch parliament 
that Javanese who had known the Chinese ‘in baggy clothes, with a peculiar 
straw-hat, a long pigtail and bare feet’, as a person who mixed cordially with 
the Javanese, spoke their language and settled in their villages, ‘suddenly had 
to look up to the Chinese as a toewan, who although he had allowed him to 
address him by his name in the past, now demanded that he knelt in front of 
him’.41 Reports from Java linked racial tension with the new found self-esteem 
of the Chinese. The Javanese Regent of Rembang wrote that since the establish-
ment of the Chinese Republic, Chinese ‘fancy themselves a great deal and look 
upon the Javanese as an inferior being, which has fostered a grudge among the 
latter against the Chinese’.42 The Chinese under his administration bragged 
that within a few years they would replace the Dutch as masters of Java and 
rest of the Archipelago. In anticipation of this, ‘the Javanese were going to 
have to show them all honour and obedience, which they are shortly going 
to be forced to do’.43 In Surakarta, Chinese predicting that the new Chinese 
Republic would soon conquer the Netherlands Indies demanded more ‘hor-
mat’, more respect, and expressed the desire to be addressed as Toewan, Sir.44 
Hatred of the Chinese, according to the Dutch Resident, was intense in his 
district. Even a child of about eight, when asked what he wanted, had replied 
‘to kill all Chinese’.45
Watching such manifestations of anti-Chinese resentment, some Dutchmen 
could not hide their gloating. Rinkes considered the Sarekat Islam ‘a nice 
(cold) shower for the Chinese, who have lain low for quite some time, but after 
their Republic had been founded, were again getting above themselves’.46 Its 
39 De Locomotief, 11-11-1913 referring to Taman Sari, October and November 1903 and Bintang 
Hindia, 1902 and 1903.
40 Memorandum Dutch Consul General in Singapore, NA, BuZa, A-dos. 190, box 452.
41 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1913-14:215.
42 Sarekat Islam 1975:190.
43 Sarekat Islam 1975:232-3.
44 Resident Surakarta to Idenburg, 11-11-[1912] (Sarekat Islam 1975:328).
45 Resident Surakarta to Idenburg, 11-11-[1912] (Sarekat Islam 1975:331).
46 Rinkes to Moresco, 18-11-1913, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 13-5-1914 10.
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function as contre-poids, counter-balance, to Chinese presumptions was one 
of the positive effects he saw in the founding of the Sarekat Islam.47 A similar 
opinion was expressed by Pleyte when he defended his budget in parliament 
at the end of 1913. In his eyes, the ‘awakening’ of the Javanese served as a 
means to check arbitrary behaviour by indigenous Indonesian lower-ranking 
civil servants (he did not mention Dutch civil servants), and by those ‘one 
considers the economic exploiters of the Javanese’, singling out the Chinese 
petty traders as an example.48
The unrest occasioned by the founding of the Sarekat Islam, the demon-
strations of anti-Chinese feelings, and the occasional brawl on estates where 
labourers under the influence of the religious revival demanded to have a 
day off on Islamic holidays, greatly upset the Dutch community. Idenburg 
reported to Pleyte that especially in East Java which was studded with sugar 
estates the mood was one of a ‘highly nervous tension’.49 Sugar companies 
began to consider arming their staff. One such company went as far as to 
publish a newspaper advertisement, asking for a military officer who could 
help it to take the necessary precautions to ward off an attack.50 With Chinese 
and Dutchmen expecting the worst, the sale of firearms boomed. Fear of a day 
of reckoning spread fast. The Dutch started to speculate about the impend-
ing murder of Europeans in August 1913 during the Fasting Months. It was a 
major topic of conversation in the clubs. In Batavia people later spoke about 
the ‘fearful’ days.51 There was even talk that the citizen’s guard in town would 
be mobilized. European newspapers speculated about the prospect of a St 
Bartholomew’s Night. The following year De Expres wrote that such ‘journal-
istic feats’ gave cause to think that the scare had been fanned by importers of 
revolver.52 Yet even this newspaper, usually very sympathetic in its attitude to 
Muslims, showed some apprehension at the end of 1913 when three returning 
hajis had tried to smuggle in firearms.53 
Tuban was the only place in which there were serious problems. Its 
Assistent-Resident earned himself the displeasure of his superiors. His chief 
accused him of cowardice because when faced with Sarekat Islam unrest, he 
had asked for troops. A plucky civil servant should first have tried to solve the 
problems by visiting the scene of the troubles, not by asking for military assist-
ance. Nevertheless, much to his own chagrin the Resident had to send in sol-
47 Adviezen 1913:42.
48 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1913-14:222.
49 Idenburg to Th.B. Pleyte, 16-5-1913, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 16-5-1913 63.
50 Soerabaiasch Handelsblad, 15-7-1913, cited in McVey 1965:7; Baars and Sneevliet 1991:110.
51 De Locomotief, 29-11-1913.
52 De Expres, 17-4-1914.
53 De Expres, 2-1-1914.
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diers. He justified his action by pointing out that he had only done so because 
European females in Tuban, fearful of a plot to murder all Europeans, had 
become terrified. He wrote to Idenburg that he could not cope with women. 
The idea that his refusal to send soldiers would keep ‘a number of ladies in a 
continuous state of fear’ had so burdened his conscience that he had changed 
his mind about not sending in troops.54 
The commotion caused by the early activities of the Sarekat Islam did not 
escape the attention of the foreign press. In Australia, the Straits Settlements, 
and as far away as China, alarming reports appeared in the press about a 
break-down of law and order in Java. In Singapore, the Dutch Consul General 
reported that articles in the Pinang Gazette and The Straits Times which tried to 
demonstrate that Java was teeter on the brink of a revolution had upset those 
trading with Java.55 An editorial in The Straits Times, basing itself on informa-
tion from its ‘well-informed and reliable correspondent, whose views receive 
ample corroboration from many sources in Singapore’, predicted ‘trouble of 
grave character’ in the near future. It was claimed that because of ‘drastic cen-
sorship of news’ by the Dutch colonial authorities, the general public can glean 
but little of the innermost turmoil which is now tearing at the bowels of Dutch 
administration’. The sudden change had overwhelmed the correspondent. He 
saw ‘signs which portend evil’ everywhere: 
Insolence on the part of carriage drivers, domestic servants, and menials, hither 
unheard of is a common occurrence. Boycotts are the order of the day and some 
mysterious murders have occurred. [...] And it may be further mentioned [...] that 
there is no native in Java who does not wear his kris.56 
In Australia, the Melbourne Argus (11-6-1913) drew the attention of its readers 
to the developments in Java with headlines like ‘Fear of outrage’ and ‘Sinister 
conditions in Java’. Blaming the trouble on a ‘secret society styled Sarekat 
Islam’, its correspondent in Surabaya noted that it was a ‘nervy’ time and that 
there was ‘not a firearm to be obtained for love or money’. Wrongly he added 
that Javanese troops had hurriedly been deployed to Sumatra and Ambona, 
and that ‘purely Dutch soldiers’ were concentrated in Java. In China, a news-
paper reported that thousands of Chinese had asked and received permission 
to provide themselves with firearms, this because of actions by the natives 
who, it was claimed, harboured ‘the greatest antipathy towards all foreign-
ers’, and had as their watchwords the extermination of the whitemen and the 
54 Gonggrijp to Idenburg, 21-8-1913 (Sarekat Islam 1975:203-9); De Locomotief, 19-11-1913, 5-12-
1913.
55 Consul General Singapore to Cort van der Linden, 15-9-1913, NA, BuZa, A-dos. 190, box 
452.
56 The Straits Times, 22-8-1913.
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ousting of the Chinese.57
In reacting to the sudden expressions of political and social aspirations by 
almost all population groups in the Netherlands Indies, the colonial admin-
istration adopted a cautious attitude. Upholding law and order remained a 
key expression in the vocabulary of civil servants. Nevertheless, scope was 
created for political ideas to be circulated in writing and at public meetings. 
This was tolerated as long as this posed no immediate threat to law and order 
and to Dutch Power. As it was said in 1913 with respect to the Sarekat Islam: 
the ‘Governor General desires that in its attitude towards the said association 
the Administration shows sympathy with the movement, of which the said 
association is a manifestation, [but] on the other hand shall closely and firmly 
guard against the violation of public law and order [...]’.58
Much depended on the mode of expression. Words thought to be too 
radical or blunt could lead to harassment by Dutch authorities and by the 
members of the indigenous administrative structure, and ultimately to arrest 
or censorship. Such repressive measures became more frequent in the course 
of years when the objective of changing society had become more outspoken 
and more widespread; when the ‘accoutrements’ to conceal its political nature, 
as it was concluded in 1920 by a commission to revise the legal system in the 
Netherlands Indies, had grown increasingly transparent over the years.59
The course decided upon at the top of the colonial bureaucracy, was not 
well received by the middle echelon, the civil servants in the field, or by the 
Dutch public. These Dutch Residenten, Assistent-Residenten, and district officers 
were more reserved and more reluctant to allow nationalist activities. Their 
attitude to the Sarekat Islam greatly disappointed Rinkes. In November 1913 
he had called it a ‘wonderful achievement’, that, with the exception of some 
of the Residenten, the colonial civil servants had succeeded in winning the 
distrust of so many Indonesians within such a short span of time, about six 
months, because of the attitude most of them had taken towards the move-
ment.60 Four months later he observed that the Dutch colonial civil servants 
were ‘in fact opposed to all native associations which are not very well “led”, 
that is to say which do not unconditionally say yes and amen to everything 
that is expressed and judged from the side of the civil service, European or 
Native’.61
57 Dutch Minister in Peking to Cort van der Linden, 15-9-1913, NA, BuZa, A-dos. 190, box 
452.
58 Secret circular letter of the 1st Government Secretary to the heads of regional administration 
in Java and Madoera, 11-10-1913, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 13-5-1914 10.
59 Carpentier Alting 1920:291.
60 Note Rinkes, November 1913, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 13-5-1914 10.
61 Note Rinkes, 12-2-1914, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 13-5-1914 10.
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A position similar to that of the Dutch civil servants was taken by mem-
bers of the indigenous administration. In itself the new movement already 
presented a threat to their authority, as it was an expression of a new political 
system that was emerging. Many of them did not take kindly to the nationalist 
movement. When villagers got in trouble because of their membership of the 
Sarekat Islam, were maltreated or lost their jobs as village clerks and the like, it 
was usually at the instigation of these Indonesian administrators. Their actions 
often had the support of the members of the colonial administration, who 
considered such persons ‘resolute officials’, who were well able of putting the 
fear of God into people.62 Conversely, congresses of the Sarekat Islam became 
gatherings during which such behaviour was reported and the antipathy to 
the native ruling strata and its bureaucracy could be expressed.
62 Clignett to A.W.F. Idenburg, 14-6-1915, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 9-3-1916 26.
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Indiërs 
Some Indo-Europeans welcomed the awakening of Asian in general and 
Indonesian nationalism in particular. Most illustrious among those who tried 
to break out of the narrow confines of race was Ernest François Eugène 
Douwes Dekker, Nes to his friends, a second cousin of the Dutch author 
Multatuli, born in 1879 in Pasuruan in East Java of a Dutch father (a broker) 
and a mother of German-Javanese descent. The movement he begun was prob-
ably the most radical of all in the Netherlands Indies in the years before the 
Great War. His contemporary and friend D.M.G. Koch (1960:118) described 
Douwes Dekker as 
a remarkable man with an acute, lively mind, a strong desire for action tinged with 
romanticism, impressed with the intuitive certitude that what was true and good 
should be possible in the end [...] a man who felt himself an Indies D’Artagnan, 
called upon to fight against the sorrows of and wrongdoing against the poor and 
oppressed, born into a family where the tradition of Multatuli was vividly alive. 
Van Kol, a socialist and not a friend, called him ‘an agitator, but not an 
organizer by a long chalk’.1 After his schooldays – he went to the Hogere Bur-
gerschool (HBS, Dutch secondary school) – Douwes Dekker had wanted to go 
to Holland to study engineering, but lack of money frustrated this ambition. 
Instead he found employment in the plantation industry. His strong sense 
of justice and the manner in which he vented his anger with the way the 
Indonesians were treated did not make him a model employee. His job on 
a sugar estate, his second (his first had been on a coffee plantation) he lost, 
according to his own account, after he had told the second-in-charge that he 
would throw him into the pulp machine (De Jong 1979:35). A misfit in colo-
nial society Douwes Dekker did what other like-minded people also did and 
became a journalist.
Douwes Dekker was to become the main thorn in the side of colonial 
government. He was a great source of concern to Batavia not just because he 
1 Handelingen 1913-14, I:47.
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turned the political movement of the Indo-Europeans in a radical direction, 
but especially because of his efforts to reach out to the Indonesian population. 
A movement confined to disgruntled Indo-Europeans was nothing new and 
the colonial administration could cope and rest easy with that. A campaign 
that transgressed the boundaries of this community and inspired Indonesians 
to speak out was potentially much more dangerous to law and order and was 
less easy to contain. For a time, Douwes Dekker’s influence on the ‘native 
movement’ preoccupied the minds of the highest authorities in Batavia and in 
the other cities, especially in Java, where he and his associates pursued their 
activities. His ideas struck a favourable chord, and, what was more, Douwes 
Dekker indubitably possessed personal magnetism. Many Indonesians, young 
and old alike, found Douwes Dekker a pleasant person, who inspired feelings 
of sympathy and even affection. He was also a good orator. Koch (1960:1) 
compared him to Soekarno when he recounts Douwes Dekker’s power to cap-
ture an audience: ‘He dominated a mass, which was relatively not large, but 
which he mesmerized’. Governor General Idenburg was similarly impressed. 
In August 1913, he wrote that ‘from the person of Douwes Dekker emanates a 
significant influence especially on the younger, better-educated Native [...] by 
his personal appearance he exercises a kind of fascination on them from which 
they are unable to extricate themselves’.3 
Douwes Dekker had been in contact with the Indonesian nationalist move-
ment right from its inception. He was well acquainted with the students 
of the STOVIA among whom the movement took concrete shape. Douwes 
Dekker’s house was nearby and STOVIA students frequently visited him to 
discuss social and political issues (Nagazumi 1989:56). One of them, Soewardi 
Soerjaningrat, who was to become a close comrade-in-arms, later recollected 
that Douwes Dekker’s home became a club-house as well as a reading-room 
and library for STOVIA students (Setiabuddhi 1950:39). From close by and as 
a personal friend of some of the Indonesians involved, Douwes Dekker wit-
nessed the founding of Boedi Oetomo (Noble Endeavour) in 1908, generally 
acknowledged as the first modern Indonesian organization and the starting 
point of the ‘national awakening’ (in this ignoring earlier Chinese initiatives). 
There was talk that Douwes Dekker was to become the first editor-in-chief 
of a magazine to be published by Boedi Oetomo, but nothing came out of 
this, nor did he reach a position of any prominence within the organization 
(Nagazumi 1989:15-6). The discrepancy was too great. His ideas were too 
radical and those of the majority of the Boedi Oetomo members too moder-
ate. As he wrote at the end of 191, Boedi Oetomo degenerated, the idealism 
 Rinkes to Idenburg, 16-1-1913 (Bescheiden ‘Indische Partij’ 1913).
3 Idenburg to De Waal Malefijt, 5-8-1913, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 5-9-1913 56.
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created ‘was soon permeated by the spirit of officialdom. And, thereupon, the 
national idea deserted this inhospitable home. I myself had already foreseen 
this and commented on it before it happened’ (Douwes Dekker 191e:48).
In February 1910 Douwes Dekker accompanied by his wife and two chil-
dren left Java for Europe. In Europe he travelled extensively. He visited the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Saxony, Prussia, Bavaria, and Switzerland, went to 
France, Spain, the Balearic Islands, Algiers, and Italy, and after a brief return 
to Holland, travelled to England and the Scandinavian countries. His tour 
brought Douwes Dekker into contact with the radical anti-colonial movement. 
In Paris he struck up friendship with Shyamaji Krishnavarma. Douwes Dekker 
was impressed. He wrote a special report about his meeting for the Bataviaasch 
Nieuwsblad and described Shyamaji Krishnavarma as ‘the first Indian of note 
I had ever met’.4 It was an acquaintanceship which made Douwes Dekker 
suspect in the eyes of the British authorities. Krishnavarma, editor of The 
Indian Sociologist, was among the first who – in 1901 – had called for swadeshi, 
an economic boycott of the British in India. He was considered a dangerous 
revolutionary and accused of having inspired Madan Lal Dhingra, who had 
murdered Sir Curzon Wyllie, Adjutant to the British Colonial Secretary in 
1909. Shyamaji Krishnavarma struck Douwes Dekker as a ‘political anarchist’. 
In January 1916, he recalled the conversation they had: 
He favoured individual acts of anarchy rather than the combined resistance of the 
masses. He said that individual acts of bombing people and so forth had a greater 
demoralizing effect on the Government than a revolution by the whole of the 
Indian nation was likely to have.5 
Returning from his trip in June 1911, Douwes Dekker took up Residence in 
Bandung and embarked on a path that shocked the colonial establishment. As 
a former journalist he started two journals, intended ‘for the education of the 
masses in democratic ideas’.6 Within a year their contents would be closely 
monitored by the authorities. In September 1911, Douwes Dekker launched 
Het Tijdschrift (The Periodical), a bi-monthly. The following year a daily news-
paper, De Expres, was published.
In Het Tijdschrift Douwes Dekker could disseminate his militant political 
views, calling for active opposition – and the evocation of fear – to fight the 
abuses of colonial society. National and international developments were 
closely followed, always championing the underdog and those whose rights 
and freedoms were being threatened or abused. The most outstanding feature 
of Het Tijdschrift was its international character. In this it was unique in the 
4 Statement Douwes Dekker, 4-1-1916, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 7-7-1916 5.
5 Statement Douwes Dekker, 4-1-1916, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 7-7-1916 5.
6 Statement Douwes Dekker, 4-1-1916, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 7-7-1916 5.
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Netherlands Indies. Other periodicals were almost exclusively filled with art-
icles by Residents of the Netherlands Indies. In launching his magazine Douwes 
Dekker made good use of his European trip. From its inception he could draw 
upon a score of international contributors with leftist, if not anarchist and 
libertine, opinions; and others with more esoteric ones. From Munich articles 
were sent in by Lydia Hertlein, who defended the right of motherhood for 
unmarried women in one of its first issues; while from Paris, ‘the indomitable 
apostle of freedom’, Shiyamaji Krishnavarma, argued that British rule in India 
was in the second of three phases of political despotism ‘the final one of which 
inevitably ends with its being swept away’.7 Other articles were by Sir Walter 
W. Strickland, contributor to The Indian Sociologist. Douwes Dekker introduced 
him as ‘a scholar, naturalist, explorer [...] a brave champion of the rights of 
the natives in British colonies’.8 From Paris there were also contributions by 
Mathilde Deromps and Edward Holten James. Mathilde Deromps had won 
the ‘How can Egypt liberate itself efficaciously from the English yoke’ award, 
a prize offered by the Young Egyptian League, with an essay on the ‘Martyr 
Wardani’ about the person who had been executed in 1910 for murdering an 
Egyptian minister.9 Holten James regularly submitted revolutionary-tinged 
articles about Christianity; a subject also taken up by Jos van Veen from The 
Hague, ‘a modernistic ex-curate’ who ‘has chosen poverty and privation above 
a well-manured life of hypocrisy.’10 Nor should Har Dayal, a radical Indian 
nationalist, be forgotten.
In Het Tijdschrift these authors wrote about the violent crumbling of 
European rule in the non-Western world and did not repudiate political assas-
sination as a weapon. In his own writings Douwes Dekker articulated the 
same thoughts. He stressed that, in view of legislation in Europe curtailing the 
rights of workers, he did not believe that a parliamentary system could bring 
about the society he wanted. On other occasions he hinted that violence might 
have to be used, adding that the revolutionary path he advocated did not 
necessarily imply that actual violence had to be resorted to. Among the many 
expressions that greatly disturbed the authorities was Douwes Dekker’s claim 
in Het Tijdschrift in February 1913 that resistance to colonialism was a moral 
obligation. A colonial administration had to be defied. However friendly a face 
it might present, colonialism remained a system based on inequality of justice, 
in which those born as rulers would never yield their prerogatives. Of neces-
sity it was a form of despotism, of tyranny. Listing the methods that could 
7 Krishnavarma 1911:107. The qualification is by Douwes Dekker: Het Tijdschrift, 1-1-1911, 
p. 16.
8 Het Tijdschrift, 1-1-1911 p. 05.
9 Het Tijdschrift, 1-9-1911, p. 16; Setiabuddhi 1950:6.
10 Het Tijdschrift, 15-11-1911, p. 199.
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be employed to combat it, here and in other articles Douwes Dekker freely 
used words such as demonstration, agitation, revolution, passive resistance, 
strike (singling out such important sectors as the postal, telegraph and railway 
services), boycott, and rebellion.11 A fortnight later, referring to the American 
Revolution, he wrote about the indigenous population preparing itself ‘to tear 
away with hostility from the mother country’.1
Douwes Dekker’s were reminiscent of the words of socialist and anarchist 
agitators in Europe. He welcomed the Chinese Revolution during which ‘the 
power of China’s people expressed itself’, and praised sabotage and syndical-
ism: ‘The man of action now is fed up with reform. Reform, that is indeed 
socialism, has failed’ (Douwes Dekker 191a:411, 191f:747). Another example 
was provided by what had happened in the Philippines. Douwes Dekker 
applauded the Emilio Aguinaldo rebellion and used it to draw comparisons 
with the situation in the Netherlands Indies. One of his central ideas was that 
concessions could only be won by evoking fear. He argued that in British 
India ‘only after dynamite bombs had been thrown, people had been killed, 
buildings and institutions destroyed, did the oppressors realize that they had 
to make concessions in the end’.13 He condoned a murderous assault on the 
life of the Russian Czar ‘because each new so-called “attempt” must keep alive 
the stimulus of fear in persons who, by accident were born to the purple, yet 
because of character flaws do not belong on a throne’. He himself, Douwes 
Dekker continued, would reveal where people could find their ‘political 
Browning-guns’. A month later, entitling his editorial ‘Browning-guns’ he 
elaborated on the theme, promising his followers ‘to show them where they 
could find their political Browning-guns. [...] the maxims and the example 
of the great figures of human history. [...] whose words and thoughts are the 
crowbars to open the rusty doors of your armouries which have fallen shut.’ 
(Douwes Dekker 1911a:165, 168, 1911b:4.) True to the revolutionary spirit 
that so attracted Douwes Dekker, in an effort to explain Jesus to the Javanese 
readers of Het Tijdschrift, he drew a parallel between ‘a Roman province and 
a Dutch colony’, and introduced Jesus as ‘the bold apostle of freedom, the 
audacious preacher of independence, the glorious anarchist’ (Douwes Dekker 
191b:437, 439). These were words which had not yet often sullied the ears of 
the colonial authorities.
Indonesians also contributed to Het Tijdschrift right from its inception. To 
the amazement of some Dutch people they did so in excellent Dutch. The 
Dutch even wondered whether ‘some contributions to Het Tijdschrift, espe-
cially from Native contributors, had actually not mainly originated from the 
11 Editorial in Het Tijdschrift, 15--1913, cited in Vervolg 1913.
1 Het Tijdschrift, 1-3-1913, cited in Vervolg 1913.
13 De Expres, 1-3-1913, quoted in Vervolg 1913.
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publisher’. Among the doubters was Rinkes. He did not rule out the possibil-
ity some contributors were completely fictitious.14
In November 1911, in ‘a confession of faith’ in Het Tijdschrift Douwes Dekker 
announced that he intended to found a party which ‘embraces Dutchman and 
Native, and all political variations in between’ (Douwes Dekker 1911:139???). 
About a year later, in mid-September 191 after it had been announced that a 
Indische Partij (Indies Party) had been founded a week earlier, a campaign was 
launched to publicize the new party. A ‘propaganda deputation’ headed by 
Douwes Dekker toured Java. From Bandung, Douwes Dekker’s place of resi-
dence, they travelled to Yogyakarta, Surabaya, Malang, Madiun, Semarang, 
Pekalongan, Tegal, and Batavia. The trip was planned to pave the way for a 
merger of as many organizations as possible. When the realization dawned 
that the regulations of the associations Douwes Dekker had in mind – Boedi 
Oetomo and Sarekat Islam – did not allow for such a step, the goal was changed 
to close cooperation. At the Yogyakarta railway station, and this must have 
worried the colonial authorities, the deputation was welcomed by local Boedi 
Oetomo leaders; and during the interval in a public gathering in the evening 
of that same day, the deputation conferred with representatives of the Sarekat 
Islam. At the station they had also been greeted by Prince Notodirodjo, son of 
Paku Alam V, the ruler of one of the two Yogyakarta principalities, and chair-
man of Boedi Oetomo. Dutch sources claimed it was just a chance encounter. 
This may have been so, but at the end of the public gathering, the same Prince 
Notodirodjo thanked Douwes Dekker and the other speakers and wished 
them success – according to Douwes Dekker’s own report – in their ‘honest 
endeavour, as he chose to call it, to ensure the Indiër [...] of the rights to which 
he had already been entitled for so long’.15
Douwes Dekker had planned meticulously. Meetings during the propa-
ganda tour had been well publicized in advance on handbills, bill-boards, and 
advertisements, and were reasonably well attended. Special invitations had 
been sent to persons the members of the deputation specifically wanted to 
meet. At railway stations brass bands turned out to welcome them. The climax 
came on 5 December 191 in Bandung. In the ballroom of Maison Vogelpoel 
in the Bragaweg the Indische Partij was formally constituted. Deliberately, in 
violation of existing legislation, no permission had been asked to hold the 
meeting.16 The establishment of the Indische Partij, the phraseology chosen, 
and these words stuck in the mind of the authorities, was ‘a declaration of war 
by the tax-paying slaves to the tax-grabbing state of the home country’.17 Black 
14 Nota Douwes Dekker 1913:19; Rinkes to Idenburg, 16-1-1913 (Bescheiden ‘Indische Partij’ 1913).
15 Het Tijdschrift, 15-10-191, Nota Douwes Dekker 1913 (II):8. 
16 Volksraad 1918-19:48.
17 Report of the audience granted to Douwes Dekker, Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo and Van Ham 
on 13-3-1913 (Bescheiden ‘Indische Partij’ 1913).
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was chosen as background-colour of the Indische Partij flag to symbolize the 
mourning for the bondage of the non-totoks in the colony.18 
The gathering in Bandung was one manifestation of Indo-European brava-
do. The mood was definitely anti-Dutch and anti-totok. At the railway station 
‘thoroughbred’ Europeans were ignored. When the trains arrived in the early 
evening carrying participants from outside the city, this raised a general cheer. 
The same happened when Douwes Dekker, who had come to the station to 
greet his friends, was chaired aloft. One and a half years later De Expres recol-
lected that the whole station hall had resounded with loud shouts of joy.19 The 
Dutch civil servant who had to report on the events said that at the station and 
at Maison Vogelpoel Indo-Europeans behaved as if they were in charge. He 
himself had fallen victim to this mood. In the Maison Vogelpoel the dinner he 
had ordered was grabbed from him by an Indo-European, who snapped that 
he was certainly more hungry.
Around nine o’clock in the evening Douwes Dekker escorted by his com-
rades in procession came from his house to the meeting hall. In front marched 
a military band, and torch-bearers lent drama to the parade. J.G. van Ham, 
a Boer officer who had settled in the Netherlands Indies, had arranged for a 
guard of honour of Boer soldiers on horseback. ‘Sons of the land’ only, includ-
ing some Javanese, were admitted to the meeting, which was attended by 
about eight hundred people. Totoks were refused entry and intimidated. They 
were given a look of contempt, and some were deliberately run down.
Meant to be a party for all who did not belong to the European white 
segment of colonial society the Indische Partij called for the creation of what 
was designated an ‘Indiërs race’. Once this ‘race’ had been formed, and ‘the 
Javanese no longer calls himself a JAVANESE, the Chinese a CHINESE, the 
European a EUROPEAN, but all call themselves INDIËR’, it was explained 
in De Expres in April 1914, ‘then all existing iniquities will automatically dis-
appear’.0 Unity was what was required and true to this credo members of 
the Indische Partij reached out to Islam and to the Chinese. Douwes Dekker 
stressed that the Chinese were not foreigners.1 De Expres called it a mistake by 
‘our brothers’ of the Sarekat Islam that they were obsessed by alleged Chinese 
hostility. Not the Chinese but others were the enemy of the Javanese people. 
Christianity was treated with less indulgence. Douwes Dekker maintained 
that missionary activities were a political instrument devoid of any ethics, and 
consequently harmful and dangerous.3 De Expres proudly wrote in 1914 that 
18 Rinkes to Idenburg, 16-1-1913 (Bescheiden ‘Indische Partij’ 1913).
19 De Expres, 31-7-1914.
0 De Expres, 17-4-1914.
1 De Expres, -1-1914.
 De Expres, 11--1914.
3 De Expres, 7--1914.
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in one year the Indische Partij had succeeded in recruiting more Muslims as 
members then Christian mission had been able to convert in three centuries 
of colonial rule.4
True to his principles in establishing the Indische Partij Douwes Dekker, 
of whom it was assumed that he was inflicted with the Indo-European 
hatred of rule by Dutch people from Holland, sought out the cooperation 
of Indonesians. Some of them he had known since the founding days of 
Boedi Oetomo. By taking this step he tried to enlarge the group from which 
he could drew support for his revolutionary ideas; a prospect which really 
frightened the government. Idenburg suffered nightmares imagining what 
might happen were Douwes Dekker and his political friends to succeed in 
taking control of the Sarekat Islam and its mass following.5 It was an unlikely 
prospect, but not completely unfounded. Douwes Dekker had succeeded in 
involving leaders of the early Indonesian nationalist movement in his plans. 
A few even became close comrades-in-arms.
At the end of 191 and in early 1913 stock was taken. Dutch civil servants 
were asked to indicate how far Douwes Dekker’s influence had penetrated 
their district. Almost all concluded that neither he nor his movement had been 
very successful in gaining support among the non-European population. It 
was observed that most Javanese who might be favourably disposed towards 
the Indische Partij had adopted a wait-and-see attitude. They flinched from 
Douwes Dekker’s radicalism, and could not completely rid themselves of their 
suspicion of Indo-Europeans, many of whom were not prepared to treat them 
in a genuinely friendly fashion. An additional reason for distrust was the fact 
that the Indische Partij was in favour of granting Indo-Europeans the right of 
landownership; a point which was referred to with some frequency in news-
papers affiliated with Boedi Oetomo and Sarekat Islam.6 While all this may 
have been true, some civil servants pointed to some groups which were sus-
ceptible to his propaganda. In January 1913 the Resident of Bantam reported 
that Douwes Dekker exercised a ‘fatal influence’ on many native civil servants, 
who ‘swallow all he says’, while his articles, copied by the Malay newspapers, 
were not ‘without their influence on Foreign Orientals and the more edu-
cated members of the Native population’.7 This assessment seems to be cor-
roborated by the other reports. Occasionally it was mentioned that Indonesian 
intellectuals and members of the Javanese bureaucracy had become members; 
motivated in some cases by the arrogance of the Chinese. 
4 De Expres, 15-1-1914.
5 Idenburg to De Waal Malefijt, 5-8-1913, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 5-9-1913 56.
6 Rinkes to Idenburg, 16-1-1913 (Bescheiden ‘Indische Partij’ 1913).
7 Van Rinsum to Idenburg, 14-1-1913 (Bescheiden ‘Indische Partij’ 1913).
III  Indiërs 53
Of the Indonesians who joined the Indische Partij two stood out in par-
ticular. One was Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo a native doctor. At the meeting at 
which the Indische Partij was constituted he was elected its Deputy Chairman. 
He also became editor of De Expres. Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo had been born 
in 1886 in the village of Pacangakan in Jepara, on the north coast of Central 
Java. In 1911 he had distinguished himself during the outbreak of plague 
in East Java; a disease which in those days was still relatively new to the 
Netherlands Indies, where there had only been a few isolated cases up to that 
time. Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo was the first to volunteer for service in the 
plague-stricken areas, where others physicians, also European ones, were hes-
itant to venture. For his services he was awarded a knighthood in the Order of 
Orange-Nassau, something he did not fail to mention in later years when he 
had became embroiled in conflicts with the colonial government. At moments 
when his relations with the authorities were at a low ebb, he threatened to 
return the decoration. He was, in the words of Koch (1960:146), somebody ‘of 
great intelligence, with a lively mind and a strong sense of right and justice’.
Rinkes described Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo as ‘Mr. Douwes Dekker’s big 
trump card’. Others also singled him out when they ventured to comment on 
the influence of the Indische Partij among the indigenous population.8 The 
Assistent-Resident of Tangerang was sure that Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo, not 
Douwes Dekker, was the reason why quite a large number of Indonesians who 
could understand Dutch read Het Tijdschrift and De Expres.9 Initially Tjipto 
Mangoenkoesoemo was well regarded in colonial government circles and his 
contributions to Het Tijdschrift were praised for their moderation. Within a 
short span of time this attitude changed. Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo’s style was 
described as having been transformed into ‘biting sarcasm’.30 This contributed 
to making him notorious, as he himself described it, ‘as the greatest revolu-
tionary, who stalks the Indies’ (Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo 1915:).
The other was a member of the higher, but impoverished, Javanese nobil-
ity: Raden Mas Soewardi Soerjaningrat. His father was a son of Paku Alam III. 
Soewardi had entered the STOVIA but had dropped out when he had to repeat 
a year and his study grant was stopped. Nevertheless, as a distinctive token of 
praise he had received a special certificate testifying to his excellent mastery of 
Dutch (Soeratman 1981-8:19). He had found employment in a chemist’s shop 
in Yogyakarta, but was dismissed because he spent too much time writing for 
De Expres and other newspapers (Soebagijo 1981:63). Thereupon he became 
a proof reader for De Expres and chaired the local Sarekat Islam branch in 
Bandung.
8 Rinkes to Idenburg, 16-1-1913 (Bescheiden ‘Indische Partij’ 1913).
9 Vernet to Resident of Batavia, 7-1-1913 (Nota Douwes Dekker 1913, II:118). 
30 Darna Koesoema in Weekblad voor Indië, cited in De Indische Gids 1918, I:48.
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As early as February 1913, the Governor General and his advisers began 
to think about whether action should be taken against Douwes Dekker. The 
utilization of extraordinary legal powers might also be appropriate to prevent 
what had been written in Het Tijdschrift and De Expres to appear in the Malay 
press.31 Soon hesitation was thrown to the winds and action was taken against 
Douwes Dekker and his closest associates. It started innocently. At the end of 
31 De Graeff to the Council of the Indies, 0--1913, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 7-3-1913 35.
Soewardi Soerjaningrat (l), E.F.E. Douwes Dekker (c) and Tjipto Mangoenkoesomo 
(r) in Java (Koch 1960)
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November 1913, it would be one hundred years since the Netherlands had 
been liberated from the Napoleonic occupation. This called for celebrations, 
likewise in the colony. It was not too long before it became known that in some 
places Indonesians had been persuaded (perintah haloes, a gentle order, was 
the term used to describe this method of suggestion) to contribute money for 
the celebrations. Alerted by this Batavia urged its civil servants to exercise the 
greatest circumspection in involving the population in the commemoration. 
Requests that they contribute financially could easily slip over in improper 
pressure, even abuse. Caution was essential ‘because urging Natives to give 
contributions on a somewhat larger scale, would be calling on circles in which 
the meaning of the festivities might not be understood or at least not recog-
nized as a cause for rejoicing’. They should not be presented with subscription 
lists and gifts should only be accepted from those persons who in the past 
had clearly testified that they desired ‘to identify as much as possible with the 
Dutch Nation and who therefore will participate in a Dutch national festivity 
completely out of their own free will’.3 
The exercise of celebrating the Netherlands regaining its independence 
from the French was a little bit awkward in a colony and might not exactly 
be a reason for rejoicing for the non-Dutch residents. The colonial administra-
tors realized this and were not alone in doing so, not even in the European 
community. As might have been expected strong opposition was voiced by 
the leaders of the Indische Partij. Douwes Dekker announced that he would 
oppose the plans to celebrate the anniversary with ‘vigilance and ridicule’.33 
Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo chose another course. In July 1913 he founded a 
Native Committee for the Commemoration of the Netherlands Centenary of 
Freedom; generally known as the Native Committee or, in Malay the Comité 
Boemi Poetra (in a brochure by Douwes Dekker and friends correctly trans-
lated not as ‘natives’ but as ‘sons of the soil’). The main objective was to plead 
for a change in the composition of the Koloniale Raad, the Colonial Council, 
a quasi-representative advisory body that The Hague had announced the pre-
vious year to be established in the Netherlands Indies. It should have more 
Indonesians among its members than initially envisaged, and the majority of 
these Indonesians should not, as the government intended, be recruited from 
the ‘notables’. Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo explained later that another motive 
behind the formation of the committee had been the collection of money 
among Javanese in Malang by the patih, the Deputy Regent.34 
Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo and Soewardi wanted to use the centenary to 
3 Circular 1st Government Secretary, 6-8-1913, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 17-10-1913 61; Idenburg 
to Pleyte, 30-8-1915, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 14-10-1915 P1.
33 De Expres, 6--1913, cited in Vervolg 1913.
34 Memorie van verdediging van Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 5-9-1913 
56; Douwes Dekker et al. 1913b:11.
The Malay and Dutch version of If I were a Dutchman’...
III  Indiërs 57
draw public attention to the undemocratic nature of the colonial system and to 
press for political reform. They intended to send a telegram of congratulations 
to Queen Wilhelmina. It should contain more than just platitudes. The senders 
would ask for the removal of the restriction on the right of free assembly and 
intended to emphasize that the çolonial council should be constituted as soon 
as possible and be a truly representative and democratic forum. Before they 
could send the telegram the authorities had already intervened. The reason 
for Batavia to act was a brochure published by the Committee, ridiculing the 
celebrations, Als ik eens Nederlander was... (If I were a Dutchman...). 
The pamphlet sent shockwaves through Dutch circles. In Holland C.Th. van 
Deventer, the founding father of the Ethical Policy, considered it an affront. He 
said in parliament that the pamphlet totally disregarded the civilization with 
which the Netherlands was imbuing its colony.35 In the Netherlands Indies the 
pamphlet became the excuse for the colonial authorities to act against the top 
of the Indische Partij. The problem was not the pamphlet as such, Idenburg 
was to reveal in 1919 speaking of Soewardi, it was ‘his whole mentality’, which 
had prompted him to decide to act.36 
In Java copies were confiscated by the police. This, of course, whetted every-
one’s appetite to read the pamphlet. Two weeks after its publication, the chair-
man and secretary of the committee, Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo and Soewardi, 
were arrested. No risks were taken. Paranoia had taken root. The Resident of the 
Preanger, T.J. Janssen, under whose authority Bandung fell, was convinced that 
Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo could count upon considerable support among the 
followers of the Indische Partij. Hence, he feared a ‘mad coup’ by the Indische 
Partij. Between thirty and forty soldiers were sent to the houses of Tjipto 
Mangoenkoesoemo and Soewardi. Other troops and policemen patrolled the 
city. Government offices and houses of civil servants were guarded. The two 
other members of the committee were also apprehended. One was the novelist 
Abdoel Moeis, editor of the newspaper Kaoem Moeda (The Young Ones) and 
publisher and editor of the paper Hindia Serikat (The United Indies). The other 
was the editor-in-chief of Kaoem Moeda Wignjadisastra. After twenty-four hours 
detention both were set free again. On his release Wignjadisastra promised to 
refrain from seditious writings in future, and to report only on abuses, after 
first investigating whether they had indeed taken place or not. Abdoel Moeis 
decided to halt the publication of Hindia Serikat for the time being. 
The arrests were made even before Idenburg had ordered them. Janssen 
had acted of his own accord to prevent the movement, which he believed was 
still confined to a few ‘hot-headed persons’, from spreading. There had been 
35 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1913-14:119.
36 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1918-19:08.
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no legal basis to justify Janssen’s decision, but Idenburg, stressing the neces-
sity to take into custody persons who formed a threat to the maintenance 
of law and order, condoned it. He also took up a suggestion by Janssen to 
apprehend Douwes Dekker. When Douwes Dekker praised Soewardi and 
Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo as heroes and victims of the good cause in De Expres 
Idenburg set in motion the procedure to have Douwes Dekker banned from 
Java. It was a course of action some had already been suggesting for months. 
His advisers, Rinkes and Hazeu, had been against it. They feared opposition 
in Holland and were sure that banishment could well afford Douwes Dekker 
a ‘martyr’s crown’.37 
What made the situation all the more serious in the eyes of the colonial gov-
ernment was that the pamphlet had also been published in Malay. They would 
never have been arrested the public prosecutor told Soewardi in jail, had there 
not been a Malay version (Douwes Dekker et al. 1913a:???). Idenburg deemed 
the whole affair so urgent that he called an emergency meeting of his advis-
ers, the council of the Indies, on 31 August 1913. At this meeting Idenburg 
asked the council for its support in ‘crippling the movement’. He also took 
the opportunity to point out an important change that had taken place during 
the previous six months. All kinds of seditious opinions were now being aired 
in Malay. Idenburg stressed that the import of this should not be underrated. 
In August, in a fifteen-page-long letter in which he explained his steps to the 
Minister of the Colonies in The Hague, he once again touched upon this mat-
ter. To underline the seriousness of the affair, he pointed to the plans of the 
Indische Partij to start a Malay edition of De Expres, which would therefore 
be written ‘in the language in which the Native middle class throughout the 
whole of the Netherlands Indies can be reached’.38
The prospect of De Expres in Malay made Idenburg and other colonial 
administrators even more doubtful about whether the legislation provided 
the government with sufficient clout to prevent and curb the dangers that 
might arise from what was called a ‘tendentiously edited periodical press, 
publishing its products in Eastern languages’.39 The impotence of Batavia 
was put forward as one of the arguments for tightening the press regulations 
and returning the colonial administration some of the powers it had ceded 
less than a decade before. Idenburg explained to the Minister of the Colonies 
that he had refrained from bringing the leaders of the Indische Partij to court 
37 Idenburg to De Waal Malefijt, 5-8-1913, Rinkes to Idenburg, 16-1-1913, Hazeu to Idenburg, 
14--1913, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 5-9-1913 56, Bescheiden ‘Indische Partij’ 1913.
38 Minutes of the extraordinary meeting of the Council of the Indies, 31-7-1913, Idenburg to De 
Waal Malefijt, 5-8-1913, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 5-9-1913 56.
39 Idenburg to Pleyte, --1915, 1st Government Secretary to Rinkes, 8-5-1913, NA, Kol. 
Openbaar, Vb. 17-9-1915 46.
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because criminal law was riddled with loopholes, and judges on the whole 
tended to act in contradistinction to the interests of the colonial administra-
tion, instead of cooperating with it.40 His legal advisers had also pointed out 
to him that the sentences a judge might pass on Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo and 
Soewardi would probably be trifling and would not deter them from continu-
ing their activities. The Council of the Indies shared this view.
The fact that shortly before their arrests Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo and 
Soewardi, indignant at the way in which Dutch-language newspapers had 
reported the activities of their Committee, had published letters to the editor 
in De Expres entitled respectively ‘Power and terror’ and ‘All for one and one 
for all’ was seen as additional proof that they were determined to proceed with 
their campaign. Neither had eschewed bold words. Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo 
had written about the thrill of provoking the government, forcing it to strain 
every nerve. Soewardi’s article had ended with the words, Rawé-rawé rantas 
malang malang poetoeng; ‘it will be slashed to shreds, obstacles will be broken 
down’, a phrase which would be developed into a popular slogan in the 
nationalist movement.41 
In a sense the Committee had accomplished what it set out to do. In their 
explanatory memorandum issued in their defence, which they had written 
while in jail, Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo and Soewardi both explained that the 
intention of the committee had been to stir up as much outrage as possible 
in the European community: the more, the merrier. This was the only way 
to elicit a reaction from the Dutch public and parliament. Both claimed that 
it had never been their intention to mobilize the masses. Had any news ever 
reached the colonial authorities about disturbances caused by their activi-
ties? To prevent disorder, the pamphlet had deliberately not been written in 
Javanese or common Malay, but in literary Malay which limited its readership 
to educated people.4 
Whatever Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo, Soewardi, and Douwes Dekker might 
write or state in their defence, all was to no avail. Idenburg had made up his 
mind and was intent on safeguarding the Indonesian population against any 
further incursions by the three. He used the extraordinary powers vested 
in him to ban Residents of the Netherlands Indies to another part of the 
Archipelago. All three were interrogated as was required, but only as a for-
mality to comply with the law. On 18 August 1913 Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo 
40 Idenburg to De Waal Malefijt, 5-8-1913, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 5-9-1913 56. 
41 Minutes extraordinary meeting of the Council of the Indies, 31-7-1913, Memorie van verdedi-
ging van Soewardi Soerjaningrat, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 5-9-1913 56.
4 Memorie van verdediging van Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo, Memorie van verdediging 
van Soewardi Soerjaningrat, Proces-verbaal interrogation Abdoel Moeis, 13-8-1913, NA, Kol. 
Openbaar, Vb. 5-9-1913 56.
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was assigned the island of Banda as his place of residence; Soewardi that of 
Bangka. Douwes Dekker was banned to Kupang in Timor. Douwes Dekker’s 
efforts to ‘reach the native population in particular young native intellectuals’ 
carried great weight in the justification of this decision.43 All three decided, as 
was the right of people sentenced in this way, to ask to be allowed to go and 
live in Europe. Idenburg granted the request. His purpose had been to render 
the three harmless, and was not set on a punitive expedition or revenge.44
The affair left a bitter aftertaste. In Batavia and The Hague there was a con-
viction that Idenburg could have intervened earlier and that he would not have 
been forced to take such draconian measures had the colonial government 
held wider powers. Realization also dawned that existing regulations only 
covered printed matter. Other forms of incitement by ‘embittered extremists 
who had come to see the creation of discontent in their environment as a sacred 
vocation’ had to be taken into account as well. This included public speeches, 
theatrical performances, and hand-written documents; also mentioned in the 
official correspondence about the issue was ‘a loud conversation in a full club 
house’ and even a chance remark ejaculated in anger or frustration.45
Another question discussed by the authorities was how to tighten up 
control of associations. Organizations could be refused formal legal recogni-
tion by the Governor General, but that was all. This did not automatically 
spell dissolution. Members could ignore the decision and continue to pursue 
their activities. Action against them had to be left to the courts, with all the 
reservations the colonial administration had about such a course of action. 
Copying British legislation in the Straits Settlements was considered, but 
rejected. European public opinion would not accept it. In contrast to legisla-
tion in the Straits Settlements, government control of organizations should 
remain the exception, not the rule. Unlike the Straits Settlements, there were 
many European associations in the Netherlands Indies, including labour asso-
ciations, which because of their aims had a militant character. All these – the 
council of the Indies also mentioned reading circles and evenings for cards 
– would be covered by a Singapore-like legislation. Any legislation should also 
allow for supervision over Chinese organizations, nationalist associations like 
the Sarekat Islam, and occasionally even some European ones; but hundreds 
of European associations should remain untouched by it.46 
A similar dilemma was posed by the action the colonial administration took 
against the Indische Partij. The Indische Partij was transformed into a banned 
43 Decision Idenburg, 18-8-1913, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 5-9-1913 56.
44 Idenburg to De Waal Malefijt, 5-8-1913, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 5-9-1913 56
45 Note section II General Secretary, 3-9-1913, Note section A1 BuZa, 8-11-1913, NA, Kol. 
Openbaar, Vb. 17-1-1913 1.
46 Cordes to Idenburg, 6-3-1913, Council of the Indies, 7-7-1914, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 14-6-
1915 31.
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organization. In the eyes of Idenburg and his advisers, it had taken on the 
guise of a political party. This was against the law in the Netherlands Indies. 
Members of the Indische Partij had made themselves liable to punishment. 
Meetings and torchlight processions or other parades had to be prevented, if 
necessary by employing force.47 Strictly speaking acting against the Indische 
Partij meant the authorities also had to act against the Boedi Oetomo and the 
Sarekat Islam if political issues were raised at their meetings, and also, as the 
council of the Indies had pointed out, against the Association for Women’s 
Suffrage.48 The solution found was to explain that what been the deciding fac-
tor in the case of the Indische Partij was the threat it posed to public order.
Having acquired the stigma of a subversive organization, the Indische 
Partij dissolved itself in April 1913. Memories were more difficult to erase. In 
1914 calling cards, writing paper and the like in the colours of the Indische 
Partij were still advertised in De Expres. Its activities were continued by 
Insulinde, which had its headquarters in Semarang. Van Ham, the Boer leader 
and up to the secretary of the Indische Partij, became its chairman. He and 
other Insulinde leaders were put under police surveillance. 6 September, the 
day the Indische Partij had been founded, and by chance also the day the three 
exiles had sailed for Holland, was proclaimed I.P. Day by Insulinde.
The resolute action of the colonial authorities bore fruit. It had frightened 
off many members of the Indische Partij from joining Insulinde. This did not 
discourage De Expres. Heartening its readers it reminded them that the SDAP, 
by now well-represented in Dutch parliament, had been founded by twelve 
people. The newspaper itself experienced a drop in subscriptions and conse-
quently faced severe financial difficulties. It was – for the time being – only 
rescued by money from the Tado Fund (Tot aan de Onafhankelijkheid, Till 
Independence) established by the Indische Partij. Yet, the paper stressed, the 
core remained as determined as ever. 
To the hard-core members the three exiles assumed a saint-like aura. In 
April 1914, when Insulinde held its Patriots Days, three chairs behind the 
committee table remained unoccupied. ‘The respective spirits will be invited 
to occupy the empty seats’, De Expres wrote in advance.49 The meeting itself 
was an enjoyable event with a pasar malam held in the garden. A telegram sent 
by the exiles ‘Hold high the banner’ created a furore. People testified to their 
devotion to them.50 Dédéism, named after DD, defined in De Expres as this 
‘entirely independent building of thought, this political sociological system’ 
became the ideology of Insulinde.
47 1st Government Secretary to Director of Justice, 1-4-1913, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 14-6-1915 
31.
48 Advice Council of the Indies, 3-3-1913, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 7-3-1913 35.
49 De Expres, 8--1914.
50 De Expres, 16-4-1914.
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The controversial festivities to commemorate independence from the French 
were organized with a somewhat tempered zeal all over the colony. There 
were countless early morning parades by military bands, not always appreci-
ated by people who wanted to sleep in on these public holidays; prayer meet-
ings in churches; and musical performances, dawn concerts and singing by 
schoolchildren and orphans. Matinées musicales, and film showings; kermesses 
d’été, and pasar malam fairs also featured prominently in the celebrations.
In spite of the misgivings expressed about the active involvement of non-
Europeans in the festivities, ordinary people flocked en masse to enjoy the 
spectacles and assiduously attended the entertainment especially arranged 
for them: popular games; gamelan and wajang wong performances and other 
traditional dance parties. Occasionally, it was even observed that Chinese and 
Javanese had gone to even greater lengths to decorate their houses or hang 
out flags than had the Europeans. Natives and Chinese, and on a rare occasion 
also Arabs, participated in parades, which were often organized separately for 
the different population groups. Of these, too, it was sometimes remarked that 
much more effort was put into them than into the European parades. 
In Kupang in Timor one of the main feasts was an electrische dubbeltjes vis-
serij, electric dime fishery, in which people had to try to recover a coin from an 
electrically wired aquarium. It was reported that at first the natives thought it 
an easy game to get some extra money. This was a miscalculation: ‘Kaja ajer-
blanda [strong sparkling water] said one who quickly withdrew his hand from 
the water. Tadjam [sharp] said his neighbour. And both went to throw hoop-
la rings at a packet of tobacco, a knife, or a skein of coloured wool’.51 Near 
Medan one of the programme items was ‘cycling for Easterners’. In Semarang 
a ‘surprising combination’, a mixed public of ‘Thomas Atkins and Kromo 
together with fathers and sisters and orphans from the Christian institutions, 
schoolchildren and high school pupils, as well as the barracks flowers’ filled 
the theatre to watch what was mainly a demonstration of gymnastics and mili-
tary skill.5 The grand finale was impressive: the enactment of an attack on a 
column of marching soldiers by Acehnese. After the assault had been beaten 
off, children in orange, white, and blue suits formed a pyramid, with the Maid 
of Holland on top; all with Bengali illuminations providing a background, 
their smoke bothering the choir of Protestant orphan girls who adorned the 
scene with patriotic songs.
Javanese civil servants had their own special festivities, usually in the 
house of the Regent. In Semarang they were regaled with a tajuban, a tradition-
al dance party with paid female dancers. Local leaders of nationalist organi-
zations did not sit by passively. In Medan a deputation of the Sarekat Islam 
marched along in an historico-allegorical procession that paraded through the 
51 De Locomotief, 9-1-1913.
5 De Locomotief, 19-11-1913.
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town alongside floats of the wealthy estate companies. In Rembang a crowd of 
Sarekat Islam members – De Locomotief estimated that at least a few thousand 
took part, carrying Dutch flags and Orange pennants – visited the Resident. At 
the Residency statements were read praising educational policy, freedom of 
religion, and legal security. The Resident reported that in view of these accom-
plishments, Sarekat Islam members could not but join in the cheering: ‘They 
had not failed to notice how many millions are spent to elevate the native’. 
This finished the procession went on to the Dutch social club where a fancy 
dress ball had just started. After performing a number of dances and shout-
ing ‘Long live the Netherlands – long live the SI – hurray! – hurray!’ they left 
again.53 In Semarang the Sarekat Islam held a special prayer session in the 
main mosque asking for God’s blessings for the welfare of the Netherlands 
and its royal house. It was followed by a selamatan, a communal religious 
meal, ‘for members and other natives.’54 Similar prayer sessions were held 
in Purworejo and Surabaya. In the latter city the Sarekat Islam newspaper 
Oetoesan Hindia had even called upon its readers to come to the mosque to 
pray to celebrate Dutch independence. 
Some performances were a perfect enactment of how life in a tranquil, 
contented colonial society should be. In Cirebon, after parading through town 
in sarong and a white coat, with an orange or red, white, and blue sash, their 
heads bedecked with a straw hat, schoolchildren paid their respects to the por-
trait of Queen Wilhelmina by kneeling down and making a sembah. Thereupon 
they sang a ‘native song’. The correspondent of De Locomotief called it ‘truly a 
gripping demonstration of homage’.55 In Tegal the festivities were opened by 
the controleur. His three cheers for the House of Orange and the Netherlands 
was met with such a passionate response from the Europeans present that the 
‘subsequent glass of champagne brought a welcome refreshment to the dry 
throat’. This over and done with, a deputation of the Sarekat Islam appeared 
‘on fiery horses, dressed in splendid uniforms, with black moustaches glued 
on, and bedecked with medals’. After the Deputy Chairman had been offered 
a glass of lemonade, homage was paid to Dutch rule.56
In Ambarawa festivities started with a selamatan in the kewedanaan, the house 
of the Javanese district chief, where ‘the priyayi ate and the many Europeans 
drank’. Next day the controleur delivered a speech in the city square. Natives 
and Chinese had assembled in front of the podium, Europeans had taken 
refuge in the cool of the gallery of the lieutenant-colonel’s house. All cheered 
53 De Locomotief, 9-11-1913; Gonggrijp to Idenburg, 7-11-1913, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 3-1-
1914 15.
54 De Locomotief, 13-11-1913, 19-11-1913, 1-11-1913.
55 De Locomotief, 19-11-1913, -11-1913.
56 De Locomotief, 5-11-1913.
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the controleur’s exposition, speaking first in Dutch and than in Javanese, about 
what the Netherlands had done in the past one hundred years for its colony. In 
the evening people again went to the kewedanaan. There, a Dutchmen wrote to 
De Locomotief ‘a beauty treated us to her rhythmic tandak movements, and the 
host to whisky and soda’.57 The Europeans left before midnight. The Javanese 
continued to watch the dances; the civil servants inside the kewedanaan, the 
commoners outside it.
The person who reported to De Locomotief on the celebrations in Ambarawa 
could not hide his pleasure at the demonstration of native devotion to the 
Dutch crown. It formed a good opportunity for him to lash out against those 
who had expressed doubts regarding the loyalty of the Indonesian population: 
‘Let them talk, those who dare to claim that the native would not share our 
sentiment about our independence because in the past few days in Ambarawa 
it became apparent that he harbours sentiments for the House of Orange, 
although of course less than we do’.58 It must have been a great relief – and 
letters by Dutch civil servants reporting to Idenburg on the festivities testified 
to this – after the spectre of a St Bartholomew’s Night in August, barely three 
months before to observe that Indonesians – and the equally troublesome 
Chinese and Arabs – had joined in the festivities in great numbers. 
Opposition by Indonesians and Indo-Europeans had been drowned in the 
manifestations of their fellow-countrymen who had joined in the parades and 
other festivities. From Surabaya it was reported that an Indonesian ‘trouble-
maker’ had tried to persuade the local population to boycott the festivities. A 
girl from Semarang, she was only fourteen, wrote to Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo 
that she and many of her fellow-girl pupils at the Middelbaar Uitgebreid Lager 
Onderwijs (MULO, Dutch lower secondary school) considered the anniversary 
a totok celebration in which they should not take part. She had also observed 
how members of the Indische Partij drove around in a car, with two orange 
flags and two flags of the Indische Partij, the latter boldly raised higher than 
the former, deliberately driving through Bojong, the quarter where many 
totoks lived. Elsewhere it appears to have been mostly Indonesian students 
at Western type educational institutions who had declined to participate. In 
Batavia students of the STOVIA, greatly to the annoyance of their director, had 
refused to attend in the feast organized by their school. The same had hap-
pened at the Opleidingsschool voor Inlandsche Ambtenaren (OSVIA, Training 
College for Native Civil Servants) in Bandung, Magelang, and Madiun. One 
of the reasons for the refusal of the OSVIA students in Madiun was that they 
considered the popular games too childish and below the dignity of people 
who belonged, as many of them did, to the nobility.59
57 De Locomotief, 7-11-1913.
58 De Locomotief, 7-11-1913.
59 De Indiër Vol. 1, no. 7, 1, 14, 15.
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Such outbursts of protest remained an exception. At the end of November 
Idenburg could wire Queen Wilhelmina that all population groups ‘by and 
large had celebrated the centennial feasts with great cheerfulness and with 
gratitude had commemorated what the Netherlands Indies owes to the Orange 
Dynasty’. The reply was equally high-spirited. Communicating her gratitude, 
the Queen expressed her hope that ‘God would ever seek to strengthen the 
bond between the mother country and the Indies; that the one may benefit the 
other’.60 Nevertheless, in August 1915 when Idenburg suggested celebrating in 
August the following year the centennial of the transfer of Java by the British 
to the Dutch on an at least equal scale, the response was far from positive. The 
council of the Indies pointed out that celebrations in 1913 had not been charac-
terized by sincere enthusiasm, and feared renewed Indo-European protests.61 
The ‘three exiles’, as they were known, had witnessed nothing of this. They 
had arrived in Holland on  October. With the financial support of the Tado 
Fund they and their families began a new life. All three took up residence in 
The Hague. On their arrival their they were welcomed at the railway station 
by a small crowd of about fifty people, who greeted them singing the march 
of the Indische Partij; the Indies national anthem, as it was sometimes known. 
In the Netherlands they attended meetings, gave lectures to a variety of 
organizations and political parties, including the socialist ones. Occasionally, 
when he addressed such meetings Soewardi bedecked his head with a fez. 
On one such occasion a former colonial civil servant at one such occasions 
complemented the ‘native speakers’ on their excellent Dutch. From the public 
gallery, where special seats were reserved for them, they followed the discus-
sions in parliament about their banishment in November.6
Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo enrolled as a medical student at the University 
of Amsterdam. ‘Higher education for a barbarian. My friend!’, he wrote to De 
Expres, ‘it felt so strange to take a seat in the lecture-room among the students, 
the flower of the Dutch youth’. Observing Indonesian students attending 
lectures filled him with pride. It was proof that ‘the Indiër is not as stupid 
as he is commonly depicted’.63 Besides resuming his medical studies, Tjipto 
Mangoenkoesoemo intended to carry on as a journalist. He explained that 
he refused to let down those who had contributed to the Tado Fund. He and 
Douwes Dekker were both mentioned as ‘editors in the Netherlands’ in the 
colophon of De Expres.
Shortly after his arrival Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo also became editor of De 
Indiër, a ‘weekly devoted to spiritual and material life in the Indies and East 
60 De Locomotief, 4-11-1913.
61 Idenburg to Pleyte, 30-8-1915, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 14-10-1915 P1.
6 De Locomotief, 19-11-1913.
63 De Expres, -3-1914. 
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Asia’, published in The Hague. He shared the editorship with Frans Berding, 
a friend of Douwes Dekker. De Indiër strove after an international network 
resembling that of Het Tijdschrift. In De Expres it was said that its editors 
were amongst other activities in close contact with the Committee Pro India in 
Zurich, (its members included Douwes Dekker’s old friends Walter Strickland 
and Shiyamaji Krishnavarma), with Egyptian nationalists, who have their circle in 
Geneva, with patriots from British India, with the Islamic brotherhoods in Europe, 
and it seeks constantly to widen its contacts with all who express the general resur-
gence of all Eastern peoples.64 
64 De Expres, 11-5-1914.
The three exiles in Holland. Sitting from left to right, Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo, 
E.F.E. Douwes Dekker and Soewardi Soerjaningrat. (KITLV 375.)
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Occasionally De Indiër did indeed contain the veiled references of Het Tijdschrift 
to a revolution – always explaining to the readers that the editors had a revo-
lution of ideas in mind and not physical violence. Among its contributors was 
Mathilde Deromps, now testifying to her admiration for Madan Lal Dhingra, 
the ‘killer of tyrants’. On the eve of World War I De Indiër refused to condemn 
Gavrilo Princip and his assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand. 
Soewardi entered a training college for teachers. So did his wife, whom he 
had married the day before he left for Holland. De Expres informed its readers 
that after her return to Java she wanted to ‘be useful to the education of our 
girls’.65 Soewardi also continued to be active as journalist, contributing to 
newspapers and periodicals in Holland and the Netherlands Indies. Later on 
he became the Director of the Indonesisch Persbureau (annex Brochurehandel), 
the Indonesian Press Agency (annex publisher of brochures), of which either 
on purpose or by chance the abbreviation was IP. In setting up this press 
agency, Soewardi did not just want to serve the aims of the Indische Partij. 
He believed that by providing the Dutch public with more information about 
the Netherlands Indies Dutch politicians would gradually come around and 
become more sympathetic to the nationalist cause and would take the interest 
of the colony and its inhabitants closer to their hearts. Hence, the Indonesisch 
Persbureau was not only intended to become a link between the Dutch press 
in Holland and the native press in the Netherlands Indies. It wanted to 
use whatever channel available to inform the Dutch about the Netherlands 
Indies. Organizing meetings and lectures was a priority, and cheap brochures, 
‘Indonesische brochures’, were to be published. Planned was also a series of 
‘Indische monografieën’ dealing with current topics, written by ‘an Indiër or a 
Chinese’. When the subject dealt with required this the opinions of a ‘compe-
tent Dutchman’ would also be given, ‘in the form of either an ordinary essay 
or an interview’.66 Among the first brochures were publications about the 
Indische Partij and the banishment of its three leaders. 
Douwes Dekker set out to write a ‘political handbook’, a ‘scholarly work 
about the historical evolution of the Netherlands Indies’. De Expres revealed 
that a rich friend had rented a study for him, ‘an empty room, 3rd floor in a 
suburb’. It was furnished with ‘two night tables, a chair, a gas heater and a 
lamp’. De Expres kept the address a secret, explaining that Douwes Dekker did 
not want to be disturbed while working on his book. The newspaper conclud-
ed somewhat sadly that ‘our hermit therefore will also not have much time 
to correspond’.67 Douwes Dekker’s wife followed a course in German and 
English commercial correspondence. It was hoped that this would later enable 
65 De Expres, --1914.
66 Statutes Indonesisch Persbureau.
67 De Expres, 3--1914.
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her to support the family, which would then no longer be completely depend-
ent on the Tado Fund. Cogently Douwes Dekker used his time in Holland to 
expand his relations with foreign socialists and agitators. At the end of 1913 
he travelled to Germany where among the persons he met were Karl Kautsky 
and Heinrich Cunow. Around the same time he was invited to France to dis-
cuss plans to call together an annual Asian congress with Krishnavarma and 
others. Lack of money prevented him from accepting the invitation.
None of the three was happy in Holland. After he had tried in vain to 
turn public opinion in Holland in his favour, Douwes Dekker, as he was to 
confess later, was to move to Switzerland to join in June 1914. He took up 
residence first in Versoix near Geneva and then in Zurich, where he was 
to study political economy. In 1950 in a book published in his praise it was 
said that he had done so ‘to train in the fermenting of rebellion’ (Setiabuddhi 
1950:100). Soewardi, one his Dutch political friends confessed, experienced all 
‘the miseries of an Easterner with limited means in a strange, cold, indifferent 
country’ (Fromberg 1918:16-7). He himself wrote in January 1917 that his exile 
and caring for his family had tired him mentally.68 Soewardi even had been 
among the few persons who had the courage to abuse a high civil servant at 
the Colonial Office. Th.B. Pleyte described Soewardi’s behaviour as a ‘devi-
ant outburst’.69 It occurred in February 1917 when forced by his straightened 
financial circumstances, he had decided to send his pregnant wife and child 
back to Java. The person in question had refused him access to Pleyte when 
Soewardi paid a surprise visit to the Ministry of the Colonies. He had brought 
his wife and child along so that they could bid Pleyte farewell. He also wanted 
to know whether he himself would be allowed to leave Holland on the next 
mail boat. The civil servant in question had pointed out that an appointment 
had to be made to see the minister. As Soewardi wrote to him the following 
day, he had treated him as ‘a mischievous boy’, giving him a lesson ‘in polite 
manners with some unchristian curses’.70 Soewardi had responded in kind. 
The person who suffered most from his stay in Holland was Tjipto 
Mangoenkoesoemo. Early in July 1914, Soewardi sent Pleyte a letter. Tjipto 
Mangoenkoesoemo was critically ill and might not have long to live. Pleyte 
was asked to show compassion and allow Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo to return 
to Java. Nobody, except a few colonial die-hards, had felt comfortable with 
the banishments. Even Idenburg felt some remorse. In his letter to The Hague 
of August 1913 explaining his decisions to ban the three, he had expressed 
the hope that in the not too distant future he could revoke his decision to ban 
68 Soewardi to Abendanon, 16-1-1917, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 6-6-1917 A8.
69 Pleyte to Van Limburg Stirum, 6-6-1917, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 6-6-1917 A8.
70 Soewardi to Bakhuis, 1--1917, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 6-6-1917 A8.
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Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo and Soewardi from Java.71 Of the three banish-
ments that of Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo had probably been taken with the 
greatest reluctance, that of Douwes Dekker with the most pleasure. In spite 
of what he did and was to do, Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo could still count 
on the sympathy of senior colonial officials. Being one of the Javanese who 
caused the Dutch authorities the most headaches, and not renowned for his 
sedate behaviour, he still remained a person who was viewed sympatheti-
cally. As late as August 1916 the Acting Adviser for Native Affairs, Hazeu, 
wrote that Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo had a far higher character than most of 
the leaders of the nationalist movement. He was almost universally admired 
by Indonesians for his honesty, unselfishness, and the sacrifices he made to 
help others.7
Pleyte, who had become the new Minister of the Colonies less than two 
weeks before Idenburg had signed the order to banish the three Indische 
Partij leaders, was also not unfavourably disposed. He was less in favour of 
repressive measures to curb somewhat excessive expressions of nationalism 
than his predecessor, De Waal Malefijt. Yet, loss of face had to be avoided. The 
image of the colonial administration had to be preserved. The feeling was that 
to reverse a decision of the Governor General within weeks ‘would seriously 
weaken the respect for the decisions of that Government’.73 
During the debate on the colonial budget in parliament Pleyte had already 
hinted that where a possibility to offer itself to show clemency he would seize 
the opportunity. Soewardi’s letter seemed to present an elegant solution. Pleyte 
received more detailed information from the Amsterdam physician, Professor 
C. Winkler. What he learned was alarming. Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo was 
partially paralysed and Winkler did not rule out that if his illness progressed 
Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo days were numbered. Chances of recovery were 
slight. The only hope was to allow Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo to return to 
Java, where, Winkler stressed, he would pose no threat at all to law and order. 
His energy was exhausted. Were Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo to die in exile in 
the Netherlands, Winkler ended his letter, the political significance would be 
much greater ‘though I do not understand how such a poor soul – because 
such name he now deserves – has [ever] been dangerous’. Immediately 
Pleyte sent a wire to Idenburg, suggesting the decision to banish Tjipto 
Mangoenkoesoemo to be revoked. In view of the urgency of the matter he 
asked for a reply by telegram.74
71 Idenburg to Pleyte, 5-8-1913, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 5-9-1913 56.
7 Hazeu to Idenburg, 1-8-1916, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. -11-1916 6.
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After consulting the council of the Indies, Idenburg wired back within a 
few days that he consented, providing that Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo sub-
mitted a formal request to him. Pleyte summoned Soewardi to his office, and 
explained that he as Minister of the Colonies would support such an appeal 
to Idenburg. The two also discussed who was to pay for the passage. Tjipto 
Mangoenkoesoemo was too poor to do so. Pleyte’s solution was to treat Tjipto 
Mangoenkoesoemo as an ‘indigent’ and have the state bear the cost of the 
cheapest fare. He also pointed out, but this could hardly have been a serious 
alternative in view of Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo’s health, that the latter could 
always earn a free passage on a freighter by signing on as the ship’s doctor.75 
When Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo heard about this conversation he reacted 
indignantly. In an angry letter he told Pleyte what he could do with his sugges-
tion. Correspondence with Java would take months. He was not sure that his 
health allowed such a delay. Calling Pleyte’s attention to the fact that a Dutch 
physician travelling to Java to combat the plague had been offered a first class 
passage Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo wrote that ruined and ill as he was – for 
both of which he blamed the Dutch government and the decision to exile him 
– he probably had no other alternative than to accept the offer. On arrival in 
Batavia he was prepared to be sent to Banda – the place of exile assigned to 
him in August – ‘if the vengefulness of His Excellency the Governor General 
has not yet been stilled after all the sorrow and misery experienced by me’. 
Piqued he announced his intention to return his knighthood in the Order of 
Orange Nassau. The offer of a third class fare had ashamed him. It seemed he 
had become unworthy of the distinction. Revealing that he was to make his 
letter and Pleyte’s reply public, Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo ended his letter by 
asking Pleyte to mention a date on which he could personally hand back his 
knighthood.76
In spite of the letter’s ‘highly unseemly tone [...] only partly to be excused 
by his overstrained situation’, Pleyte once more summoned Soewardi to his 
office.77 Soewardi had to convey to Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo that the colonial 
office would mediate and that correspondence with Java was to be conducted 
by wire. Returning home – they both lived in the same house in The Hague 
– Soewardi succeeded in calming Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo down. The same 
day Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo wrote two letters. One to Idenburg in which he 
asked to be allowed to return to Java as soon as possible; and one to Pleyte in 
which he offered his apologies for his earlier letter, blaming his ‘overstrained 
situation’ for its wording.78 On 7 July Idenburg revoked the banishment. 
75 Note Pleyte, 0-7-1914, Pleyte to Idenburg, 8-7-1914, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 4-7-1914-X13; 
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On  August 1914 Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo left for Java. ‘Forgotten are all 
those dark days spent here in these low countries, days of misery and want’, 
he wrote in his farewell to the readers of De Indiër, announcing that in Java he 
would again take part in the ‘renaissance’ of his fellow-countryman.79
79 De Indiër Vol. 1 no. 43.

chapter iv
The threat from the north
Non-Europeans, and some Europeans shared their accolade, had hailed 
Japan as the herald of Asia’s awakening and as an example of an Eastern 
nation which had forced the European states to treat it as an equal since it 
defeated China in 1895. Japan’s conflict with Russia put it in an even more 
prominent position in the discussions about the future of Asia. Just before 
the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War gloomy predictions had circulated 
about in- and outside the Netherlands about what a Japanese victory would 
mean for the Netherlands Indies. The correspondent of Schlesische Zeitung 
in The Hague observed that since Japan had made immense advances in the 
intellectual and material spheres, ‘It is an indisputable article of faith in the 
Dutch Archipelago that the bold state eager to spread its wings, caught up 
in the urges of its force to expand, has designs on the annexation of parts of 
the Dutch colonial possession’.1 Other contemporary newspapers, among 
them the Cairo newspaper, Al-Liwa, surmised that a Japanese victory would 
signal the end of Dutch colonial rule in Southeast Asia. It argued of all the 
European nations it was the Netherlands which had the most reason to fear 
the outcome of the war. Japan had outgrown its population. North Asia was 
not the only direction in which it sought to expand its dominion, Southeast 
Asia was also in its sight. Formosa was presented as the bridgehead to the 
Netherlands Indies, whose immense richness in natural resources was no 
secret in Japan. The Schwäbische Merkur in Stuttgart was convinced that the 
war was the catalyst to decide who would be master of the Pacific. It would 
be crucial in determining whether Japan would be content with what it had, 
or whether ‘unlimited hegemony’ in the Pacific would be its lot. In the latter 
case the Schwäbische Merkur foresaw that in the latter case the slogan ‘Asia 
for the Asians which is already resounding more openly from Tokyo into the 
world’ would sooner or later pose a real threat to the European possessions 
in East Asia. All these European colonies were well defended, except for one: 
1 Schlesische Zeitung, 18-2-1904. 
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the Netherlands Indies.2 An Italian newspaper also noted that Japan lusted 
after parts of the Netherlands Indies. Though usually when this subject came 
up, Borneo and Celebes sprang most readily to people’s lips, in this case it 
was Java which was supposed to be the cynosure of Japan’s ambitions. The 
newspaper claimed that the location of Java and its natural resources would 
be sufficient to make Japan independent of the Western Powers. In the 
Netherlands itself, the Prime Minister, A. Kuijper, went as far as to imagine 
a combined horde of Chinese and Japanese attacking Europe. During a visit 
to Brussels he expressed the fear that three hundred million people might 
launch themselves into the Old World.4 In the Netherlands Indies, people 
were more realistic about an immediate Chinese threat. What they feared was 
not China but Japan, since the signing the Anglo-Japanese Treaty in 1902 an 
ally of Great Britain. The new power constellation in the Far East disquieted 
the Dutch who feared that London might condone a Japanese advance south, 
though others argued exactly the opposite, postulating that the treaty had 
made such a move less likely (Kuitenbrouwer 1985:147). The prospects of  a 
war between Russia and Japan alarmed the pessimists, whose faith in the 
support of London in keeping the colony intact had steadily lessened because 
of the Boer War, and, farther back in history, the annexation of North Borneo. 
If  Japan won the war, De Locomotief, wrote in February 1904, its ambitions 
will be limitless. This was the explanation offered why its editor wholeheart-
edly wished Japan would suffer a good thrashing.5 
After Japan had defeated Russia, a country which many in the rest of the 
world had considered to be militarily far superior to it, Japanese aggression 
came to feature even more prominently in the aspirations and the haunted 
fantasies of people in Asia. The sheer fact that Japan, an Eastern nation, had 
successfully waged war on a Western World Power greatly impressed Asians 
and Europeans alike, the latter maybe even more than the former. Nowhere 
was this stronger the case than in the Netherlands Indies where the Dutch 
were often prey to a vague foreboding that a more powerful rival would one 
day oust them. Some, as the newspaper the Algemeen Handelsblad in Holland 
did not hesitate to do, castigated the British for having betrayed Europe and 
European interests by signing the Anglo-Japanese Treaty. Hag-ridden by its 
fear and hatred of Russia Great Britain was accused of having created a much 
more formidable rival. It had allowed Japan to become the paramount power 
in the Pacific. Inexorably the consequences would soon be felt: ‘In Asia, in its 
India, impoverished and depopulated by the plague, England will notice what 
2 Schwäbischer Merkur, 18-2-1904.
 De Indische Gids 1906:1905.
4 De Locomotief, 20-2-1904.
5 De Locomotief, 1-2-1904.
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the triumph of the yellow race over a great, Christian, white nation means. 
England will perceive in China and everywhere else how cheap labour and 
unrestrained power will enable the Japanese to bar European products from 
the market.’6
The Japanese victory also made a great impression in Indonesian society. 
Significantly, even in remote villages in Java colour pictures depicting the 
Japanese victory appeared (Thijs 1965:17-8). The vernacular newspapers dis-
cussed the event and its consequences at length (Adam 1995:10-1, 155). One 
of these, the Chinese-Malay Kabar Perniagaan (Trade News), concluded that 
Japan had become the strongest power in Asia (Adam 1995:16). In Singapore, 
Japan was praised as ‘the first successful champion of the Asiatic race to have 
arisen since the Tartar invasion of Russia, at any rate since, in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth century, Holland, Russia, France and Great Britain had con-
quered and controlled all that in Asia was worth having, except Japan.’7
Religious sentiments were not left untouched. Rumour abounded in the 
international Muslim world that the Japanese considered changing their reli-
gion (Watson Andaya 1977:18-9). That this indeed would become a reality 
was not ruled out. In 1906 in a letter to the editor of a Singapore publication, 
it was argued that under no circumstances should Christianity become the 
national religion of Japan. A Christian Japan would only add to the misery of 
the people in Asia as Christianity foreshadowed the spread of prostitution, 
addiction to drink, and the waste of luxury. Muslims prepared themselves to 
win over Japan for Islam. Some went to Japan to preach. The famous university 
of Al-Azhar in Egypt declared it was prepared to accept students from Japan. 
In the Netherlands Indies Muslims also speculated about an Islamic Japan, a 
supposition which remained alive till World War Two (Thijs 1965:19).
Japan formed a source of inspiration to those in Asia and Africa who 
detested European hegemony. In Asians eye’s Japan had shown what could be 
accomplished when people were prepared to make sacrifices and cast off old 
habits. Reflecting on the ideal of modernization and progress which educated 
Indonesians cherished at that time as the way to achieve emancipation, in 190 
a Malay newspaper compared the fate of the Javanese and the Japanese. It 
observed that the Javanese were far inferior to many other races in the world, 
which had not been the case three hundred years earlier. The reason presented 
for this decline was that the Javanese had kept to their traditional customs and 
had refused to adapt to modern life. With the Japanese it was a very different 
story. They had suddenly won so much esteem because they had discarded 
6 Algemeen Handelsblad, 1-6-1905 cited in De Indische Gids 1905:1098. 
7 Dutch Consul General in Calcutta to Van Tets van Goudriaan, 22-1-1907, NA, BuZa, A-dos. 
190, box 450.
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customs which were no longer consonant with the age.8 Others seized the 
opportunity to present Japan as an example to illustrate what a good educa-
tion system could accomplish. An article published in 1908 in the influential 
reformist Islamic newspaper al-Imam (The Leader) observed that the establish-
ment of good schools had allowed Japan to outshine the European nations and 
had made its victory over such a mighty European Power as Russia possible 
(Laffan 2006:19). Another conclusion some Indonesians drew was that edu-
cation had transformed Japan from the ‘warlike nation’ it had been into the 
‘centre of arts and science, of trade and industry in Asia’.9
Japan had become a prototype of what could be accomplished. The coun-
try had made it clear that ‘superiority was no absolute monopoly of the 
Westerners’, that ‘physical or intellectual development was not a monopoly of 
the white race’.10 As a new power Japan assumed the same function European 
nations and the United States had long held for the Asian states which had 
endured the onslaught of imperialism. As early as 1896 Japan was one of the 
countries to which the Filipino rebels of Emilio Aguinaldo had looked to for 
moral and military support. In the years before World War One, people in 
Aceh, Bali, Pontianak, and West Sumatra, convinced that Japan would certain-
ly defeat the Netherlands in a military confrontation, if it was not already pre-
paring for an invasion of the Netherlands Indies, turned to Tokyo, or at least 
this was what was rumoured, for assistance in their struggle against Dutch 
rule, and asked for intervention and the sending of warships.11 In Java there 
were also Muslims, though it is impossible to reconstruct with any exactitude 
how many, who would welcome a Japanese invasion. At the time of the Russo-
Japanese War the saying attributed to the Prophet Muhammad that Muslims 
should follow black banners (the flags of jihad) which came from the East was 
recalled in Batavia to intimate that Muslims should support a Japanese inva-
sion of Java. Such speculations meant that the colour black was suspect in the 
eyes of Dutch administrators for at least a decade to come.12 To others, who 
did not aim to oust the Dutch immediately, the accomplishments of Japan pre-
sented a pattern to be followed on the road to emancipation. Even in a journal 
published in the Middle East, the hope was expressed that the Javanese would 
learn from the Japanese show of strength.1 As Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo 
8 Bintang Hindia, -4-190, cited in De Locomotief, 11-11-190.
9 Volksraad 1918:17.
10 De Expres, 16-4-1914; speech by Soeropati at the annual congress of Insulinde, 11-4-1914 (De 
Indiër 1914:86).
11 De Waal Malefijt to De Marees van Swinderen, 18-12-1908, Spakler to Van Heutsz, 27-4-1908, 
19-2-1909, Dutch Vice Consul in Singapore to Idenburg, 20--191, NA, BuZa, A-dos. 190, box 450, 
452 and NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 17-5-191 17; Watson Andaya 1977:15-8; Ricklefs 1981:18. 
12 Bescheiden ‘Indische Partij’ 191:158.
1 Liwa, cited in Snouck Hurgonje to Idenburg 12-11-1904, NA, BuZa, A-dos. 190, box 450.
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would state shortly before the outbreak of the World War One: ‘You feel an 
awakening which in recent years has dominated the Eastern people, the devel-
opment started with Japan, it has announced itself to China, the Philippines, 
among the British Indians, and finally also among the Javanese’.14
Aware of the threat of pro-Japanese feelings in the Netherlands Indies, the 
Dutch colonial authorities viewed Japanese visiting the Archipelago or set-
tling in one of its islands with the utmost suspicion, especially when the region 
they happened to choose lay outside Java. They were convinced that these 
Japanese harboured ulterior motives and were planning to contact the domes-
tic enemies of Dutch rule to conspire to produce a reason to wrest such regions 
from the control of the Dutch. Japanese traders suspected of trying to win over 
Indonesian leaders were arrested and their entry to the Netherlands Indies 
was barred. Celebes, where part of the local elite still had not come to grips 
to the recent advances made by the incursions of Dutch rule was considered 
especially susceptible to Japanese blandishments. Individual Japanese, among 
them officers on warships which visited the island in 191, were believed to 
be trying to foster good relations with disgruntled noblemen. Such noblemen 
were suspected of having turned to the Japanese Consul in Batavia, or of plot-
ting with Japanese who happened to be visiting Celebes. In the second half of 
1915, one of its spies told the colonial government that a Japanese, clad in tra-
ditional Makassarese costume with a red sarong, a white coat, and a red velvet 
cap, had asked such noblemen for a written statement. According to this story, 
they had to list their grievances against Dutch rule and ask for help from the 
Japanese emperor.15 A second area where the situation was delicate was the 
Riau Archipelago. The Dutch were sure that the Japanese were trying to win 
over supporters of the former Sultan who had been deposed by the Dutch. 
Even the fact that Japanese were trying to conclude trading arrangements with 
such people was seen as a subversive act. It was argued that the Japanese sur-
reptitiously aimed to create the impression that the signatories still were the 
legal local heads of the population.16 
Chinese inhabitants of the Netherlands Indies formed an exception to 
shower of the admiration for Japan. Japan’s victory over Russia evoked mixed 
feelings among many of them. Indubitably also to them Japan presented 
an example of what an Asian nation could accomplish (Adam 1995:155). 
Nevertheless they were well aware that Japan aimed to expand its influence 
in China. All these apprehensions were overshadowed by the fact that in 1895 
Japan had established yet another invidious reputation, for cruelty. People 
14 De Expres, 16-5-1914.
15 Extract Gowa report J. Coenen, Idenburg to Pleyte, 17-10-1914, governor Celebes to Idenburg, 
11-10-1915, NA, Kol., Geheim, Vb. 8-1-1915 R, Vb. 16-12-1915 X14.
16 Report about meeting with Japanese Envoy, 4-6-1917, NA, Kol., Geheim, Mr. 1917/120x.
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recollected that Japanese troops were notorious for their cruel treatment of 
the civilian population of the regions its army had invaded. This meant that 
there was at least one other group in the Netherlands Indies which looked 
askance at the Japanese victory over Russia and its possible consequences 
with as much apprehension as the Dutch. Newspapers observed that Chinese 
were more interested in the course of the war than were the rest of the popula-
tion, and greeted news of Russian successes in the early days of the war with 
delight, cheering any news of Japanese set-backs.17 
When Japan emerged victorious from the two wars the country fought around 
the turn of the century, it was difficult to accept that in a short span of time 
its army and Navy had been transformed into a formidable war machine. To 
resolve the conundrum of the Japanese achievement an explanation was con-
structed which became part and parcel of the popular image of the Japanese 
among Westerners. Japan’s military performance in northern Asia was firmly 
believed to be the result of a well-organized network of military spies whose 
formation had been instrumental in the Japanese successes on the battlefields. 
It was maintained that spies who lived a humble life abroad had provided 
information which had been invaluable to the advance of Japanese troops. As 
early as 190 a British Captain claimed that the ‘whole East is sown with its 
spies’, when he reported on his visit to China just after the Boxer Rebellion. 
To illustrate his statement he mentioned the march on Peking: ‘When the 
legation was threatened, Japanese who had been working at inferior trades in 
Peking came in and revealed themselves as military officers who for months 
or years had been acquainting themselves with the plans, methods, and the 
strength of China’ (Casserly 190:49). Others made a similar observation. One 
of them was the German explorer and naturalist Albert Tafel, who had him-
self traversed Tibet disguised as a merchant around the same time. He wrote 
that Japanese spies were stationed all over Tibet, passing themselves off as 
merchants, teachers, or Buddhist monks and so forth.18
A fear of Japanese spies would re-emerge in full force on the eve of the 
outbreak of World War One, when, as contemporaries dubbed this, the ‘East 
Asiatic danger’ posed by the ‘warlike island empire’ was seen as an even more 
realistic, if not major, threat. The enemy to be prepared for was Japan. After 
the Boer War Great Britain was still represented as another candidate which 
might attack the Netherlands but was no longer frequently mentioned as such. 
The change in emphasis did not pass unnoticed: 
17 De Locomotief, 1-2-1904, 15-2-1904, 20-2-1904.
18 De Indische Gids 1906, II:1905.
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Engelsch heette toen de boeman In those days the English were the bogey-
man
waarmee men ons naar bed toe jaagt   With threats of whom we are sent to bed
Verwisselt is het nu met Japan    Now this has been replaced by Japan
‘t Gaat zoals ‘t die heer’n behaagt   Everything goes the way  that pleases those 
gentlemen.19
Japan captured the imagination of the Dutch in two ways. Nobody could 
deny it had become an industrialized nation within a relatively short period 
of time. It was thought that the Dutch could learn from this how to set about 
promoting the indigenous industrial development in Java. Consequently, and 
such plans had already been toyed with since the beginning of the century by 
the successive Ministers of the Colonies, somebody was dispatched to Japan 
by The Hague in 1914 to study whether the economic policy of the Japanese 
government held elements which could be applied in the Netherlands Indies. 
The person who was assigned to the task in May 1914 was Van Kol. Van Kol 
who at that moment was already in Japan accepted. The assignment fitted his 
ideals like a glove. As he put it himself, for years he had devoted the best of his 
energies to the promotion of a large native industry. At the outbreak of World 
War One he returned to Holland, but was allowed a second trip to Japan in 
March 1915 to conclude his research. Van Kol (1916:5) was sure that Java 
could and should follow the example set by Japan: 
And referring to Java? Why would Java pass through an evolution different from 
so many other, yea most, countries on earth? Will there as well – where the simi-
larity with Japan is really striking in numerous respects – similar causes not have 
similar consequences? Will earlier or later the unrelenting necessity not force 
the government to take a similar road to prevent further impoverishment, even 
famines? 
For some other socialists imbued with their particular belief about how society 
should evolve from one stage to another, the Japanese experience held out 
other hopes. Soon colonial society might change in a direction favourable to 
their cause. In a very short time Japan had made the transition from ‘an agrar-
ian, feudal caste society’ to one where proletarian life blossomed.20
The other side of the coin was that Japan was seen as a mighty warlike 
nation, preparing for territorial expansion. In 191 in a report about the eco-
nomic and political expansion of Japan a civil servant of the Ministry of the 
Colonies, Ch.J.I.M. Welter, concluded that every Japanese in the Netherlands 
Indies was a spy. He made much of the suspicious way in which Japanese 
19 De Expres, 14-5-1914.
20 Minutes constituent meeting ISDV (Tichelman 1985:188).
Japanese admiral as trade mark of a 
Japanese firm exporting textile to the 
Netherlands Indies (Javasche Courant, 
Trade mark 711)
Japanese admiral as trademark of a Japanese firm exporting medicines to the 
Netherlands Indies (Javasche Courant 1914, Trade mark 7182)
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officers who had visited the Archipelago in the previous years had behaved. 
By now Idenburg’s advisers on the council of the Indies had also concluded 
that Japan formed a threat.21 The following year in the Dutch newspaper De 
Telegraaf Henri Borel, a Dutch expert on China, called attention to the activities 
of the India-Japanese League, an organization founded to promote Japanese 
trade in British India, which had expanded its activities to other parts of the 
world, including the Netherlands Indies in 1911.22 Alluding to the presence of 
Japanese spies abroad, he warned that it was sufficiently well known ‘that in 
the last ten and more years of the history of the Far East “trade” has been a 
cloak under which the secret Eastern policy lurks and simultaneously beavers 
away at its most intimate plans, its most hopeful dreams’.2 He also referred to 
the stories which circulated about the Japanese military as excellent spy-mas-
ters. Indubitably the so-called spyphobia might at times take an exaggerated 
form, nevertheless, 
the Japanese Generals and admirals disguised as barber’s assistant or house serv-
ants who at the time ‘were stationed’ in Vladivostok and Port Arthur, are still too 
fresh in the mind, to find the supposition that among the bosses of the small, insig-
nificant Japanese shops in our colonies, sporadically somewhere or other certainly 
also colonels and naval commodores will be found, groundless.24 
The Japanese, a colonial official was to state in a letter to the Governor 
General early 1915, were born spies (Mulders 1987:12).
The suspicion had grown in the minds of people in the Netherlands Indies 
that influential groups in Japan contemplated a drive southwards to satisfy 
Japan’s hunger for territorial expansion. On the eve of World War One ques-
tions were asked in Dutch parliament about a power – not mentioned by name 
– where the occupation of the Netherlands Indies was openly propagated, 
and which had stationed a great many spies in the colony.25 As in the previ-
ous decade, Europeans were convinced that Japan lusted after the European 
colonies in Southeast Asia, of which the Netherlands Indies was the weakest 
example, and consequently the most vulnerable to an attack. For some this 
particular danger posed by Japan would evaporate after the opening of the 
Panama Canal. More than it had been in the past the United States was seen 
as a protective force, if not a potential naval ally. This idea was based on the 
growing animosity between Japan and the United States, in 191 leading to 
21 Advice Council of the Indies, 16-1-1914, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 7-10-1914 V20; Verboom 
1987:64; Van Gestel 1987:92-7.
22 De Expres, 11-4-1911.
2 De Indische Gids 1914, I:725.
24 De Indische Gids 1914,I :725.
25 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 191-14:195.
The Netherlands Indies and the Great War82
a clash over the treatment of Japanese immigrants in the United States and 
over Japanese support for Mexico. The opening of the Panama Canal would 
give American warships easier access to the Pacific. This, coupled with the 
growing strength of the fleets of Australia and New Zealand, would put a 
stop to Japanese arrogance and any dreams it might foster of conquering 
the Netherlands Indies. It was cautiously hoped that the new international 
power relations in the Pacific that were in the making made the possibility of 
a Japanese invasion less likely. 
Others took the opposite standpoint. In their opinion the Panama Canal 
would only increase the likelihood that the neutrality of the Netherlands 
Indies would have to be guarded. Rather than being simplified international 
relations in the Pacific would only become more complicated. Such people 
saw the Japanese-American animosity as only one of the many contemporary 
international conflicts which might well escalate into a major war. Japanese 
economic and military achievements fuelled to the belief, already manifest at 
the turn of the century, that it was the Pacific as a region of economic growth 
and potential where an armed conflict between the great powers was most 
likely to erupt. ‘The biggest source of anxiety for world diplomacy lies in the 
Far, and no longer in the Near East’, Karl Haushofer, a Major on the Bavarian 
General Staff who had lived in Japan from 1908 till 1910, explained in a 
book about Japan, at the very moment that the Balkan Wars had broken out 
(Haushofer 191:285). Economic rivalry and military build-up were bound to 
increase after the opening of the Panama Canal. The implicit conclusion was 
that Japan would almost certainly be among the belligerents in an imminent 
great war. Some of the possibilities raised at that time postulated that Japan 
might well act were the neutrality of the Netherlands Indies not meticulously 
guarded in an international armed conflict. 
The implication was that in the event of Japan’s participation in any such 
war once again the Netherlands Indies was presented as a stake in the inter-
national diplomatic game. Right from the outbreak of the war – in an effort to 
fan anti-British feelings abroad newspapers in Germany reported this to be a 
fact – it was speculated that in return for Japan’s participation London would 
promise it a free hand in the Archipelago or at least in parts of it; though others 
argued that British investments in Sumatra were too large to permit London to 
leave that island to the clutches of Japan.26 Another scenario was reported from 
Japan by J.C. Pabst, Major on the General Staff of the Colonial Army, a person 
whose opinions were highly valued by Batavia. Berlin was supposed to have 
offered parts of the Netherlands Indies to Tokyo in efforts commenced shortly 
26 De Locomotief, 8-11-1914; De Indische Gids 1914, II:1660-.
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after the outbreak of the war to detach Japan from the allies.27 Such specula-
tions would re-emerge from time to time; right up to the closing months of the 
war. In July 1918 when Iswestia revealed that in February 1915 Moscow had 
been prepared to allow Japan to seize parts of the Netherlands Indies (Borneo, 
Java, and Celebes were mentioned in the German press) in return for a more 
active Japanese participation in the war in Europe, people again discussed the 
possibility that this still might happen even though Russia had withdrawn 
from the war. Amid the furore, among the persons who stressed that Japan 
had no intention to invade the Netherlands Indies was Van Kol, acclaimed as 
a Japan specialist. He argued that the Dutch open door policy left Japan noth-
ing to gain from invading the Netherlands Indies. The story was also denied 
by the allies, including the Japanese government. For some this offered little 
consolation. Had not British politicians lied about the British military links 
with France in the months before the war?28    
Suspicion of Japan was strengthened by the fact that in the pre-war years 
Japanese had begun, albeit still in very modest fashion, to make their econom-
ic presence in the Archipelago felt. The colonial race in the Pacific had shown 
that peaceful penetration could well be a prelude to military intervention. 
Japanese immigrants, though their numbers were still small, became a source 
of concern, as were Japanese investments.29 In both cases ulterior motives 
were suspected. Consequently, a ‘strong increase’ in the number of Japanese 
taking up residence in the Netherlands Indies was anxiously observed. People 
speculated that the influx might well accelerate in future because Hawai’i and 
the Philippines had now been closed to Japanese immigrants and Washington 
was considering a ban on immigration from Asia.
An additional danger apprehensively perceived was that were Japanese 
immigrants to feel threatened or discriminated against they might well turn 
to their home country for military assistance. Japan could, as other nations 
had done in other parts of the world, use real or imagined maltreatment 
of its citizens in the Netherlands Indies as an excuse for an invasion. Even 
when the Japanese did nothing wrong people were not sure that there was 
no danger looming. In July 1914, writing about Japanese settlers in Kuala 
Lumpur, De Locomotief remarked that law-abiding, diligent Japanese tended to 
make people forget that Japan was one of the most imperialistically oriented 
nations in the world, and that such immigrants, easily and for the most trivial 
reason, could turn to their government to ask it to intervene were they find 
27 Pabst to dep. VII General Staff, 5-1-1915, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 0--1915 Y5.
28 De Indische Gids 1918, II:1129-0; Koloniale Studiën 1918, II:524-5.
29 At the end of 1914, there were 84 male and 286 female Japanese living in Java. In the rest 
of the Netherlands Indies 1,816 male and 1,078 female Japanese had settled, NA, Kol. Geheim, 
Vb. 22-9-1915 W11.
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fault with their treatment in their host country.0 Indicative of such feelings of 
fear that the great powers might use any excuse to invade was an editorial in 
De Locomotief in July 1916. Its editor wrote that it was generally expected that 
would the Philippines indeed be granted self-rule riots would erupt which 
would give Japan the excuse to invade.1  
There was a prevalent Japannervrees, Japanophobia, or ‘Japanitis’ as the 
press chose to dub this. Criticism of colonial conditions in the Japanese press 
stoked apprehension. Such articles were perceived to be in a similar vein to 
the arguments adduced by European nations to justify their own colonial 
expansion, namely as an excuse to act in order to redress wrong and abuses. 
Fear went hand in hand with disdain. The Japanese community was held in 
low esteem. In the eyes of the Dutch apart from the occasional trader and 
shopkeeper, it consisted mostly of peddlers (of whom some travelled around 
selling medicine throughout the length and breadth of the Archipelago, whom 
the Dutch suspected were not much interested in their trade immediately 
incurring the suspicion that they were spies), whores, and brothel-keepers.2 
The occasional trader and shopkeeper could also not count on much sympa-
thy. Writing about such people on the East Coast of Sumatra and in Singapore 
in 1916 it was observed that a Japanese was ‘not thought to be a pleasant 
human being’. At best, when it was opportune to write something nice about 
Japan, the country was blamed for allowing persons who did not know how to 
behave to come to the Netherlands Indies. The Soerabaiasch Handelsblad stated 
in 1917 that the Japanese lacked ‘civilized pioneers’, persons who obeyed the 
laws of the Netherlands Indies, who were able to adjust themselves to the local 
customs, and had learned to act sociably.4 Another author suggested that arti-
cles in the European press in the colony attacking the activities of the Japanese 
in the Netherlands Indies did no harm. Even in Japan, those who travelled to 
the Netherlands Indies were considered ‘outlaws’ and people ‘who lived on 
the fringe of civilization.’ Criticizing the behaviour of such fellow-countrymen 
did not offend the ‘really civilized Japanese’.5 Nevertheless, such a position 
did raise doubts. There was a suspicion that as nobody was allowed to leave 
Japan without the express permission of the government, Japanese emigration 
was deliberately directed by Tokyo.6 
The colonial government also had its misgivings. It feared that Japanese 
0 De Locomotief, 10-7-1914.
1 De Locomotief, 10-7-1916.
2 Koloniaal Tijdschrift 1917, I:96; Van Gestel 1987:97-100.
 De Locomotief, 2--1916.
4 Soerabaiasch Handelsblad, cited in De Indische Gids 1918, I:78.
5 De Indische Gids 1918b, I:51-6. 
6 Remarks about Ernst Grünfeld’s Die japanische Auswanderung, 191, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 
22-7-1914 O1.
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spies were mapping strategic mountain passes and roadsteads to facilitate an 
invasion, and that representatives of the Japanese government had tried to 
befriend disgruntled rulers and former rulers in the Archipelago. In October 
1914 J. Loudon, the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, informed the Dutch 
Envoy in Tokyo that sometimes action against Japanese citizens had to be 
taken. He stated this at a moment when the involvement of the Netherlands in 
the war and a subsequent attack by Japan on the Netherlands Indies seemed 
a likely scenario.7 Anticipating complaints by the Japanese government, 
he provided the Envoy with a list of examples of the behaviour of Japanese 
nationals in the Netherlands Indies, who the colonial authorities suspected of 
having specific aims in mind detrimental to Dutch interests. Loudon urged 
his Envoy to present the data to the Japanese government ‘in a friendly way’. 
Were this handled delicately enough, then Tokyo might understand why in 
some cases the colonial authorities had deemed arrests and deportations of 
Japanese necessary.8
One of the reasons for Loudon’s action was that Batavia had become 
convinced that Japanese investors were angling to acquire land at militarily 
strategic spots. It was feared that their principal motive was not economic gain 
which would have been the case with other foreign investors, but that they 
were motivated by military considerations. They wanted to take hold of tracts 
of land with little economic value but harbouring great strategic importance 
located along the coast of the Minahasa in northern Sulawesi, in the Riau 
Archipelago, and along the mountain passes near Padang and its port on the 
West Coast of Sumatra, the gateways to the interior of the island.9 
Such suspicions put Batavia and The Hague in a awkward position. Even 
before 1914 Batavia had pleaded that Sulawesi be closed to ‘undesirable 
elements from Japan’. The Hague for obvious reasons – and fearful of how 
Japan would react – could not allow this sort of discrimination of Japanese 
subjects.40 It could only agree to secret measures to be taken by Batavia to 
prevent Japanese acquiring long-term leases on land wherever they wanted in 
the Archipelago. To make it impossible that such places could be used to assist 
the operation of a foreign fleet in the territorial waters of the Netherlands 
Indies (the sailing of the Russian Baltic fleet to Asia had hammered home the 
importance of protected places close to shore to coal), in October 1912 regional 
civil servants were urged in by Batavia to be on the alert for foreigners anxious 
to acquire agricultural concessions in coastal regions or in areas along rivers 
7 Loudon to Van Asbeck, 14-10-1914, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 18-8-1915 J11.
8 Loudon to Van Asbeck, 14-10-1914, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 18-8-1915 J11.
9 Van Asbeck to Idenburg, 18-5-1915, Idenburg to Van Asbeck, 2-6-1915, NA, Kol. Geheim, 
Vb. 5-8-1915 A11. 
40 Idenburg to Pleyte, 6--1914, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 7-10-1914 V20.
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which were navigable by sea-going vessels. Before allowing any such deals 
to be struck the opinion of the Commanders of the ColonialArmy and Navy 
had to be sought. Initially the Japanese were not mentioned by name, but it 
was clear to everybody that for ‘foreigners’ Japanese should be read. If there 
was still any lingering doubt, this was removed by a second circular issued by 
Batavia in February 191. It explained to civil servants outside Java that such 
advice always had to be asked if the request for a concession came from the 
Japanese, or from somebody of whom it could be assumed that he acted in 
their name. A year later, in March 1914, the civil servants were ordered to keep 
a constant (but discreet) watch over concessions already granted. They had to 
alert Batavia immediately if there was any suspicion that military instead of 
commercial and industrial aims were being pursued.41
These ‘top secret’ directives were issued with some trepidation. As in the 
case of the immigration of Japanese labourers, a formal ban could not be pro-
claimed. This would be in violation of the officially pledged open door policy; 
and especially in times of international tension could become a political liabili-
ty were Tokyo ever to be resolved to redress the discrimination of the Japanese 
the instructions implied. The latter seemed a likely prospect. The directives 
issued on how to deal with Japanese investments in land had fortified Dutch 
civil servants in their opinion that Japanese were potential enemies. A series 
of Japanese complaints had been the result. In turn these had made the policy 
makers in the Netherlands Indies fear that anti-Dutch sentiments could take 
hold in Japan. The civil servants, of course, had to investigate ‘Japanese machi-
nations’, but they had to do so with prudence and tact to avoid the Japanese 
who were suspected of ulterior motives taking offence.42 It was glaringly obvi-
ous a different approach was necessary, but to those who had to develop new 
guidelines it was not altogether clear what form it should take. One solution 
proposed was to try to attract non-Japanese capital, in this way limiting the 
opportunities for the Japanese to invest.4
Besides the investors believed to be seeking out strategic spots deliber-
ately there was also the spectre of Japanese spies and agents contacting local 
rulers outside Java as a first step to establishing protectorates in the Archipelago 
to think about. How to keep track of Japanese spies and potential saboteurs 
formed a major problem. At the time of the Russo-Japanese War and the sail-
ing of the Baltic fleet, Idenburg had turned for help to the main Dutch ship-
41 Circular Kindermann, 6--1914, Kindermann to Governor Celebes, 2-10-1915, Idenburg to 
Pleyte, 26-10-1915, note department C1 Colonial Office, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 7-10-1914 V20, 16-
12-1915 X14, 5-1-1916 L1.
42 Kindermann to Governor Celebes, 2-10-1915, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 16-12-1915 X14. 
4 Idenburg to Pleyte, 26-10-1915, note Department C1 Colonial Office, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 
5-1-1916 L1.
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ping lines plying Asian waters, the steam-shipping companies Nederland and 
Rotterdamsche Lloyd, and the Java-China-Japan Line. Captains of their mail-
boats were asked to notify the colonial administration if among the foreign pas-
sengers on board there were people whom they suspected of being a spy. They 
had to look out for ‘passengers of a foreign nationality, of whom one knows or 
suspect that they are officers’.44 All three lines promised to cooperate. 
The request had not produced any results. The involvement of captains of 
the mail-boats proved a failure and captains of Japanese vessels could hardly 
be expected to cooperate. A more efficient solution had to be found. With 
Japanese particularly in mind in 1911 the Commander of the Colonial Army, 
G.C.E. van Daalen, pleaded for the establishment of an intelligence service 
(Verboom 1987:64). Two years later he urged for stricter immigration rules. 
For the time being Van Daalen’s suggestions were not headed. The colonial 
administration wanted to abide by immigration rules which were ‘as strict as 
possible for Chinese, Arabs and the like, who used to come to here as paupers 
and to live off and enrich themselves at the expense of the Native population’, 
but for others, including Japanese, were as liberal as they could be.45 To pro-
mote this policy all foreigners were charged a twenty-five guilder fee when 
they entered the Netherlands Indies.
From time to time between 1914 and 1918 anxiety about a Japanese inva-
sion would lead to waves of intensified apprehension. In the second half of 
1914, the prospect of Japanese espionage emerged to haunt the authorities and 
the public alike in full force.46 The mood was such that Idenburg’s secretary, 
A.C.D de Graeff, concluded in September 1914 that some policemen tended 
to see a spy in every Japanese.47 Japanese who had the misfortune to travel 
with detailed maps in their possession, or who were spotted near strategic 
sites such as fortifications and ports ran the risk of being arrested, especially if 
they were bold enough to take pictures. One of the persons to whom this hap-
pened was a representative of the South Manchuria Railway Company who 
had come to Java to study the coal market. Arrested in September 1914 for 
taking pictures in Tanjung Priok he was detained in a police cell for a couple 
of hours, during which to his great consternation he had not been allowed to 
have a meal. To make matters worse a police mug shot was taken of him. A 
protest by the Japanese Consul, S. Ukita, was in order. The Consul complained 
that ‘for an innocent man the idea of being photographed by the police is tan-
tamount to an insult’. Ukita admitted that under the present circumstances it 
44 Idenburg to Van Heutsz, 0-1-1905, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 0-1-1905 K.
45 Van Daalen to Idenburg, 5-11-191, 14-2-1914, Cordes to Idenburg, 19-5-1914, Idenburg to 
Pleyte, 4-12-1915, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 2-2-1916 W2.
46 Van Asbeck to Loudon, 20-6-1916, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 0-8-1916 A10.
47 De Graeff to Attorney-General, 25-9-1914, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 18-11-1914 C2.
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had not been very wise to take photos of a harbour, but ‘Japanese tourists vis-
iting these colonies and going around with their camera to take photographs 
of open places should not be subject to any suspicion and enjoy the same 
what Dutch certainly have, in spite of it being times of war, to go about with 
a camera in Japan’. Idenburg concluded that in the case of this Japanese ‘with 
a certain social position’, Ukita had a point. In future police officers should 
act with ‘moderation’ in their dealings with Japanese. In September 1914 De 
Graeff wrote on Idenburg’s instructions that in no case should Japanese when 
arrested be treated ‘as vagabonds or criminals’.48
Distrust of Japanese intentions continued to plague the colonial administra-
tion and the Dutch public throughout the war. There were fears that Japanese 
spies were busily engaged in Sabang and other important ports. In Padang 
suspicion was aroused because there were five to six Japanese shops in such 
a small town and that each had a large staff, which changed every so many 
months, and consisted, so the description ran, of disciplined young men.49 In 
Surabaya the editor of the Soerabaiasch Handelsblad called attention to the many 
Japanese bars which were frequented by sailors of the Colonial Navy.50 In the 
same city a Japanese ‘vendor of sweets and biscuits’ was taken for a ‘disguised 
Major on the Japanese General Staff’ as he was selling his wares near one of 
the coastal batteries in January 1916. De Locomotief reported on the case under 
the headline ‘The Japanese Spying Farce’.51
The first instruction of September 1914 setting out how to treat Japanese 
after their arrest seems to have been generally disregarded. In early 1917 new 
guidelines were issued. Again police officers were asked not to be overhasty 
in arresting Japanese and to treat Japanese suspects politely, addressing them 
as ‘sir’. The suggestion provoked the scorn of the newspaper the Sumatra Post, 
which under the headline Toean Yap vehemently attacked the attitude that had 
inspired the instruction: ‘that submissiveness, that fear of conflicts, that fear of 
the strong neighbour, in short Dutch diplomacy which has already sunk so low 
that it orders government employees to address recalcitrant individuals [...] 
with toean’. The Sumatra Post observed that Japanese all over the Archipelago 
acted arrogantly, and in view of this the circular was another example of the 
‘ridiculous compromises’ which were compelled by ‘anxious times for small 
nations’. The colonial administration should not yield to Japanese pressure.52 
Some Chinese, but for a completely different reason, were also irritated by 
Dutch kid gloves approach to the Japanese. In 1918 in Medan the newspaper 
48 Ukita to Kindermann, 15-9-1914, Ukita to Idenburg, 18-9-1914, decision Idenburg, 25-9-1914, 
De Graeff to Attorney-General, 25-9-1914, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 18-11-1914 C2.
49 NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 5-8-15 A11.
50 Soerabaiasch Handelsblad, cited in De Indische Gids 1916, I:786.
51 De Locomotief, 26-1-1916.
52 Sumatra Post, cited in De Indische Gids 1917, I:674.
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Andalas observed that Chinese were usually dealt with rudely by the Dutch, 
and Japanese, whatever their social standing was, never. The newspaper pre-
sented an explanation for this: the Dutch feared the Japanese jujitsu.5 
The scaremongering about Japanese spies and agents was characteristic of 
the suspicions about Tokyo’s malicious intentions. In 1915 the fear that Japan 
might act induced retired Officers of the Colonial Army and Navy to found a 
union, Bendor, to safeguard their pensions, which might be threatened were 
the Netherlands Indies to be lost. For the same reason former colonial civil 
servants living in Holland followed their example. In the latter case the initia-
tive was taken in The Hague by a former Resident of Madura, F. Fokkens. In an 
article published in a number of newspapers, in June 1915 he appealed to civil 
servants and widows of civil servants to unite in view of ‘a great danger’ that 
threatened them (Fokkens 1916:). He warned them that in the past nobody 
had given a thought to the possibility of the loss of the Netherlands Indies, 
convinced that the rivalry between the major powers would prevent this. The 
war had shown that such a guarantee counted for nothing. Were the colony 
to be conquered by an enemy, it was by no means certain that the Dutch 
state would be obliged to pay the former colonial civil servants their pen-
sions, as this expenditure was drawn from the colonial and not the national 
budget. He received a great many positive responses and one month later the 
Bond van Indische Ambtenaren, the Union of Indies Civil Servants (later to 
become Pension Union of Indies Civil Servants), was established. It started 
modestly with about three hundred members. Admittedly the appeal had not 
been greeted with acclaim by everybody. At least one newspaper, the Nieuwe 
Courant, refused to publish the appeal, considering Fokkens’s assessment that 
the Netherlands could well lose its colony in Asia defeatist.54 
5 Andalas, cited in De Locomotief, 4-6-1918.




Each time international tension mounted, whether in Europe or in Asia, discus-
sions flared up about the strength of the army and the Navy and their poten-
tial role in repelling an invasion. At one end of the spectrum stood those who 
argued that the Navy would never be able to defeat an enemy fleet and that 
the land forces would have to be relied on for the defence of the Netherlands 
Indies. Carried to the extreme, the consequences of this view were that the 
Navy only needed one or two larger vessels to show the Dutch flag abroad 
and to impress the natives. No money should be expended on building large 
well-armoured and heavily armed ships (Boeka 1903:15). Others advocated 
precisely the opposite. Because the Netherlands could never fit out an army 
large enough to drive back an invader, not even were all the forces to be con-
centrated in Java, all available means should be earmarked for the build-up of 
the fleet.1 Generally, whether it was in 1870, 1900, 1904 or 1914, such discus-
sions tended to assume a fatalistic, pessimistic, and at times hysterical tone. 
The debate centred on weaknesses and not on strengths.
Civilians did not put much faith in either the colonial army or the Navy. 
Both failed rather dismally to impress. The fleet the Dutch maintained in 
Netherland Indies waters was not exactly best suited to a demonstration of 
might. Its ships were outdated and small. Many of its sailors suffered from 
venereal diseases. In the Netherlands Indies about half of the crew members 
was affected. Nine per cent had contracted syphilis.3 Naval command tried 
to remedy the situation, but without avail. One of the rather naive measures 
taken had been to forbid shore leave in the evening. It did not work. The oppo-
site was in fact observed: a significant increase.
The social gap that separated the ordinary crewmen from the established 
society was great. A telling example of this was what happened during the 
visit of the warship Friesland to Padang in 1904. Unquestionably her arrival 
cheered up life in the city. The ‘Music, Drama and Gymnastic Society of 
1 Indische Gids 1900, I:641.
 For a thorough analysis of colonial defense policy between 189 and 190, see Teitler 1988.
3 Handelingen Eerste Kamer 1913-14:365.
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the Petty Officers and Ratings’ put on a performance in the local club, De 
Eendracht. The audience was entertained with a comedy, ‘My lieutenant’, and 
comical sketches, the customary fare on such occasions in those days. The 
sailors made a good impression, not least because they showed a ‘decent and 
helpful attitude’ and had seen to it that ‘nobody, that is to say at least not the 
women, had to sit beside the sailors of lower rank’.4
Similar remarks can be made about the army. In 1904 De Locomotief con-
cluded that it was ‘ill-trained and exhausted by the daily fight against the 
internal enemy, partly unshod and improperly armed’.5 Around the same time 
the same newspaper maintained that the army would not be able to accom-
plish much against a foreign enemy.6 The army about which De Locomotief 
was writing consisted of European and indigenous soldiers. Neither group 
inspired the general public with much confidence. Many of the European sol-
diers had been enticed by the bounty they received on enlisting, had signed 
up to try to escape poverty, or were on the run from the law. Soldiers were 
considered riff-raff and consequently treated as such. The European soldiers 
hovered on the fringes of the European colonial society. Even in the eyes of 
the Indonesian population, soldiers were inferior to other Europeans. As a 
newspaper noted around the turn of the century every Dutchman was a sir, a 
toean, to the natives. The exception was the soldiers, who were simply called 
soldadoe, soldiers.7 
Indonesian soldiers, two thirds of them Javanese, did not fare much better 
in the public opinion of the European community. A note from the Department 
of the Colonies in 1906 observed that such soldiers came from the bottommost 
layers of society.8 Except at the times when their service was needed, all the 
prejudices the white European community cherished about the Indonesian 
population and its various ethnic groups resurfaced in full force when their 
performance in battle was discussed. On the eve of the Russo-Japanese War 
De Locomotief wrote on a number of occasions that many native soldiers came 
from races devoid of military qualities, imbued with no or little martial spirit. 
The Javanese were useless in battle. They could not take on even an ‘inferior’ 
internal enemy on their own and when going into battle against such oppo-
nents had to be accompanied by European soldiers.9 Native soldiers were 
dressed in European uniforms, but this did not make them good soldiers in 
European eyes. The fact that they went barefoot, as did the majority of the 
4 De Locomotief, -3-1904.
5 De Locomotief, 5-1-1904, 3-1-1904.
6 De Locomotief, 7--1904.
7 De Locomotief, 8--1904.
8 Note Department C, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 13-7-1906 Q15.
9 De Locomotief, 5-1-1904, 3-1-1904.
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population, made them even less soldierly figures in the eyes of many white-
men. Presumably shoes made the good soldier. When the matter of Dutch 
troops joining the expeditionary force in China had come up, it was argued 
that nothing was wrong with sending Indonesian troops, as long as they were 
Ambonese soldiers – who wore shoes – who were sent, and not others who 
still went barefoot.10
As late as 1913 De Locomotief wrote that the European, Ambonese and 
Manadonese soldiers could make good soldiers under the capable guidance 
of the Dutch officers. The Javanese were a different story. Most of them lacked 
the required physical and intellectual endowments. Even so, there was a gleam 
of hope. Till recently, De Locomotief continued, the Javanese had lacked the 
requisite physical and mental training in their youth, but times were chang-
ing. In ‘our peculiar days’ the emergence of a nationalist movement had also 
manifested itself in an increased care of their bodies among the Javanese.11 The 
colonial army, it was also argued at that time in the Dutch senate, could not be 
expanded simply by recruiting more soldiers from among the local popula-
tion; that would be detrimental to its fighting capability.1 That same year mili-
tary experts had also decided that, for fighting a foreign enemy or for action in 
regions in the Archipelago home to warlike populations, half of the troops, no 
more, should consist of native soldiers, not more.13 Despite such stereotypes, 
hesitantly the idea dawned that Indonesian soldiers were in fact not inferior 
to their European brothers-in-arms. In Parliament L.F. Duymaer van Twist 
pointed out that there were ‘many good elements among the natives’. In the 
artillery corps they could hold their own with Europeans. What they lacked in 
physical strength, they made up by ‘thought, calmness, and caution’.14
The struggle for hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region in the early twen-
tieth century in which Japan, Great Britain, Russia, the United States, and 
Germany were the main contestants put the strengthening of the Dutch Navy 
high on the agenda. The danger of the threat of war was considered to loom 
largest in the colony, not in Europe. It had been argued as early as 1904 that 
the warships needed there should be more up-to-date than those in Holland 
itself. For the defence of the North Sea coast warships of the existing types, 
cast-offs so it were, would suffice.15 Ten years later the Minister of the Navy, 
J.J. Rambonnet, explained in Parliament that in Europe the main task of the 
Dutch fleet was to assist the army in guarding neutrality. The strategic location 
10 De Locomotief, 0-7-1900.
11 De Locomotief, 0-10-1913, 1-11-1913.
1 Handelingen Eerste Kamer 1913-14:65.
13 Rapport 1913:9.
14 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1913-14:1339.
15 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1904-05:66-3.
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of the homeland coupled with the rivalry between Great Britain and Germany 
made it unlikely that the Netherlands would become a party in a conflict in 
Europe. In the Netherlands Indies the threats of war were greater. In contrast 
to Holland, where the army formed an essential part of the defence strategy, 
in the Netherlands Indies it was the Navy that would have to bear the brunt 
of resisting foreign aggression.16
As elsewhere in the world on the eve of World War One, in the Netherlands 
voices pleading for a strong defence force became more vocal, especially when 
the Netherlands Indies was concerned. The question of whether the days of 
Dutch rule there without such a force were not numbered was hotly debated 
at home as well as in the colony. Many alarmist scenarios were presented. 
Fear intensified at the time of the Balkan Wars, when especially De Expres 
manifested what Rinkes called ‘evident nervousness’.17 Believing that the 
great powers were eventually to be dragged willy-nilly into the conflict, the 
newspaper urged ‘the comrades’ to organize and prepare for the moment 
that Java would have to face an aggressor. The appeal was an indication that 
the leaders of the Indische Partij seized upon the contemporary international 
tension as yet another opportunity to show that they were good patriots. At 
the meeting at Maison Vogelpoel, the situation was used to argue that the 
fear shown by the authorities, a fear which some Indo-European were sure 
was justified, of arming the Indiërs was short-sighted. Had the Balkan Wars 
exploded into a European conflict, there could have been a very good chance 
that Japan would have used the occasion to invade the Netherlands Indies. 
Without arms the Indiërs would have been forced to stand idly by as the 
Dutch flag was lowered.18 
Pessimists expected war, not lasting peace. H.C.C. Clockener Brousson, a 
former lieutenant in the colonial army, who had earned himself some fame as a 
journalist, claimed the efforts to prevent a major war would be unavailing. The 
Peace Palace, inaugurated in The Hague in 1913 and optimistically described 
in De Locomotief as the ‘most modern of all international institutions’, was no 
more than an additional sight in that city:
Vredesbonden, stomme honden!  Peace Bonds, stupid fools!
Dat weerhoudt geen wereldmacht.  Do nothing to restrain World Powers
Maar een vloot naar zee gezonden,  But to launch a fleet,
Stomme honden!  Stupid fools!
Dat beduidt voor Indië: ‘Kracht’.19  For the Indies that means ‘Power’.
16 Handelingen Eerste Kamer 1913-14:48, Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1913-14:1366.
17 Rinkes to Idenburg, 16-1-1913 (Bescheiden ‘Indische Partij’ 1913:158).
18 Extract minutes constituent meeting Indische Partij, 15-1-191, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 7-3-
1913 35.
19 De Indiër 1-:18; De Locomotief, 3-10-1913.
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As in 1900 for some, and probably for more people than at the turn of the cen-
tury, the big powers seemed to be teetering on the threshold of a major war. 
In 1913 when the Dutch Parliament discussed the banishment of the three 
Indische Partij leaders, for instance, one of its members suggested that the 
debate had already dragged on for much too long. Instead of inconsequent 
blathering, issues of real importance should be raised. One of these was the 
defence of the Netherlands: ‘One day there will be fighting, perhaps even 
very soon’, he exclaimed to add punch to his words.0 
It was an open secret that the Dutch fleet which had to guard the Netherlands 
Indies, which since 1905 was known as the Dutch Squadron in the East Indies, 
falling under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Navy in The Hague (and 
not as the colonial army did under that of the colonies), did not count for 
much. During the Russo-Japanese War De Locomotief had to admit that, read-
ing the many complaints in Dutch newspapers and magazines about the con-
dition of Dutch warships and the state of the Navy, made people dispirited.1 
As a consequence of the scare raised by the Russo-Japanese War, a new plan 
had been drawn up in 1906 to bring naval defence up-to-date. It opted for a 
fleet depending on fast, but small torpedo-boats. The plan had been presented 
almost at the very moment that Great Britain launched its first dreadnought. 
There had been no follow-up. In fact the size of warships had only grown big-
ger, and they were armed with increasingly heavy guns. All over the world 
countries were building and ordering dreadnoughts. The Dutch fleet had none 
of these new, large battleships. The defence of the Archipelago was entrusted 
to a number of destroyers, a few ironclads, and armoured plated battleships. 
The most pessimistic evaluation was that maybe one of these ships still pre-
served some battle-worthiness. An alarmist pamphlet claimed in 1914 that 
the combined firing power of the Dutch battleships was inferior to that of one 
single modern dreadnought of which class Great Britain, Germany, and Japan 
had many in their navies.3 Politicians tended to agree. Idenburg considered 
the fleet to be ‘nothing but a heap of rust’, while naval command dismissed 
the Dutch fleet as a quantité négligeable.4 Rambonnet, himself a former naval 
officer, had to admit that the Dutch fleet did not amount to much, and in 
expressing this view he did not differ much from his predecessors, who 
almost without exception had stressed this point in an attempt to boost the 
Navy budget.5 
0 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1913-14:47.
1 De Locomotief, 18--1904.
 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1913-14:1355.
3 Neerlands ondergang1914:6. 
4 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1913-14:1339; Bijl de Vroe 1980:56.
5 Handelingen Eerste Kamer 1913-14:418.
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Socialist agitation, in the pre-war years much better organized and effective 
in the Navy than in the army, gave the authorities additional cause for concern. 
For those on the right side of the political spectrum, the ‘undermining class 
struggle’, as it was sometimes dubbed, had resulted in what some regarded 
as a ‘red fleet’. The Bond van Minder Marine-Personeel, the Union of Lower-
Ranking Naval Personnel, had won considerable support among sailors. Its 
periodical, Het Anker, The Anchor, was widely read. In spite of efforts by some 
of the naval officers to check their crews’ mail in order to confiscate the maga-
zine, this situation had prevailed since the beginning of the century. Such was 
the worry of the naval authorities about the influence of socialist propaganda, 
that in March 1914 when sailors stationed at the naval base in Surabaya were 
invited by the association Concordia to attend the full dress-rehearsal of a 
play, their commander forbade them to march as a group from the union 
building to the theatre. Such a procession was seen as a violation of the ban on 
sailors participating in demonstrations. When the sailors – one hundred and 
seventy-five in all – disregarded the ban and did indeed march as a group to 
the theatre, they were kept under close guard by an armed patrol.6
From time to time senior officers, among them the Commander of the Navy 
in the Netherlands Indies, called for stern action to be taken against the union 
and its activists. In doing so they could count on the support of Rambonnet, 
a convinced enemy of Het Anker and all the magazine stood for. De Expres 
described him as ‘the god of war of the Dutch fleet, the fierce opponent of the 
red spectre on board ships’.7 Rambonnet stated in parliament, speaking he 
claimed from personal experience, that on the whole individuals sailors were 
a cooperative sort of people. It was only the ‘powerful collective suggestion, 
the belief in the class struggle’, and collective psychological phenomena such 
as ‘loss of individual observation, individual responsibility and individual 
critical judgement’ that made them susceptible to ‘inflated words and extrem-
ist feelings’.8 Such an observation did not go down well with representatives 
of the Dutch socialist party, who in turn pointed out the contribution of the 
Union of Lower-Ranking Naval Personnel to combating of moral abuses in the 
Navy, including rampant alcoholism.
Crewing was a major problem. The Navy was troubled by a shortage of 
sailors; not of officers, of whom there were too many, but among the rat-
ings. The dearth had forced the Minister of the Navy to reduce the auxiliary 
squadron to five ships. A tour of duty in the tropics was considered to be an 
unhealthy one for the European sailors – a reason why the Dutch naval min-
ister welcomed visits by Dutch warships to cooler regions such as China and 
6 De Expres, 11-3-1914.
7 De Expres, 17-6-1914.
8 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1913-14:1373.
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Japan – to which a crew which had just returned home should not be submit-
ted again too soon. Recruitment decreased over the years and in 1913 only one 
hundred and fifty boys volunteered to enter the service and become a sailor. 
Animo to sign on was not great. One major reason for this was that a sailor 
had to serve a period of three years at a stretch in Asia. Another argument 
presented to explain why people – and according to some especially boys and 
parents from devout Christian families – were put off was the rough, immoral 
life of a seaman liberally dosed with booze and sex, notably when on duty in 
the colony, where, as Rambonnet chose to put it in 191, sailors were forced to 
observe an unnatural abstinence.
Forced to deal with a shortage of crew, in March 1913 an experiment was 
launched to recruit Indonesians, who up to then had served only in very 
minor positions as batmen to naval officers and the like, to become what were 
dubbed ‘war sailors’ in the auxiliary fleet. Even when properly trained these 
first Indonesian sailors were considered inferior to their Dutch colleagues. 
Consequently – Pleyte was to stress that this was only a temporary measure 
– they received less pay. The experiment held out the extra advantage that, if 
it were successful, Indonesians could take the place of some of the European 
sailors, who considered their long tour of duty in the colony an ‘inevitable 
disaster’.9
Opinions about the prospects of recruiting Indonesian sailors were mixed. 
The staunchest advocates of the plan were to be found in circles close to the 
Indische Partij. Clockener Brousson argued that there were various ethnic 
groups from whom good sailors could be recruited. They would not be infe-
rior to those who served in the Japanese Navy, and certainly would show 
themselves more committed to defending the Netherlands Indies, which was 
their homeland, than Dutch ‘hirelings’.30
As when under similar circumstances Indonesians had entered a field of 
employment previously closed to them, it was hard for some of the Dutch to 
admit that Indonesians could qualify. Reliability, honesty, discipline – and in 
this instance also sexual abstinence – were traits reserved for the own race. 
Officers argued that the Indonesians were too indolent, lacked resolution and 
failed to remain calm in tense circumstances so essential to ‘the modern fight-
ing sailor’. Moreover, they did not have the necessary energy. A Dutch sailor 
could do three times as much work.31 Actual facts refuted such observations. 
In parliament Pleyte stressed that indigenous Indonesians would make excel-
9 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1913-14:54.
30 De Indiër 1-:18.
31 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1913-14:554-5; Idenburg to Pleyte, 17-3-1914, NA, Kol. Geheim, 
Vb. 1-1-1914 Q3.
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lent gunners. In target practice they outperformed Dutch sailors.3 
Agitation and moral conduct also played a role in the evaluation of the 
experiment to train Indonesian sailors. Some feared that mixing with the 
Dutch crew could infest the Indonesian sailors with the ‘erroneous spirit’ of 
socialism, which could have pernicious consequences for maintenance of the 
authority of Dutch rule in the colony.33 Others raised the bogey sexual habits. 
This discussion was triggered off by an interview in a Dutch newspaper with 
an officer in the Colonial Navy, who had suggested that serving as a sailor 
would be a healthy occupation for people from North Celebes. Referring to 
a statement by the local Dutch Resident, he claimed that early and frequent 
sexual intercourse coupled with bad food – sago was their staple – had 
resulted in heart diseases, and had made 80 per cent of the young men in the 
Minahasa unfit for service in the army. The isolated life on board a warship 
and the healthy food served by the Navy could redress this.34 Next day he 
disclaimed his words, but others took up the issue of native sexual habits. In 
parliament was remarked that it was a well-known fact that the ethnic groups 
from which the government intended to recruit the indigenous Indonesian 
sailors had sexual intercourse at a very young age. Agreeing with the efforts 
to change this by recruiting Indonesians for the Navy, he cautioned that isola-
tion on board ships should not last too long. Otherwise ‘other sexual usages 
which are perhaps even worse’ might be the result.35 He was sure that conti-
nence would be unbearable to natives. As proof he cited the newspaper, the 
Java-Bode (Java Messenger), in which this was mentioned as one of the reasons 
it would probably be impossible to recruit Indonesians into the Navy in great 
numbers. In the army sex formed less of a problem. Women accompanied 
their husbands to their stations. This was impossible in the Navy and might 
put many Indonesians off. Without ample shore leave and without an effort 
on the part of the government to promote marriage, the number of sufferers of 
venereal diseases might only increase in the Navy if Indonesian sailors were to 
be enlisted. When the Minister of the Colonies chose to ignore these remarks, 
the same member of parliament raised the issue again. This time he became 
more explicit. He pointed out the danger that because of a long spell on board 
‘the sexual urge, which exists in these boys, will lead in a wrong direction and 
[that] it would be much worse were they to seek satisfaction for this need in 
an abnormal way than if they did so for that matter in a natural way albeit out 
of wedlock’.36 This time Pleyte did react. He said that there had never been 
3 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1913-14:561.
33 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1913-14:455.
34 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1913-14:556.
35 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1913-14:556.
36 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1913-14:56.
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reports from the merchant fleet and the Indies Military Navy that Indonesians 
sailors had a ‘worse’ sexual life than Dutchmen. Nor was there any reason to 
assume that Indonesians in particular indulged in abnormal sexual relations 
when forced to serve abroad for some time.37
Rambonnet saw the training of Indonesian sailors as a realistic way to 
relieve the shortage of Dutch crew. However, it would not ease the pressure 
on scarce manpower resources. For a moment a ‘Militia-Navy’ conscription for 
the Navy for a period of two years was toyed with in Holland. Rambonnet was 
not in favour and wanted to make a ‘final effort’ to achieve a viable volunteer 
Navy.38
The army was also assailed by problems. Like the Navy it had to cope with 
problems of enlisting new recruits in Europe, which one Dutch newspaper 
declared was a clear sign of growing prosperity in Holland.39 There was also 
a shortage of officers. To make matters worse, the salary of an officer had not 
kept pace with that of Dutch civilians employed in the colony, who had prof-
ited from the economic boom the Netherlands Indies experienced in the pre-
war years. This some feared, but others denied this assertion instantly, could 
adversely affect the motivation of the officer corps.
Fears and doom-laden prophesies about an imminent war with Japan trig-
gered off a renewed debate about the security of the Netherlands Indies in 
which opposing views raged about the best way to defend the Archipelago. 
Again it was widely argued that the contentment of the population formed an 
important prerequisite if the Dutch were to remain in power. Even the sugges-
tion that part of the colony be sold re-emerged. In De Groene Amsterdammer, 
it was hinted that the Netherlands should do so before it was too late. The 
Netherlands could never win a confrontation with Japan. The most propitious 
move it could make would be to offer the islands most difficult to defend to 
Great Britain, Germany, the United States, or Australia, only holding on to 
Java and Sumatra. This would decrease the likelihood of a conflict with Japan, 
might even earn the Netherlands a new mighty friend, and would enable the 
Dutch to concentrate their efforts on the two islands which really constituted 
the heartland of the colonial possessions.40
Anticipating a foreign threat, in June 191 the Dutch government appointed a 
special state commission to investigate what steps should be taken to improve 
the defence of the Netherlands Indies. As De Locomotief chose to phrase this the 
task of the state commission was to study how to defend the colony in spite of 
37 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1913-14:56.
38 Handelingen Eerste Kamer 1913-14:364, 390.
39 Het Vaderland, cited in De Locomotief, 5-11-1914.
40 De Groene Amsterdammer, cited in De Expres, -6-1914.
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lack of manpower and of money. Unconvinced the newspaper concluded that 
this was an absurd mandate.41 
The state commission published its report in August 1913. In it it sketched 
a gloomy picture of international relations in the Pacific. It was pointed out 
that in recent years the region had undergone major changes. Germany had 
become an established Colonial Power in Asia, the United States of America 
had acquired the Philippines and had built naval bases in Manila and on 
Guam in Micronesia, and Japan had emerged as a major power. Beginning 
to find its feet Australia had experienced a period of economic growth, while 
China had also entered a new phase in its existence. Additional complica-
tions would arise from the opening of the Panama Canal. All these factors 
taken together had created a new international constellation which posed a 
much greater danger to the colony than it had ever experienced before. The 
likelihood that the Netherlands Indies would become involved in a war either 
directly or through a violation of its neutrality grew more likely the more ‘the 
Asian Powers in the East and the Colonizing Western States approached one 
another’.4 If until recently the only danger had come from complications 
brought about by a war taking place far away from the colony, in the future 
the possibility of an armed confrontation fought in or near the Archipelago 
could no longer be excluded.43 In the opinion of the Commission, the possibil-
ity of potential involvement in a war was still heightened even more by the 
development of international law, which bristled with strict rules defining the 
obligations of neutrals. Belligerents would take offence at a lax attitude and 
would not hesitate to declare war if neutrality was not zealously guarded. This 
danger was all the more serious as it was ‘not an unlikely supposition that the 
relations between the Powers in the East could lead to wars, in which the lines 
of operation of the Powers involved, may, yes indeed sometimes have to, run 
through the Indies Archipelago.’44 
The conclusion was that the only adequate means to defend its neutrality 
would be for the Netherlands Indies to remain a scrupulous neutral bystander 
in any armed conflict in the Pacific. Other nations fighting a war would think 
twice before involving the Netherlands, if a confrontation with the Dutch Navy 
would almost certainly result in serious damage to their own fleet, weakening 
its fighting value in an engagement with the main enemy. In the view of the 
state commission not taking the precaution of improving the colonial defence 
amounted to ‘a reckless, irresponsible frivolity’.45 To demonstrate what was at 
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stake the Commission – and its assessment provoked a heated debate – drew 
attention to the consequences of the loss of Java and the other islands of the 
Archipelago. The Netherlands, which internationally was still held in high 
esteem precisely because of its vast colonial empire, would sink to the level 
of one of the least significant European states. For the Dutch economy losing 
the Netherlands Indies would be nothing less than a national disaster. The 
population of the Netherlands Indies would also undergo great hardship. The 
state commission did not elaborate on this, but the observation tAllied with 
the conviction, also shared by many on the left, that the Indonesian population 
benefited from Dutch rule and from the efforts made to develop the colony, 
and that other nations would act less benevolently.
In short, the colony needed to be defended strongly enough to ensure that 
‘for any nation, however powerful it might be, the assault on our territory or 
the violation of our neutrality [would be] an undertaking of a serious nature’.46 
This had an additional advantage. The state of the Dutch means of defence 
was to be a factor of consideration for other nations in deciding whether or 
not to come to the assistance if the Netherlands Indies were attacked. The state 
commission left no doubts about how such a condition should be realized. 
What was needed was an artillery fleet, not a fleet, as was still being suggested 
in 1906, which derived its strength from torpedo boats.
The ideal would be to have a Navy with nine large battleships, each costing 
about twenty-five million guilders, forming the core; preferably they should 
at least be of the same speed and armed with the same heavy guns as the 
dreadnoughts the British, the Germans, and the Japanese were building. The 
first dreadnought had to come into service in 1917. Four such warships should 
be ready at all times to engage an enemy in colonial waters. This implied that 
a fifth reserve dreadnought also had to be stationed there as well. The period 
of major overhaul which battleships had to undergo every four of five years, 
tying them to port for a considerable length of time, should be taken into 
account. The other four battleships should be stationed in European waters. 
Five vessels in the Netherlands Indies was less than the number of battleships 
of the big powers, but, the state commission argued, such nations would never 
throw the full weight of their complete fleet against the Netherlands Indies. 
The battleships should be stationed in European waters after having served in 
the tropics for twelve years. It was calculated that they could still be used in 
Europe for another eight years.
The total extra annual cost of building the battleships plus a number of 
smaller warships was calculated at a little over twenty million guilders. The 
members of the state commission could not agree on how to divide these 
costs between the homeland and the colony. A minority was in favour of an 
46 Rapport 1913:10.
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equal division. The majority wanted to have the lion’s share to devolve onto 
the shoulders of the colony. They argued that this way the colony and the 
homeland would share in equal parts in the total annual expenditure of the 
Navy in the colony. The homeland should finance 5.35 million guilders; the 
colony 8.75 million guilders. The rest of the money had to come from cuts in 
army expenditure. De Locomotief wrote that such figures made people ‘boggle 
at the thought’.47 
In its report the state commission devoted a special paragraph to the recruit-
ment of personnel. To man the battleships would require a large increase in 
the number of ratings. The Commission was optimistic about the prospect 
of training Indonesians. It foresaw one problem. Following the advice of the 
Commander of the Colonial Navy the commission pleaded for a segregation 
of Indonesian and European personnel wherever possible. Were this not to be 
done, Indonesian sailors would perform less well. European sailors even when 
they were lower in rank, would look down on them. Conversely, Indonesians 
sailors ‘with a certain kind of awe looked up to the usually heavier built Dutch 
sailor, the representative of the ruling white race’ and would be afraid to give 
orders.48 Even were a considerable number of Indonesians to enlist in the 
Navy the state commission considered it very unlikely that enough European 
crew members could be enlisted on a voluntary base for the fleet it envisaged. 
An extra ,800 men were needed for the lower ranks. This made the establish-
ment of a naval militia unavoidable. 
There was one dissenting voice: A. van Gijn, the chief accountant of the 
Ministry of Finance. He refused to underwrite the report. In a note to Queen 
Wilhelmina, which was added to the report as an appendix, he explained 
why. Van Gijn accused the advocates of an artillery fleet of having forced their 
opinion on the other members of the state commission. The recommenda-
tions envisaged a utopian situation. They were based on a specicial compari-
son between what the Netherlands could muster in the future and the 1913 
strength of the fleets of the big powers, which would only grow in size, firing 
power, and speed in the years to come. Were the Netherlands not to acquire 
yet larger and more expensive dreadnoughts in the future the Dutch fleet 
would soon be relegated to the second rank.
The recommendations were made at a time when extra expenditure on 
the army in homeland had to be considered because of alarming develop-
ments in Europe. Members of parliament protested that although the defence 
budget increased year after year this had not produced an army and Navy 
which could perform their tasks as they should. One of the most vocal of these 
47 De Locomotief, 17-1-1913.
48 Rapport 1913:51.
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opponents was Van Kol. He called upon people to remember that since the 
close of the nineteenth century, it had invariably been the same. The govern-
ment indicated the limited fighting capacity of the Navy to ask for money for 
new ships. After these warships had been built they almost were immediately 
declared to be obsolete by contemporary standards. Van Kol calculated that 
between 1904 and 1913 seventy million guilders had been spent on a fleet 
which was considered to be of little or no value in 1913.49 He said – as at the 
time of the sailing of the Baltic fleet some civil servants of the Ministry for the 
Colonies had argued along the same lines – that the Netherlands would do 
better with a weak fleet than a strong one. Nobody would have protested dur-
ing the Russo-Japanese War had the Russian fleet entered Sabang. Were the 
Dutch cockle-boats to be replaced by more impressive battleships the reaction 
might be different. With a strong fleet it would be impossible not to join bat-
tle, though still without any chance of winning.50 Opponents of the fleet plans 
also pointed out that it was sheer madness to try and join in the race with the 
big naval powers to acquire ever larger and better-armed warships. In their 
view the best guarantee against foreign aggression remained the competition 
between the great powers which would never allow a rival to occupy Holland 
or the Netherlands Indies. If none of them came to the assistance when the 
home country or the colony were attacked, as some of the most pessimistic 
voices croaked, a large fleet would make no difference.
Naturally, army circles were appalled by the fact that the state commission 
did not show much faith in the colonial army as a potential deterrent. The 
commission had teetered on the verge of wanting to do away with the colonial 
army. It had suggested reducing its budget by 6 million guilders. The function 
of the army in the Netherlands Indies should – apart from a limited role in 
coastal defence and in the destruction of railways and telegraph lines in the 
event of an invasion – be confined to three main tasks. It should concentrate 
on fighting any internal enemy, that is suppressing local unrest, and in this 
respect the state commission praised its performance in Aceh; on defending 
the seat of the government; and on protecting a number of fleet stations and 
the main naval basis.
The state commission had based its recommendation on the conviction that 
any eventual battle for the Netherlands Indies would be one for the control of 
the seas. Once an enemy commanded these waters even a large, well-equipped 
army would not be able to accomplish much. At most, it could temporarily 
retain a hold on some of the islands of the Archipelago. Were Java to be cut 
off from the outside world the island would certainly fall into enemy hands 
49 Handelingen Eerste Kamer 1913-14:418.
50 Handelingen Eerste Kamer 1913-14:419; note Ministry of the Colonies, 13-1-1904, NA, Kol. 
Geheim, Vb. 1-1-1904 J7.
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sooner or later. In the cold light of the day, Java lacked the natural resources 
both to keep its economy running and for a prolonged resistance. Relying on 
the army, half of its strength made up of  ‘elements (natives) of presumably less 
fighting value than those of which the enemy army consisted’, to defend Java 
was utopian ‘self-deception’.51
The commission also pointed out that though Java might still be ‘politi-
cally the most important and economically most developed’ island of the 
Archipelago, other regions, especially Sumatra, were gaining quickly in eco-
nomic significance. The days in which a defence of the colony could concen-
trate on Java were past. Other regions had become economically too impor-
tant. To abandon them would be to forfeit abundant sources of prosperity, and 
would be a blow to national prestige.5 All this called for a dominant role of 
the Navy, which could be directed quickly to areas all over the Archipelago.
The army officers did not accept it was a foregone conclusion that Java 
had lost its paramount importance and that in contrast to the past, defence 
strategies should no longer be concentrated on its defence. They also refused 
to acquiesce in the observation that an army could not defend the island. 
In their view a strong fleet was fine, but a strong army was an even more 
important asset. They maintained that it was a folly to assume that a Dutch 
fleet could command all the seas and straits of the Archipelago. In a battle 
with the Japanese Navy the Dutch fleet would be destroyed within hours. An 
army would be able to prevent the occupation of Java for weeks, enough time, 
maybe, for international relations to turn to the advantage of the Netherlands.53 
The Navy should concentrate on guarding neutrality and on inflicting heavy 
losses on an enemy fleet.
Shocked out of their complacency some officers went on a lecture tour. 
Others wrote articles, or published books and pamphlets. One of them 
was Colonel W.R. de Greve, a member of the General Staff and a future 
Commander-in-Chief of the colonial army. He was convinced it was Java 
on which the Dutch Colonial Power was founded. If there was the slightest 
chance that the Navy would be weaker than an approaching enemy fleet – and 
he and others were sure that would be the case were a big power such as Japan 
to be the aggressor – the defence of Java by the army should have priority. To 
have the Navy defend an Archipelago – and De Greve resorted to the words 
of Napoleon to stress his point – against a stronger foe who commanded the 
sea was foolish. It was not beyond the bounds of possibility that the Navy 
might experience the same fate as that of the Russian fleet locked in without 
any chance of escape at Port Arthur. In De Greve’s view it was even worse 
51 Rapport 1913:19, 4, 31.
5 Rapport 1913:17, 3.
53 Van Daalen to Idenburg, 6-11-1913, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 1-1-1914 Q3.
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that the plans of the commission called for a period in which the Netherlands 
Indies would be especially vulnerable. Army strength would have to be cut 
down years before the Dutch Navy had its five dreadnoughts. There was yet 
another very good reason why the army should not be reduced in strength. 
Were the plans of the state commission ever to become reality, the army would 
cease to be strong enough to suppress a large-scale uprising in Java. Five years 
earlier it had taken three and a half battalions to put down a rebellion in West 
Sumatra, in a region with little over one million inhabitants. What about Java 
with its population of thirty million people? Would the eight battalions the 
state commission suggested suffice if these were confronted with a rebellious 
movement in the island?54
De Greve’s arguments, which attracted wide attention, elicited a reaction 
from the Navy. Its Commander in the Netherlands Indies, Vice Admiral F. 
Pinke, stressed the economic development outside Java. Moreover, it was not 
only money that mattered. ‘The question is whether or not even before a shot 
has been fired, even before a hand has reached out towards our property, we 
are willing to accept that part of this property will be taken away from us for 
good while we have to look on passively.’ Pinke castigated the plan of concen-
trating the defence on one island, Java, and maybe also on part of Sumatra as 
‘an open declaration of impotence’. It might also solve nothing. Another island 
handed over to the enemy could well serve as a convenient bridgehead for an 
invasion of Java.55 Pinke was not very complimentary about the competence of 
the army to fence off an invasion. The result would only be ‘some prolonging 
of a hopeless resistance’. The state commission had been right. The only task 
to be assigned to the colonial army was to assist the Navy. Its strength could 
be reduced considerably without much harm.56 
Pinke’s argument won the support of the most senior colonial civil servant, 
the Secretary General. He postulated that should an enemy occupy any part 
of the Archipelago outside Java, it might well be that at a peace conference, 
the whole or a portion of it would have to be ceded to that enemy. The situ-
ation that would then arise would be of a mighty state not well disposed to 
the Netherlands having a foothold in the Archipelago. This would compel 
even much greater defence expenditures if it was desired that Java remained 
Dutch. Pessimistically he was convinced it would be to no avail. Java would 
inevitably fall. Poverty and anarchy would prevail within a given period were 
Java to be sealed off by the enemy. This would signal the end of Dutch colonial 
rule in Asia.57
54 De Greve 1913:8-17.
55 Pinke to Idenburg, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 30-6-1914 O11.
56 Idenburg to Pleyte, 17-3-1914, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 1-1-1914 Q3.
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Major General J.P. Michielsen, who as a member of the state commis-
sion, had agreed with its opinions and who recently had been appointed 
Commander-in-Chief of the colonial army, also came to the defence of the 
army. In May 1914 he wrote to Idenburg that he would never have been in 
favour of the Commission’s recommendations had he at that time been able 
to forecast such developments as had manifested themselves in the Sarekat 
Islam.58 His predecessor, Van Daalen, expressed a similar view. Were wide-
spread unrest in Java, organized by Sarekat Islam to be orchestrated it would 
be impossible for the army to be prepared on all fronts. Were the unrest to 
spread to Sumatra, the situation could well become perilous.59 
The army could count on the support of Idenburg and the council of the 
Indies. Idenburg wanted both: a strong army and a strong fleet. In his eyes a 
strong fleet was essential, not least because Japan might not have Java in mind 
as a target for expansion. Looking for regions in which to settle its surplus 
population it might prey on islands with a low population density, Celebes for 
instance. To thwart any such intention a strong fleet was essential. At the same 
time Idenburg was prepared to consider a significant reduction in the colonial 
army only where it was certain that a fleet could put to sea which could suc-
cessfully defend the colony against an invasion under all circumstances. It 
should never come to pass that when the Dutch Navy had been defeated Java, 
the seat of the colonial government, would fall into the enemy’s hands without 
any fierce resistance being offered, whatever the prospect of the outcome of 
such a battle would be. Consequently, as money was scarce, the strength of the 
army should at least remain as it was. This did not obviate the fact that extra 
money had to be allocated to improve the Navy. Idenburg even pleaded for 
seven, not five, battleships. He suggested that without too many additional 
costs this could be accomplished by adjusting the proposals for the Dutch 
fleet in European waters. Instead of the four large battleships proposed by the 
state commission, three smaller ones could suffice at home. Were the colony 
not to get its seven dreadnoughts, willy-nilly the colonial army needed urgent 
expansion, and thus extra money.
The debate about the comparative advantages of a naval or army defence, 
made even more abstrusely by many unknown parameters, especially for 
the laymen who joined in and indeed not only for them, was complicated by 
technological developments. Landmines, or mine grenades as they were called 
at the time of their introduction, submarines, and aeroplanes had made their 
appearance. Submarines and airplanes meant that warships, as Van Kol chose 
58 Idenburg to Pleyte, 17-3-1914, Michielsen to Idenburg, 7-5-1914, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 3-
7-1914 S13, Vb.1-1-1914 Q3.
59 Van Daalen to Idenburg, 6-11-1913, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 1-1-1914 Q3.
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to phrase this, could be attacked from above and from below.60
Submarines had already been a topic of discussion for some time. In 1906, 
at the request of the Governor General, one of his advisers had written a report 
in which he argued that since the Netherlands could never keep pace with the 
larger powers in building large battleships, the best defence of the Archipelago 
with its many straits and narrow passages lay in its recourse to naval guerrilla 
warfare. Submarines and torpedo-boat destroyers should be preferred above 
battleships. No enemy would dare to contemplate a coup de main if it was 
known that submarines armed with torpedoes could appear on the scene any 
moment, ‘approaching invisibly, the periscope two feet above the water’.61 The 
then Commander of the Navy in the Netherlands Indies, clearly no advocate 
of submarines, did not agree. He stressed that the German and French navies 
had submarines but that almost nothing reliable was known about their tacti-
cal value as a defensive weapon.6 
By 1913 the deployment of submarines had become accepted practice, 
though Pinke still tended to look at them askance. In his eyes it was mastery 
of the seas that counted.63 The state commission also entertained doubts. Its 
report stated that submarines were too slow and could not remain invisible all 
the time. They would only be of use for local defence.64 Another impediment 
was that they had still not yet been perfected. At the end of 1913 the first sub-
marine for the Colonial Navy was scheduled to be transported to Java on a dry 
dock. The transport had to be delayed. During a trial run in the North Sea, it 
turned out that its engines generated to much heat. Even in the cool European 
climate the temperature on board had become unbearable. A second cooling-
machine had to be installed before the voyage could be made.65
Opinions varied about the employment of an air force even more. The 
Minister of War was clearly impressed by the possibilities. He was convinced 
military aircraft was of even greater importance to a small nation than to the 
larger ones. On the ground an enemy army of sufficient strength usually 
succeeded in preventing a sound reconnaissance by an army patrol. Such a 
task was much more efficaciously performed by an aeroplane. It could move 
around freely, and could pass an enemy ‘to the right, to the left, above, and 
below’.66 De Expres also thought an air force held a particular attraction. 
Smaller countries like the Netherlands would be ruined for eternity were they 
60 Handelingen Eerste Kamer 1913-14:418.
61 Nota over de verdediging te water van Nederlandsch-Indië, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 5-5-1906 
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to strive to realize their dreadnought dreams. When money had to be ear-
marked for the defence of the Archipelago, it could better be used for building 
up an air force. Pointing out the differences in flying an aircraft in a cool and 
in a hot climate, De Expres suggested that a fighting plane should be developed 
suitable for use in the tropics. This could make an Netherlands Indies air force 
superior to those of Great Britain, France, and Japan.67 Others doubted the use 
of aircraft in warfare, even in reconnaissance missions, as ‘the first thing one 
does in the army is to take cover under every tree, hedge or bush, etc.’. A small 
country like the Netherlands, faced with a large expenditure on its army and 
Navy, and confronted with novelties such as submarines, could not afford a 
military air force on top of this.68
 
The Dutch government opted for a more modest course than that suggested 
by the state commission: four instead of five battleships in the colony, but big-
ger ones and more heavily armed. The fleet in Europe could do without such 
battleships. Idenburg who wanted seven dreadnoughts, could not agree. In 
vain he implored The Hague not to cancel the fifth reserve battleship.
In October 1913 news spread that the government was contemplating 
ordering the first dreadnought. It was to be financed by a loan to be borne by 
the Netherlands Indies. A new topic of debate now raged. Who had to pay 
and who profited most from the colony remaining under Dutch rule? And, 
if the Netherlands Indies were to provide a significant contribution would 
this mean a serious setback to efforts to develop native society, or would the 
exploitation of its natural resources provide enough financial capacity to bear 
the financial burden? Even in Holland the suggestion of having the colony 
pay raised a few eyebrows. In his note rejecting the recommendations of the 
state commission, Van Gijn had already postulated that were money to be 
earmarked for the economic and social development of the Indonesian popu-
lation to be withdrawn from the colonial budget in favour of the army and the 
Navy, the result would be a precarious situation, in which no large fleet would 
be able to assuage the feelings of insecurity which might upset the colony.69 
Others also feared unrest in the Netherlands Indies. Van Kol believed having 
the Netherlands Indies finance the dreadnoughts meant an insurmountable 
obstacle for the stated intention of the Dutch government to promote people’s 
welfare in the colony, and therefore potentially dangerous.70 As a good social-
ist, he suggested that it had to be the Dutch business community which drew 
67 De Expres, 7-3-1914.
68 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1913-14:119.
69 Van Gijn to Wilhelmina, pp. 15-6 (Rapport 1913).
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hefty profits from the colony that should foot the bill.71
Political adversaries deployed counter arguments. The colonial budget 
was a huge one, growing each year by fifteen million guilders, and would 
soon equal to that of Japan. Another argument they put forward was that it 
would only benefit the local population if they remained under Dutch rule 
and could profit from the Dutch policy designed to improve their spiritual 
and material well-being.7 Such self-glorification, which was shared by many, 
was not without critics. In Holland De Groene Amsterdammer called it a gross 
presumption to proclaim that Dutch rule was the most desirable and that this 
made it fair to have the Dutch subjects in the colony pay heavily for this pre-
rogative. In the Netherlands Indies De Locomotief agreed. The ‘maritime cheer 
squad’ had to realize that there was not much reason for the native population 
to contribute willingly to the strengthening of colonial defence. Undeniably, 
money was being spent for their benefit, but still only a very small percentage 
of Indonesians went to school. Health care was poor, as well as legal security 
and so forth and so on.73 In another issue De Locomotief ventured to suggest 
that were the Netherlands Indies to have to pay for the Dutch fleet, the Sarekat 
Islam would exploit this in its propaganda among the Javanese and others 
who were bowed down by many pressing needs, and who were not the least 
bit interested in the talk about a foreign enemy.74
As the latter words indicate, the suggestion did not go down well in the 
colony with those who were staunch supporters of the Ethical Policy. They 
stressed that the fleet plans should not proceed to the detriment of the money 
spent to develop native society, nor should it result in an increase in direct and 
indirect taxes for the European or other population groups. Unrest might be 
one of the results; presenting the additional danger, as De Greve and others 
had also pointed out, that internal turmoil would present an excuse for jeal-
ous powers to interfere. It would be better to use the money to build schools 
or to improve medical care. Opposition was also strong in the circles of the 
former Indische Partij, well known for their distinct dislike of anything that 
came from Holland and their fierce anti-totok sentiments. Within a few days 
commenting on the ‘criminal fleet dream’, De Expres stated that the Indiërs 
would not mind a bit were the shares of Dutch imperialists to go to the dogs, 
and carried headlines such as ‘The Indies as Object of Exploitation’.75 One of 
the contributors to De Indiër wrote that in the Netherlands Indies people ‘do 
71 Handelingen Eerste Kamer 1913-14:35.
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not ask for iron-clads, they ask for schools!’76
The Dutch government ‒ maybe the idea had been copied from Germany 
where to avoid a political confrontation over the Navy budget a parliamentary 
debate had been postponed ‒ refused to discuss the report of the state commis-
sion during the budgetary debate in parliament that took place and the end of 
1913 and in early 1914. In her queen’s speech Wilhelmina had explained that 
76 De Indiër 1-:17.
Already 350 Dutch ships pass the Suez Canal each year. Onze Vloot Propaganda. 
The Bedouin: ‘What a mighty merchant fleet that must be. Daily I see ships with the 
red-white-blue flag in the Channal.’ (Neerland’s ondergang 1914.)
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the government did not consider it to be in the interest of the state to provide 
any further information. First, and this would take time, the Governor General 
in Batavia had to be consulted by a special Envoy. The subject was too impor-
tant to be settled by correspondence.
Fortified by the report of the state commission, the proponents of a strong 
fleet launched a campaign to impress upon the Dutch population the dangers 
which lay ahead in the near future and what the consequences would be were 
another nation to grab the Netherlands Indies. Instrumental in this was the 
association Onze Vloot (Our Fleet) which had been founded in May 1906. 
Like its counterpart in Germany, the Flottenverein founded at the instigation 
of Krupp, and with similar drives in Great Britain and France as additional 
examples, Onze Vloot aimed at mobilizing public opinion in favour of a build-
up of the Navy. By organizing lectures all over the Netherlands, its members 
spread the message that a powerful fleet was a prerequisite for the defence 
the Netherlands Indies. In the first years of its existence, the activities of Onze 
Vloot had not really caught much public attention. This changed after the 
publication of the report of the state commission. Its recommendations were 
what the members of Onze Vloot had been waiting for. The call for a large fleet 
appealed to them as did the glorification of Dutch might and the emphasis on 
the esteem in which Holland was still held all over the world, exactly because 
of the Netherlands Indies.
Onze Vloot could count on the support of a score of influential public fig-
ures. Members of the executive committee, many of them former naval offic-
ers or senior civil servants, included H. Colijn and former Governor General 
C.H.A. van der Wijck. At the close of 1913 the association claimed a member-
ship of over seven thousand. It also boasted that its activities had been well 
received by Dutch people living abroad. Nevertheless, Onze Vloot remained 
largely an affair of the Dutch in Holland. It had to be admitted that in the 
Netherlands Indies there was still only one branch at that time, in Balikpapan 
of all places.77 In Surabaya a branch for East Java was set up in July 1914. It 
appealed to people from other parts of the Archipelago to join as long no 
branch existed yet as in their own place of residence.78 It would be November 
1916 before the adjutant to Idenburg, C.L.M. Bijl de Vroe, founded a branch in 
Batavia. Months passed before it was granted corporate personality in March 
1917. Its chairman became A. van der Boon. In 1917 the Perserikatan Minahasa 
(Minahasa Union) became a member of the branch.79 
In October 1913 Onze Vloot published its first pamphlet in support of the 
report of the state commission. It sketched the disastrous consequences of the 
77 Circular by Onze Vloot, cited in De Expres, 0--1914.
78 Letter to the editor, in De Locomotief, 3-7-1914.
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loss of the Netherlands Indies for the home country. An alarming title was 
chosen: ‘s Lands welvaart in gevaar! (The country’s prosperity in danger!), ‘ A 
serious word to the Dutch people’. The author was W.A. van Aken; former 
naval officer; and first secretary and treasurer of Onze Vloot. The state com-
mission had clearly touched a patriotic chord. It was exclaimed that at last 
people, and important ones at that, had the courage to state publicly that ‘the 
Netherlands is not a small nation [...] that the Netherlands with its colonies [...] 
is a great Power [...] that we are not small and powerless’.80 It issued a serious 
plea that were the circumstances in and around the Pacific Ocean to remain 
as they were, or perhaps worsen, the Netherlands would have to make great 
financial sacrifices for the defence of its colony. Should the Netherlands not do 
so, overwhelming national poverty would be the result and the Netherlands 
would lose much of its international status. Danger loomed. Ten years earlier 
had the Russian-Baltic fleet forced its way into colonial territorial waters, an 
act the Dutch fleet would have been unable to prevent, the Japanese certainly 
would have jumped at the opportunity: ‘The Netherlands Indies lay and lies 
open to them!’81
In a similar vein to the ideas expressed by the state commission, Onze 
Vloot protagonists stressed that a strong fleet in the Netherlands Indies would 
certainly be valued by friendly powers as a contribution to maintaining the 
status quo in the Far East. Another pamphlet put out by Onze Vloot stated 
that a strong fleet in the Netherlands Indies could join with the navies of the 
United States and Australia to counter an attempt by Japan to become the 
master of the Pacific. ‘Or do you think that they alone will protect us, with 
their ships, their lives, and their money?’ 8 Were the colony to be attacked, 
Van Aken stated at a meeting in Haarlem, the United States and Australia 
would certainly come to the assistance of the Netherlands, providing that the 
Netherlands had a strong fleet.83 Others did not believe in such a scenario. The 
Nieuwe Soerabaia Courant called it an illusion to think that the United States 
would enter into a confrontation with Japan because of the Dutch colonies. 
Were Australia to come to its assistance, this meant that Great Britain would 
become involved as well, but this country was Japan’s ally.84
Representatives of Onze Vloot had to admit that its first pamphlet was 
greeted with much criticism.85 Even those, like the editors of the Nieuwe 
Rotterdamsche Courant who were in favour of a stronger defence castigated its 
80 ‘s Lands welvaart 1913:-3.
81 ‘s Lands welvaart 1913:9.
8 Neerland’s ondergang1914:6.
83 De Locomotief, 17-1-1913.
84 Nieuwe Soerabaia Courant, cited in De Locomotief, -1-1913.
85 Neerland’s ondergang 1914:3.
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one-sided emphasis on the economic benefits to Holland of the Netherlands 
Indies, not touching upon the equally important task of developing the colony 
for its own sake.86 Another newspaper in Holland, De Telegraaf, wrote that it 
was not right and proper to suggest that if the recommendations of the state 
commission were not followed, sooner or later the Netherlands would lose 
its colonies. This amounted to scaremongering and one-sided and unworthy 
propaganda.87
In the Netherlands Indies newspapers expressed similar opinions. De 
Expres, exulted by the admission by Onze Vloot that were the Netherlands to 
lose its colonies, the country would be reduced to being one of the least sig-
nificant nations in the world, qualified the wording of the pamphlet as ‘manly 
language!’88 De Locomotief wrote about ‘the hyper-nationalists of Onze Vloot’ 
– one of the other qualifications used by the newspaper was ‘hadjis of Dutch 
nationalism’ – and disparaged the ‘savage pamphlet’ and ‘fleet fever rash’.89 
On another occasion De Locomotief wrote that it was not in accordance with 
modern notions of colonial policy to stress the benefits of the colony to the 
home country.90 In Surabaya the Nieuw Soerabajasch-Handelsblad commented 
that the conclusions of the state commission and the support given to them by 
Onze Vloot alluded to ‘Tom Thumb and the seven-league boots’. It was folly 
to aim at taking on the big powers. People who pleaded for such a course had 
lost all sense of proportion.
In holding out the economic consequences of losing the Netherlands 
Indies, ‘s Lands welvaart in gevaar had refuted the opinion that the colony was 
only of importance to a small group of capitalists and only in general terms. 
Another pamphlet published shortly afterwards, written by C.G.S. Sandberg, 
a geologist from Haarlem, set out to demonstrate this in more detail. The cover 
showed an emaciated, bent, naked man, leaning on a crutch. It depicted ‘the 
limping and begging Mercury [...] the image of our future, if the Netherlands 
does not do its duty [...]. The quick winged-god of trade degenerated into a 
poor devil [...]’; or maybe De Indiër suggested ‘the emaciated beggar, one can 
come across in famine-stricken regions (Blora) in Java’.91 The title Sandberg 
used, and he had given the lectures he delivered the same motto, was even 
more alarmist and captured the public imagination: Indië verloren, rampspoed 
geboren (The Indies lost, a catastrophe born).
The pamphlet was one long, extensive enumeration of professions and 
86 De Indiër 1-15:169.
87 De Telegraaf, cited in De Locomotief, 17-11-1913.
88 De Expres, 0--1914.
89 De Locomotief, 17-1-1913.
90 De Locomotief, 7-7-1914.
91 De Indiër 1-6:10.
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trades in Holland which directly and indirectly, completely or in part, 
depended on colonial trade. Attention was drawn to the many Dutch people 
employed in the Dutch shipbuilding industry; to those who found a job in 
the production and transport of the goods needed to build ships; and to the 
labourers in the Dutch export industry. Turning to what was needed to fit out 
ships sailing to the Far-East sailors, beer brewers, vegetable- and fruit farmers, 
cattle breeders, pastry cooks and biscuit manufacturers were not forgotten, to 
say nothing of manufacturers of beds and carpets and glassblowers. All these 
people lived in Holland, and had to be housed, fed and dressed, and their 
children went to school. This meant customers for grocers, bakers, butchers, 
shoemakers, tailors, doctors, carpenters and so on; in short it is easy to get 
the impression from Sandberg’s words, almost the whole Dutch population 
– he himself spoke of the largest part – benefited from the trade with the 
Netherlands Indies.
This was not the end of the story. Dutch manpower was also active in the 
colony and the Netherlands Indies formed a market for Dutch equipment. 
Machines made in Holland were used when cargo was loaded and unloaded 
in the ports of Java and the other islands, in the construction of harbour 
works, and in dredging works. Dutch staff supervised such activities. In the 
transport sector in the Netherlands Indies most engineers and other European 
personnel in the railway companies were Dutch. At least so it had been: ‘The 
State, which in the first place is called to serve the interests of the [Dutch] peo-
ple and race, for some time and for pernicious reasons of economy engages 
foreigners in various branches of the service, who do not even have to naturalize 
themselves!’ (Sandberg 1914:9). Were the colony to be lost orders for the Dutch 
industry from the Netherlands Indies would dry up. Sandberg stressed that 
the Transvaal had proved this. The event had formed a clear warning that 
had the Netherlands to part with its colony, Dutch commerce and industry in 
the Netherlands Indies would be replaced by that of the new Colonial Power. 
Whether a country professed to adhere to an open door policy or not was 
irrelevant. Its government would always give priority to its own industry and 
commerce.
Two steps were said to be essential to avert such a calamity. One was 
aimed at defusing the dangers posed by an internal enemy; the other at those 
emanating from an external one. To deal with the first Sandberg suggested 
that Christian missionary activities in regions not yet converted to Islam, 
which he claimed formed the largest portion of the Archipelago had to be 
stepped up. Any further advance by Islam could only be to the detriment 
of Dutch rule. The second threat had to be countered by a strong army and 
Navy. The Netherlands should not gamble on rivalries between the powers, 
Netherlands’s ruin can and must be prevented (Onze Vloot publication 1914)
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or put any faith in their guarantees of territorial integrity. Recent develop-
ments had proved that such promises were empty promises: ‘Remember 
the Transvaal, Libya, Morocco, Turkey, Cuba, Persia etc., etc. ad infinitum’ 
(Sandberg 1914:). It would not be difficult for the big powers to conjure up 
a pretext to adopt an aggressive policy, couched in ethical terms such as the 
bringing of civilization, or putting an end to misgovernment.
A third pamphlet was written by C.W. de Visser, a former Captain in the 
Dutch Navy: De verdediging van Ned.-Indië tegen het Oost-Aziatische gevaar 
(The defence of the Netherlands Indies against the East Asian danger). His 
aim was to make Dutch people aware of the perils in store and of the threat 
posed by Japan and sometime in the future by China. To demonstrate that he 
was not just conjuring up a spectre, De Visser called attention to the fact that 
often, as was supposed to have happened in 191, when Japanese warships 
called at ports in the Netherlands Indies, on the days natives and Foreign 
Orientals were invited on board, large signs were displayed with the Malay 
text: ‘These ships are conquered on the Europeans [that is the Russians]’ 
(De Visser 1913:8). And, to underline the reality of the threat even more, he 
related the story of a Japanese naval officer, who, during a visit to schools 
in Makassar and Manado, had told the Indonesian pupils that within fifteen 
years Celebes would be theirs. De Visser suggested that the Netherlands 
would be on its own in fending off a Japanese threat. Europe would not inter-
vene if Japan were, for instance, to seize mineral-rich Bangka Island as such 
an action would not hurt the direct interests of the ‘big money world’. How 
little Europe could do had been proved by the Balkan Wars and the Italian 
conquest of Tripolitania in North Africa during the Italo-Turkish War of 1911-
191 (De Visser 1913:10).
By early 1914 the Onze Vloot campaign had gained real momentum. In 
Holland provincial newspapers received articles about the importance of the 
Netherlands Indies to Holland, which they could publish free of charge, from 
a press agency in Amsterdam, the Nederlandsch Correspondentiebureau 
voor Dagbladen (Dutch Correspondence Bureau for Newspapers) headed by 
Jac. Rinze. De Expres, always prepared to make use of the poetic vein of its 
editors and contributors wrote:
Kom Rinze geef jij nu de stoot  Come on Rinze set the ball rolling
We moeten hebben een sterke vloot  We should have a strong fleet
Roep het uit in alle talen  Proclaim it loud in every tongue
Indië zal ‘t wel betalen.9  The Indies will pay for it.
Just in case Sandberg and De Visser had not yet have been plainly spoken 
9 De Expres, 5-5-1914.
The Indies lost, a catastrophe born. Onze Vloot Propaganda. 3,000 unem-
ployed return from the Indies. There they join a still more enormous number 
of victims of the loss of our colonies. (Neerland’s ondergang 1914.)
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enough Onze Vloot published yet another pamphlet in May 1914: Neerland’s 
ondergang kan en moet voorkomen worden (The Netherlands’s ruin can and must 
be prevented). Its aim was to demonstrate to the critics of ‘s Lands welvaart in 
gevaar that Holland really was in danger of losing its overseas possessions. 
This time the cover displayed the Dutch Virgin sunk in despair – De Expres 
described her as ‘a well-rounded damsel’93 – while a vulture in the sky car-
ried away a human figure representing the Netherlands Indies. The role of 
the bogeyman was assigned to Japan. The readers were reminded of Japan’s 
victory over Russia. It was recalled that this was the first time ‘the yellow 
Asian’ had defeated ‘the old rulers of the civilized West’.94 China, ‘our larg-
est Asian neighbour, the enormous Chinese empire, the young Republic’, 
was also not forgotten in the warning about a coming struggle between East 
and West. For the moment China was still preoccupied with domestic affairs. 
But what would happen when the Chinese government had put its house in 
order? Were there not 600,000 Chinese living in the Netherlands Indies?95 
In this brochure Onze Vloot also did its best to highlight the economic sig-
nificance of the Archipelago to the Dutch economy. People should not think 
that after the Netherlands Indies had been occupied by another country, the 
existing economic ties could be salvaged. In the first place governments took 
care of their own industrial and commercial community, even when they 
paid lip-service to an open door policy. The history of the Boer Republic had 
proved this, as had developments in ‘the Philippines, Cuba, etc.’.96 
To lend additional strength to the argument the last twenty pages, about 
half of the total pamphlet, were filled with letters to Onze Vloot stressing 
the vital importance of the Netherlands Indies to the Dutch economy. They 
came from such correspondents as the Chambers of Commerce of Rotterdam 
and Amsterdam, of Enschede and Oldenzaal (pointing out the consequences 
for their textile industry), of Wageningen (telling how many students of the 
Academy for Agriculture, Horticulture, and Forestry found employment in 
the Netherlands Indies), of Kaatsheuvel (pleased, De Expres commented sar-
castically, that more and more Indonesians were wearing shoes), of Vlissingen 
(Flusing) (signed by J. van Raalte, President of the important shipbuilding 
yard De Schelde); and of Haarlem (with its production of railway and tram 
carriages).97 In addition letters penned by key figures in the Dutch economy 
were included. Most illustrious of them was G. Vissering, President of the 
Nederlandsche Bank, the Dutch Central Bank, and former President of the 
93 De Expres, 4-7-1914.
94 Neerland’s ondergang 1914:4-5.
95 Neerland’s ondergang 1914:5.
96 Neerland’s ondergang 1914:15.
97 De Expres, 6-7-1914.
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Javasche Bank. Among the letters was also one from J.B. van Heutsz, who 
was an avowed proponent of strengthening the army and Navy. Van Heutsz 
was sure the colony would be more than happy to bear the costs of a well-
equipped and well-manned fleet and a strong army. ‘Thunderously’ the 
colony would cry out that only a powerful fleet and army guaranteed its ‘con-
tinued existence in the present manner under the Dutch flag.’98 Neither for the 
European nor for the native population would this pose too heavy a financial 
burden. The soil of the Netherlands Indies held treasures far more valuable 
than the money needed to pay for the interest and redemption of the loan 
which would be required to finance the improvement of the armed forces.
Such pamphlets provided opponents of Onze Vloot with ample ammuni-
tion to strike back. They used the pamphlets to argue that Holland had to 
finance the expansion of the Dutch fleet. Had not the propagandists of Onze 
Vloot convincingly stressed the economic importance of the Netherlands 
Indies to the homeland? Opponents also remained convinced that the whole 
campaign was purely intended to safeguard the interests of the well-to-do. 
The socialist leader Troelstra translated O.V., the letter monogram of Onze 
Vloot, as Ons Voordeel, Our Benefit. Het Volk, The People, the socialist newspa-
per, drew attention to the fact that ‘the cry of the bourgeoisie’ was a conscious 
drive to have the Navy budget raised considerably. It was quick to point 
out that this was happening at a time when there was no money to expand 
the compulsory schooling of working-class children by one additional year. 
Pointing a finger at the extra direct and indirect taxes the Javanese popula-
tion would have to pay, Het Volk concluded that the ‘sense of justice of the 
Dutch bourgeoisie’ demanded that the Javanese also had ‘to sacrifice his 
farthing to preserve Dutch capitalists from the loss of the much-loved billion 
which is their hope, their prop, and their pride’. It was ‘extortion to have the 
security premium for Dutch fire power paid by the Javanese’.99 Other social-
ists cautioned against the whipping up of militarist and nationalist passions, 
recalling the British mood during the Boer War (and remaining silent about 
that of the Dutch at that time). Protests were directed to the fact that dan-
gerous and false arguments were used in the campaign conducted by Onze 
Vloot and its supporters. It was not Holland which would benefit from the 
retention of the Netherlands Indies, this privilege would be reserved for the 
business community alone. 
The investor feels the palpitations of his Indies stocks heart. The factory owner, 
the shipping company entrepreneur, the mining developer wants to maintain his 
privilege over others, wants to secure a market. And in this way, gradually, much 
98 Neerland’s ondergang 1914:.
99 Het Volk, 31-1-1914, cited in De Expres, 5-3-1914.
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to the benefit of the conservative-militaristic elements in our country a fervent 
breeding ground is prepared for imperialist swagger, because of which it is dif-
ficult to see matters in their correct framework and right perspective.100  
After Wilhelmina, in her Queen’s Speech in September 1913, had announced 
that the Dutch government seriously considered strengthening the fleet, 
the report began to circulate that commercial circles – following examples 
abroad, most noticeably in Turkey and Germany – would appeal to the Dutch 
population to collect money for a battleship after parliament had approved 
the expenditure on the first dreadnought. The driving force behind the initia-
tive was C.J.K. van Aalst, President Director of the Rotterdamsche Lloyd and 
President of the Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij (NHM). Before the 
year was out, Van Aalst and other key representatives of the Dutch business 
community contacted the government. They said they were prepared to con-
tribute 10,000 guilders to the building of a second dreadnought. The stated 
reason for their offer was the consequences for their colonial interests of the 
‘desire for expansion’, which they claimed was manifesting itself in Japan 
and China.101 The offer was gratefully accepted by the government.
In the Netherlands Indies De Locomotief and other newspapers were quick 
to demonstrate that Van Aalst and his commercial friends annually made 
enormous profits from the colony.10 Most vocal probably was De Expres. 
Holding out the example of Germany, where the fleet had become a mat-
ter of national pride, doubts were expressed in De Expres about whether 
the millions of Dutch people would indeed raise the money needed for the 
construction of a dreadnought; implying that many in Holland did not care 
in the least about the Netherlands Indies.103 Its editors were also somewhat 
bewildered by the sudden campaign which was mounted to impress upon 
the Dutch population that it might not be long before the Netherlands Indies 
was lost. What special information had Van Aalst and his protagonists to 
back up their alarmist views?104 What De Expres wrote annoyed Batavia. In 
May 1914 Idenburg instructed the Attorney-General to investigate whether a 
prosecution of the newspaper was in order.105  
All this talk about armament and the threat of war did not fail to bypass 
Indonesian society. In July 1914 when the local Sarekat Islam of Semarang 
was recognized by Batavia this called for a big celebration. A parade through 
100 De Expres, 3-4-1914.
101 Note Pleyte and Rambonnet prepared for the Council of Ministers November 1913, NA, 
Kol. Geheim, Vb. 1-1-1914 Q3.
10 De Locomotief, 1-1-1913.
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105 Monsanto to Idenburg, 3-5-1914, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 17-9-1915 46.
The Netherlands Indies and the Great War1
town formed the highlight. Modernity and war were conspicuously present. 
Floats not only displayed freighters complete with smoke coming out off 
their funnels, but also guns (some with cannonballs dangling from their 
muzzles), dreadnoughts and aeroplanes106.  
In The Hague the government took its time deciding. At the end of the 
parliamentary year it had still not submitted its plan for the defence of the 
Netherlands Indies. It was not that the government did not consider the 
matter urgent. Though Pleyte did not believe that the Netherlands would 
be embroiled in a European war, he did not preclude an armed conflict with 
Japan intent on occupying less densely populated parts of the Archipelago 
such as Celebes. He rated the chance of a Japanese invasion of Java low. 
It would prove too costly for Japan. The likelihood would decline even 
more steeply were the Netherlands to have a strong fleet patrolling colo-
nial waters.107 In parliament as well as in his correspondence with Idenburg 
Pleyte stressed that every effort was being made to draft a proposal. In June 
1914 he stated in parliament that not a day had passed in the nine months he 
had been Minister of the Colonies without people working on it.108 One of 
the bottlenecks, and certainly not the easiest one to solve, was how the fleet 
plan should be financed, and how the financial burden should be divided 
between the home country and the colony. Pleyte wrote to Idenburg that 
this ‘continuously, – yes, I may say: in some periods daily – occupied the 
thoughts of the Government’.109  
To find a solution required close consultation between the Ministers of the 
Navy, of the Colonies, and of Finance. Van Aalst, representing the business 
community, was also involved in the deliberations. In Batavia Idenburg was 
kept informed by Pleyte through official as well as private letters. Pleyte and 
Van Aalst agreed with the opponents of the fleet plans that the population 
of the Netherlands Indies had to be sheltered as much as possible from the 
financial consequences. They wanted to prevent a situation in which income 
generated by the colony would have to be used for the fleet to the detriment 
of the ‘welfare policy’ and the care of the native population. It was admitted 
that the population was already heavily taxed. Its burden of taxation should 
not be increased yet further.110 Pleyte himself was convinced that sparing the 
indigenous population was also important since they had begun to organize 
themselves. They demanded their lot to be improved and would certainly 
106 De Locomotief, 4-7-1914.
107 Minutes meeting Pleyte and Van Aalst on 7-7-1914, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 19-8-1914 S16.
108 Reaction Pleyte to Note, NA, Kol. 18--1913, Pleyte to Idenburg, 9-6-1914, NA, Kol. 
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protest about a higher cost of living or a reduction of their wages.111 He 
wanted the expansion of the fleet to be financed by those who could afford 
it best. In the Netherlands Indies the money should be produced by those 
companies active in the colony. Private individuals should not be affected. 
Initially Pleyte had considered a special wealth tax in the home country and 
a capital tax in the colony. The stumbling block was that in this way a new 
kind of taxation would be introduced into the Netherlands Indies. Pleyte 
feared that the drafting of the necessary legislation could well result in an 
unacceptable delay.
After consultation with a deputation from the business community, the 
government assigned Th.A. de Meester and D.G.J.H. Kropveld, a former 
public prosecutor in Surabaya who acted on behalf of the Van Aalst group, 
the task of drawing up a plan of how to finance the proposed fleet. Among 
the extra taxes proposed in the Netherlands Indies by them were an increase 
in export duties and in the freight tax for the shipping and private rail- and 
tramway companies. Van Aalst and Pleyte could live with the suggestion. 
Pleyte was sure that additional freight duties should not to be shifted onto 
the population; especially not as the transport companies had suggested 
the tax themselves. He also did not object to an extra export tax on estate 
products such as coffee, tea, rubber, tobacco, and sugar, and on oil. Copra, 
a ‘native product’ was another matter. Here the additional tax proposed by 
De Meester and Kropveld could well be passed on to local small produc-
ers. Pleyte’s objections annoyed Van Aalst and his business associates. They 
refused to come up with alternative suggestions about how to cover the 1.5 
million guilders an extra copra export tax would yield. Van Aalst informed 
Pleyte that to their regret they could not offer any proposals for raising such 
a large sum.11 Pleyte’s solution was to propose to raise the export tax on the 
other export products.
A bill concerning the income and expenditure for improving the fleet was 
completed in the middle of July 1914. It called for larger battleships than 
those initially planned for, of course costing more: three million guilders 
extra per ship. Idenburg was given till 10 August to comment. The outbreak 
of World War One intervened. As he wired to Pleyte, Idenburg correctly pre-
sumed that the tabling of the bill would be postponed till the consequences 
of the new international circumstances could be assessed.113 Van Aalst and 
his associates did not have to part with the money they had pledged for the 
building of a second dreadnought. At the outbreak of the war the Navy bill 
was withdrawn. Large battleships had to be built abroad and war made it 
111 Pleyte to Idenburg, 9-6-1914, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 9-6-1914 L11.
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impossible for the Dutch government to buy one (Beunders 1984:41). No 
Navy Act was promulgated during World War One. In November 191 a new 
Navy Bill was brought before Parliament. In October 193 it was turned down 




Shortly before the outbreak of hostilities in Europe, at least three newspapers 
in the Netherlands Indies, the Java-Bode, De Locomotief, and the Preanger-bode, 
reported that a Japanese fleet had entered Wijnkoopsbaai on the south coast 
of West Java. The source of the news was a telegram from Cibadak addressed 
to the Governor General, in which it was stated that fifteen Japanese warships 
had been sighted in the bay. The Assistent-Resident of Sukabumi was instructed 
to investigate. He sent a telegram to a government official stationed on the 
coast. The reply was that nothing was known about any Japanese fleet. After 
headquarters in Batavia had contacted him, the local agent of the Koninklijke 
Paketvaart Maatschappij (KPM, Royal Packet Company) shipping company 
in Pelabuhan Ratu submitted a similar report. Army and naval command 
had also been alerted. General De Greve, by now chief-of-staff of the colonial 
army, personally travelled to Pelabuhan Ratu by car to check. There were no 
Japanese warships in sight. All had fallen victim to a practical joke. Someone 
had wanted to deceive the telegraph clerk in Cibadak and had succeeded with 
a vengeance. Without giving the matter a second thought he had transmitted 
the telegram with its alarming news.
The reaction elicited by the telegram is a minor example of the anxiety 
that had gripped people all over the world. The dying days of July 94 were 
pregnant with rumours and speculations about what was going to happen. 
The gloom that was building up only grew even more sombre after Vienna’s 
ultimatum had expired and war was declared on Serbia on 28 July 94. The 
Netherlands succeeded in remaining neutral, but inevitably could not escape 
the economic and financial consequences of the war. A severe crisis was in the 
making. It was to affect almost all sectors of the Dutch economy. Shipping, 
trade, fisheries, agriculture, and industry, none escaped repercussions at the 
outbreak of war. Anxiety was stirred up to greater heights because a shortage 
of wheat, and hence of bread threatened. Holland was dependent on imports 
for the bulk of its wheat. Available stock would suffice for two or three weeks. 
 De Locomotief, 28-7-94, 3-7-94.
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The new harvest at the end of September would provide only enough wheat 
for domestic consumption for about two months. Good pre-war bread became 
but a memory. The Dutch had to eat ‘war bread’, made of one-quarter of 
wheat flour to three-quarters bran. To guard against a food-shortage export 
bans, including one on wheat, were instituted. Fuel also threatened to become 
scarce. To prevent a forcing-up of prices, burgomasters were given the author-
ity to confiscate stocks of food and fuel.
One reason for the threat of scarcities was the fact that Great Britain 
and France aimed to create a complete economic blockade of Germany 
and Austria. British warships operated off Dover and off the north coast of 
Scotland, blocking the entrances to the North Sea. South of Dover, the French 
Navy patrolled the seas. Neutral merchantmen were arrested and directed to 
French and British ports. The stopping of neutral merchantmen in a search for 
contraband had been a point of concern and deliberations for years. During 
the Russo-Japanese War searches on the high sea of neutral merchantmen by 
Russian warships had caused great dismay in British commercial circles. At 
that time London had refused to call for a change in the international rules 
on contraband. The British government had felt uneasy about the searching 
of British ships, but had not protested. The prime minister, A.J. Balfour, had 
explained why. He said that 
[W]e can not be sure that the time will not come when our role will be changed; 
and that we shall be the belligerents, and when that time comes it will indeed be 
unfortunate if we had by our own action at the present moment forfeited any of 
the privileges which belong to a belligerent and which we might at such a time 
ourselves desire to exercise.2 
Impressed by the damage to the trade and shipping, the liberal government 
of his successor, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, had adopted a different 
position in 907 at the time of the Second Peace Conference in The Hague. 
Cautious, preferring other states which would arouse less opposition from 
Germany and other powers, to take the initiative, the Foreign Secretary, Sir 
Edward Grey, had prepared proposals for the abolition of the concept of con-
traband – and when this proved impossible, for the restriction of goods bel-
ligerents could forbid their enemies to be supplied with by neutrals. Initially 
he had even pleaded for the immunity of enemy private property carried as 
cargo in ships captured or searched at sea. The Peace Conference ended in a 
great disappointment for the British delegation and for Grey personally. Apart 
from a well-intentioned resolution about the urgent necessity to cut defence 
spending, plans for a naval conference, to be held in London, were the only 
2 The Times, 29-0-904.
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concrete result. ‘The whole conference’, one of the British delegates, E. Crowe, 
reported, ‘practically united against us on every question of naval warfare, 
except as regard our proposal to abolish contraband, which was accepted by a 
majority but which that majority subsequently declined to stick to’.3 The sub-
sequent Sea War Conference in London did not abolish contraband, also not 
the so-called conditional contraband; not weapons, but goods which could be 
used by an enemy army and Navy, such as foodstuffs, garments, and even hay 
for horses. It drafted a definition, listing products which were to be considered 
contraband, but at the outbreak of World War One the governments concerned 
had not yet ratified the London Declaration.
In August 94, it was blatantly obvious that London had forfeited any 
reservations it might have entertained about interfering with neutral ship-
ping. The Triple Entente Powers published lists of absolute and conditional 
contraband, of goods which in order to prevent them ending up in Germany 
or Austria, they would not allow to be shipped to neutral ports, or if so only 
in limited quantities. In the latter case guarantees were demanded that such 
imports would not ultimately end up in Germany or Austria. On the lists were 
items like foodstuffs, forage and grains suitable for feeding animals, clothes, 
fabrics for clothing, boots and shoes, suitable for use in war, and gold, silver, 
and money. After the outbreak of war London forced ships on their way to 
Rotterdam or Amsterdam with wheat and other contraband goods as their 
cargoes to return to Great Britain. Other ships which carried such goods from 
other countries of origin were arrested, thereby adding to the gloomy food 
prospects in Holland. The Times defended the Allied policy writing that Great 
Britain did not want to make bread more expensive in Holland, if only it were 
possible for the supply to Germany to be cut in other ways.4 Similarly imports 
of cotton for the textile industry in the eastern part of Holland of cotton were 
cut by the British, indirectly affecting the batik industry of Java, which had 
become dependent on Dutch cloth. After a couple of weeks when it had 
become evident to London that all these products were to be used exclusively 
for Dutch consumption, imports were allowed, albeit in lesser quantities than 
before.
As Dutch foreign trade included the transit of German merchandise, 
London also called a halt to some exports from Holland. The British govern-
ment justified this policy by pointing out that it could not be ascertained 
whether cargo had originated from Holland or from Germany. Among the 
products which suffered were sugar and beet sugar. British imports of sugar 
from the Netherlands Indies in Great Britain were still allowed, providing that 
3 Crow to Tyrrell, -0-907, PRO FO 800 69.
4 The Times, 9-0-94.
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the ships transporting the sugar sailed directly to a British port without first 
calling at a Dutch one.
Paris pursued a similar policy. The Netherlands, as one French Senator 
remarked, should be economically neutral as well. In the eyes of some Dutch 
people France was even more stringent than Great Britain. The delays in 
French ports were lengthier, more cargo was considered contraband, and 
unloading took more time. The Dutch suspected that the reason for the French 
pestering could only be that its government was influenced by the French 
press which had contained among other incorrect reports one about German 
troops marching through the south of Limburg. As the former editor of De 
Locomotief, P. Brooshooft, put it, the French press was motivated by ‘ignorance 
and an innate suspicion’.6 A few weeks later he observed that British, French, 
and British Indian newspapers showed ‘a suspicious interest’ in the way in 
which Holland observed its duties as a neutral country.7 Some, among them 
the Times of India and the Daily Mail, called for a blockade of the Netherlands, 
when it remained a source of imports of food and other essential products for 
Germany.
With international trading virtually grinding to a standstill, mass unem-
ployment threatened in Holland. Consequently, great apprehension was 
voiced about the growing number of jobless and the many people who might 
no longer be able to buy essential foodstuffs or, having no money to pay their 
rent, would be evicted from their houses. To help out the many families threat-
ened with economic ruin, Queen Wilhelmina took the initiative for the setting 
up of a Netherlands Koninklijk Nationaal Hulp Comité (Royal National Relief 
Committee). She herself became honorary chairperson. The committee, which 
also aimed to provide assistance to companies which had run into trouble 
because of the war, was constituted on 0 August during a solemn gathering 
in the Trêveszaal in The Hague. Newspapers did not fail to mention that when 
the Queen addressed the meeting she could not hide her emotion, speaking at 
times in a tremulous voice.8  
Impressed by the grim prospects for Europe and the consequences the war 
might well have for the Netherlands, expressions of official public joy on fes-
tive days were cancelled. Celebrations planned for the birthday of the Queen 
Mother were called off. Flags were not flown on public buildings on that day. 
The same decision was taken with regard to 3 August, Queen’s Birthday. 
Austerity was the catchword and would remain so till the end of the war. At 
the Queen’s own request celebrations were postponed till the war had ended. 
 De Locomotief, 7-0-94.
6 De Locomotief, 22-0-94.
7 De Locomotief, 9-0-94.
8 De Locomotief, 22-9-94.
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This was a moment many people in the Netherlands and elsewhere in the 
world believed – or hoped – would not be far off. Hopes were pinned on the 
fact that the high costs of modern war technology would impede a prolonged 
war. Before this goal had been reached and peace had been concluded, public 
life should be sober.
In the Netherlands Indies Idenburg decided not to cancel the customary 
audiences held by Dutch civil servants on Queen’s Day to which representa-
tives of all population groups were invited, but in view of the grave situation 
to cancel the customary balls which were planned in many cities. In December 
he confided to his adjutant that dancing was not proper given the circumstanc-
es (Bijl de Vroe 980:46). He was forced to change his decision. Instructions 
from The Hague were explicit: ‘Her majesty emphatically requests (to) cancel 
audience and avoid everything drawing attention to birthday’.9 In Batavia the 
customary audience at Idenburg’s palace was called off. Idenburg also did not 
present any honours either to native Indonesians and foreign orientals in the 
colony as was the custom. Civil servants were not even given a full day off. To 
ease the pain, their chiefs were given the discretion to determine how long and 
during what hours their subordinates had to work on Queen’s Day.
The Hague’s decision upset the calculations of those in the Netherlands 
Indies who intended to turn Queen’s Day into a day on which to testify to their 
loyalty to the Queen and to the Dutch state. One of the persons most eager to 
do so was the Sultan of Yogyakarta. He could not be dissuaded from offering 
his congratulations on Queen’s Birthday in person to the Resident, saddling 
the latter, who had to follow instructions not to celebrate Queen’s Birthday 
in any way, with a bit of a problem. All the Residents could accomplish was 
when he visited the Residency in the morning of 3 August that the ‘old ruler’ 
as he called him – the sultan was about eighty years of age – did not wear his 
full-dress uniform of an army Major-General, but came in undress. His two 
sons who accompanied him were similarly clad in the undress uniforms of 
lieutenant-colonels.0
If the truth be told, people did not feel like celebrating. In the Netherlands 
and elsewhere in Europe governments decided that it was not proper to organ-
ize festivities when soldiers were killing each other at the front. Even dancing 
was discouraged. In Holland the atmosphere was such that a visitor from the 
Netherlands Indies, who had looked forward to his stay in his fatherland and 
had arrived there during the first days of the war, almost immediately decided 
to return to Java as quickly as possible. He wrote home that ‘[e]verywhere 
there was gloom, poverty began to manifest itself everywhere, merrymaking 
9 Pleyte to Idenburg, 24-8-94, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 2-8-94 Y6.
0 Resident Yogyakarta to Idenburg, 3-9-94, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 30-2-94 K2.
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was absolutely out of the question, theatres, concerts, fairs did not go on’. In 
the Netherlands Indies the mood was much the same. Concerts and theatrical 
performances, even by such a famous Dutch actor as Eduard Verkade, who 
only a few days earlier had still attracted full houses, were suddenly much 
less busy. Fancy fairs were cancelled because of the ‘sad circumstances’. In 
the north of Sumatra, as an extra gesture of sensitivity, the local authorities 
asked directors of cinemas not to show war films. The Javanese elite joined in 
this effort to avoid excessive festivities. In Yogyakarta the installation of a new 
crown prince was celebrated with less lustre than was customary.
The grave consequences of the war – initially still qualified as a European 
war – for the country’s economy coupled with the tense international situa-
tion compelled the Dutch Senate and Parliament to shorten their recess. Both 
convened on 3 August to discuss the political and economic situation that had 
been thrust upon them and the measures to be taken to deal with the situation. 
Foreign affairs formed no part of the debate. The Dutch government refused 
to say anything about such matters. The Prime Minister, P.W.A. Cort van der 
Linden, explained that his government was afraid that any word incautious 
about that subject could expose the Netherlands to the ‘gravest danger’.2 
Urgent decisions had to be taken. Cort van der Linden asked the members 
of the Lower House to complete their discussion of the emergency measures 
suggested by his government concerning the armed forces and the economy 
within one day.3 Ranks were closed. All proposals put forward by the gov-
ernment were accepted unanimously. Troelstra, stressing that if there was one 
government in Europe which was innocent of ‘the terrible crime’ it was that 
of the Netherlands, joined in the call for unity. He announced that his party 
would continue its socialist propaganda against militarism and capitalism 
with redoubled vigour after the war. At the end of the month, Troelstra could 
also proudly point out the exemplary behaviour of the crew of the ‘red fleet’, 
and at the decision of the Bond van Minder Marine-Personeel to abandon any 
agitation for the time being.4 He was probably not aware that in Surabaya 
the chairman of the union had gone further and had urged the members of 
his union to forget that they were socialists. Had the socialists at home not 
inveighed so loudly against the strengthening of the fleet, the Navy would 
have had bigger and better ships. This mistake should not be repeated. In 
future the colour to be fought for should not be red, but Red, White, and Blue, 
the national colours. His audience greeted these words with cheers.
 De Locomotief, -0-94.
2 Handelingen Eerste Kamer 93-4:289.
3 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 93-4:8.
4 De Locomotief, -0-94. 
 Soerabaiasch Nieuwsblad, cited in De Locomotief, 7-8-94.
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Decisive measures were all the more necessary because in the Netherlands 
and elsewhere in Europe people had panicked when war broke out. The finan-
cial world, already reacting nervously as international tension mounted, came 
under severe pressure. It was observed a few weeks later in a Dutch periodi-
cal that it was difficult to find words to describe the consternation elicited by 
the political reports following Vienna’s ultimatum (Van Nierop 94:348). In 
Amsterdam, as in other European stock markets, share prices plummeted. 
Traders who had borrowed money on shares as security feared financial ruin 
and forced the exchange to close on 28 July. The closure became effective the 
following day. This had not even happened in 870 at the outbreak of the 
Franco-Prussian War. The exchanges in London, Paris, and Berlin closed on 
3 July.
In Holland commercial and savings banks were confronted with runs 
on their buildings by customers who wanted to close their accounts. At the 
Rijkspostspaarbank, the State Postal Savings Bank, a sum amounting to over 
one million Dutch guilders was withdrawn on 30 July. The following two days 
the figure rose to two-and-a half, and almost five million guilders respectively 
(Van Nierop 94:362-3). Banks reacted by refusing withdrawal of deposits, 
except when it could be established that the money was to be used for urgent 
purposes. To back them the government extended the period within which 
a bank had to honour a request for payment of deposits from two weeks to 
six months; allowing for intermediate withdrawals of at most 2 guilders per 
week. People also tried en masse to change paper currency for silver coins. 
Armed with chairs, mattresses, and cushions they queued in the evening to 
make sure that they were served the following morning (Vissering 920:23). 
Generally speaking, the public was hesitant to accept bank notes. Some feared 
immediate depreciation and sold their paper currency at a price lower than 
its face value. Coins were hoarded. People refused to part with their coins 
and small change was not given, which undermined the faith in paper money 
even more. Shopkeepers refused to act as an ‘exchange bureau’ for customers 
trying to get rid of their banknotes. To cope with a situation in which many 
members of the public had lost their confidence in financial institutions, the 
Dutch government prohibited the export of gold on 3 August. As an addition-
al measure the Central Bank was allowed to extend its uncovered circulation 
from two-and-a-half to five times its gold and silver reserves. To keep money 
transactions at a reasonable level, the state and even municipalities were 
forced to print zilverbonnen, ‘silver paper money’ to replace the coins of small 
denomination (Treub 920:3-9).
Besides the flight in coins, another major problem which had to be solved 
was that of credit and loans. Some feared that they would not be able to cash 
in outstanding loans. Others wondered whether they would still be able to 
pay their debts or receive the credit they needed to pursue their business. The 
C.J.K. van Aalst, President NHM (Gedenkboek 924: between pages 90 and 9)
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possibility of a moratorium on the payment of debts, endorsed by a number 
of Chambers of Commerce, was considered. It was rejected by the government 
on the grounds that such a measure would be counterproductive and would 
only add to the panic. Great Britain and France did introduce a moratorium, 
Germany did not. 
Leading bankers acquiesced in the stand taken by the government. They 
wired the Minister of Agriculture, Industry, and Trade, M.W.F. Treub, that a 
moratorium was ‘a highly precarious leap in the dark’. It would upset the 
whole credit system, lead to enormous disasters especially for the Netherlands 
Indies, and would damage the reputation of the Netherlands for a long time 
to come.6 The major Dutch banks had worked out their own solution. They 
formed a syndicate to come to the rescue of companies engaged in industry 
and trade that had run into trouble. Van Aalst had been the key figure in 
bringing this about, and most of the negotiations to establish such a syndicate 
took place at the offices of the Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij (NHM, 
Netherlands Trade Company). The syndicate had to help out bona fide com-
panies with sound security, which had ran into trouble because of the excep-
tional circumstances and needed credit to avoid bankruptcy. Its establishment 
caused some confusion. An advertisement had to be published in the Dutch 
papers to assure the public that it would be incorrect to conclude that the con-
sortium came to the rescue of the stock and money markets, and of wholesale 
business only. Small businesses or private persons were equally eligible for 
help. By September it had already turned out that applications for financial 
assistance were not as numerous as initially expected; and that the financial 
consequences of war in the Netherlands were less catastrophic than had been 
feared in the inevitable confusion during the first days of the war. Although 
rather an anti-climax, Treub concluded that the syndicate had done a good 
and useful job. It had restored confidence that credit was still available.7 Ten 
years later the NHM was ready to acknowledge the praise it considered its 
due. In a commemorative volume of the company it was suggested that most 
of the financial measures taken by the government at the outbreak of World 
War One had been at the suggestion of Van Aalst and other bankers, whom, 
the government indeed had pledged, it would consult at all times before con-
crete measures were taken.8
When the war was discussed in the Dutch Parliament it seemed as if the 
Netherlands Indies did not exist. Attention focused on the situation in Holland. 
The colony was only alluded to in passing as an additional argument to reject 
a moratorium on debts. The Dutch possessions in the West Indies did not rate 
6 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 93-4:293.
7 Handelingen Eerste Kamer 93-4:93; Treub 920:4.
8 Gedenkboek 924:94.
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a single mention. In a sense it was not at all necessary that the Netherlands 
Indies should have featured in parliamentary debate in The Hague. The 
colony was much better prepared to cope with the immediate consequences 
of war on economic life than was the mother country. With the constant fear of 
a Japanese attack contingency plans had been drawn up years before. In this 
respect Germany and the Netherlands Indies formed an exception. Nowhere 
else in the world had governments prepared the economic and financial meas-
ures which needed to be taken in the event of war. Consequently, the Javasche 
Bank knew precisely what to do at the end of July 94 (Vissering 920:2).
The disregard the Dutch Parliament showed for the fate of the Netherlands 
Indies in July and August was shared by the general public in Holland. This 
attitude contrasted sharply with the concern expressed in the Netherlands 
Indies about developments in Europe. A.J. Lievegoed wrote a lengthy article 
in De Locomotief at the end of August in which he complained about the lack 
of interest in Holland in the way the colony might be affected by the war. 
He observed that people in Holland were more concerned about Poland and 
Finland, about the German possessions in China and Samoa, and about the 
fate of the Czechs, Albanians, and stranded American tourists in Europe, than 
about the Netherlands Indies. In Holland people knew all there was to know 
about the armies and fleets of the belligerents, but were ignorant of the strength 
of the Dutch naval squadron that had to defend Java.9 There were exceptions 
to this rule. One Dutch weekly raised the question of whether measures had 
been taken to declare the Netherlands Indies independent the moment the 
Netherlands should become involved in the war. Such a proposition was grist 
to the mill of the emerging nationalist movement in Java. ‘Unbelievable!’, was 
the comment in Oetoesan Hindia. Such an eventuality would raise the status of 
the Javanese in the national and in the international context, and would mean 
that the fate of the Netherlands Indies would not be decided in the North Sea 
but in the Java Sea.20 
The Netherlands Indies had plenty to complain. War came at a moment 
when the economic boom it had experienced since the turn of the century had 
seemed to have stagnated for more than a year. In August 94 it seemed as if 
the consequences of the war would be as grave in the colonies as in Holland, 
perhaps even more serious. Merchant vessels, and not only those flying the 
flag of a belligerent, remained in port. In retrospect the term ‘general panic’ 
was used to describe the atmosphere prevailing in shipping circles during the 
first days of the war (Voogd 924:63). Captains and owners of Dutch ships 
refused to take them to sea before a proclamation of neutrality had been pub-
9 De Locomotief, 0-0-94.
20 Oetoesan Hindia, 6-0-94.
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lished in the Javasche Courant. This did not happen till 4 August. Neutral mer-
chant ships which sailed before and after that date risked being stopped and 
searched at sea. German and British warships carried out this task in Asia, but 
most problems arose in European waters. Dutch ships sailing from North and 
South America to Holland, or from Holland to the Netherlands Indies expe-
rienced a similar fate. It was no exception for such ships to be stopped five to 
six times, perhaps more in the first days of the war. One Dutch ship was even 
forced to call in at Bizerta, Malta, Marseilles, Gibraltar, Cherbourg, Le Hâvre, 
Dover, and London (Voogd 924:63).
Another problem facing Dutch trade in those confused early days of the war 
was that German merchantmen were taken as prizes by Allied warships. Some 
had Dutch cargo on board. To deal with this problem a Committee for Seized 
Exports was formed in the Netherlands in October 94. In the Netherlands 
Indies instructions on how to reclaim such goods before prize-courts were 
published in the Javasche Courant around the same time. The information con-
sisted of notices on procedure issued by the British authorities in the Straits 
Settlements. Part of the Dutch cargo confiscated would be returned, but settle-
ments were far from satisfactory. Over 80 Dutch companies which disagreed 
with the decision of the prize courts in Allied countries and in Germany and 
Austria, which later in the war also had to decide on questions about whether 
their warships and submarines had rightfully destroyed neutral freighters, 
turned to the Dutch government for help in November 96. They urged that 
an international court of appeal be instituted.
Passengers cancelled their journeys. Mercantile houses in the Netherlands 
Indies, among them the NHM, unsure of what the fate of their cargo would be, 
had already decided before 28 July not to ship their merchandise. This reaction 
was consonant with the trends generally prevailing in trading at that time. 
Unsure of how prices would react – some predicted a rise, others a fall – the 
dominant mood was one of wait-and-see and to put off buying and selling for 
the time being. After the war had broken out insurance companies refused to 
insure cargo against the risks of war. 
Apprehension grew when exporters learned from the civil servants in 
Batavia and from newspaper reports about the confiscation of colonial prod-
ucts on board ships which had been forced to enter French and British ports. 
Their prompt reaction was to unload such cargo before ships set sail. Pleyte 
informed his colleague in Foreign Affairs that this had caused ‘great conster-
nation’ in the shipping companies concerned.2 These companies, of which the 
Rotterdamsche Lloyd and Stoomvaart Maatschappij Nederland were the two 
most important, immediately noted a sharp fall in the cargo offered. August 
2 Pleyte to Loudon, -9-94, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. -9-94 M8.
Sultan Hamengkubuwono VII of Yogyakarta in his uniform of a General in  
the Netherlands Indies army, circa 90 (KITLV 4027)
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94 was a disastrous month for the export of colonial products. Compared 
with July the export of coffee dropped drastically from 2,303,000 kg to 400,000 
kg, that of copra from 7,62,000 to ,727,000 kg, and that of sugar from 
233,33,000 kg to 26,4,000 kg. The tobacco export experienced a decline 
from ,72,000 to 394,000 kg and that of tea from 2,634,000 to ,38,000 kg. The 
rubber export in August 94 amounted to 37,000 kg instead of 48,000 kg in 
the previous month.22
The postal service between Asia and Europe was another victim. The 
German trade and mail service to and from the Netherlands Indies came to a 
halt after German steamers in Asian waters were either seized by the enemy 
or did not venture to leave port. With the exception of mail from Medan and 
from the Dutch sub-post offices in Singapore and Penang, the sending of post 
by British mail was suspended after 8 August. This was done partly at the 
request of the British government of the Straits Settlements, which wanted 
to relieve the burden of the censorship offices in Singapore and Penang. The 
French mail service was no longer used after 2 September.23 It did not form 
a realistic alternative as war had disrupted the overland rail link between 
Marseilles and Holland. The Dutch mail service was the only possibility that 
remained, but ran into serious delays because of an initial hesitance to sail 
and the stopping and searching of liners in the North Sea and in ports. In 
order not to delay the postal service unnecessary from August till the end 
of 94 mail for Holland was forwarded from Gravesend to Flushing with 
steamers from the shipping company Zeeland. Sending mail to Germany 
and the other Continental Powers from the Netherlands Indies and vice versa 
became increasingly difficult. Letters and parcels destined for Germany on 
Dutch steamers had to be unloaded in Genoa. When they were taken along to 
British and French ports they were subject to the Allied measures to isolate the 
Continental Powers. Such shipments ran the risk of being confiscated. After the 
Ottoman Empire entered the war, mail for Turkey, including letters addressed 
to the Dutch Consul in Jeddah and to Indonesian Muslims in Mecca, also had 
to be redirected from French and British ports to Genoa, causing considerable 
delays. This route was even disrupted before May 9, when Italy joined the 
Allied Powers. When relationship between Italy and the Continental Powers 
soured the Ottoman government seized Italian mail at Jeddah in March 9. 
Thereafter, mail still could be sent, but there was no way to avoid the mail 
restrictions introduced by the allies. 
All this circuitous mail did not mean that communication between the 
German community in the Netherlands Indies and Germany was completely 
22 De Locomotief, 7-0-94.
23 Information of the Department of Agriculture, Industry and Trade, cited in De Locomotief, 
29-7-96.
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disrupted during the war. The British censor was keen to intercept money, 
cheques, and merchandise – even in small quantities, mindful of the saying 
many a mickle makes a muckle – and German war propaganda, which also 
came to mean German newspapers and magazines in which according to the 
Allied a distorted picture was given of what happened at the fronts. Letters 
could still be sent to and from the Netherlands Indies, and German newspa-
pers still reached the Netherlands Indies; though not by British mail. Letters 
with a suspect content were confiscated when neutral ships were searched but 
the remainder was allowed through. To circumvent seizure of German mail 
that was carried on neutral ships by the Allied Powers, codes were developed 
by the German government to keep open the communication with country-
men in Asia, Africa, and the Americas, essential for trade and for the conduct 
of war. Nevertheless, the chance was high that such mail would be seized, 
soon eliciting no more than a formal protest by the Dutch Captains and The 
Hague.24 According to the Acting German Consul General in Batavia about 
90 per cent was ‘lost’.2 There were other ways of having messages reach 
their destination. Sometimes Dutch people were prepared to act as a courier. 
Another method – until discovered – was to use the telegraph connection 
between the Netherlands Indies and Japan which was less scrupulously moni-
tored by the censor, using a special code. Important German diplomatic and 
commercial correspondence sent by sea mail to addresses in neutral countries 
occasionally also escaped the attention of the British censor, especially when 
the message was in code or written in invisible ink. Such letters from Germany 
or from the Netherlands Indies were sent to an address in Holland or in some 
other neutral country. From there they were forwarded to their real destina-
tion. German Envoys, including the Acting Consul General in Batavia, also 
transposed commercial messages into a special secret code; investing them 
with a cloak of innocence. The reverse also happened. German diplomats 
sought the cooperation of German companies to disguise official correspond-
ence. In the Netherlands Indies a central role in this respect was played by the 
important Hamburg-based estate company and trading house of Behn, Meyer 
and Company, which had had branches all over Southeast Asia before the war 
and acted as agent for the German shipping lines.26 
For more than a month no mail from the colony, including the reports regu-
larly sent by the colonial administration to Ministry of the Colonies, reached 
24 De Locomotief, 22-2-96.
2 Interrogation Th. Helfferich, 3-8-97 and Windels, -8-97, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 0--
98 S.
26 At the beginning of 97 the sending of German mail to and from the United States, and 
from there to and from the Netherlands Indies, by submarine was briefly contemplated. Senders 
who wanted to make use of this service had to write the word Tauchbootbrief on the envelope.
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Holland. In the middle of September the last written reports that had been 
received by the Ministry of the Colonies at the Plein in The Hague were dated 
one and a half month previous.27 The Netherlands Indies likewise received no 
post from Europe. The first mail from Holland, with Dutch newspapers carry-
ing detailed information about what was happening in Holland and the rest 
of Europe, reached Java on  September.28
To make matters worse, the telegraph links between the two parts of the 
empire also broke down. Telegrams could not be sent nor reach their destina-
tion. In 94 use of a German cable turned out to be a serious liability. German 
cables were vulnerable to British attacks. At the end of July, Le Roy had alerted 
the Ministry of the Colonies to the fact that special precautions had to be taken 
to protect that part of the cable to Yap that ran through the Archipelago. He 
pointed out that German warships guarded the cable at Shanghai and at Yap. 
A Dutch warship should patrol the waters near Manado.29 Idenburg, informed 
of this by The Hague, refused to send a warship to Celebes to guard the cable 
and the station at Manado against an attack. He was afraid of the consequence 
of splitting the ‘a naval force already too weak’.30
What Idenburg did, and this step initially amazed Pleyte, who inquired the 
reason by wire, was to replace the German staff of the Manado station with 
Dutchmen.3 A few days later, on 4 August, after Great Britain had entered the 
war, a similar measure was taken with respect to British staff at the telegraph 
stations of the Eastern Extension Australasia and China Telegraph Company 
in the Netherlands Indies. The council of the Indies had advised this be done 
in order to honour the rules about the way a neutral country should treat bel-
ligerents impartially. As an additional precaution, military officers were sta-
tioned at the offices to censor foreign telegraphic communications. As with so 
many of the measures the colonial government took to guard neutrality, igno-
rance of how things went in real life anticipated serious flaws. Dutch officials 
did replace the telegraph operators, but not the other British members of the 
staff. As two copies of a telegram were filed for administrative purposes, these 
Britons, as became clear in February 96, forwarded the text of telegrams 
from abroad which the censors had refused to pass on to the addressees. 
In his letter in which Le Roy had alerted Pleyte, the former had stressed the 
importance of the German cable for uninterrupted communication between 
The Hague and the colony at a time of international crisis. Despite their 
precautions it was precisely this telegraph link between Europe and Asia 
27 Pleyte to Loudon, -9-94, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. -9-94 M8.
28 De Locomotief, -9-94.
29 Le Roy to Bakhuis, 3-7-94, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. -8-94 O4.
30 Idenburg to Pleyte, 3-8-94, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 4-8-94 Z4bis.
3 Pleyte to Idenburg, 3-8-94, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 4-8-94 Z4bis.
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which broke down first. On August 8 the installation on Yap, a major link in 
the German communications system in the Pacific, was destroyed by well-
directed fire from British cruisers; this had been announced to his colleague 
in Manado by the German telegraphist with the words ‘Adieu Kamarad dort 
kommen die Engländer’, but within a fortnight the Germans succeeded in 
building an improvised station.32 For a brief period the shelling of Yap also put 
an end to the telegraph link between Java and Tokyo. The Netherlands Indies 
had once again became largely dependent on ‘British lines’, and the censor-
ship Great Britain had imposed on telegraphic communications at home and 
in her colonies and protectorates immediately after it had entered the war. 
This dependence was an additional reason for apprehension in those first 
uncertain days of the war. The Dutch in the Netherlands Indies were sure that 
Great Britain would not inform Batavia were the Dutch government to choose 
to join the German side. London would not allow the Netherlands Indies to 
prepare for an attack. Were British armed forces to strike, they would do so 
without warning.33 To intensify the sense of isolation, the French line between 
Pontianak and Saigon had broken down too, and could not be used. 
For the time being telegrams had to be sent via Eastern Extension, which 
only accepted properly addressed messages with a French and English text.34 
London also demanded that telegrams bore the full name of the sender and 
the addressee. Pleyte personally instructed his staff that telegrams had to be 
addressed to ‘Governor General, Batavia’.3 If coded messages in cipher had 
to be sent, this should be done via the Dutch Envoy in Washington, using the 
connection via Guam and Yap to Manado. Dutch trade was also hit by the 
measure. Trading companies used to conduct much of their telegraph corre-
spondence in code. Departing from this custom meant that wires were much 
lengthier, and hence more expensive, and that the companies had to part with 
an established way of identifying products.
Trade and communication were not the only matters to suffer from the 
war. Passengers, often fairly strapped for cash, suddenly found themselves 
stranded in foreign ports when the ships on which they sailed, in most cases 
German vessels, were unable to continue their voyage. Ships of neutral coun-
tries offered the only opportunity for them to continue their travels; and some 
captains showed enough compassion not to ask the full fare. Tourists who 
wanted to return home as quickly as possible were likewise looking for sea 
transportation on ships flying a neutral flag, for instance Dutch ships calling 
32 Teitler 984:3; Holtappel to Pop, 24-8-94, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 8-2-94 P24.
33 M. 922:844.
34 Sending telegrams to Curaçao was even more difficult. The line was disrupted at Santo 
Domingo, and from there the telegrams had to be transported by ship to Puerto Rico. 
3 Note Pleyte, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 6-8-94 D.
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at Genoa and Marseilles. In Genoa hundreds of tourists on holiday in Italy and 
Switzerland tried to take passage on Dutch liners. Some of them offered large 
sums of money far in excess of the ordinary fare. Instructed to do so by the 
owners, Dutch Captains usually accepted only Dutch people. Conditions on 
board were crowded; the more so as Dutch passengers from the Netherlands 
Indies, who in normal times would have preferred a leisurely trip overland for 
the last leg of their journey, decided to remain on board. Extra bunks had to 
be placed in the cabins, forcing the passengers to accept ‘billeting’. Smoking 
salons and lounges were converted into dormitories. On at least one such 
ship, meals were rationed. In anticipation that, as indeed did happen, the ship 
would be stopped and forced to sail to a British or French port, less copious 
diners were served. To make room for over one hundred additional Dutch 
tourists on another Dutch passenger ship cooks, stewards, and Javanese serv-
ants had to vacate their cabins and move to the quarters usually reserved for 
soldiers and to the forecastle. She, too, was stopped a number of times. When 
it finally became clear that she was to be allowed to continue her journey to 
Holland, the passengers broke into the Dutch national anthem. On rare occa-
sions such additional passengers complained. A Dutchman who had boarded 
a Dutch ship at Marseilles considered the third-class cabin below the dignity 
of him and his daughter. Later he sued the captain for endangering the lives 
of his passengers by sailing too fast in foggy weather in an attempt to reach a 
Dutch port as soon as possible. He lost his case.
The fate of German and Austrian passengers was even more hazardous. At 
the most the Dutch had to share a cabin, or if they were forced to disembark 
in a French city, had some difficulty in explaining that they were not Germans, 
and that the language they spoke was Dutch. When Germans or Austrians 
managed to board a Dutch ship, they and the German members of the crew 
were usually arrested if the ship on which they sailed was searched in Asian 
and European waters. They remained interned for the duration of the war. 
Only clergymen and elderly persons were allowed to continue their journey. 
For those Germans who had made their living in the Netherlands Indies 
and were arrested, a life lay in store for which an existence as a member of a 
colonial elite had not prepared them. One, probably a planter from Sumatra, 
complained in a letter published in De Locomotief about the way the prisoners 
were treated in a camp in Colombo. The washing facilities were dreadful, they 
had to do the dishes themselves, and had to cook their own meals. The camp 
beds on which the prisoners were expected to sleep were not provided with 
mosquito nets; and, because brushes and polish had not been handed out, they 
could not clean their shoes.36
36 De Locomotief, 9-9-94.
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Occasionally Germans serving in the Dutch colonial army were among 
those arrested. After protests by the captain of the ship, by their superior 
officer, or by the Dutch Envoy they were usually released again. Sometimes 
merely having a German name sufficed to arrested. As Dutch nationals who 
had visited Germany could also run into trouble the Ministry of the Colonies 
came to demand from civil servants and army officers who had been on leave 
in Holland, that if they had been in Germany that they travel home with a 
new passport. 
In the Netherlands Indies a few days elapsed before the news of the war sank. 
On  August De Locomotief still reported that the outbreak of the war had been 
received calmly by the population. People were aware of the seriousness of 
the tidings, but Europe was too far away for them to become emotionally 
involved. The newspaper added that the war did not seem to make the least 
impression on the natives or the Chinese. The Indische Financier dated the same 
day also carried a reassuring message. Discussing the panic on the financial 
markets in Europe it pointed out that, although there were close links between 
the exchanges in Batavia and in Amsterdam, there was no reason to fear the 
worst. Europe was far away, and most investors in the colony had put their 
money into estates in Java and Sumatra. Contrary to what really was to hap-
pen, it wrote that the estates were not threatened by the war in Europe. The 
conclusion drawn was that the intrinsic value of shareholdings and bonds was 
not at risk.37 To this De Locomotief added equally encouragingly that it was not 
difficult to imagine why there were runs on banks in Holland, but that the 
situation in the Netherlands Indies was completely different. Holland was 
close to the theatre of war; the Netherlands Indies formed ‘a closed circulation 
area, which as such is completely outside the war’.38 The newspaper begged 
its readers not to withdraw money from the banks. Banks needed their sup-
ply of precious metals. Anyway: ‘Large amounts of money in your own house 
is not safe and should unrest occur the plundering of private houses is more 
likely, in any case easier, than an attack on the safes of the banks’.39
It was one of the many appeals in the colony aimed to avert a panic in early 
August. Observing that people were on edge Idenburg had a special instruc-
tion sent to the Dutch Residents. Should circumstances require this, they had 
to assure the population that there was ‘not the slightest reason for the ten-
sion and anxiety’ which could be ‘observed here and there’, and that the eco-
nomic situation did not warrant ‘excessive concern’ either.40 In De Locomotief 
37 Indische Financier, cited in De Locomotief, 4-8-94.
38 De Locomotief, 4-8-94.
39 De Locomotief, 4-8-94.
40 Idenburg to Pleyte, 3-8-94, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 8-9-94 I9.
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of  August it was noted that ‘calm judgement in facing a dark present and 
grim possibilities is a great strength’.4 Six days later a reader who observed a 
pervading atmosphere of ‘extraordinary nervousness’ appealed to his fellow-
Europeans to act normally. They should not forget that Europeans had a task 
to fulfil in the colony. Millions of natives looked up to them: ‘Our calm gives 
them composure. If we do lose our calm than the people who expect guidance 
from us will lose their heads and turn to excesses.’42 The author of these words 
was not the only one who held this opinion. White Dutch people should set 
the example. If they did not panic, the population would not either.
Such suggestions fell on deaf ears. The same economic consequences elic-
ited by the news the war had had in the motherland could be observed. Prices 
rose, the volume of exports and imports declined, food shortages threatened, 
the supply of credit virtually dried up, and there was a run on gold and silver 
reserves. Shipping, including inter-island traffic, and the estate industry were 
especially affected, as were export firms all over the Archipelago. On estates 
and in harbours the prospect of mass unemployment loomed. Local indig-
enous producers of export products, rubber, tea, copra, maize, cassava, and 
beans and peas, and forest products, also suffered. Exports virtually ground 
to a standstill and prices dropped steeply.
The financial world reacted accordingly. Though there had already been a 
drop in prices in July the initial hope had been that the exchange in Batavia 
could stay open. The panic that held sway in Europe had to be avoided, and 
it had to be said, as it was stated in a report by the Javasche Bank, the stock-
exchange in Batavia was of little significance.43 The Netherlands Indies proved 
less self-contained than people had argued. The exchange had to be closed. 
Many wanted to sell their shares. 
The commercial credit system, an essential element in the business net-
works, where it was common practice for export firms to advance loans to Arab 
and Chinese middlemen who in their turn provided credit to their local suppli-
er, came under pressure. European firms set the example. In Batavia it was the 
NHM which was among the first to renege. The NHM refused to honour letters 
of credit or to provide credit to companies which were its customers. Such sup-
pliants were referred to the Javasche Bank.44 Other European firms demanded 
cash payments and their Chinese and Arab customers soon followed suite, or 
ran into difficulties because they had no cash to pay for new purchases or to 
meet outstanding financial obligations. All this led to the gloomy prediction 
that many private companies, even banks, would not survive the financial cri-
4 De Locomotief, -8-94.
42 De Locomotief, 7-8-94.
43 Feiten 96:42.
44 Secret note President Javasche Bank, -8-94, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 8-9-94 H9.
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sis that seemed the inevitable accompaniment to the outbreak of the war and 
would soon be bankrupt. Some suggested a moratorium, a suspension on col-
lecting debts and other financial obligations. As in Holland this never eventu-
ated. The Javasche Bank intervened by extending its activities to the provision 
of credit, including those against the pledge of loans or mortgages, and other 
forms of transfers and the borrowing of money. Not to hurt commerce unnec-
essarily, the bank advisedly decided not to increase its interest rate.
In such grave circumstances The Hague deemed it necessary that Idenburg, 
whose term in office was to end in December, should remain in office. On 4 
August he was sent a wire via the German and Eastern lines first in Dutch, and 
to be sure that it indeed reached its destination, repeated the next day via the 
second line in English. Idenburg was informed that ‘with high approval’ (the 
Queen) the appointment of a successor had been postponed ‘unlimitedly’ and 
that mindful of the current situation Pleyte trusted that he, Idenburg, would 
not object.4
The economic crisis with which Idenburg and his staff had to cope was 
acute. Business slowed down. A fall in foreign trade and production, whether 
brought about by the contraband policy of the Allied Powers or the hesitation 
about sailing, would exert a negative effect on the income of the state, which 
could well lose a significant portion of its customs and tax revenues. In the 
first nine months of 94 these earned . million guilders less than during the 
same period the previous year; almost all of which had to be attributed to the 
decline of international trade as a consequence of the war.46 As in the mother 
country where the Minister of Finance had called for the ‘highly essential 
thrift’, the colonial administration had to economize. Were the estate sector 
to collapse, much of the national income would dry up. At the end of August 
when the situation had already improved somewhat De Locomotief gloomily 
predicted that in such circumstances the Netherlands Indies was forced to rely 
for its finance ‘on the fragile fiscal capacity of the native population, on the 
sixty million or more, which the land rent, the salt, the opium, and the pawn-
shop services yield together’.47 Consequently public projects were postponed 
and salary increases promised to European and Javanese civil servants were 
cancelled. In September, Idenburg also called for a cut back of expenses for 
tours of duty. Civil servants should travel on duty only when strictly neces-
sary. Idenburg insisted that they had to limit the use of motor cars, and where 
possible should travel overland instead of booking a sea passage.
4 Pleyte to Idenburg, 4-8-94, -8-94, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. -8-94 B4, Vb. 6-8-94 
D.
46 De Locomotief, -2-94, citing Korte berichten published by the Department of Agriculture, 
Industry, and Trade.
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In The Hague Pleyte went further. A national budget was presented to 
Parliament in September. It was somewhat of a farce. The departments had 
prepared its drafts before war had begun. The Constitution demanded that a 
budget be submitted but this had to be done at a time when nobody had had 
any inkling about the financial consequences of the war. Even the govern-
ment admitted that it was little more than a gesture.48 Still it already had one 
immediate consequence for the colony. One of the decisions Pleyte took was to 
scrap any rises, how small these might be, in expenditure on personnel from 
the draft budget. An exception was only made for a few very specific groups 
such as native schoolteachers and the sub-district heads. To solve the acute 
problem of the shortage of liquid assets induced by the war, the Ministry of 
the Colonies also contemplated speeding up and extending plans developed 
in 93 to attract private capital for such government enterprises and services 
as the people’s credit banks, forestry, and the government railways and postal 
service. To raise additional money the ‘first Indies loan’, which had already 
been discussed before the outbreak of the war, was floated. It was intended not 
to add money to the budget but to pay off the floating debt of the Netherlands 
Indies in Holland. Subscription was opened in March 9. Within weeks the 
loan was oversubscribed in the Netherlands Indies. A reason to be proud. The 
48 De Locomotief, 3-0-94.
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loan was as much an investment opportunity as a chance to kindle colonial 
patriotism. People wondered whether the loan would have similar results in 
Holland (which it did). Mention was made of large contributions by members 
of the Javanese nobility and by affluent Chinese, who as their rich compatri-
ots in the Straits Settlements were pillars of colonial society. The staff of the 
General Secretariat (the Governor-General’s office) also subscribed a modest 
amount of money.49 
The reaction of the European community to news of the war exacerbated 
the situation. People’s anxiety mounted by the day. All over the Archipelago 
people phoned newspapers editors, civil servants, and other supposedly well-
informed persons to check the many rumours which were circulating and to 
find out what was happening in the colony and in Europe. It was reported 
that in Semarang the Resident’s phone rang almost incessantly.0 Such was the 
increased demand for calls that during the whole of August trunk lines had to 
be opened to the public for two extra hours in the evening. 
Almost all cities of any significance saw runs on the bank. Even in far-away 
Gorontalo in North Celebes panic struck. The indigenous population were 
also not unscathed. A remark by a Chinese that it would not be long before 
Dutch banknotes would no longer be legal tender acted as ‘a spark in a barrel 
of gunpowder’. Almost all coins were withdrawn from circulation. It was 
the same everywhere. Paper currency was distrusted. Occasionally people 
inquired whether bank notes could still be cashed. Many preferred coins. 
Consequently an extra supply of silver money had to be sent to banks. The 
export of gold and silver was prohibited.
Anticipating a financial crisis, as early as  August Pleyte had asked 
the Queen to allow Idenburg to change the backing of bank notes, current 
accounts and balance to coins or coin material of the Javasche Bank. Using this 
power Idenburg lowered the ratio from two-fifths to one-fifth. This offered the 
possibility to increase the amount of paper money in circulation to deal with 
a situation in which there was a mounting demand for cash payments, just at 
a time people were withdrawing large amounts of silver coins from the bank 
without having any intention of spending the money in the near future. As 
an additional security and aware that ‘gold [was] nowhere obtainable’, spe-
cial contracts were concluded with the mining companies in the Netherlands 
Indies by the Javasche Bank which gave the bank preferential rights to buy 
gold.2 In an attempt to decrease the distrust in paper currency, banknotes of 
the Javasche Bank were formally declared legal tender. To combat the hoard-
49 De Locomotief, 3-3-9, 6-3-9, 8-3-9.
0 De Locomotief, -8-94.
 De Locomotief, -9-94.
2 Report Javasche Bank cited in Feiten 96:44.
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ing of coins the Dutch Residents were instructed by Idenburg to act as rigor-
ously as possible against anybody who undermined trust in banknotes and by 
doing so stimulated the withdrawal of coins from circulation. 
Initially the measures were ineffective. People in all the population groups 
continued to flock to banks to change their notes for coins. Occasionally the 
police had to be called in to calm people down. In Semarang, the local branch 
of the Javasche Bank was overrun by customers. After it had opened its doors 
those waiting outside ‘dashed in and the whole day it continued to be a 
continuous flood of people desiring silver. At certain moments the agitation 
among those still waiting was such that quarrels and small scuffles occurred, 
to which Europeans were also not immune.’3 Tram and railway companies 
demanded the exact money in coins for fares. They refused to accept pay-
ment with large notes which would have required change in coins. The tram 
and railway companies were perfectly within their rights to do so, and it may 
have been their contribution to decreasing the exchange of notes for coins, 
but Europeans castigated such behaviour as setting a bad example to the 
non-European population. It inexorably stimulated the distrust in paper cur-
rency of the indigenous Indonesians who for years had been in the habit of 
treating railway stations as a convenient place to change banknotes for coins. 
At at least one station the result had been that the Chinese shopkeepers living 
nearby refused to accept paper currency.
The Batavia head-office of the NHM was partly blamed for the panic. It 
refused to pay out silver coins to anybody, not even to long-standing custom-
ers who needed the money to pay their employees’ wages. As a consequence 
the Javasche Bank had to help out the shipping company, the KPM, and a 
number of estate companies which had an account with the NHM but were 
refused silver coins. Another large company, which also needed money to pay 
its employees, the Nederlandsch-Indische Gas-Maatschappij (Netherlands 
Indies Gas Company), was only provided with coins by the NHM after it 
threatened to close its account. The NHM had prepared for an emergency 
such as that which occurred in August 94. Since 92 it had built up large 
stock of coins. The Director of the NHM, A.F. Marmelstein, did his best to keep 
this so-called war-cash box intact. Expecting a run on his bank, in vain he tried 
to persuade the Javasche Bank to give his company three million guilders in 
silver coins. He even called on the mediation of Idenburg. The President of the 
Javasche Bank and Idenburg refused to comply. They could not permit such 
a substantial decrease in the stock of the Javasche Bank, exactly at a moment 
when that bank needed all the gold and silver it had to pay out to the public 
and to endorse its banknotes. Marmelstein was given to understand that for 
3 De Locomotief, 8-8-94.
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the sum for which he asked the Javasche Bank could bring into circulation an 
amount of banknotes five times higher. The most Marmelstein was prepared 
to commit himself to, and he considered it a ‘fair deal’, was that the NHM 
would not withdraw cash from the local branches of the Javasche Bank as long 
as its own stock remained intact. 
Even Pleyte could not persuade the NHM to change its policy. Pleyte had 
‘instantly’ phoned the NHM main office to summon Van Aalst to his Ministry 
when Idenburg had informed him about the company’s attitude on 8 August. 
The result had been disappointing. Van Aalst was not available, and his 
deputy, A.H. Muller, was not very eager to send instructions to Batavia rap-
ping Marmelstein over the knuckles. When instructions were finally sent, they 
did not exude the spirit Pleyte had expected. They merely told Marmelstein 
to lend the colonial government every assistance without prejudicing the 
interests of the NHM.4 Pleyte concluded that the conduct of the NHM had 
been questionable. Idenburg shared this opinion. He wired Pleyte a few days 
later that the company was ‘only alive to its own interests’. This was neatly 
phrased. According to a secret note drawn up by the President of the Javasche 
Bank – at the request of Pleyte the words were not included in the version of 
the report to be shown to the management or Van Aalst – the attitude of the 
NHM in Batavia at the outbreak of the war had been one of ‘irrational fear, 
egoism carried to the extreme, and complete indifference to the interests of 
society and the rights and interests of its clients’.6
The stubbornness of the NHM meant that in Surabaya and Semarang espe-
cially, the NHM withdrew large amounts from branches of the Javasche Bank. 
To add to the irritation, the manager of the NHM office in Surabaya refused 
to participate in a meeting of the Resident, local banks, and rich Chinese and 
Arabs to discuss combating the hoarding of silver. He remarked arrogantly 
that his company was sound enough and had coins enough. It did not have to 
call on help from Chinese and Arabs.7
The monetary policy of the NHM became the talk of the town. It fortified 
the general public in their belief that banknotes had lost their value. This 
meant that to all intents and purposes Marmelstein could have made himself 
liable to the rigorous action Idenburg had demanded Residents take against 
people fuelling distrust in banknotes. Marmelstein was indeed punished, 
but was too important a person to suffer serious repercussions. Angered by 
the policy of the NHM, which as it was stressed a number of times in official 
4 Marmelstein to Idenburg, 0-8-94, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 8-9-94 L9.
 Idenburg to Pleyte, -8-94, Pleyte to Idenburg, 8-9-94, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. -8-94 
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correspondence only considered its own interests and not those of the state, 
Idenburg sent a wire to The Hague on  August. In it he withdrew his sug-
gestion that Marmelstein be awarded a royal decoration on Queen’s Birthday. 
In retrospect the President of the Javasche Bank would later complain that 
because of the lamentable conduct of the NHM, the public had been robbed 
of its senses. Between 4 and 8 August the bank had literally been stormed by 
people wanting to change their paper currency for coins.8 In total the various 
offices of the Javasche Bank had been forced to pay out twelve million guilders 
to people who came to hand in their banknotes.9 
Apart from changing banknotes, many people went to the bank to empty 
their accounts. Most of them were Europeans, Chinese, and Arabs. The indig-
enous population still did not make much use of the services of banks. In 
Surabaya 48,000 guilders was withdrawn from the Savings Bank in one day. 
Under normal circumstances the bank paid out 7,000 guilders per day. On the 
same day, the branch of the Javasche Bank in Surabaya had to pay out 80,000 
guilders. The demand for ready money was such that in Semarang the board 
of the local Savings Bank put an announcement in the newspapers informing 
the public that the bank would resort to its statutory right to institute a three 
month period between requests for withdrawals and the actual pay-out. The 
bank explained that it could cope with the many requests for restitution, but 
that it had to act in anticipation of even more withdrawals. It could not do 
otherwise. Most of its money was invested in solid mortgages, which if sud-
denly realized would place the debtors in grave trouble, and in shares, which 
could not be sold at a time when the exchange was closed.60 To help out its 
employees, who could well find themselves suddenly without cash money 
because of the decision of the Savings Bank the Internationale Crediet- en 
Handelsvereeniging Rotterdam (Internatio, International Credit and Trading 
Association Rotterdam) decided to pay moderate advances, with savings-bank 
books as a pledge. The Semarangsche Hulpspaarbank (Semarang Savings 
Bank)  also announced that in order to help out small savers and to combat 
usury, it would pay out small advances in this way.
Simultaneously, and in this respect Europeans also led the way, all over 
the colony people began to hoard. In many cities carriages packed with bags 
of rice, tins of petroleum, dried milk, and tinned food bought by passengers 
who were often female Europeans became a frequent sight. From Kupang in 
Dutch Timor an extraordinary demand for evaporated milk was reported.6 
The panic which gripped citizens in a number of regions was augmented by 
8 Secret note President Javasche Bank, -8-94, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 8-9-94 H9.
9 Koloniaal verslag 9:6-6. 
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emergency purchases made by the government, army and Navy. The com-
mander of the Navy, Pinke, ordered the purchase of rice, sugar, coffee and 
flour for a period of six months (Teitler 986:3). The commander of the army, 
Michielsen, ordered the regional army supply officers in Java to lay in a stock 
of rice, tinned milk, dried fish, butter, and flour, also, but people were not 
aware of this at first, to be used for distribution among the population should 
this become necessary. Later Navy beans, sugar, and sago were added to the 
list.62 As a precaution, in order to be able to act if food shortages were to occur 
in certain parts of the Archipelago were imports of rice to dry up, this was fol-
lowed on 8 August by an instruction to the army’s quarter-master general to 
stock extra food supplies. He was given the extra responsibility transporting 
food to regions which might potentially suffer a food shortage. He was pro-
vided with two special advances for this purpose; one of one and a half million 
guilders; the other of over three million guilders.
Though runs on shops had already started talk of the massive purchases 
by the authorities added to the atmosphere of alarm. In Yogyakarta staff from 
the nearby estates were alerted by phone to come to the city and stock pro-
visions. It was recollected a few days later that it seemed as if a famine was 
imminent.63 The run on the shops in Yogyakarta had commenced after reports 
began to circulate that the army was buying up the whole supply of milk, but-
ter, and chocolate in the city. Indeed, so much butter was bought by the army 
that some of it had to be sold again after a few days. Large-scale purchases by 
the army also contributed to the panic elsewhere. In Batavia people feared that 
in little more than a week there would no longer be any bread in the shops. 
In Surabaya the army was blamed for the rising price of bread. In Semarang 
leading trading firms blamed the panic in the city on the army and its sudden 
and seemingly unlimited purchases. The result had been a sharp rise of prices 
in the city, and especially so in the interior.64 From Salatiga it was reported that 
after the army had started to make large purchases ‘almost everybody went 
a little crazy’ and that shops were ‘as it were plundered whatever the price’.6 
What was being referred to in all these reports were essential commodities. 
Many shops faced a drop in sales because customers unsure of what the future 
would bring were hesitant to part with their money.
Bleak financial prospects – newspapers reported that the colonial admin-
istration contemplated lowering the salaries of its civil servants, according 
to some rumours as much as by half – and a rocketing demand for some 
62 Verslag omtrent de belangrijkste militaire maatregelen sinds 3 Juli j.l. getroffen, NA, Kol. 
Geheim, Vb. 8--9 P.
63 De Locomotief, 8-8-94.
64 De Locomotief, -8-94, -8-94, 9-3-9.
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commodities meant that shops refused credit. Up to that moment buying on 
credit had been an accepted practice and some owners of shops, as happened 
in Batavia, used the opportunity to force their clients to settle outstanding 
bills. They refused to sell any more commodities before debts were paid. 
Even a newspaper like De Locomotief joined in. As of 6 August De Locomotief 
demanded cash for subscriptions and advertisements. Some welcomed this 
new, unusual situation as a blessing in disguise. Credit, the buying with, as it 
was called, bonnetjes, on account, had been widespread. In the opinion of its 
critics this credit system in the wholesale and retail trade had turned into an 
unhealthy habit. There were too many outstanding debts and people spent 
much more than they could afford.66 They expressed the hope that the sudden 
demand for cash payments would provide an opportunity to scotch this evil 
once and for all. It did not come to this. After about two weeks the old practice 
of buying on credit was resumed.
Expecting a disruption in supply and confronted with the sudden demand 
shopkeepers, importers, and wholesale traders raised the prices of food-stuffs, 
drinks, and textiles. European traders, in their own words, ‘adjusted prices to 
the demand’. De Locomotief reported from Bandung that consumer prices sky-
rocketed. The result had been ‘great bitterness’.67 In Semarang one firm dou-
bled the price of flour within a day; another raised the price of a box of matches 
in six hours from eighty-five to two hundred guilders. Shopkeepers defended 
their decision by pointing out that Europeans were prepared to pay whatever 
was asked, even an increase of two hundred per cent.68 Occasionally they went 
too far. In the West Javanese city of Sukabumi, a Chinese wholesale trader was 
forced to distribute a leaflet in which he apologized for the fact that he had 
increased his prices by 60 per cent. Fearing a boycott by his Chinese custom-
ers, he promised to make restitution of the money paid in excess. In Surakarta 
a shopkeeper decided to lower his prices by 2 per cent after angry customers 
had threatened that they would stop visiting his shop after the war.69
The situation was aggravated by the fact that imports stopped or were dis-
rupted. Some products grew scarce almost immediately. One of these was beer 
from Europe, but as the editor of De Locomotief wrote, he had bought some 
Japanese Asahi beer and it had not tasted different.70 Much more alarming 
was the prospect of a decline in the supply of rice. After a week the bans on 
rice exports abroad had been lifted, but much solace this had not given. The 
war came at a moment that the Archipelago was suffering from an extremely 
66 De Locomotief, 8-9-94.
67 De Locomotief, -8-94.
68 De Locomotief, 0-8-94.
69 De Locomotief, 7-8-94, 26-8-94.
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long drought and concomitantly poor harvests. Coupled with the prospect 
that because of the disruption of international shipping, rice imports might 
not be forthcoming for some time, the result was great trepidation. In Java 
though there were still large stocks of rice available, prices rose sharply almost 
everywhere; boosted by the fact that the colonial administration started to buy 
up rice in large quantities. It was reported that in doing so any price asked 
was unquestionably accepted.7 One of the consequences of the rise in price 
was that pawnshops were inundated with indigenous customers who wanted 
money which they thought they needed to buy rice. 
The situation outside Java was more critical. In South Borneo, one of the 
worst struck areas, the yield had been half of that of the previous year. In 
Ternate the harvest had been ‘very disappointing’; while from South Celebes 
it was reported that because of a bad harvest rice shortages threatened.72 The 
estate and mining regions of Sumatra formed an especially weak spot. These 
were threatened with the prospect of a sudden shortage of rice – and a sharp 
increase in its price – as French Indochina, Siam, and Burma had instituted 
export bans and international shipping any way had come to a standstill. In 
the north of Sumatra the price of an one hundred kilogram bag of Siam rice tri-
pled from ten to thirty guilders.73 Europeans were sure that the labour force on 
the estates would certainly rise when there was no longer rice to feed them.74 
In Jambi, Lampung, and the Riau Archipelago people also feared food riots. 
In the Riau Archipelago, on the island of Pulau Tujuh, this fear was realized. 
Great anxiety among the population was also reported from Billiton. Rumours 
were rife that Chinese miners, who expected a shortage of rice, intended to 
plunder the small town of Tanjungpandan.
On the East Coast of Sumatra, where about two hundred thousand estate 
workers had to be fed, the Dutch Resident summoned a meeting with planters 
and the managers of shipping agencies and import houses to discuss the food 
situation. The region was almost completely dependent for its supply of rice 
on imports from abroad. Afraid that worse was to come, the meeting decided 
to try and buy 20,000 bags of rice in Rangoon and Siam, a supply sufficient 
to feed the labour force and the ‘free natives in the cities’ for three months. 
When necessary the purchases had to go ahead against any price asked, a very 
popular phrase at that time. Managers promised to start planting ketela, sweet 
potatoes, and other secondary crops, like maize and soya bean, on their estates 
as a substitute staple. Soon this was to give rise to a new anxiety. The large-
scale, sudden planting of secondary crops could well lead to diseases, which 
7 De Locomotief, 7-8-94.
72 Koloniaal verslag 9:3-2, 3-6, 4-2.
73 Feiten 96:82.
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might also affect the main crop, tobacco. In Bangka an appeal was made to the 
indigenous Indonesians and Chinese to prepare extra fields for the growing 
of food crops. The situation on the island appeared so alarming that anxious 
to feed the many miners, the colonial administration was prepared to pay for 
rice bought by private firms in Rangoon, even accepting the risk that because 
of acts of war the cargo could be lost at sea.7 It was one of the rare instances 
in which colonial and home governments were prepared to offer insurance 
against the risk of war.
On 4 August Batavia banned the export of rice. Ships destined for Europe 
which had already loaded rice had to discharge their cargo. An export ban 
of important secondary crops, like cassava, maize, peas and beans, followed 
three days later. Special measures were taken for Bali and Lombok. Rice 
exports from these islands to other parts of the Archipelago were forbid-
den. Simultaneously Dutch civil servants took action to fix the price of rice. 
Hoarding was threatened with the confiscation of stock. As an additional 
threat, the Attorney-General sent a circular to the newspapers ostensibly ask-
ing the help of the editors to warn the public that the criminal code covered 
punishment for spreading unsubstantiated rumours intended to influence the 
level of prices. He did not fail to mention that the press regulation allowed 
action to be taken against the deliberate spreading of incorrect reports. The 
publication of false rumours in newspapers, even when an editor did not 
know that these were not true, was liable to punishment.76 The warning was 
to no avail. Newspapers continued to report about rising prices and a panick-
ing public.
In the efforts to calm the public down yet another circular, quoted exten-
sively in the press, was sent to Dutch regional civil servants. It said that the 
supply of food was still amply sufficient, that prices could be kept under 
control, and that the circulation of money would remain normal providing 
that coins were not withdrawn. The circular stressed that the colonial admin-
istration fully comprehended what was going on and had taken the necessary 
action to curb the panic.77 
Feeding their work force was not the only problem faced by the estates. 
Dutch- and foreign-owned plantations had to deal with an acute shortage of 
cash. No money could be wired or sent to them to pay the labour force or to 
meet other financial obligations. In normal times production was financed by 
advances from banks which would be repaid from the sale of the estate prod-
ucts, but in this precarious time this source of money threatened to dry up. 
Private banks – and again the NHM has to be mentioned unfavourably – could 
7 Javasche Courant, 4-9-94.
76 De Locomotief, 6-8-94.
77 De Locomotief, 3-8-94.
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not or would not help out. The result was that many estate companies had 
almost no money in hand; a situation made all the more pressing because the 
Islamic fasting month was approaching and labourers expected their custom-
ary advance. One company in Deli had only sixty guilders in cash.78 Railway 
companies, themselves feeling the consequences of the drop in economic activ-
ity, were also not always helpful. In Sumatra the Deli Spoorweg Maatschappij, 
the Deli Railway Company, demanded cash payments for its services. It also 
asked the estates to pay outstanding bills within three days. The company 
justified its request by pointing out that it needed money urgently to pay its 
own staff. As an indication of the financial problems in which the Deli Railway 
Company found itself it announced that it could not, as was normal practice, 
advance a month pay to its Muslim personnel to pay for their extra expenses at 
the end of the fasting month. Owing to circumstances, this would be halved.79
European estate managers feared trouble with the Indonesian labour force 
if wages were not paid in full. Occasionally disputes over pay did indeed lead 
to disturbances. In the middle of August a British estate in Sukabumi had to 
call in troops to restore order.80 Some estates in dire need of cash decided to 
sell all the stock they had with all the consequences this would have for prices. 
In other cases, one of the regions where this happened was Malang, estates 
had used the money that remained to buy foodstuffs for their European 
78 De Locomotief, 29-0-94.
79 De Locomotief, 7-8-94, 8-8-94.
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staff and indigenous labour force and had to stop production temporarily.8 
Sometimes estates instructed the owners of small shops on their land to sell 
their merchandise for pre-war prices; promising compensation if this meant 
that they had to sell at a loss.
Informed of such predicaments, Pleyte urged Idenburg to help the estates 
in any way possible. The Javasche Bank should give advances to Dutch- and 
foreign-owned estates with produce as a security. It was a superfluous request. 
Fearing a ‘general debâcle’ – a production stop, massive unemployment among 
the labour force, and in the wake of this ‘all kinds of riots and disturbances in 
the interior’ resulting in a even larger panic among the public – the Javasche 
Bank had already acted in the direction suggested by Pleyte.82 As early as 
2 August the Javasche Bank promised financial assistance to estates which 
were in financial hot waters because of the war. Among these were estates in 
Sumatra for which the branch of the NHM in Medan had refused to buy bills 
of exchange. As other private banks also refused to accept bills of exchange, in 
the third quarter of 94, the Javasche Bank had an extra volume of business 
in this sector of monetary trade of 20 million guilders.83 By fits and starts, other 
banks followed the example of the Javasche Bank, partly prompted to do so by 
the fact that import firms unable to transfer their money to Europe had built 
up large deposits. 
The feeling among the general public, which was well aware of the prob-
lems confronting the estate sector, was that many estates in Java and Sumatra, 
and certainly those which were foreign owned, should stop production. 
Predictions were rife that labour would have to be fired on a massive scale, 
which might well result in unrest among the native population. In a society 
riddled with rumours, even holidays allowed to estate workers to celebrate 
the end of the fasting month were initially believed to be lay-offs caused by the 
difficult situation in which estates found themselves.84 Under normal circum-
stances the Dutch did not worry much about such temporary periods of high 
unemployment. They were convinced that native society could cope. Excess 
labourers returned to the countryside where they were fed by their fellow-
villagers. This time it was a different story. Lay-offs would be accompanied 
by a rise in prices of basic food-stuffs. People expressed the fear that were it 
to become impossible for a large section of the population to buy food in suf-
ficient quantities, this would create a situation in which the people would be 
susceptible to agitation. It was stressed a number of times in De Locomotief that 
estates should refrain from dismissing their labour force at a time when prices 
8 De Locomotief, 7-8-94.
82 Report Javasche Bank, cited in Feiten 96:43.
83 Report Javasche Bank, cited in Feiten 96:46.
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escalated sharply. Keeping workers on meant an extra financial burden, but 
the estate managers should have a larger and more important interest at heart: 
domestic peace. Under no circumstances should the colonial army, which 
might be needed to defend Java against a foreign enemy, need to be deployed 
to quell local unrest.8 
Bristling with similar fears the colonial administration also took precau-
tions. Large public works had to be slowed down if possible, except for 
projects which might be useful to combat unemployment. If mass dismissals 
became a reality, the execution of labour-intensive projects had be speeded 
up. Indigenous Indonesians who had become redundant could again do work 
which in recent years had been taken over by machines. Wherever possible 
the new jobless should – as some indeed would in early August – be engaged 
‘against a moderate daily wage’ in the digging of irrigation canals, the con-
struction and repair of roads, and on harbour works, where dredging could 
be done manually.86 
It transpired that the reality was not to be as fraught as initially feared. Within 
a week the immediate crisis had passed. Idenburg and the President of the 
Javasche Bank won great acclaim. In retrospect one German businessman, 
Emil Helfferich (92:0), wrote that their unique cooperation and deter-
mination had done much to calm emotions down. Newspapers began to 
report about the ebbing away of the ‘great nervousness’ of the first few days. 
The runs on the banks diminished. A reverse process set in. People en masse 
deposited in the banks the silver coins they had withdrawn a few days earlier. 
Helfferich attributed this in part to the policy of the Javasche Bank. He relates 
how, with what he calls ‘a good understanding of the psyche of the Chinese’, 
at banks names of Chinese and the amount they withdrew were written down 
conspicuously. Helfferich explains that Chinese did not like to have their 
name written down, just as Arabs were averse to having their picture taken. 
Consequently they returned their money as soon as possible and asked that 
their names be struck off (Helfferich 92:0). No special regulation to relieve 
the Javasche Bank of its obligation to exchange paper currency for coins had 
to be issued, and no extra paper money had to be put into circulation. Visits to 
concerts and theatres were resumed. Later horse races, the highlight of social 
life in many cities, were once again part of the social calendar. Contrary to 
the more gloomy expectations, they were as usual attended by large crowds. 
The telegraph links with Europe were restored. After days of anxiety and no 
opportunity to send or receive messages, people flocked to the telegraph offic-
es to contact relatives and business associates abroad. At the busiest offices a 
8 De Locomotief, -8-94, 6-8-94.
86 De Locomotief, 24-8-94.
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night service had to be instituted.
The measures taken by the colonial administration to contain the rice price 
had been successful. The restoration of the shipping links with Singapore and 
other Asian ports also helped quell anxiety. As no prolonged food crisis even-
tuated, in September the colonial government found itself burdened with a 
stock of rice – 20,000 tons – it had bought for a price higher than that at which 
it could sell it. State companies were instructed to buy the rice they needed 
from this stock. Reassured, the government lifted the export ban on cassava, 
and beans and peas on  September, that on maize on 0 October.
Across the board prices dropped. Nevertheless, at the end of August it was 
reported from Batavia that loaves of bread had become ‘a little bit smaller and 
somewhat more expensive’. The bread price was indicative of what was hap-
pening. Compared to pre-war standards, the cost of living rose, while the pur-
chasing power in all population groups declined. Indigenous Indonesians left 
the cities, where life had become more expensive, for the countryside. Other 
city dwellers who had been able to afford some luxury in the past, adjusted 
their menus. Chicken replaced beef, coconut oil was used instead of butter, 
more local vegetables and fruits were eaten. The positive effect was that this 
Governor General J.P. van Limburg Stirum at the horse races in Bandung, 97 
(KITLV 064) 
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stimulated the rural economy; the negative effect was that such products were 
growing more expensive in the villages.87 
Some found themselves in real trouble. Among them were those who had 
been fired, or had been forced to accept a drop in wages, or had seen their 
income dwindle in other ways. The principal victims were people in the estate 
and trading sector. Other sufferers were missionaries. Apart from the fact that 
money could not be transferred to them from Europe, donations dried up. 
Less income forced missionary societies to stop the posting of new mission-
aries in the colony for the time being. The stipend of missionaries already in 
the field in the Netherlands Indies was drastically reduced, in some instances 
even halved. The two measures were interrelated. The boards in Holland 
feared that were their number still allowed to increase missionaries would 
impose upon themselves and their families ‘much hardship, which will bound 
later on their health’.88
Europeans became thrifty. The panic shopping of the first days of the war 
was replaced by a tendency to buy only the bare necessities, postponing the 
purchase of clothes, household goods and the like. Owners of shops, hotels, 
and restaurants frequented by Europeans felt the consequences and had to 
dismiss personnel or lower their salaries. Some hotels had to close. Tourists 
cancelled their trips to the Netherlands Indies. Others who had arrived 
returned home as fast as they could. Luxury commodities could not be sold. 
In October the rent for space in warehouses in Surabaya was doubled. They 
were full of cars and other goods importers could not sell. 
In the estate sector a massive lay-off never eventuated. The following year 
the official report of the Minister of the Colonies to parliament would state in 
a veiled way that business on the East Coast of Sumatra ‘here and there to a 
greater or less degree’ was reduced, but that nowhere had production been 
stopped.89 Nevertheless, unemployment grew. Because of the initial conse-
quences for international trade, coolies in ports found themselves without 
work and income, or were forced to offer their services for much lower pay; 
sometimes, as was reported from Gorontalo, they asked only one-third of their 
normal wage.90 Estates dismissed labour and staff. In the larger cities in Java 
groups of unemployed Javanese strolling idly became a familiar sight. Many 
had travelled home from the estates in Sumatra, which had also stopped 
recruiting labourers in Java. The situation in Sumatra was not better. Some 
of the labourers who had become redundant were employed in the construc-
tion of railways. In North Sumatra preference for this sort of work seems to 
87 Preanger-bode, cited in De Locomotief, 30--9.
88 De Standaard, cited in De Locomotief, -0-94.
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have been given to Chinese, who were considered a greater threat to law and 
order than the indigenous Indonesians.9 Recruitment of coolies in China was 
stopped. At the end of November, this was followed by the repatriation of coo-
lies. The government bore part of the cost. It paid 2 guilders per person for 
about three hundred unemployed Chinese whom the Resident of the east coast 
described as ‘bad elements’ constantly on the prowl. The measure contributed 
to the maintenance of law and order, but not completely. The Resident of the 
East Coast of Sumatra reported there were still many unemployed at his post, 
some of whom refused to take a job because of the low wages offered.92 The 
local Dutch community continued to worry about a ‘plague of coolies who 
wander about’, fearing that the government did not have the money to send 
them all back to China.93 To combat theft and other ‘vices’, the private police 
forces of the local Sultans were assigned to ordinary police duties.94 At least 
9 Koloniaal verslag 9:2-2.
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as late as January 9, on the East Coast of Sumatra large groups of jobless 
Chinese, roaming around footloose and fancy-free, were arrested and repatri-
ated by the colonial authorities. In some cities of Java Chinese without visible 
means of support were also sent back to China at public expense. 
In the construction industry labour was hit by the decision of the colonial 
government to continue only those works which were strictly necessary or 
could serve as relief projects. It was reported that construction industry had 
almost ground to a halt.9 One exception to this rule were the plague regions. 
As it was stated in the Encyclopaedie van Nederlandsch-Indië the principal aim 
of the government scheme to combat the plague was to ‘increase the distance 
between the plague-infected rat(s) and people to such an extent that the chance 
of infection of the latter is reduced’.96 In practice this meant an improvement 
of housing. Hollow bamboo was replaced by wood or stone, was sealed off, 
or filled with cement; thus creating extra employment and a continued high 
demand for products such as roof tiles.
Civil servants suffered as well. Their pay was frozen. Pleyte considered 
a raise in the salary of Dutch colonial civil servants in 9. In spite of the 
growing unemployment in Holland, it remained difficult to attract qualified, 
well-educated Dutchmen for employment in the colonial civil service. Higher 
pay would change this. Reluctantly Pleyte later withdrew his proposal. He 
had to bow to the argument advanced by Idenburg and his advisers that a 
rise in pay was politically imprudent. Discontent could well be the result if 
people were to realize that in such economically difficult times they had to 
pay extra tax to improve salaries of civil servants.97 The decision did not go 
down well with those in government pay. This was one of the reasons army 
officers in the Netherlands Indies formed their own association. They argued 
that many officers and their families had to live in poverty, while on the whole 
the economic situation in the Netherlands Indies was not yet so bad that a rise 
in salary was out of the question.98 
The crisis had passed but had disquieted many. In Amsterdam, repre-
sentatives of the major Dutch estate companies met on 7 August to draw up 
guidelines in case telegraph communication with the colony should break 
down again. Not sure how Great Britain would act many thought that such a 
moment could well not be far off. Once again Van Aalst had taken the initia-
tive. The meeting decided that in four cities located in the heart of the main 
estate regions – Batavia, Semarang, Surabaya, and Medan – local committees 
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Industry, and Trade.
96 De Raadt99:392.
97 Idenburg to Pleyte, 9-0-9, 3-0-9, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 8-2-96 O2.
98 De Locomotief, 28--96.
The Netherlands Indies and the Great War62
should be founded. They should determine how to proceed in such an event. 
The committees were charged with the task of pleading the interests of the 
plantations with the colonial administration and were responsible for advising 
individual estate managers on what to do. It was stressed that they had to per-
form their task without taking nationality into account. Once it was decided, 
a deputation visited the Secretary General of the Ministry of the Colonies to 
ask his mediation in having the decision published in the Javasche Courant; the 
best way to ensure that estate managers all over the Netherlands Indies were 
informed.
The very same day a wire was sent to Java. Idenburg was not overjoyed. 
He feared that exactly at a moment that panic had subsided its publication 
would upset people. A report in the Javasche Courant about the meeting should 
not contain any reference to a new break-down in telegraphic communication. 
Idenburg stressed in a wire in English to Pleyte that business was again ‘calm-
ly going on’. Any mention of such a possibility would ‘disturb again seriously 
(the) calm state of mind (of) commercial people and other inhabitants’.99
The Governor General did not have much choice. Newspapers in Holland 
had published the decision. The colonial press would certainly cite these 
reports when copies reached the Netherlands Indies (which De Locomotief did 
on  October). The message Idenburg disliked the most, that about a break-
down in telegraphic communication, could not be omitted. Pleyte made this 
clear. It formed the quintessence of what the estate companies wanted to con-
vey; it was the moment the committees had to start working. Idenburg had to 
consent. At the suggestion of Pleyte, the note was added that the Minister of 
the Colonies considered the initiative of the companies in Holland ‘a measure 
of extreme precaution’. As an additional reassurance, the gazette observed 
that, though a new disruption in telegraphic communication between mother-
land and colony could never be ruled out completely, the Governor General 
did consider it highly unlikely that it would happen again. Idenburg also 
zealously guarded his own authority. He made it plain to the estate companies 
that in the event of a new crisis it was he who would take the decisions, and 
not some local committee.
For sugar producers and traders, the war proved a blessing. The sugar 
industry had been on the brink of collapse. In previous years the sugar estates 
in the Netherlands Indies had lost much of their share of the European mar-
ket. Selling-prices had been low. Most of the sugar consumed in Great Britain 
had come from Germany and Austria-Hungary, and from sugar-beet fields 
in France which were now laid waste because of the war. Confronted with 
the drying up of these sources of supply, London placed huge orders in the 
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Netherlands Indies. As early as the beginning of September Idenburg could 
report with satisfaction to Pleyte that the sugar sales to England had yielded 
enormous profits.00
All in all, the Ministry of the Colonies showed itself pleased with the way 
Batavia had coped with the crisis. There was also praise for the Javasche Bank, 
which had spent large amounts of money to meet the demand for cash not 
only from the business community, but also from the colonial government, 
which had been forced to undertake a large expenditure to back up neutral-
ity.
There was less acclaim for the ban on the export of rice, which had been 
suggested by the Ministry itself. The main reason for this was probably that, 
contrary to the financial measures taken, the decision to ban the export of 
rice had met with fierce disapproval, even in the colonial press. The colonial 
authorities were accused of having failed to realize that ‘natives’ and people 
in Europe ate rice of a different quality. The export variety, the so-called table-
rice, was ‘much too good for the general population and for feeding coolies 
on Bangka’ (Mees 9:463). A lobby was started by rice dealers in Holland 
who had already paid for the rice which was not allowed to be exported and 
had become ‘very upset’.0 The traders succeeded in convincing Pleyte that 
only a small quantity was at stake, which could easily be substituted by rice 
of a cheaper variety from Burma. A telegram was sent to Idenburg asking 
him to lift the ban. Idenburg consented. Rice exporters were allowed to ship 
rice to Europe on the condition that they first imported an equal amount of 
Rangoon or Saigon rice ‘fit for the consumption of the natives’. The rice had 
to be of such a quality that it was indeed to the taste of the Javanese.02 This 
decision immediately posed a new problem. Exporters in Java, who had 
expected the ban to last, had already sold part of the quantity they had com-
mitted themselves to sending to Holland and other countries in Europe on the 
local market. They now feared – and their representatives in Holland did not 
fail to impress upon Pleyte the disastrous consequences – that their European 
buyers would demand delivery of the originally contracted quantities, which 
would be impossible for them to honour. Pleyte wavered, suddenly in favour 
of maintaining the export ban. Idenburg’s reply was reassuring. It concerned 
only a few exporters, on whom pity should not be wasted as they had made 
big profits.03
The Ministry of the Colonies was extremely unhappy with the NHM. It 
was disappointed by the lack of cooperation received in the efforts made 
00 Idenburg to Pleyte, 9-9-94, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 6-9-94 A9. 
0 Pleyte to Idenburg, -8-94, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 7-8-94 Hbis.
02 De Locomotief, 2-9-94.
03 Idenburg to Pleyte, 2-9-94, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 2-9-94 B20.
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to ward off a financial crisis, and by the company’s refusal to pay out coins 
and to provide credit; decisions which a wider public the Netherlands Indies 
held against Van Aalst and the NHM till well after war had ended (Helfferich 
98:479). The NHM was also held responsible for the ban on the export of 
gold and silver. Initially the Javasche Bank had deemed such a step unneces-
sary. The bank had been confident that, in view of the war, nobody in the 
Netherlands Indies intended to export gold or silver. Only after the Javasche 
Bank had learned that the NHM had shipped gold to Singapore, had its man-
agement advised Idenburg to set up an export ban.04
Marmelstein did not understand what he had done wrong. He wrote to 
Idenburg that ‘in these difficult days’ the NHM had done all it could to help 
the government. He added that he would be pleased to learn why Idenburg 
had complained to The Hague.0 Van Aalst reacted in a similar vein. In 
the middle of October he sent a letter to Idenburg. He took all the blame. 
Marmelstein had acted on his instructions. Blame may not be the right word. 
Van Aalst was the saviour of the nation. He reminded Idenburg that ‘in those 
tense days’ when the Dutch economy ‘ran the serious danger of becoming 
disastrously disrupted’ he had frequently – ‘without exaggeration we may 
say day and night’ – been consulted about the economic policy to be followed. 
Because of the measures taken and of the consortium that had been formed 
under his leadership, danger had been averted. The Netherlands Indies had 
been spared those anxious days. Nobody in the colony had ever known how 
critical the situation had been, and what disaster could have struck there, had 
no resolute action been taken by the NHM in Holland.06 Idenburg was not 
impressed. He asked his Secretary General to write a brief reply. He, Idenburg, 
had read Van Aalst’s letter with interest, and wanted to let the matter rest. 
Dragging it up would only disturb the relationship between the NHM and 
the Javasche Bank.07
 
04 Report Javasche Bank, cited in Feiten 96:44-.
0 Marmelstein to Idenburg, 0-8-94, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 8-9-94 H9.
06 Van Aalst to Idenburg, -0-94, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 2--9-.




Rear Admiral F. Pinke and Lieutenant General J.P. Michielsen met on 29 July 
after a telegram had been sent to Idenburg from The Hague to alert him to the 
fact that a breakdown of peace in Europe was very likely in the evening of the 
previous day. They did not seem to be in particularly worried. Suddenly they 
were confident that the Dutch fleet in the Netherlands Indies could cope. They 
based their optimism upon the consideration that at the outbreak of a war 
the European naval squadrons in the Far East would be fully occupied with 
protecting their own colonial possessions and their own shipping. Busy else-
where, the fleets lacked the strength to launch an invasion of the Netherlands 
Indies. A raid by a limited number of enemy warships could not be ruled out 
but Pinke and Michielsen judged the Dutch colonial army and Navy strong 
enough to deal with such a contingency. The situation would not be so propi-
tious were Japan to seize upon a European conflict to launch a war of conquest 
against the Netherlands Indies. A Japanese attack would pose a real threat, but 
was not considered very likely. Pinke and Michielsen did not yet see any indi-
cation that Tokyo contemplated such an act of war. With these considerations 
in mind, the two commanders gave priority to the guarding of neutrality and 
not to the repulse of an enemy attack. 
Judging the danger of a breach of neutrality to be greatest in the western 
part of the Archipelago, it was decided to concentrate the Dutch squadron 
at Tanjung Priok and not at its Surabaya base. The core of the fleet should 
remain at anchor there, ready to act in concert. Only under extraordinary cir-
cumstances, and Idenburg was following Pinke’s advice when he refused to 
send a warship to Manado to guard the German telegraph cable, should the 
squadron be divided up. From Tanjung Priok the warships could easily reach 
any putatively potential trouble spots where neutrality might be threatened. 
As a precaution, as soon as possible smaller warships should steam to Sabang, 
Emmahaven in Padang, and the port of Makassar, all protected harbours with 
stocks of coal. Were neutrality to be violated these warships could ‘pending 
further action by the Dutch squadron add at least some immediate force to a 
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protest to be lodged’.1 Special attention was also paid to the island of Tarakan 
on the northern part of the coast of East Borneo with its important oil instal-
lations. Yet another smaller warship had to be sent to Pontianak to assist in 
suppressing disturbances in West Borneo; disturbances some people in those 
rumour-ridden days were sure had been provoked by a foreign country to lure 
Dutch troops away from Java (Idenburg and De Graeff 1920:370).
After the outbreak of the war, the Dutch naval squadron had to call off 
manoeuvres east of Java and was ordered to Tanjung Priok as planned. Crew 
and officers had already been informed about the Vienna ultimatum. This 
made little impression on them. They assumed that the news had been sent 
as a wireless message to them to add a touch of realism to the exercise. The 
manoeuvres had been continued without a second thought, but exactly at the 
moment when the ‘enemy’, that was Dutch destroyers acting as such, was 
sighted by the battleships, the order was received to terminate the exercise 
and to proceed to Surabaya, where coal and victuals were to be taken in, after 
which the vessels sailed to Tanjung Priok (M. 1922:843-4). In Tanjung Priok 
the warships were fitted out for real battle. All unessential wooden objects 
and other inflammable materials, including books and even chicken coops, on 
board were removed (Bauduin 1920:16). The hulls, which had been painted 
white again to suit the tropical climate after the Russo-Japanese War, were 
repainted grey.
Now that a European war had become a reality some of Pinke’s confi-
dence ebbed. He no longer deemed it safe to have his fleet remain moored 
in Tanjung Priok.2 A captain of a merchantman, and Pinke’s thoughts turned 
especially towards Germans, might suddenly try to do something were news, 
whether true or not, to reach him that the Netherlands had joined the war. 
He could decide to scuttle his ship to block the exit of the harbour, or force 
a collision with one of the Dutch warships, causing considerable damage. A 
more compelling reason for Pinke to change his mind was that at anchor in 
the roadstead of Tanjung Priok, a Dutch squadron was vulnerable to a surprise 
torpedo attack. Consequently the warships sought shelter in Banten Bay. It 
was hoped that they could remain there for the time being, undetected by a 
potential enemy. A flotilla ship was entrusted with guarding Tanjung Priok. 
Within a week the fleet was moved again. First it was ordered to sail to the 
Karimun Jawa Islands, north of Semarang. Thereupon, so as to hide the fleet 
from a chance sighting by merchantmen plying the Java Sea, the squadron 
moved to the Kangean Islands east of Madura. 
1 Resumé van het besprokene tussen den Legercommandant en den Commandant der 
Zeemacht op 29 Juli 1914, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 14-9-1914 T18.
2 For a detailed account of ship movements and Pinke’s opinions and decisions, see Teitler 
1986. 
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Unlike what happened in Holland no mobilization order for the army 
was issued. This might have provoked Japan. A general panic should also 
be avoided. Instead, Idenburg allowed Michielsen to take all those measures 
which would otherwise have been set in motion after mobilization had been 
declared, instructing him to avoid attracting unnecessary public attention. 
The army staff seems to have thought of everything. The private tram- and 
railway companies were reminded of their obligation to obey orders issued 
by the civil and military authorities if troops had to be transported or rails 
had to be destroyed to render tram- and railway useless. Should war become 
a reality, officers and former officers of the army would take over from civil-
ians as stationmasters. A special uniform was designed for such military sta-
tionmasters. No detail was overlooked. A directive about the amount of food 
soldiers were entitled to during mobilization carefully differentiated between 
Europeans, Africans, and Ambonese on the one hand, and natives and con-
victs on the other. Bread and butter was the prerogative of the first group. The 
order assiduously noted that fresh pork and smoked bacon did not form part 
of the natives’ meal.3 Nor were horses forgotten. Dutch civil servants were 
asked to issue instructions to their staff for the requisitioning of grass by the 
army. In October Michielsen and his staff introduced identification tags which 
soldiers had to wear in battle, made of drill and inscribed with washable ink. 
An older type did exist, but most soldiers had forgotten about this. Detailed 
plans were also drawn up for the evacuation of the government offices in 
Batavia to Bandung if an enemy fleet appeared off the coast of Java. This 
was deemed an important precaution. Batavia was a weak spot in the Dutch 
defences. Obviously the city was vulnerable to bombardment from the sea, 
and it was extremely exposed to an attack by land. It was almost impossible 
to defend in fact.
Preparations were also made to order units from other islands to Java. Such 
a relocation of troops would not fully solve Michielsen’s problem, exacerbated 
by the fact that five companies from Java were pinned down in Aceh and in 
Borneo to suppress local unrest. Unable to deploy the number of troops he 
deemed necessary Michielsen urged that some of these companies be sent 
back to Java. He was immediately rapped over the knuckles. He was given 
to understand that Idenburg was convinced that the military commander in 
Borneo was wise and well-informed enough not to withhold soldiers he did 
not need from Java; whilst Aceh was the last region from which troops could 
be withdrawn.4
Adding to Michielsen’s problems was the fact that the colonial army 
3 Javasche Courant, 14-8-1914.
4 Michielsen to Idenburg, 2-9-1914, Kindermann to Michielsen, 17-9-1914, NA, Kol. Geheim, 
Vb. 18-1-1915 P.
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was still chronically undermanned. There was a shortage of three thousand 
European men, or one-quarter of its organic strength, and of over seven-
teen hundred indigenous Indonesian soldiers. The financial incentives to 
encourage people to enlist were improved to promote fresh recruitment of 
both groups of soldiers. A few years later, it was claimed that this step had 
only resulted in an influx of ‘undesirable elements’ among both groups.5 In 
conformity with prevailing views about which ethnic groups made excel-
lent soldiers, special attention was paid to the enlistment of Ambonese and 
Manadonese recruits. In North Celebes the nagari heads were promised an 
extra ten guilders for each villager who enlisted.6 The campaign was success-
ful, at least with regard to numbers. In the middle of October, fifteen hundred 
new Indonesian recruits had enlisted. Needless to say the army was not pre-
pared for the influx. Barracks became overcrowded and galleries and officers’ 
messes had to be converted into sleeping places. The training time allotted to 
these new soldiers was shortened to about half of what it would have been 
under normal circumstances.
Among Europeans the campaign was not as propitious. Because sea com-
munication with Europe was disrupted, the drive had to be confined to the 
Netherlands Indies. In the middle of October the shortage of European sol-
diers had risen by another one hundred.7 The number of non-commissioned 
officers was also inadequate. In order to cope the European corporals and 
soldiers of the school for warrant officers were promoted and sent to join the 
troops in the field. Rules being rules, even a soldier who had been admitted 
to a hospital and still confined to his bed was promoted to corporal.8 Faced 
with this shortage of troops, Michielsen decided to leave the guarding of rail-
ways, bridges, and tunnels, to be protected against sabotage by ‘malevolents 
from the population (that is agents of the enemy)’, to auxiliary forces like the 
citizen’s militia, the armed police, and the native corpses.9 Members of the citi-
zen’s militia were given the opportunity to report for actual military service.
Issues dealing with concrete acts of warfare now emerged to exacerbate the 
troubles of the colonial authorities. As during the Russo-Japanese War, it soon 
became clear that a proclamation of neutrality could not cover all eventuali-
ties. The proclamations issued in 1914 forbade the entry into territorial waters 
of warships of belligerents and vessels which could be equated with these; 
5 Soerabaiasch Handelsblad, cited in De Indische Gids 1917, II:1248.
6 Michielsen to Idenburg, 8-8-1914, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 18-1-1915 P.
7 Verslag betreffende de belangrijkste militaire maatregelen sinds 31 Juli j.l. getroffen, NA, 
Kol. Geheim, Vb. 18-1-1915 P; De Locomotief, 28-12-1914.
8 Preanger-bode, cited in De Locomotief, 22-10-1914.
9 Michielsen to Idenburg, 6-8-1914, Idenburg to Pleyte, 13-8-1914, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 18-9-
1914 I19, Vb. 18-1-1915 P.
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stating that if such ships disobeyed they would not be allowed to leave again 
before the war had ended. A number of exceptions were made. Entering a port 
or roadstead to take in provisions and fuel was allowed, providing that the 
warships left again within twenty-four hours. Provisions should not exceed 
the normal amount aboard in peace-time. The amount of fuel provided should 
only be enough to allow the vessel to reach the nearest port in the home coun-
try. Fuel and provisions were not to be sold without the permission of the 
authorities. Warships which entered ports and roadsteads because of damage 
or seeking shelter from bad weather could anchor as long as it took to make 
basic repairs without adding to their fighting capability or till the weather 
improved.10 A third exception was made for vessels of war used exclusively 
for religious, scientific, or humanitarian purposes. As had been done at the 
outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, sea captains, shipowners, and natives 
were warned of the dangers of running a blockade, and of the shipping of con-
traband and military dispatches. It was advised that those who disregarded 
the warning could not count on the protection of or intervention by the Dutch 
government.
One of the problems which arose almost immediately was that of the 
nearest home port. Pinke, and in his wake Idenburg and Pleyte, were of the 
opinion that for British warships calling in at ports in the Netherlands Indies 
the nearest port in their own country was one in the British colonies and 
dominions in Southeast Asia. They refrained from mentioning that this in 
almost all instances meant Singapore. The British Consul General in Batavia, 
T.F. Carlisle, did not agree. He made a subtle distinction. For warships of ‘the 
British Navy proper’ the nearest home port meant a port in Great Britain; 
for those of the Indian Navy a port in British India, and for warships of the 
Australian Navy, Thursday Island.11 
More essential was the matter of auxiliary warships; merchantmen and 
ocean liners transformed into warships. The proclamation of neutrality spoke 
of warships and vessels equated with warships. It was a vague definition which 
left room for interpretation. In 1907, during the Second Peace Conference in 
The Hague, the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, had still consid-
ered the definition of auxiliary warships to be ‘not of vital importance’.12 
London clearly thought differently in 1914. On 9 August the British chargé 
d’affaires in The Hague explained to the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
J. Loudon, that British merchantmen were only armed for the purpose of putting 
up a defence when attacked and that this was valid under international law. 
10 Later during the war a similar stipulation was issued with regard to enemy merchantmen 
seized by belligerents.
11 Idenburg to Pleyte, 14-9-1914, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 14-9-1914 U18.
12 Grey to Fry, 30-7-1907, PRO FO 800 69.
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They could not be converted into men-of-war on the high seas. Consequently 
the British government would not allow such ships to be interned after a stay 
exceeding the twenty-four hours allowed for the taking in of fuel and provi-
sions; or that its captains would be forced to remove the guns before proceed-
ing to sea. The chargé d’affaires explained that German merchant vessels were 
a different matter. These could be converted into warships. Such ships should 
be interned ‘in the absence of any binding assurance that the latter should not 
be converted so, an assurance for which the neutral government must assume 
all responsibility’.13 Two days later the Dutch government was presented with 
a number of indications which provided reasonable grounds for the suspicion 
that a German merchant vessel would be converted into a warship once she 
had left territorial waters. Among the items listed were ‘any signs of shipping 
ammunition, concealing arms and ammunition on board, mounting guns, 
taking in an unnecessary large quantity of coal, and especially painting ship a 
warlike colour or refusing to take passengers on board if the vessel is fitted for 
passenger accommodation’. Expressing ‘the confident hope’ that if the Dutch 
government had not already issued the necessary instructions, it ‘would do so 
immediately’, the chargé d’affaires revealed that he had notified British con-
sular officials in Holland to report all suspect cases to the British legation.14 In 
Batavia Carlisle sent similar directions to the British consuls in Netherlands 
Indies ports. He asked them to report to him when German merchant ships 
did anything to arouse suspicion and to contact the local authorities at once 
if they suspected that merchantmen would be likely to be transformed into 
auxiliary warships in the near future.
The Dutch government reacted to the British demonstrations almost 
instantly. Instructions went out that merchantmen which on the grounds of 
construction, equipment, or crew showed evident signs that they were to be 
used as a cruiser or mine-layer had to be treated as warships if they carried 
guns or mines on board.15 This left the problem, one which was to result in the 
first diplomatic row with London, of how to act in the case of merchantmen 
carrying weapons for defensive purposes. The British government had argued 
that these ships should not be treated as warships. Some Dutch politicians 
and civil servants agreed. Pleyte feared that if they were considered warships 
and appropriate action was taken, such an act could well close Dutch ports 
to almost all merchant vessels of the belligerents, with all the consequences 
this posed for the import of products of which shortages threatened in the 
early days of war. A civil servant noted that, quite apart from this, it would 
13 British Chargé d’Affaires to Loudon, 9-8-1914, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 14-8-1914 D16.
14 British Chargé d’Affaires to Loudon, 11-8-1914, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 14-8-1914 D16.
15 Loudon to Pleyte, 12-8-1914, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 14-8-1914 D16.
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be unwise to resort to a policy which would hurt Great Britain especially.16 
Nevertheless, to the annoyance of London this was exactly what the Dutch 
government was to do. All merchantmen with arms on board were treated as 
warships by the Dutch. The Dutch naval Minister Rambonnet confided to the 
British Naval Attaché that although he himself could differentiate between an 
auxiliary cruiser and a merchantman defensively armed, ‘the people might 
not [be able to]’.17 He added that if the original instructions about how to treat 
armed merchantmen as warships were changed, the German Navy and the 
Dutch people, who have been ‘somewhat afraid of a violation of their territory 
by England’, might accuse the Dutch government of no longer being strictly 
neutral.18 
In the Netherlands Indies another topic took precedence. As during the 
Russo-Japanese War, most attention was paid to the bunkering of warships of 
the belligerents. To prevent any illegal fuelling and provisioning of warships 
of the belligerents by merchantmen, special measures were deemed necessary. 
In Sabang the entire stock of coal was bought by the Navy and transferred 
to the naval base in Surabaya. In November the three month period within 
16 See NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 14-8-1914 D16.
17 Chilton to Grey, 10-8-1914, State Papers 1914:336.
18 Chilton to Grey, 10-8-1914, State Papers 1914:336.
Mountain battery (Van Gent, Penard en Rinkes 1923: Photo 240)
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which no coal was to be provided to a warship that had bunkered previously 
became the subject of discussion. Realizing that the war was already three 
months old and in order to prevent the Netherlands Indies becoming a base 
of war operations, The Hague suddenly decided that before a second ration of 
fuel could be allowed, the captains of warships had to mention on paper the 
ports they had called during this period. The consent of Idenburg before coal 
could be supplied was a second requirement. Pinke made no secret of the fact 
that he considered these new directions from The Hague impracticable. One 
problem was that consulting the Governor General might take most if not all 
of the twenty-four hours a warship was allowed in port and in roadsteads 
for bunkering. A telegraph network covering the whole Archipelago was 
still non-existent, and the opening hours of its stations were restricted. More 
importantly what The Hague wanted was potentially very dangerous. Naval 
officers would certainly refuse to reveal where their warships had been. The 
consequence could well be that the Dutch authorities had no other choice than 
to intern ship and crew. Pinke was sure that such a course of action would 
The Koningin Regentes is made ready for battle. All flammable and loose objects are 
removed from board. (Ons Element 1-52:842.)
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elicit a hostile response. Pointing out to Idenburg that the first warships of 
the belligerents which might be subjected to the new rule were two French 
torpedo-boat destroyers, he sketched how, after their internment, the complete 
combined fleet of the Allied in Asia might descend on the Netherlands Indies 
to demand the release of the two destroyers. The prospect was reason enough 
for Idenburg to disregard the directives from The Hague.19 However, relations 
between Pinke and Rambonnet had incurred heavy damage. 
As during both the Boer War and the Russo-Japanese War, government and 
press held different opinions about what the newspapers could report and 
write about. The colonial administration was adamant that the position of 
the Dutch forces should not be revealed by the press. At Michielsen’s sugges-
tion a special issue of the Javasche Courant appeared on 5 August forbidding 
the reporting on movements of the troops and ships of the colonial army 
and Navy. Journalists considered the ban an absurdity. It was far too gener-
ally worded. Reports about a Dutch warship anchored in a roadstead, about 
troops sent to regions outside Java to suppress local resistance, about military 
parades and about many other events which had little or nothing to do with 
the Dutch effort to guard neutrality might become punishable. What journal-
ists had feared became a reality. An editor of the Soerabaiasch Handelsblad was 
sentenced to two weeks’ imprisonment for reporting about soldiers sent to 
Borneo, and about a ship which had left the port of Surabaya, which turned 
out to be a warship.
Other court cases were more directly related to the Dutch effort to guard 
neutrality. E. van Ghert, editor of the Nieuwe Soerabaia Courant, was brought 
to trial for a report in August about the running in of a German merchantman 
by two Dutch warships at Surabaya in December 1914. He was sentenced to 
a fine of one guilder; the minimum penalty, and one-tenth of what the public 
prosecutor had demanded. Circumvention of the rules was acted upon as 
well. One of the persons who was to learn this lesson was H. Tersteeg of the 
Soerabaiasch Handelsblad. In July 1916 his newspaper carried a report of the 
sailing of Dutch warships, but names had been replaced with dots. It did 
not help. Tersteeg was prosecuted. When the court acquitted him, the public 
prosecutor appealed. The appeal was a clear attempt to scare journalists in 
the Netherlands Indies who, the public prosecution was sure, wanted to place 
themselves above the law. Not the irresponsible press should decide what 
could be published and what not, but a responsible government (Van Geuns 
1918:212). The High Court sentenced Tersteeg to one month’s imprisonment 
19 Pinke to Idenburg, 4-12-1914, Idenburg to Pleyte, 9-12-1914, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 18-1-1915 
N1.
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in 1917. Two months had been demanded. A recommendation for mercy was 
rejected by the Governor General.20 A journalists’ monthly wrote about a 
‘deeply unjust punishment’. Tersteeg’s colleague, M. van Geuns, fully agreed. 
He called the verdict a ‘shocking action against Indies journalists’ (Van Geuns 
1918:211). He also wondered what harm had been done by the report. The 
army and Navy in the Netherlands Indies amounted to nothing, and with so 
many Japanese spies around, Tokyo would be informed anyhow about the 
position of Dutch warships.
Idenburg, Pinke, and Pleyte thought differently. They considered such 
contested press reports an affront, a serious threat to Dutch neutrality, and 
took them to heart personally. Pinke was sure that from what Tersteeg had 
written, the movements of the whole fleet could be deduced.21 At times 
Idenburg would become enraged by what newspapers wrote. In April 1915 
when the Java-Bode copied a report from the Dutch newspaper De Telegraaf that 
two German submarines had sailed into the Scheldt, he reacted furiously. In 
private he called the editor a traitor to his country. Such a person should not 
be imprisoned for one or two days. He should be flogged with the cat (Bijl de 
Vroe 1980:52).
Reports about the movements of Dutch warships were not the only mat-
ter worrying Batavia. After three written appeals to newspaper editors to 
refrain from reporting which could cast doubts on Dutch neutrality abroad 
had proved to be in vain, Batavia once again issued a special edition of the 
Javasche Courant on 10 September. Well aware that the belligerents did not 
want their own press to report on movements of troops and ships, Batavia 
forbade the publication of reports on the movements of warships of belliger-
ents in the Archipelago. The regulation proclaimed during the Russo-Japanese 
War about deliberately endangering neutrality was revived. A prison sentence 
for Europeans and forced labour on the chain-gang for members of the other 
population groups for between five and ten years was threatened.
As had been the case with the ban on writing about the movements 
of Dutch warships prosecutions followed. Van Geuns of the Soerabaiasch 
Handelsblad was prosecuted in October 1914. His newspaper had published 
the incorrect report that a German raider, the Emden, which had been disturb-
ing shipping in the seas between the Malay Peninsula and India, had entered 
the port of Sabang, and that two British warships were patrolling in the vicin-
ity. Van Geuns defended the report by pointing out that information about 
the movements of the Emden was vital to colonial exports, especially East Java 
sugar. Informing the public about the whereabouts of the Emden was of far 
20 Indisch Tijdschrift van het Recht 1917:445-54; Van Heekeren 1918:200.
21 De Locomotief, 7-12-1914.
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greater importance than keeping to a stupid ban issued by the authorities. 
De Locomotief commented that evidently Van Geuns valued sugar interests 
more than national ones.22 Van Geuns was sentenced to three months’ impris-
onment. For technical reasons, the High Court declared the verdict invalid. 
Batavia withdrew the ban on newspaper reporting of movements of belliger-
ent warships at the end of May 1915. Van Geuns claimed that his lawsuit had 
been instrumental in bringing this about (Van Geuns 1918:211). The ban on 
the disclosure of movements of Dutch troops and warships in the Archipelago 
remained in force.
On hearing the news of the war, nationalist feelings among Germans, Britons, 
and the French ran high, the men – at least this was the impression created 
– were anxious to obey the orders of their consuls to leave as soon as possible 
for their homelands or nearby colonies to enlist in the army. Many tried to 
book passages on Dutch ships which raised the question of whether Germans, 
Frenchmen, and Britons eligible for military service were contraband. It was 
not deemed unlikely that the ships on which they took passage would be 
confiscated by the belligerents.23
On board ships calling at Netherlands Indies ports and carrying migrants 
for Australia emotions also ran high. On one of these, the Roon, moored in 
Cilacap in Java, fights broke out between British and German passengers. The 
Germans put the blame on the drunken British. They claimed that it had been 
only the third-class British passengers, members of the lower working-class, 
who had created problems. Relations between Germans and Britons in the 
second class, all civilized people, had remained good. The British passengers 
claimed that after news of the war had reached the Roon, the Germans had 
treated them as they pleased, that is ‘as dogs’.24
On 10 August, Idenburg obliquely alluded to such patriotic feelings by 
appealing to foreign nationals, who, as it was put, enjoyed the hospitality of 
the Netherlands Indies, to collaborate in the strict observance of Dutch neu-
trality. Everybody, irrespective of nationality, had to refrain from acts which 
held the danger of making the territory of the Netherlands a base for conduct-
ing hostilities. Idenburg’s appeal did not go unheeded. In Medan the board of 
the local German Union asked its members not to demonstrate their patriotic 
feelings in public. The Germans were living in a foreign, hospitable country 
and ‘in a time at which national sensitivity comes so sharply to the fore, we, 
the guests, should do everything we can by behaving tactfully and by respect-
ing and sparing the patriotic feelings of other nations, whichever they may be, 
22 De Locomotief, 9-12-1914.
23 De Locomotief, 17-8-1914.
24 De Locomotief, 14-8-1914, 15-8-1914, 19-8-1914.
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to preserve our good name’.25 Such appeals were to no avail. Disregarding the 
occasional voice of constraint, the Germans, old residents and new arrivals 
alike, throughout the war testified to their nationalist feelings. In Balikpapan 
in Borneo, for instance, in the local club of which a German was the chairman, 
pictures were exhibited of British and French prisoners-of-war guarded by 
German soldiers in 1916. The exhibition also enraged the local Dutch com-
munity, of whom the majority was anti-German. Pleyte wrote to Wilhelmina 
in 1918 that all the time the Germans were bearing witness to their ‘common 
emotion and their devotion to king and fatherland’.26 Frenchmen and Britons 
did not act much differently. All such foreign nationals zealously kept track 
of what their enemies were doing. The Dutch authorities were caught in the 
crossfire. An incident in Surabaya in April 1916 illustrates this nicely. A British 
protest about the sale of portraits of the Kaiser and the Sultan of Turkey in a 
shop in the Arab quarter prompted the police to confiscate them. The owner 
of the shop turned for help to the German Consul in the city. After his formal 
complaint, the portraits were returned to the shop.27
As during the Boer War with passion running high national anthems 
became a way to vent patriotic feelings. Germans embraced this method, as 
did French and British nationals. In Semarang the Dutch and French national 
anthems were sung at the railway station when the French male citizens of 
the city, six in total, obeyed the order of their consulate to report for military 
service and left for Batavia on the first leg of their journey home. On their 
arrival in Batavia, they were met by the French Consul, H. Fliche, and his wife. 
Fliche, dressed in a ‘grand uniform’ held a French flag in his hand, on which 
were written the words Vive la France, aux braves coeurs. His wife, presenting 
the six men with a rose and a tri-colour cockade, broke into ‘La Marseillaise’. 
It was greeted with cheers of Vive La France, and ‘May God protect the French 
army’.28 The Turks quickly got in on the act. In Cirebon, two women, a mother 
and daughter, in a small Turkish opera company dressed as Turkish officers 
waved the Turkish flag and sang martial songs.29 
The Dutchmen joined in enthusiastically, singing the national anthem of 
whatever country they favoured, which was usually not Germany. The edi-
tor of De Locomotief stressed that such behaviour was not fitting. In a colonial 
society in which people from various nationalities lived together restraint 
should be shown. Alluding to the ‘national decency’ of the Dutch he pleaded 
that Germans be treated courteously, especially as they had formed a merito-
25 Sumatra Post, cited in De Locomotief, 25-8-1914.
26 Pleyte to Wilhelmina, 10-8-1918, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 10-8-1918 K7.
27 Oetoesan Hindia, 4-4-1916.
28 De Locomotief, 17-8-1914.
29 De Locomotief, 9-12-1914.
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rious segment of colonial society for years. An ‘international balance’ had to 
be maintained. It was commendable that the Dutch sang patriotic songs, but 
to honour Dutch neutrality they should refrain from singing foreign national 
anthems: ‘Provoking international demonstrations was a national satisfaction 
of the lowest sort’.30 Even the singing of the Dutch national anthem did not 
pass undisputed. In early August – and rumours that the Netherlands and 
Germany were at war may have been a reason for this – German guests in 
a restaurant in Surabaya tried in vain to prevent the Dutch national anthem 
being played by the band. When the other guests stood up and sang the 
anthem at the top of their voices the Germans left the restaurant.31
Though they could well face the dangers of war on their journey home 
French, British, and Belgian nationals usually succeeded in reaching their 
homelands and the battlefields. In view of the strict British and French naval 
control of the sea lanes to Europe, this was less easy, if not almost impossible, 
for Germans and Austrians acting with equal patriotic zeal. Realizing that 
taking passage on a neutral steamer bound for Europe or for Kiaochow, to 
where part of the German reservists were ordered, held the very prospect 
that if French or British warships stopped such ship, they were to be interned, 
most Germans accepted the fact that they were stuck in the Netherlands 
Indies. Soon those who had not left were joined by compatriots from abroad 
who had succeeded in escaping to the Netherlands Indies, or were forced to 
evacuate to that region. They came from Singapore and the Malay Peninsula, 
from Colombo and French Indochina, and from Hong Kong. Even a number 
of native policemen from German Papua New Guinea, their uniform consist-
ing of a cap and a loincloth, fled to Hollandia. The colonial administration did 
not consider they belonged to the armed forces. It was decided to treat them 
like Belgian refugees in Holland. After they had been disarmed they were not 
interned as a neutral state was compelled to do with regular soldiers.32
To this influx of Germans living in South and Southeast Asia were added 
the crews and passengers of German ships, which could not sail on from 
ports in the Netherlands Indies; in total there were about fifty vessels. Among 
their passengers were also European emigrants on their way to Australia. 
Idenburg gave such third class passengers short shrift, stigmatizing them as 
‘undesirables’ to be got rid of as soon as possible. This was easier said than 
done as Australia refused to admit any of German and Austrian nationality.33 
Emigrants on board ships arriving in Tanjung Priok were accommodated on 
30 De Locomotief, 12-8-1914.
31 Oetoesan Hindia, 8-8-1914.
32 Michielsen to Idenburg, 3-1-1915, 1st Government Secretary to Palmer, 5-1-1915, NA, Kol. 
Openbaar, Vb. 9-12-1918 66.
33 Idenburg to Pleyte, 13-8-1914, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 14-8-1914 28.
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Onrust, a nearby island which the colonial government felt highly suited to 
isolating and detaining undesirable elements. Some of those who travelled 
on ships which chanced to enter another port were more fortunate. The 
British emigrants on the Roon were moved to Semarang, where because of the 
Colonial Exhibition which had just been opened houses converted in make-
shift hotels had remained empty. As a consequence of the war, the number of 
visitors was far fewer than expected.
The arriving Germans and Austrians were all victims of British naval 
superiority in Asia. In the first days of the war, the Netherlands Indies became 
a sanctuary for German and Austrian merchantmen which had fled French 
ports in Asia or had decided to avoid them. The influx became greater still 
when captains of German ships were ordered by their companies to leave 
British ports shortly before Great Britain entered the war. Ships fled to Sabang 
and the other ports in Sumatra, to the Riau Archipelago, to the harbours on the 
north coast of Java, and to Makassar. Ambon found itself experiencing a sud-
den influx of foreign merchantmen. At one particular moment twelve steam-
ers from various countries lay anchored in Ambon Bay; a sight the inhabitants 
could not remember ever having seen before. For them the presence of so many 
foreigners meant an exiting interlude in the usually ‘somewhat monotonous 
and prosaic life’.34 Once in the Netherlands Indies the German and Austrian 
ships could not leave. Their captains and owners were not prepared to risk an 
encounter with British warships. The mail these German ships carried formed 
an additional problem. One of the steamers, the Kleist, was the very last ship 
of the German mail service. Other German merchantmen also carried mail. 
The Dutch authorities took it upon themselves to forward this mail to Europe, 
which was no easy task. Problems were not encountered with the mail carried 
by the Roon, which had to be sent on to Australia.
Many of the Germans in the Netherlands Indies, whether residents or 
recent arrivals, travelled to Batavia to contact the German Consulate General. 
Not all were satisfied with their reception. One of them noted in disgust that 
the declaration of war had caused the staff of the consulate to lose their heads 
completely. They had forgotten to lock the cupboard containing secret docu-
ments and codes, enabling a spy from the British consulate to copy a list with 
the names of the German reservists. He also complained that they did not 
know how to deal with their compatriots who came to the consulate for advice 
and help. Reservists did not receive any support. In fact, they were treated 
incorrectly and were fobbed off with inadequate advice. Some had told him 
that the German Deputy Consul General, E. Windels, who had to hold the fort 
as the Consul was on leave in Berlin and could not return to his post because 
34 De Locomotief, 29-9-1914.
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of the war, had at times been extremely brusque and discourteous. One of the 
reasons for such intense disappointment was that the staff of the consulate 
considered the chance slight that the more adventurous Germans who pre-
sented them with all kinds of wild plans to reach Germany would succeed in 
their efforts. No money was provided for Germans who wanted to head for 
China or dreamt, as some indeed did, of chartering a sailing cutter, as some 
indeed did, to head for the German possessions in East Africa or the Arabian 
Peninsula.35
Some Germans did succeed in reaching Europe or China using false iden-
tity papers, but most Germans were trapped in the Netherlands Indies for 
the duration of the war. Only on very rare occasions, serious mental illness 
is an example, was the Dutch government prepared to consider mediation in 
the repatriation of Germans. Sailors were housed in sailors’ homes founded 
by the German community, or had to stay on board for the remainder of the 
war. Some of the German residents who failed to leave the Netherlands Indies 
took up their old jobs again. Others suddenly found themselves unemployed. 
They joined the growing number of Germans in the colony who were without 
any income. It was a diverse group: Germans who had fled from British and 
French possessions in Asia; passengers and crews of German ships taking 
refuge in the Netherlands Indies; Germans, who at the outbreak of the war 
had been fired by British, French, and Belgian estates or firms, though initially 
this did not seem to have been done on a massive scale; and – a problem the 
authorities in Holland also had to cope with – wives and children left behind 
without adequate financial support by husbands who had left to report for 
military service in their fatherland.
For the stranded Germans life became difficult over time. They were 
assailed by boredom and restlessness as time went by. Within months there 
were also the first reports of crew members who caught malaria and other 
tropical diseases, or committed suicide. Throughout World War One the 
names and exploits of such Germans, their brawls and efforts to earn some 
extra money, occasionally popped up in newspapers and contemporary docu-
ments. Some of the sailors tried to find work ashore. In exceptional cases crew 
members had to be arrested by the Dutch authorities when they ignored their 
captain’s order to return to their ship, refused orders to do work on board, or 
had resorted to begging when their financial resources had dried up. Some 
accepted any job offered or tried to earn a living by giving singing lessons 
and the like. It was probably the crew of the Roon who were responsible for a 
change on the entertainment scene in Semarang. In October 1914 De Locomotief 
reported that Europeans, stewards of a large ship that lay idle in Cilacap, had 
35 See NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 9-12-1918 63.
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made their appearance as waiters in a restaurant at the Colonial Exhibition in 
Semarang.36 The colonial authorities sometimes made full use of the difficult 
position where such people found themselves in. In March 1916 eight cooks 
of the Kleist made themselves useful in Padang by preparing the elaborate 
welcome dinner for the new Governor General, J.P. van Limburg Stirum, when 
he set foot on colonial soil for the first time on his way from Europe to Java. 
Others played the music which accompanied the musical greeting of Dutch 
and Indonesian schoolchildren. They must have been adept musicians. The 
Dutch schoolchildren sang the Dutch national anthem-to-be, the ‘Wilhelmus’; 
the Indonesian schoolchildren local songs, which the person who sent a report 
on the event to De Locomotief noted ‘lent a certain sacred atmosphere because 
of the peculiar rhythm’ to the tribute.37
In the course of time, the situation of the sailors grew more precarious. 
They received their pay, or at least part of it, but as the war dragged on and 
prices rose they could not make ends meet. In August 1918 about fifty mem-
bers of crew of the Roon had to be detained after they had run amok when 
they had been informed that their pay was to be cut. At the end of December 
of the same year, the railway company generously decided to transport 
the Christmas presents sent to them free of charge. The maintenance of the 
German freighters themselves were largely neglected during their protracted 
stay in the ports of the Netherlands Indies. When Abdoel Moeis, visited 
Sabang in January 1917 he was struck by the poor condition of these ships. 
He noted that they were extremely filthy and that the sides were overgrown 
with barnacles.38
 
In the middle of August, when the initial fear that the Netherlands might be 
dragged in the war had abated somewhat, Pinke decided on a less defensive 
and more active naval policy. The squadron was split up. One ironclad, the 
Tromp, and two torpedo-boat destroyers were ordered to the eastern part of 
the Archipelago, to the Moluccas and surrounding waters. The other three 
ironclads – De Zeven Provinciën, the Koningin Regentes, and the Hertog Hendrik 
– ironclads escorted by four destroyers were detailed to cruise the seas 
around Bali and Lombok. The brief given to the commanders was to look 
out for foreign warships and to assure that these did not violate the colony’s 
neutrality.39
Soon it turned out that a more pressing problem was at hand. In the middle 
of August, a British protest was received concerning the sailing of a number 
36 De Locomotief, 17-10-1914.
37 Bijl de Vroe 1980:88; De Locomotief, 18-3-1916.
38 Neratja, 29-11-1917.
39 Pinke to Idenburg, 19-8-1914, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 1-4-1915 A6.
VII  Guarding strict neutrality 181
of German merchantmen; which, as Pinke wrote in his diary ‘displayed what 
seemed to us a disturbing but generally admirable activity’ (Teitler 1986:40). 
One, the Offenbach, had left the port of Surabaya with its decks piles high with 
coal. The British Consul in Batavia was convinced that she had sailed out to 
provision German warships. His suspicion was fortified by the sailing of two 
other German merchantmen which also carried coal as deck cargo. These had 
left the port of Makassar around the same time. Batavia reacted immediately. 
The export of coal and durable foodstuffs was rigorously rationed. Ships 
leaving ports in the Netherlands Indies were only allowed to carry coal and 
provisions deemed sufficient for the voyage to the next port.40 The decree was 
poorly formulated and soon had to be amended. Its wording implied that the 
decree was also in force for ships sailing from one port in the Netherlands 
Indies to another, or if sailing to another Dutch port in the Archipelago, first 
called at Singapore or Malacca. It had to be explained that the prohibition con-
cerned only genuine export.41 To be on the safe side Pleyte sent a confidential 
letter to De Scheepsagentuur in Amsterdam and Internatio in Rotterdam the 
following month. In order to prevent ‘problems’, both firms were asked not to 
sell coal in the Netherlands Indies before the colonial authorities, if possible 
the Governor General himself, had had the opportunity to ‘judge whether 
40 Javasche Courant, 13-8-1914. 
41 De Locomotief, 26-8-1914.
The warship the Koningin Regentes (KITLV 34113)
The Netherlands Indies and the Great War182
the sale is desirable from a political point of view’; and to inform their agents 
accordingly. Both did so.42
The incident put Idenburg in a somewhat awkward position. His staff had 
completely forgotten about secret instructions about how to deal with the ship-
ping of coal which had been issued to the local Dutch civil servants. According 
to these rules which were issued to prevent colonial territorial waters to being 
transformed into an operations base for one of the belligerents local authorities 
should prevent the sailing of merchantmen if there was a reasonable suspicion 
that they intended to provision a warship of the belligerents with fuel, muni-
tions, and weapons. Unless their captains agreed to unload such cargo, passing 
ships were only allowed in territorial waters for a period of twenty-four hours. 
Ignorant of these instructions, in his reply to the British Consul Idenburg put 
forward various reasons to show that the colonial authorities had done nothing 
wrong, even when it was true that the merchantmen in question had planned 
to supply German warships with coal. It was pointed out that the 1907 treaty 
concluding the The Hague Peace Conference about the rights and obligations 
of neutral states did not require a neutral government to prevent the supply of 
belligerent warships by a third party outside territorial waters. At this moment 
the whole situation still appeared innocent to Idenburg. There were no reason-
able grounds to assume that the Offenbach was going to serve as an auxiliary 
cruiser, the stowing of coal as deck cargo was not unusual, and no provision-
ing of German warships had taken place in colonial territorial waters.43
At the end of August the Tromp sighted the Offenbach near Jampea, south 
of Celebes. It now dawned on the authorities that she probably was not such 
an innocent vessel as Batavia had thought and, but the realization only slowly 
grew, that she might be involved in a scheme to provision German warships 
cruising Southeast Asian waters harrying Allied merchantmen. As Batavia 
would soon realize Germany had prepared well, involving consuls, busi-
nessmen and other Germans living in Southeast Asia in the plans to supply 
German raiders with coal and victuals.
There were at that moment two such German raiders prowling the waters 
in the vicinity of the Netherlands Indies: the gunboat the Geier, which at the 
outbreak of the war had been on her way to the German part of New Guinea, 
and the cruiser the Emden, which had crossed the Archipelago on her way 
from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean after the outbreak of the war. The Geier 
– which had stopped and searched a Dutch merchantman, the Houtman, in the 
waters between Makassar and Surabaya on 5 August – was a nuisance, but no 
more than that. The Emden created a real uproar. Pursued by British, French, 
42 Pleyte to De Scheepsagentuur, 7-9-1914, Pleyte to Idenburg, 7-9-1914, Scheepsagentuur to 
Pleyte, 9-9-1914, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 7-9-1914 B18, Vb. 7-9-1914 D18, Vb. 11-9-1914 N18.
43 Idenburg to Pleyte, 18-8-1914, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 2-10-1914 P20.
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Russian, Japanese, and Australian warships, on her own she sank about twen-
ty Allied vessels, including a French torpedo boat and Russian cruiser, which 
were sunk when the Emden raided the port of Penang. Her exploits were an 
additional reason why the colonial government attached such importance 
to the ban on writing about movements of foreign troops and ships in the 
Archipelago. The operations of the Emden in the Bay of Bengal, the Andaman 
Sea, and along the Malay coast led to panic in British India, Ceylon, and the 
Malay Peninsula, where people had been unaccustomed to the idea that one 
day they might be confronted with an attack by a foreign enemy. In October 
in Singapore a member of the Legislative Council of the Straits Settlements 
would state during one of its meetings about Penang, an island actually raided 
by the Emden, that it was completely without military protection, because ‘I 
am here’ (Proceedings 1915:B77). British merchantmen in the Straits Settlements 
and Colombo did not dare to put to sea, which also meant that the British mail 
was disrupted. At a certain moment forty-two Allied ships had taken shelter 
in Colombo for fear of an encounter with the Emden. The threat posed by the 
Emden also put a temporary halt to trade between the Netherlands Indies and 
the British and French colonies. Owners in the Netherlands Indies kept their 
ships, which were supposed to sail to these Allied destinations in port. It was 
reported somewhat exaggeratedly that trade in Surabaya grounded to a halt 
(Van Geuns 1918:211).
The German raider the Emden
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To continue their exploits the Emden and Geier needed fuel and provisions. 
In the first days of the war rumours that German warships had actually been 
furnished with coal in the Netherlands Indies were especially rife in the British 
communities of Batavia and Surabaya. The British Consul General, Carlisle, 
reported every scrap of information about such provisioning he received from 
his compatriots and consuls to British naval intelligence in Singapore. To the 
annoyance of the Dutch authorities Carlisle did not make much effort to check 
the veracity of the reports which reached him, nor did he put much faith in 
Dutch assurances that the information he received was incorrect. Pinke was 
especially annoyed by this as it concerned ‘the good name’ of the ships under 
his command. Even worse was that Batavia was sure that Carlisle’s unsub-
stantiated reports contributed to the anti-Dutch mood which was beginning 
to form in French and British possessions in Southeast Asia and in the Allied 
communities in Japan and China. In all these places people were sure that the 
Dutch in the Netherlands Indies were assisting the German war efforts.44 
Public opinion in Allied colonies was turning against the Netherlands, if 
not becoming downright hostile. In Saigon and Singapore people demanded 
a ban on all exports to the Netherlands Indies, including that of rice. In Saigon 
the mood was so fraught that a Dutch employee of one of the largest French 
companies in the city had been fired. Anti-German riots a month before, 
when houses and offices of Germans had been attacked by mobs, which had 
also smashed everything in the International Club to smithereens, were still 
fresh in people’s minds and it was feared that the company might become 
the target of such violence if it employed Dutchmen. In Singapore the Dutch 
Consul General noted that among Chinese and indigenous middlemen espe-
cially anti-Dutch feelings had been manifest. Dutch trade and shipping had 
felt the consequences. The strong anti-Dutch sentiments had been fanned by 
newspaper reports that the naval authorities in Singapore were convinced 
that the Emden and Geier were not only allowed refuge in the territorial waters 
of the Netherlands Indies, but were actually provided there with coal and 
victuals. The news that the Dutch government had denied warships of bel-
ligerents access to the Scheldt, thereby not allowing British or French ships 
to reach Antwerp, provided extra fuel for the anti-Dutch mood. Rumours 
in Singapore, Saigon, Rangoon, and Calcutta claimed that relations between 
the Netherlands and Great Britain were on the brink of being severed. In an 
effort to turn the tide, the Dutch Consul General in Singapore elicited a denial 
from the Singapore administration. In the statement issued on 14 September, 
the governor of Singapore stated that on the authority of the British Colonial 
Secretary he could assert with confidence that the relations between the 
44 Pinke to Jerram, 29-9-1914, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 19-3-1915 G5.
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Netherlands and Great Britain were ‘most cordial’.45 The statement of the 
governor of Singapore was considered important enough to be published in 
the Javasche Courant.46
In Java, where newspapers had carried reports about the manifestations 
of anti-Dutch feelings in the rest of Southeast Asia, Pinke, reasonably sure of 
himself that his fleet had succeeded in preventing any bunkering of German 
raiders, used the Batavian newspaper Bataviaasch Handelsblad to deny empath-
ically that any violation of neutrality had been committed in the territorial 
waters of the Netherlands Indies.47 Idenburg, afraid that the import of rice 
might stagnate, also acted. Hearing about the developments in Saigon, he 
wasted no time in asking for the mediation of The Hague. The Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs had to assure the French authorities that neutrality was most 
strictly observed in the Netherlands Indies. To the satisfaction of the Dutch 
authorities Paris reacted without delay. The Governor General in Hanoi was 
asked for information about the anti-Dutch mood in his colony. He was also 
instructed to take all measures to prevent anti-Dutch demonstrations. In The 
Hague the French Ambassador assured the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
that the colonial administration in Saigon did not nurture an anti-Dutch dis-
position. Nevertheless he had to admit that the Indo-Chinese press was hos-
tile.48 Dutch journalists in the Netherlands Indies seized upon the anti-Dutch 
mood outside the colony to take their revenge. To demonstrate precisely that 
the colonial fleet was not lax in guarding neutrality, newspapers should be 
allowed to report on the movement of Dutch warships.49 
The rumours about the Dutch allowing the Emden and Geier to take refuge 
in territorial waters were untrue but the efforts to furnish the two German 
raiders with coal and provisions was a real issue. The matter was all the more 
pressing as the British Navy kept a close watch on the German merchant-
men anchored in the ports, roadsteads, and bays of the Netherlands Indies. 
Occasionally British warships entered territorial waters to find out what these 
German freighters were up to. Would the naval authorities act in accordance 
with the proclamation of neutrality if they had to order the arrest of British 
warships operating in territorial waters and have them laid up till the end of 
45 Sparkler to Idenburg, 5-9-1914, Röst to Sparkler, 15-9-1914, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 17-11-1914 
A23.
46 Protesters damaged the Dutch consulate in Durban in May 1915. The British government 
was prepared to compensate the damage but only as ‘an act of grace’ and a token of friendship. 
The Dutch government, taking the position that it was entitled to the money, refused to accept the 
British offer.
47 Teitler 1986:58; Bataviaasch Handelsblad, cited in De Locomotief, 11-9-1914.
48 Idenburg to Pleyte, 6-9-1914, Pleyte to Idenburg, 11-9-1914, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 7-9-1914 
A18, Vb. 17-9-1914 F19.
49 Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad, cited in De Locomotief, 5-12-1914.
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war? Pinke thought such a policy was unfeasible, which proved how impracti-
cal and unrealistic the proclamation in fact was.50 Occasionally Dutch warships 
were ordered to leave port or, when such ships were not available, smaller ves-
sels were sent to sea to warn captains of such warships, mostly British vessels, 
that they had entered territorial waters. In most cases the colonial authorities 
were informed about transgression only afterwards. All the Dutch could do in 
such instances was to lodge formal protests. Even this was often not feasible. 
Many reports of foreign warships entering territorial waters made by civil 
servants and local people, not the best naval observers and at times given to 
exaggeration, were too inconclusive to act upon them.
Preventing the bunkering of German warships in the territorial waters of 
the Netherlands Indies posed a gigantic problem. As Pinke confided to Vice 
Admiral Sir Thomas Henry Martyn Jerram, the commander of the British fleet 
in East Asia at the end of September, ‘the total coastline of all the islands has a 
length nearly that of the equatorial circumference of the earth and that perhaps 
[a] thousand and more anchorages are found along this coastline’.51 Some of 
these places lay in isolated outposts. For instance, a Dutch civil servant on his 
way to one of the islands near Madura, sighted a large ship, of which he could 
not make out the nationality. After he had found out that an armed launch had 
steamed to shore, he reported the incident by mail to his chief in Sumenep, 
pleading the urgency of having a telegraph connection at his post. Without a 
telegraph it might take a week, and even longer, before a message could be 
sent if a foreign warship violated neutrality. He added between brackets that 
one single, lonely European civil servant even if he by chance happened to be 
present could not prevent such a transgression.52
In his letter to Jerram Pinke had also written that he had not had a day’s 
rest since the outbreak of the war. This may have been true but the real chase 
to keep watch over German merchantmen began at the end of August. After 
the Offenbach had been discovered near Jampea, the Emden had been sighted in 
the vicinity by the Tromp, and the Geier reportedly had also been spotted there. 
As one of the crew members of the Koningin Regentes said it was the begin-
ning of ‘the steaming back and forth on the trail of the various colliers of the 
Emden’. It was a ‘tedious and boring time’ (M. 1922:844). The Dutch warships 
were sent from pillar to post, sailing to and fro in search of coalers. Initially, 
the entire Dutch squadron sailed to Celebes. When it was reported that the 
Emden had bunkered in waters off the northwest coast of Sumatra and that 
British warships had been sighted nearby, the Dutch warships were ordered 
50 Pinke to Idenburg, 27-1-1915, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 19-3-1915 G5.
51 Pinke to Jerram, 29-9-1914, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 19-3-1915 G5.
52 Van der Plas to Assistent-Resident Sumenep, 29-12-1914, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 19-3-1915 
G5.
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hence early the following month. Only the Tromp remained in the eastern part 
of the Archipelago, where she was to have a busy time. On 8 September, the 
Tromp arrested two German steamers of the Deutsch-Australische Dampfschiff 
Gesellschaft, and an American ship, the Rio Päsig, in a bay north of Seram. One 
of the German ships was the Linden. On an earlier occasion she had already 
been ordered out of territorial waters because of her cargo of coal. Encountered 
in territorial waters for the second time, her cargo was confiscated. The Linden 
was taken to Ambon. Presented with the choice of unloading her coal or leav-
ing Dutch territory on the condition that re-entering it meant an embargo, the 
captain of the second German vessel, the Ulm, also loaded with coal, opted for 
the first alternative. The Rio Päsig left. She was later captured by the British. 
Having escorted the German ships to Ambon, the Tromp immediately had to 
sail on to Halmahera, to assist in suppressing an uprising, only to be ordered 
on again to Lombok, this time her quarry being a merchantman carrying no 
flag.53
In the west the scene of action was Telok Dalem Bay on the island of 
Simalur, or Simeulue in Acehnese. Three German merchantmen were moored 
off Simalur. One of them was the Markomannia, a steamer of the Hamburg-
Amerika Linie. It was no secret that she accompanied the Emden on her exploits 
as a coaler and supply ship. Just outside territorial waters the Markomannia 
was transhipping coal from a Greek freighter, the Pontoporos, which had been 
taken as a prize by the Emden. The two other German ships were freighters, 
the Choising, which just before the start of the war had fled from Singapore and 
after sailing to Tanjung Priok had left that port with Lourenço Marques as her 
stated destination, but in fact had been ordered to supply the Emden with coal; 
and the Hörde of the Hamburg-Amerika Linie.
The Markomannia and Choising remained outside territorial waters but not 
so the Hörde. She had sought the protection of the bay, where she had first been 
sighted by a local Dutch civil servant on 19 September. He had ordered her 
captain to leave, but four days later the Hörde was sighted still within territori-
al waters by a Dutch torpedo boat destroyer. Asked why the Hörde had not left, 
her captain replied that she had run into engine trouble. Later he explained 
that he had made no hurry to repair the damage because he had not wanted to 
have his crew work day and night and exhaust themselves in the tropical heat. 
De Zeven Provinciën arrived the following day. The circumstances were highly 
suspicious. The Hörde was on her way from Manila to Guam, and though her 
captain maintained that he had changed direction for fear of an encounter with 
British warships, she was far too far off course for this (and on the wrong side 
of Sumatra to boot). Besides a cargo of cigars and copra, her holds contained 
53 Pinke to Idenburg, 23-9-1914, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 1-4-1915 A6.
A captured enemy coal-ship excorted by the Koningin Regentes (M. 1922:844)
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5,000 tons of coal for which no bill of loading could be presented. Suspicion 
was also raised by the fact that the fourth officer, Captain-Lieutenant Erwin 
von Möller, took charge of the conversation with the Dutch naval officers who 
inspected the ship and her cargo. It was surmised, and rightfully so, that he 
was a German naval officer, who because of his rank was the real commander 
of the ship. At the outbreak of the war Möller, a tall man with an English 
appearance, as Idenburg would later describe him in a telegram to Pleyte, had 
commanded a river gunboat in China. Thereupon he had travelled to Manila, 
where he had boarded the Hörde at the last moment and had been assigned 
the captain’s cabin. On Pinke’s instructions the Hörde was given some respite 
to repair the engine. After the extra time had elapsed the captain was ordered 
to sail to Padang or Sabang to unload the coal. Should he choose to refuse, his 
ship would no longer be allowed to enter territorial waters.
On reaching Sabang the captain of the Hörde refused to unload his coal, 
asking for extra supplies instead to be able to sail to Dar-es-Salaam. The 
request was denied. Permission to depart was also withheld. The captain was 
left with no other choice but to sell his load of coal to the Sabang Company. 
The fact that the Hörde was not allowed to put to sea landed Möller in a dif-
ficult position. He, as it was to clearly emerge, had an important assignment 
and he made every effort he could to leave Sabang on board another German 
ship. He conferred with German captains in port and asked them to give their 
word of honour not to disclose what had been discussed. He succeeded in 
persuading the captains of two merchantmen, the Gernis and the Preussen, 
to try to sail out. The captain of the Gernis was determined to steam to the 
Bay of Bengal to supply the Emden with provisions, a voyage, he estimated, 
which would take him sixteen days. Unable to buy enough flour in Sabang 
and finding no salt meat at all on the island, he collected foodstuffs from the 
other German steamers in the bay. Möller was smuggled on board the Gernis 
disguised as a stoker. After the Gernis was refused permission to leave, Möller, 
by now wanted for questioning by the authorities, gave himself up. As he did 
not want to cause a stir in his stoker’s uniform he waited till it was dark to do 
so. Möller was arrested.54 Later he was interned on the mainland, where he 
was housed comfortably in the Aceh Hotel in Kutaraja.
In Sabang the Captains of the Hörde, R.O Hensen, of the Gernis, J. Henken, 
of the Preussen, H.H.V.F.A. Lübcke, and others were interrogated. They played 
their cards pretty close to their chests. Lübcke suffered an attack of acute 
amnesia about the meetings on board of the German merchantmen at Sabang. 
Judging from the words of the chief engineer of the Hörde dinners on board of 
that ship must have been dull affairs. He had never exchanged a word with 
54 Minutes interrogation Von Möller on 6-10-14, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 15-12-1914 K24.
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Möller.55 Möller himself was incommunicado. He refused to speak about his 
time in Manila and the route of the Hörde. Such information related to the 
movement of the German warships. Möller denied that he had taken over 
command of the Hörde and called himself the ‘intellectual leader’ on board. 
All he would reveal was that his intention had been to direct the Hörde to 
rendez-vous with German warships.56 Hensen admitted that he had been 
ordered by the agent of the Hamburg-Amerika Linie to steam to a particular 
spot in the Indian Ocean. The orders had come from Möller himself and from 
the estate company and trading house of Behn, Meyer and Company. In the 
ship’s log the place was identified by the ciphers 12384. Hensen refused to 
say where this was and whether this might be Telok Dalem Bay, of which he 
had noted down in the ship’s papers ‘end of journey’. He said that to do oth-
erwise would be treason against the state.57 Only Henken was more talkative. 
From him the Dutch authorities got an inkling about the German plans to use 
German steamers sailing the Archipelago to supply German raiders with fuel 
and provisions. Steamers of the Norddeutscher Lloyd and Hamburg-Amerika 
Linie had already been instructed to assist such German warships before the 
outbreak of the war. Their captains had been provided with a secret code for 
making contact.58
 
A bone of contention emerged in those first months of the war other than 
preventing the fuelling of German warships. Soon the Dutch authorities 
were confronted with British protests about radio contact made by German 
merchantmen which had taken refuge in the Netherlands Indies and by radio 
stations on shore with German warships plying Southeast Asian waters. At 
the start of the war Batavia had taken its precautions. It had informed the 
consuls of the belligerents that international law forbade wireless commu-
nication in territorial waters by and with belligerent warships and that the 
colonial authorities were determined to enforce this rule. Initially nobody in 
the Navy – and Pinke claimed in his diary because of the enormous pressure 
at that time – had thought of the fact that German merchantmen moored in 
territorial waters would be able to contact German warships by radio (Teitler 
1986:20). On 8 August, after such communications had indeed taken place the 
captains of German merchantmen which had taken refuge in the Netherlands 
Indies were told that they were not allowed to use their radios. Three days 
later the radios were sealed. No radio parts were removed, nor were antennas 
55 Minutes interrogation Bock on 1-10-1914, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 15-12-1914 K24.
56 Minutes interrogation Möller on 5-10-1014, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 15-12-1914 K24.
57 Minutes interrogation Hensen on 1-, 2-10-1914, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 15-12-1914-K24).
58 Record of the interrogation of Captain J. Henken on 3-10-1914, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 15-12-
1914 K24.
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taken down or sealed. Pinke considered the first measure too complicated to 
be feasible as not enough experts were available to accomplish this task; the 
second useless as running a simple wire up the mast would suffice to receive 
messages (Teitler 1986:21-3). 
From the second half of September, The Hague and Batavia were inundat-
ed by protests about communications from radio stations in the Netherlands 
Indies. Great Britain had discovered that the Germans had set up a system 
of wireless communication to keep in touch with their raiders and warships 
and suspected that radio stations in the Netherlands Indies were involved 
(Shennan 2000:78-9). In The Hague the British Envoy transmitted complaints 
on behalf of the British Foreign Secretary, Grey. In Batavia the Consul General 
lodged protests on behalf of the Straits government and Jerram. Some of these 
concerned the radio station at Sabang, about which in a rather insinuating 
fashion was occasionally added in the British press that (as all four radio sta-
tions in the Netherlands Indies) it had been built by Telefunken. Others spoke 
about radio messages to and from German steamers in the ports of Cilacap, 
Sabang, and Makassar. The Riau Archipelago was another focus of the atten-
tion for the British authorities. They were convinced that the region har-
boured German spies who had to keep in contact with German warships and 
merchantmen. At the end of August one of the islands, Bulan, was visited by 
three British officers from Singapore. They told the secretary of a local estate 
that they had sailed to the island for a picnic. Their actual behaviour aroused 
suspicion. The officers showed great interest in the hill tops and inquired after 
the nationality of the estate manager. On hearing this the Dutch Resident was 
not a little shocked, the more so as he had just received information, mention-
ing Bulan by name, that the British authorities in Singapore were on the look 
out for Germans in the Archipelago, who were in radio contact with German 
warships. He was sure that there were no spies among the few Germans who 
lived under his authority, but nevertheless promised Idenburg that he would 
do his utmost to prevent espionage.59
Not everybody, not even in the Dutch Navy in the Netherlands Indies, fully 
understood the potentials and limitations of radio communication. The British 
admiralty in East Asia seems to have been equally uninformed about its pos-
sibilities. The British Consul in Batavia maintained on the end of September 
that at three occasions the Sabang radio station had attempted to have British 
merchantmen reveal their position by asking for their speed and course.60 A 
few days later the British Envoy in The Hague, Sir Alan Johnstone, informed 
Loudon on 1 October that the station was constantly jamming Calcutta 
59 Coeven to Resident Riau, 9-9-1914, Resident Riau to Idenburg, 9-9-1914, NA, Kol. Openbaar, 
Vb. 9-12-1918 39.
60 Carlisle to Idenburg, 26-9-1914, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 18-11-1914 D23.
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and other radio stations in India. Three days later a second letter followed. 
Repeating the accusation, Johnstone claimed that Sabang appeared to be 
assisting German cruisers and that the stations P.F.A. and P.F.S. were working 
together. It was assumed that P.F.S. was located in Rotterdam; from where 
with the contemporary technology it would have been impossible to send 
messages to a region as far away as Southeast Asia.
It was not difficult to gainsay some of the complaints. A civil servant at 
the Ministry of the Colonies scribbled in the margin that the British admiral 
in Asia, from whom the complaints originated, had acted in ‘nervous haste’. 
There was as yet no wireless station in Rotterdam. P.F.A. and P.F.S. were the call 
signals of two Dutch merchantmen of the Rotterdamsche Lloyd. Every gov-
ernment and Navy official could have easily found this out. Lists of such call 
names were widely available. The allegation that the Sabang station passed on 
information to German warships could likewise be refuted. Steamers which 
wanted to transmit a message via the Sabang station were asked to mention 
their position and speed. This was standard practice, allowed by international 
radio conventions.
The jamming of the Calcutta radio station was a genuine cause for com-
plaint. The reason was frequent and lengthy communications between the 
Sabang station and Dutch warships. The squadron at that time was cruising 
the waters off Simalur. For one reason or another, experts did not know why, 
communication in that area was difficult. Transmission required full capacity. 
After Pleyte had asked Idenburg to ‘mitigate’ the inconvenience caused by the 
Sabang radio station, the latter urged the station to limit its communication 
with ships which sought contact.61
A week later Johnstone presented a new protest. It concerned a complaint 
by the naval authorities in Australia about a radio station at Situbondo (built 
the British hasted to point out by Telefunken). Civil servants quickly realized 
that the town of Situbondo, a small city with a wireless station in the eastern 
corner of Java, was meant. Pleyte asked Idenburg to investigate. Idenburg 
replied that the complaint was ‘absolutely unfounded’. On the day in question 
there had been no contact between the radio station and foreign vessels.62
The Roon, moored in Cilacap, also aroused suspicion. At the request of the 
British, the ship was searched a number of times to ascertain that she could 
not be equipped as an auxiliary vessel and to check that her radio had been 
sealed. In view of the British protests about radio messages sent from the 
61 Johnstone to Loudon, 1-10-1914, 4-10-1914, 5-10-1914, Pleyte to Idenburg, 7-10-1914, Idenburg 
to Pleyte, 8-10-1914, Von Faber to Idenburg, 16-10-1914, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 7-10-1914 U20, Vb. 
8-10-1914 X20, Vb. 18-12-1914 24.
62 Johnstone to Loudon, 13-10-1914, Idenburg to Pleyte, 27-10-1914, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 15-
10-1914 J21, Vb. 28-10-1914 A22.
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vessel the army had also erected a field radio station nearby. Nightly rounds 
by the harbour master and the police kept the Roon under strict surveillance. 
Nevertheless, it cannot be ruled out that some Dutch people were aware that 
transmissions did take place, but for one or another reason they did not want 
to report this to the proper authorities. A sailor on the Roon who had fallen out 
with her captain claimed this was the case. It must have aroused at least some 
suspicion that each time a message was sent all the lights on the ship had to 
be turned off.63 
Pinke was positive that all possible precautions had been taken, but the 
British continued to complain about radio messages sent from the Roon to 
the Emden and Geier. A wireless operator in Australia was sure that he had 
intercepted such messages and had recognized the distinctive tone of its radio 
operator. Johnstone wrote in one of his protests that such messages probably 
conveyed intelligence about British shipping. He pointed out that this implied 
that the wireless apparatus on the Roon had not been dismantled. This was a 
‘failure to fulfil duties of neutrality’. An immediate inquiry was demanded. 
Loudon complied.64 In a wire to Idenburg Pleyte indicated that the matter was 
of a serious nature.65 This time Idenburg displayed some annoyance. Pinke 
had already conveyed him his displeasure over the rash way in which the 
British naval authorities had drawn the conclusion that German merchantmen 
violated the ban on radio contact. He had stressed that not much importance 
should be attached to British complaints as long as they were not substanti-
ated by facts. Believing Pinke, Idenburg informed Pleyte that the colonial 
authorities had done all they could. They needed more than just vague accusa-
tions. What was more, the two German raiders were nowhere near Java. The 
Emden was in the Bay of Bengal, the Geier in Honolulu.66
Idenburg and Pinke should not have been so confident. The local authori-
ties, unfamiliar with the working of wireless installations, had blundered. 
The first concrete information indicating that German merchant vessels and 
warships were indeed in radio contact emerged at the end of September. It 
involved the steamers the Luneberg and the Stollberg which were moored in 
Makassar. A British complaint that their radios were being used greatly irri-
tated the Dutch authorities. They were convinced that they had done all they 
could to prevent this. The complaint was used to criticize Carlisle’s behaviour 
and to express irritation about the violation of territorial waters by British 
warships, whose crews at times disembarked on isolated islands for a swim 
63 Statement sailor Roon to the British Consul General, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 27-1-1915 G2.
64 Johnstone to Loudon, 28-10-1914, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 30-10-1914 E22.
65 Pleyte to Idenburg, 30-10-1914, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 30-10-1914 E22.
66 Pinke to Idenburg, 23-10-1914, Idenburg to Pleyte, 31-10-1914, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 2-11-
1914 J22, Vb. 19-12-1914 U24.
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and other forms of recreation. It was not a formal protest, but took the form 
of a letter to Jerram from Pinke (who, fed up with the many complaints by 
Carlisle based on ‘false rumours’ and ‘foolish but at the same time also danger-
ous gossip’, refused to communicate by mail with the British Consul General) 
(Teitler 1986:74). In the letter it was also pointed out that up to that moment no 
German warship had entered the territorial waters of the Netherlands Indies. 
In reply Jerram gave the assurance that he and Carlisle had no doubts about 
the intentions of Batavia to maintain a strict neutrality. He wrote to Pinke that 
he had only drawn attention to the two steamers in Makassar ‘with the objec-
tive of assisting you by showing where leakings existed’.67
As had become standard routine, after a British complaint had been 
received a new investigation of the ships in question was ordered. In some 
instances it was the second, third, or fourth time. This time the inspection did 
not rule out the possibility that the accusation was well founded, though that 
this was still considered to be very unlikely. The conclusion was that the way 
in which the radio installation had been rendered useless was not foolproof. 
One of the flaws was that the aerials had not been removed. The eventuality 
that the ships had a second radio on board could also not be precluded. With 
this in mind Pinke ordered the removal of the aerials of all German mer-
chantmen in Netherlands Indies waters. Pertinently this instruction was only 
in force for merchantmen. Warships – at least Allied ones – were excluded. 
Pinke was indignant when he heard that the captain of a British man-of-war 
in Makassar had been asked to lower her antenna at the end of 1915. He com-
plained to Idenburg that it had been agreed that a promise of a captain of a 
warship not to use his radio sufficed.68
Another result of the investigation in Makassar was that Pinke launched a 
serious attempt to thwart more old-fashioned ways of communication at the 
end of October. It had been discovered that the captain of the Stollberg kept 
carrier pigeons. He had explained that this was a hobby of his. Pinke pon-
dered over this piece of information for some time. Finally he decided to ask 
the regional authorities to report to him whether there were pigeons on board 
of German ships in their post. He did so, though, as he himself confessed, he 
found it hard to imagine, how these birds were to be used.69 Later, in January 
1915, a German watchmaker was arrested for possessing pigeons, allegedly 
intended for another German steamer in port.70 
Among the ports where Pinke’s instruction was obeyed was Tanjung Priok. 
On one of the ships anchored there, the Freiberg, seven pigeons were discov-
67 Jerram to Pinke, 6-10-1914, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 19-3-1915 G5.
68 Pinke to Idenburg, 1-12-1915, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 9-12-1918 70.
69 Pinke to De Graeff, 29-10-1914, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 18-12-1914 V24.
70 De Locomotief, 25-1-1915.
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ered: five adults and two squabs. The captain explained that he had bought a 
number of pigeons in Antwerp. In the course of time they had multiplied. The 
authorities were unrelenting. The Resident of Batavia, H. Rijfsnijder, ordered 
the harbour master, E.A. Kuchlin, to point out to the captain that in his own 
interest it would be best to kill the birds or have them removed from his ship. 
Kuchlin complied, but could find only five pigeons. He was sure that two 
adults had flown to another German ship, the Hagen. There it was that Kuchlin 
duly went. He saw two birds and asked her Captain, A. Wilm, to return them 
to the Freiberg. Wilm was only prepared to part with one of the pigeons. He 
said that he himself owned the other pigeon. Thereupon Wilm was given to 
understand that it would be better for him to kill his pet. He did not take 
kindly to this. His reply that the British were certainly behind the search was 
taken by Kuchlin as an insult. Oversensitive, as more of his contemporary 
Europeans were where it concerned his personal honour, Kuchlin consid-
ered the accusation serious enough to contemplate a court case. Indignantly 
he announced that he would be back in a few days’ time to ascertain what 
had happened to the pigeons. When he returned both German captains was 
absent. Kuchlin could only find the two squabs in their cage. Of the five older 
ones of the Freiberg and the one of the Hagen there was not a trace.
An incident was born. Annoyed by the frequent investigations of German 
ships, the German Deputy Consul in Batavia made the pigeons the centre-
piece of a complaint. By doing so the fate of the birds was also brought to the 
attention of the civil servants of the Ministry of the Colonies in The Hague. 
The Deputy Consul protested that no investigation should take place on 
board a German merchantman in Tanjung Priok without him being informed 
beforehand. A special agreement from 1905 gave him this right. At that time 
the colonial authorities had promised not to conduct a police investigation 
aboard German ships without alerting the consulate first. Idenburg did not 
agree. The circumstances of the day and the duty of the colonial government 
to ensure that ships of the belligerents respected Dutch neutrality demanded 
immediate, prompt action. He argued that the promise of 1905 had just been a 
polite gesture and could not be upheld. Usually there was no time to wait for 
a representative of the consulate to arrive on the scene.71
More discomforting news about German radio traffic was to follow. At the 
end of October the radio station in Sabang throughout the night intercepted 
several coded messages. They bore the mark of a telegraphist on the Emden. An 
investigation was launched. On the Scandia, the first ship visited, nothing sus-
picious was found, but suddenly one of her sloops was spied heading for the 
Preussen, where people were hurrying back and forth on the deck. Inspection 
71 See NA, Kol. Vb. 9-12-1918 39.
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of the Preussen revealed a receiver hidden under the cushion in the cabin of the 
telegraphist and an aerial concealed along the inside of the rope-ladder to the 
top of the main mast and not visible from the shore. Neither receiver nor aerial 
had been there when the Preussen, a vessel of the Hamburg-Amerika Linie, 
had arrived in Sabang on 3 August. At that time she had not carried an aerial. 
At the end of September, after the investigation of the Luneberg when all aeri-
als of the German ships in Sabang had been lowered and sealed, she still had 
not carried one. The governor of Aceh reported to Idenburg that the receiver 
had been built with material on board and had been cleverly concealed. As a 
punishment the captain, an officer of the German Navy, and the radio operator 
were moved to Medan to be prosecuted for violation of the rules proclaimed 
to guard Dutch neutrality. They were not placed under arrest as the possibility 
that they would be able to escape was considered to be nil. Initially the court 
in Medan acquitted them. The court did not consider the sending of messages 
aimed at facilitating an act of war, an enemy activity which violated Dutch 
neutrality. They were sentenced to one year’s imprisonment by the High Court 
in Batavia in 1916, and subsequently were moved from Medan to Semarang to 
serve their time. The Preussen was confiscated.
In November, after repeated British complaints about the Roon (and the 
German steamers Lübeck and Sydney moored in the same port), Pinke finally 
decided to send a real wireless expert to Cilacap. The report was devastating. 
The sealing of the radios had been clumsily done. The equipment could still 
be used without breaking the seals. The receivers were also still intact. The 
hoisting of a copper wire in the halyards was all that was needed to receive 
a wireless message. The discovery made it very probable that the Roon and 
Lübeck had used their radios. Idenburg confided to Pleyte that he was very dis-
appointed because he had been convinced that the dismantling of the wireless 
installations had been effective. He concluded that it was best to remain silent 
about the findings. In Holland Pleyte and Loudon agreed. They believed there 
was every reason to do so. The British Envoy in The Hague had conveyed 
the satisfaction of the British Admiralty with the measures taken in Cilacap. 
Pinke expostulated that he had clean hands and that regional civil servants 
were responsible. He wrote to Idenburg that sealing had to be done by expe-
rienced people but there were not enough experts in the Navy to serve the 
whole Archipelago. The Assistent-Resident of Cilacap was made the scapegoat. 
He was reprimanded for the extraordinarily careless way in which the seals 
aboard the two German ships had been affixed and the previous inspections 
had been conducted.72 Idenburg now was resolute. The sealing of radio equip-
ment was not enough. Vital parts had to be removed. Orders to do so were 
72 See NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 12-1-1915 T, Vb. 27-1-1915 G2.
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sent out in December.73
The German ships kept the Dutch naval squadron fully occupied in the clos-
ing months of 1914. In the middle of October the crew of a Dutch warship 
witnessed the sinking of the Markomannia and the taking of the Pontoporos by 
the British light cruiser, the HMS Yarmouth. The event excited them to such 
an extent that when the telegraphist reported the incident he forgot to use the 
secret code. A protest from the Japanese Consul that Dutch warships radioed 
information about the movement of British and Japanese warships in plain 
language inexorably followed.74
Relief came when the Emden was sunk near the Cocos Islands by the 
Australian cruiser transporting Australian troops, the HMAS Sydney, on 9 
November. Her exploits had inspired fear but had also drawn admiration. De 
Locomotief wrote of the Emden as the Flying German. For the Malay inhabit-
ants of Colombo she had become the Kapal Setan, Devil Ship, a term also used 
in the Malay press in the Netherlands Indies, in which her activities had been 
covered as intensely as in the European newspapers. The Emden had also 
impressed Rambonnet, the Dutch naval Minister. In January 1915, when he 
contemplated what kind of cruisers the Dutch Navy needed, he thought in 
particular about a vessel of the Emden-type, which he was convinced had 
proven its worth.75
The Emden was sunk after she had put a fifty-man-strong landing party 
ashore commanded by Captain Lieutenant Hellmuth von Mücke, which cut 
two of the three cables of the British telegraph station on the Cocos Islands and 
blew up the transmitting mast. The landing party managed to escape in an old 
ramshackle 97 ton three-masted sailing schooner, the Ayesha, which lay moored 
in the harbour. After having been at sea for sixteen days, the Ayesha made a 
brief visit to Emmahaven at the end of the month. She flew the German war 
banner and pennon at her mast-head. The Dutch authorities refused to grant 
the Ayesha recognition as a German warship. They considered the schooner 
a prize. Von Mücke protested, his flying of the war banner had been deliber-
ate. He demanded water, food, fuel, and canvas. Von Mücke also wanted sea 
charts, clothing, soap, tooth- and hair-brushes. His crew had not brushed their 
teeth for three weeks and had had one comb to share. The Dutch, considering 
the Ayesha a prize refused to allow these latter goods on board, only providing 
her with whatever was required to make the Ayesha seaworthy. Sarcastically 
Von Mücke wrote later that the authorities had probably been of the opinion 
that soap, tooth- and hair-brushes would have added to the fighting capabil-
73 De Graeff to Pinke, 30-11-1914, circular instruction Kindermann, 10-12-1914, NA, Kol. 
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ity of the Ayesha (Mücke 1916:46-9). The arrival of the Ayesha was an excellent 
opportunity for a boost to German morale. The crew was welcomed by the 
German Consul. Sailors on the German steamers anchored in port, among 
them the Kleist and Choising (which had been forced to sail to Emmahaven 
after a fire had broken out on board), cheered loudly. Cigars, cigarettes, wine, 
clothing, and German magazines were thrown on board. 
When the Ayesha put to sea again on 28 November her sailors sang ‘Die 
Wacht am Rhein and Deutschland’, ‘Deutschland über alles’.76 The British 
Navy was waiting, but the Ayesha succeeded in escaping the attention of the 
Empress of Japan, a converted Canadian Pacific liner, which especially had 
been directed to these waters to intercept her. In her search for the Ayesha the 
Empress of Japan accidentally entered territorial waters. The Dutch government 
duly protested. After drifting for about three weeks off the coast of Sumatra, 
the Ayesha was joined by the Choising, which had left Emmahaven two weeks 
after her. On board of the Choising, the Ayesha crew continued their journey via 
the Red Sea and Turkey back to Germany. On their return all the members of 
the Ayesha were awarded a silver cross. 
Instead of the Ayesha, the Empress of Japan took one of the two British col-
liers which had been captured by the Emden, the Exford. Her Captain, Julius 
Lauterbach, the prize-officer of the Emden, was sure that his ship had been 
taken within Dutch territorial waters (Lauterbach 1918:12). He and his men 
were sent to the Tangling Barracks, where the crew of the Markomannia were 
already detained. They were housed in the Emden House. Lauterbach himself, 
being the highest-ranking German officer in the camp, was accommodated in a 
small house of his own. On arrival Lauterbach and his men were greeted with 
a ‘powerful hurrah’ and ‘Deutschland, Deutschland über alles’ (Lauterbach 
1918:15; Harper and Miller 1984:18).
With the knocking out of action of the Emden, the risk of violations of neu-
trality in the waters around North Sumatra had grown less. One ship was left 
to patrol there.77 The crisis was over before the year had ended. The British 
under-secretary for Foreign Affairs concluded in a letter to Viceroy of India, 
Lord Charles Hardinge, that the German Navy had ‘practically disappeared 
from the Pacific’.78 Pinke noted with relief in March 1915 that with the sink-
ing of the Emden an end had come the plethora of rumours about German 
warships steaming around the Archipelago, or at least that the Allied Forces 
‘would no longer believe them unquestionly, as they had done all too often in 
the past’.79
76 De Locomotief, 3-12-1914.
77 Pinke to Idenburg, 17-2-1915, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 1-4-1915 A6.
78 Nicholson to Hardinge, 6-1-1915, PRO FO 800 377.
79 Pinke to Idenburg, 25-3-1915, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 5-5-1915 P7.
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Despite the passing of immediate danger, throughout the war the Dutch 
naval squadron was kept on full alert. Neutrality had to be protected. This 
pressure was so palpable that in August 1916, when one of the rare periods 
occurred in which all ships were free to hold joint manoeuvres, this was con-
sidered so important that the Muslim crews were only given a few hours off 
to celebrate the end of the Fasting Month.80 The possibility that forces of the 
belligerents might still forcibly attempt to take coal or oil was a possibility that 
could not be ignored. Now there was a turning away from the bombastic lan-
guage so prevalent at the time of the Russo-Japanese War. Idenburg was still 
of the opinion that Sabang and other coaling stations had to be defended. His 
successor, J.P. van Limburg Stirum, took a slightly different view. Shortly after 
his inauguration in March 1916, he made it plain that in his opinion fighting 
superior forces was a hopeless task. What was important was to find a mini-
mal defence that would still convince the outside world that real resistance 
had been offered without sacrificing too many lives.81
The forty-two moored German merchantman (plus the two Austrian ones) 
with a total tonnage of over two hundred thousand tons also continued to 
bother the colonial authorities, Pinke, and The Hague periodically. Behn, 
Meyer and Company wanted guarantees for the safety of the German ships, 
and in November 1915 wanted to move the Roon from Cilacap to Tanjung 
Priok, where she would be better protected against raids by Allied warships. 
Pinke was adamant that in such an instance no guarantees should be given 
that the merchantmen could count on the protection of a Dutch warship 
sailing as escort. Such an escort was occasionally given in Europe to protect 
Allied or German merchantmen, by the Dutch Navy as well, but Pinke did 
not want to become committed by such precedents. He was prepared to send 
warships along, but did not want to promise this in advance. In his opinion 
a general guarantee that the German merchantmen were safe in colonial ter-
ritorial waters had to suffice. The colonial Navy was much too small and the 
Archipelago much too large to be able to guarantee formally that neutrality 
could be backed up everywhere by the presence of one or more Dutch war-
ships. Imagine, he wrote in September 1916, what would happen if German 
raiders were to appear again, and all the British merchantmen sailing in the 
Netherlands Indies were to ask for protection by a Dutch warship.82
80 De Locomotief, 17-11-1917.
81 Erdbrink to Commander of the Army, 13-9-1916, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 10-1-1918 R1.
82 Pinke to Van Limburg Stirum, 6-9-1916, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 9-12-1918 73.

chapter viii
The European community in the 
Netherlands Indies
In the very first days of the war one of the fears that arose to haunt the Dutch 
in the Netherlands Indies was that the Netherlands would not succeed in its 
efforts to remain neutral. To serve a nervous public, Dutch-language newspa-
pers were full of war telegrams about the situation on the battlefields and the 
mood in Europe. Maps showing the movements of the armies were published 
(later in the war also about the Balkans) and special Sunday editions and bul-
letins appeared. Telegrams, maps, and Sunday editions would remain a prom-
inent feature of the newspapers for the duration of the war. The latest news 
telegrams from Europe were posted outside newspaper offices. In Medan, an 
American Methodist missionary, the Reverend Ward (who was to die in bat-
tle in France in 1918) did the same. He published war reports in English and 
Chinese on two blackboards in front of the American-Chinese school of which 
he was the head. Ward, a man who according to a local newspaper ‘has repeat-
edly shown that he had more militaristic and political than religious blood in 
his veins’ soon had to stop doing so. The way in which he reported develop-
ments in Borneo did not please the authorities: ‘Chinese revolution in Borneo; 
two towns captured; 100 men advancing to take Pontianak’.1
Presenting reliable, trustworthy news at that time was difficult. Newspapers 
from Holland were unavailable, while Great Britain controlled cable traffic. 
The latter fact meant that most war telegrams which reached the Netherlands 
Indies were of Allied origin or had to pass the gaze of the British censor. In 
Bandung one Dutch citizen, already annoyed by the anti-German public opin-
ion that was gaining ground, became so upset by what he called the poisoning 
by Allied ‘lie and soup telegrams’ that he started a one-man campaign against 
the local Preanger-bode. He must have been a choleric person. The Preanger-
bode belonged to that category of newspaper which served as a source of 
German reports for other newspapers in the Netherlands Indies, while other 
1	 De	Sumatra	Post, cited in De	Locomotief,	11-8-1914.
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newspapers also did their best to obtain German news telegrams (which could 
only reach the Netherlands Indies via the telegraph link to San Francisco and 
Guam). Using the pen-name Paul, he began by venting his opinion in a rival 
Bandung newspaper. This channel was closed to him when one of its share-
holders considered what he wrote too biased in favour of Germany and feared 
a drop in advertisements and readers. Not taken aback, ‘Paul’ continued his 
crusade and started his own bulletin, Oorlogs-commentaar (War Comment). It 
was distributed as far away as Probolinggo in East Java. People who did not 
like his stance took revenge. They brought out a fake issue, of which the con-
tents enraged Germans.2
Other people did not trust the war telegrams either or were carried away by 
incorrect reports. Rumours about ultimatums and demands by Berlin, Paris, 
and London abounded as did speculations about how the motherland and 
consequently also to the Netherlands Indies would fare. When the news that 
Germany had invaded Belgium had not yet reached the Netherlands Indies, 
people in Java ventured to speculate that were Germany not to respect the 
neutrality of Belgium Holland might be invaded as well. One of the scenarios 
put about during the first tumultuous days averred that all depended on how 
London would react. Were Great Britain to remain neutral, the Netherlands 
would also succeed in doing so. In such a situation the Netherlands Indies 
would probably be spared an invasion. Others predicted that were Great 
Britain to join the war, which it did on 4 August, the Netherlands would still 
not be attacked. Such people assumed that the Netherlands was of little or no 
strategic importance to the belligerents. Great Britain which had a small army 
would think twice before invading Holland, where a 150,000 strong army, it 
was proudly written, awaited the aggressor.4 De	Locomotief wrote that ‘It seems 
to be our national good fortune that in this war the Netherlands turns out 
not to be strategically remunerative for any of the parties’.5 This assessment 
was not altogether true. The northern tip of Holland had strategic value as a 
point from where to obstruct and observe the sailing of a German fleet into 
the North Sea. For some British statesmen and officers, W.S. Churchill among 
them, this was reason enough to consider an occupation of one of the Frisian 
Islands, Ameland (Halpern 1994:101). In the south lay the river the Scheldt. 
Running from the North Sea to Antwerp through Dutch territory, the Scheldt 
formed a main cause of concern for people in Holland and the Netherlands 
Indies. The river could well involve Holland in the war as it might be used by 
Great Britain and France to send food, troops, and war materials into Belgium. 





After 16 August its strategic importance actually grew, and along with this the 
pessimistic forecasts flew thick and fast, when the Belgian government evacu-
ated to Antwerp, and German troops besieged the city. 
Besides the possibility of Holland being invaded, another prospect which 
continued to haunt some Dutch people, especially it appears in Holland, was 
that Great Britain would strike at the Netherlands Indies. Alluding to such 
fears among the Dutch general public, Johnstone wrote to Grey in February 
1915 that an ‘excellent effect would be produced to have some member of the 
Cabinet to make an official announcement that Great Britain disclaimed the 
idea of touching the Dutch colonies’.6 Grey complied. He gave a speech about 
the right of small countries to write their own destinies. Other British politi-
cians, well aware of the mood in the Netherlands, contemplated using the 
integrity of the Netherlands Indies as a kind of bonus to lure The Hague onto 
the side of the Allied Powers. Again Churchill was one of the party. Expecting 
that Germany would attack Holland in the spring of 1915, he contemplated 
offering the Dutch an Anglo-Japanese guarantee that the Netherlands Indies 
were not to be invaded as one of the incentives to have the Netherlands join 
the war on the Allied side.
Equally disquieting for the government and the general public was the 
Anglo-French economic blockade of Germany. There was a general unease 
about the isolation of the colony which the war might bring. It was a situa-
tion for which the colony was unprepared. Until the outbreak of the war the 
Netherlands Indies had, as a prominent German Resident in Batavia, Emil 
Helfferich, chose to phrase this this, been ‘mothered’ from Holland (Helfferich 
1921:9). All decisions of any importance, whether political or commercial, had 
been taken in Holland. There were also more specific worries. London and 
Paris might not hesitate to apply force to end Dutch trade with Germany. The 
German government from its part might well take similar action were it felt 
pressed by the Allied obstruction of the transportation of corn and wheat to 
Holland. Dutch export to Germany terminated. De	Locomotief commented anx-
iously in September that closure of the borders with Germany would amount 
to a declaration of war.8 In this respect export bans imposed by the Dutch 
government directly after the outbreak of the war because of domestic scarcity 
were seen as a blessing in disguise. From various sides it was pointed out with 
some relief that German protests could be countered by explaining that such 
measures had not been taken to hurt German interests, while the bans simul-
taneously decreased the chance that Great Britain and France would consider 
Dutch territory a leak in the economic isolation imposed on Germany. In the 
6 Johnstone to Grey, 19-2-1915, PRO FO 800 69.
 Johnstone to Grey, 21-4-1915, PRO FO 800 69.
8 De	Locomotief, 16-9-1914.
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same spirit it was suggested that colonial exports to Holland should be limited 
to sufficiently cover Dutch domestic demand. It was hoped that such a course 
of action would not give Berlin much reason to protest. London and Paris 
would also be satisfied. 
Reports about the German army invading Limburg, about British troops 
occupying Flushing, and about the Netherlands having declared war on 
Germany – newspapers in the Netherlands Indies brought the news in bold 
type – fuelled the apprehension. The initial successes of the German army in 
Belgium and the landing of British troops in France came as a solace. Such 
events decreased the likelihood that German troops would march through 
Holland or that a British force was to sail up the river Scheldt. Relief was 
dampened again after the fall of Antwerp in October 1914, when it was imme-
diately speculated in the Singapore press that the German Navy would use 
Antwerp, and the Scheldt, as a base for its submarine attacks on ships in the 
North Sea.9
The impression created in the Netherlands Indies by the news telegrams 
from Europe and the many rumours which circulated was that the position of 
the Netherlands in Europe was becoming more precarious by the day. It was 
written in De	Locomotief of 8 August that reports from Europe were received 
daily about a violation of Dutch neutrality or at the very least a threat to it. 
De	Locomotief claimed it was virtually certain that Dutch territory would be 
touched by the war. Many, if not everybody, in the Netherlands Indies expect-
ed war. The tension, the commander of the Dutch fleet in the Netherlands 
Indies, F. Bauduin (1920:8) wrote, had become ‘unbearable’, adding that, to 
most of the crew it was a matter of indifference to what foreign nation the 
warships belonged which would sink their ships, but be destroyed the Dutch 
squadron would, as its fighting power was ‘absolutely nil’ (Bauduin 1920:10). 
What, for instance, was to happen if the German army had to withdraw from 
Belgium, or a German fleet was pushed towards the Dutch coast by the British 
Navy? But, De	Locomotief continued in an effort not to upset its readers even 
more, it should not be loose sight of the fact that violations of neutrality and 
the efforts to prevent them did not yet constitute acts of war. The exploits of 
the German raiders added to the panic in the Dutch community. Coupled with 
rumours about the Netherlands being in war with Germany news about the 
Geier made some Dutch people living in coastal areas even prepare for a flight 
by car into the interior (Bauduin 1920:11). 
Pessimism in the Netherlands Indies assumed such proportions that on  
August Idenburg wired, still forced to use English, The Hague to ask permis-
sion to ‘put [the] minds [of the] inhabitants at ease’ by publishing the state-
9 De	Locomotief, 25-11-1914.
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ment that Dutch neutrality was not threatened.10 After Pleyte had responded 
the following day that he saw no reason for any anxiety, a special issue of 
the Javasche	Courant was published on 10 August. It contained a statement by 
the Governor General, soon to be copied by the rest of the press, that word 
had been received from the Dutch government that the belligerents respected 
Dutch neutrality. Such a reassurance served its purpose. It diminished the 
anxiety of the people, who showed less inclination to hoard food and coins. In 
Gorontalo in Celebes, for instance, even though in that distant place the news 
must have been received some days later, the report that the Netherlands had 
succeeded in remaining neutral ‘performed within a few hours’.11 Idenburg 
himself was not reassured. Until well into 1915 he remained convinced that 
the Netherlands would not succeed in keeping out of the war (Bijl de Vroe 
1980:44).
Even though anxiety was somewhat appeased, there was still Japan, or 
what two Dutch colonial civil servants publicly called the ‘Yellow Robbers’.12 
In the first days of the war Dutch people in the Netherlands Indies became 
increasingly apprehensive about Japan’s designs. Reports that Japan had 
confirmed that it was to honour its treaty obligations with Great Britain, 
and news about a Japanese squadron sailing, resulted in many scares in the 
Netherlands Indies. At the beginning of August 1914 Idenburg and his two 
chief military advisors, Pinke and Michielsen, did not rule out an invasion 
by Japan, though they did not consider such a possibility highly likely. This 
agreed with the information that reached them from Japan. In the first days 
of the war the Dutch Envoy in Tokyo, D. van Asbeck, informed Idenburg, 
and through him the government in The Hague, a number of times that, only 
were the Netherlands to take the side of Germany, might a Japanese attack 
on the colony become a reality.1 It did not take long before war with Japan 
appeared a realistic prospect. On 10 August Van Asbeck sent a cipher to Java, 
to be forwarded by wire to The Hague, that the Japanese authorities had con-
fidentially informed him that Japan considered Dutch resistance to a landing 
of British troops along the Scheldt an unfriendly act against Great Britain. He 
had been given to understand that Japan might retaliate by acting against the 
Netherlands Indies. On reading the telegram Idenburg, Pinke, and Michielsen 
contemplated a mobilization order. After weighing up the pros and cons they 
decided against such a move. In view of the way the population had reacted 
to the outbreak of the war they realized that mobilization could well result 
in ‘great anxiety and unrest with all precarious consequences that went with 
10 Idenburg to Pleyte, -8-1914, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 10-8-1914 N15.
11 De	Locomotief, 15-9-1914.
12 Sin	Po, cited in De	Locomotief, 1-11-191.
1 Van Asbeck to Idenburg, -8-1914, 9-8-1914, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 1-12-1914 T15.
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it’.14 Another cogent reason for them not to issue the order was the prospect 
that such a step might elicit questions from the Japanese government, to which 
Batavia could not give a satisfactory answer. The three came to the conclusion 
that the moment to decide on mobilization should be delayed till concrete 
information had reached them that Tokyo was fitting out an expeditionary 
force.
The following day the issue came up again. The telegraph station on Yap 
had been damaged by a British bombardment and there was a possibility that 
telegrams from Tokyo would no longer be forthcoming, a fear which proved 
unfounded. The colonial government felt cut off from the rest of the world. 
Idenburg and his staff did not preclude the fact that they would be deprived 
of essential information. The bombardment of the telegraph station on Yap 
also meant that the measures Idenburg had ordered at the outbreak of the 
war to be prepared for a Japanese invasion also seemed to have been vitiated. 
Idenburg had instructed the military Envoy in Tokyo, the Envoy in Peking, 
and the consuls in Shanghai and Manila to report to him every scrap of infor-
mation that might indicate a Japanese move against the Netherlands Indies. It 
proved an idle instruction which did not ease anxiety. In Japan, where, Pinke 
claimed, ‘miraculous results had been achieved by stealth and deceit’, the 
absence of a naval expert was felt to be a great disadvantage, while no news 
from the consular agents elsewhere in Asia did not mean that people could 
breathe more easily.15
Once more it was decided not to mobilize, but to send a new telegram 
to Pleyte to ask him once again whether he still stood by his assurance of 8 
August. The telegram was sent on 12 August. At last able to use the secret 
code developed at the beginning of the century, Pleyte could set the Governor 
General’s mind at rest: Idenburg should ‘not be uneasy about Corry and 
Willy’.16 The message was the sign to slow down the military preparations, 
and to stop – on 1 August – the emergency purchases of food by the army.
Fears of Japanese intent lingered on as the war progressed, with German 
propaganda trying to highlight the dangers Japan siding with the Allied 
Powers posed to the Netherlands Indies. In February 1916 all this reached a 
climax when the contents became known of an article published in Japanese 
newspapers by Yosaburo Takekoshi, a former member of parliament, and 
founder of an Association for the Penetration of the Pacific entitled: ‘The first 
14 Conferentie van Z.E. den Gouverneur-General met de Commandanten van Zee- en 
Landmacht, 11-8-1914 and 12-8-1914, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 18-1-1915 P. 
15 Pinke to Idenburg, 1-11-1915, Idenburg to Pleyte, 24-12-1915, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 8--1916 
P.
16 Pleyte to Idenburg, 1-8-1914, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 14-8-1914 A16.
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step to our new naval policy’.1 Even before the war Yosaburo Takekoshi had 
shown himself to be a proponent of a Japanese drive south and of the leading 
role Japan should play in the emancipation of the peoples of Asia. Yosaburo 
Takekoshi had visited the Netherlands Indies before the war and a correspond-
ent of De	Locomotief in Medan was sure that at the root of Takekoshi’s fierce 
anti-Dutch attitude was the ‘extremely unpleasant treatment’ of Takekoshi 
during his trip to Java, when Dutch civil servants had first agreed to but then 
had prevented a meeting between Takekoshi and the Sunan of Surakarta.18 
In his 1916 article, the idea of a Japanese conquest of at least part of the 
Archipelago was propagated in no uncertain terms. Yosaburo Takekoshi 
began his article by recalling the complaints made by European statesmen 
about the burden of the civilization missions the European states had taken 
on. Observing that Japan had assimilated Western civilization he wrote that 
Japan was prepared to help relieve the Europeans of this burden. The first 
step to be taken along this road was to free the Malay population which was 
living in miserable conditions under Dutch rule. Stating that at the outbreak 
of the World War German warships in search of Allied merchantmen had been 
supplied with coal in the Archipelago (which was not true, but had neverthe-
less been rumoured all over Asia), and recalling the complications about the 
bunkering of warships during the Russo-Japanese War, Yosaburo Takekoshi 
postulated that it did not necessarily have to form a danger to Japan were it to 
have a strong power nearby. What, however, always did present a threat was 
to have a weak nation in the vicinity which could not uphold its neutrality. 
The conclusion was that Japan should at least occupy Java and Sumatra, which 
would give it control over the Sunda Straits. 
Yosaburo Takekoshi’s article also fanned fears in another way. He not only 
called for an occupation of Java and Sumatra, but went further and suggested 
that, copying the practice of the Dutch, the Japanese government should 
conclude treaties with rebellious ethnic groups in the Archipelago, transform-
ing their territory into a protectorate.19 His views were supposed to have 
influenced many Japanese and were hotly debated in the press both in the 
Netherlands and the Netherlands Indies.20 The following year De	Locomotief 
recalled that Yosaburo Takekoshi’s article had created an extraordinary com-
motion in the Dutch community in the colony.21 Another factor at play was 
that some Japanese were sure that the German influence in the Netherlands 
1 A translation of Yosaburo Takekoshi’s articles was published in the Algemeen	Handelsblad, 
24-2-1916. The translation was copied by De	Indische	Gids 1916:448-52.
18 De	Locomotief, 18-11-1916.
19 De	Indische	Gids, 1916, I:449-52, 61; Van der Weijden 1916:8-9.
20 De	Locomotief, 25-8-1916.
21 De	Locomotief, 5-12-191. 
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was great, presenting the fact that the husband of Queen Wilhelmina, Prince 
Hendrik, was a German as evidence. It was argued that, because of this, the 
Netherlands could well end up in the German camp, which would turn the 
Netherlands Indies into a German base in Asia. Japan which had driven the 
Germans from China and other parts of the Pacific could never allow this. 
One of the suggestions to prevent such a development from becoming a real-
ity was that Japan should buy the Netherlands Indies.22 Such discussions in 
Japan were followed with apprehension. The editors of the Chinese-Malay 
newspaper Warna	Warta commented in November 1916 that they knew of no 
country which was so fearful as the Dutch. Were a Japanese warship to appear 
at Tanjung Priok, the government would certainly be afflicted by diarrhoea.2 
In 1914 it was not before the end of August that people began to breath more 
easily. At that time De	 Locomotief wrote that it was becoming increasingly 
likely that the Netherlands could manage to stay out of the war. The reason 
the newspaper presented was feeble, and was still inspired by a misconception 
about the strength of the Dutch army: the nearer the moment to a decisive bat-
tle came, the more the small Dutch army was to become a factor of importance, 
which the belligerents could not afford to make their enemy.24
After the initial fright had ebbed somewhat the European Dutch commu-
nity turned its energy towards the defence of the colony. Estate managers put 
their trucks and motor cars (complete with their drivers) at the disposal of the 
colonial army. Inspired by a combination of bravura and patriotism, coupled 
with a fear for domestic disturbances, the Dutch in their clubs and other meet-
ing places began to discuss the establishment of a volunteer corps, for which 
the colonial government should provide the arms.
In early 1914 the growing concern about international developments had 
already triggered off the first plans to create such bodies. In Batavia this had 
even resulted in some commotion when a number of members of the Indische 
Partij had won places on the board of the newly constituted corps.25 After the 
outbreak of the war, more people began to contemplate the establishment of 
volunteer corps. To some such an enterprise was nonsense. They said they 
understood that able-bodied men who had to look on idly in the colony while 
Holland might be attacked might want to actualize their feelings of patriotism, 
but pointed out that such persons could easily do so by temporarily signing 
up to the colonial army. This would be enough proof of the fact that such per-
22 China	Press, 9-8-1916, cited in De	Locomotief, 0-8-1916.




sons were prepared to die for their motherland.26
These voices of restraint were few and far between. Meetings were held all 
over Java and in the major European settlements in the other islands, nurtur-
ing patriotic feelings. In Lembang all adult European male inhabitants, thirty 
in total, left no doubt about their desire to join a newly established volunteer 
corps. The Preanger-bode remarked that it was to be ‘small but strong’. Most 
of its prospective members were Boers who had taken refuge in Java and 
had experience of warfare in South Africa.2 It would probably not be safe 
to say the same about the corps envisaged in Buitenzorg. In this city the ini-
tiative had come from civil servants employed at the General Secretariat and 
the other government offices located in the city, who wanted to do their bit 
in securing Dutch rule in the colony during those dangerous days. Women 
enlisted in the corps as well, not to fight should the need arise, but to serve as 
nurses with ambulances and in hospitals. In Bandung, Sukabumi and other 
cities the Red Cross organized ambulance classes and other courses to pre-
pare women for their allotted task. There was one problem. Bandages were 
in short supply. In Holland an export ban had been issued on bandages and 
medicines. The Dutch government had done so without thinking about the 
Netherlands Indies, the Nieuwe	Rotterdamsche	Courant wrote in 1916.28 Exports 
were resumed after the minister of the colonies had intervened.
Some of the initiatives taken were directed towards assisting the army in 
times of crisis either as their sole or as their major aim. Among these was a 
motor club envisaged in Surabaya. The club was supposed to function as a 
‘relay service’. Members had to carry messages for the army. The Vrijwillige 
Automobiel Korps (Voluntary Automobile Corps) had the same objective. It 
was limited to Dutch nationals who owned a car with at least four seats, which 
could be driven at least at a speed of 40 km/h, and had no difficulty in ascend-
ing a gradient of one in twelve. Four seats were required because a registration 
of private cars already begun by the army before the war had demonstrated 
that the army was not interested in cars with only two seats. Other corps were 
unquestionably established in anticipation of unrest among the population. In 
Bandung and in Malang, and probably also in some other cities, the organi-
zations founded were Ordebonden (Leagues of Law and Order). This was 
certainly the case in North Sumatra, where Europeans feared that they would 
all be killed.29 
In the establishment of volunteer corps and law and order leagues, much 
time and effort was poured into the drafting of rules and the designing of 
26 De	Locomotief, 8-8-1914.
2 Preangerbode,	cited in De	Locomotief, 10-8-1914.
28 Nieuwe	Rotterdamsche	Courant, cited in De	Locomotief, 1-9-1916.
29 De	Locomotief, 0-5-1916.
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uniforms. In Sukabumi – where the inaugural meeting was opened by the 
Assistent-Resident with the cry ‘Long live the Queen, Long live the Motherland, 
Long live the Colonies’ – the choice was for a uniform resembling that of the 
colonial army. The main difference was that the volunteers were to have a 
turned-down collar instead of a stand-up one, and were to wear a bamboo 
hat. In Malang and Buitenzorg prospective volunteers were more exuberant. 
In Malang they decided to don a bamboo hat with an orange cockade as their 
distinguishing mark. Their colleagues in Buitenzorg wanted to adorn their 
bamboo hat with a carmine red ribbon.
Local Dutch civil servants looked with favour upon such initiatives taken 
by the Dutch European community. Batavia was rather dubious, especially 
when the corps envisaged were supposed to lead a semi-independent exist-
ence, thereby dodging full army control. One of the reasons for concern was 
that people who wanted to create volunteer corps still cherished a romantic 
recollection of the Boer War. Army headquarters had a different view. It was 
now argued that lack of both discipline and military training had been the 
cause of the downfall of the Boers.0 One of the victims of the restraint shown 
by the authorities was the League of Law and Order in Bandung. Almost three 
hundred men had registered. Seventy-six of them were members of the Union 
of Non-Commissioned Officers. The League of Law and Order had to be dis-
banded within a month, even though the Resident had welcomed its establish-
ment. He had gone so far as to vow to take personal responsibility to see that 
the weapons requested from the government would be used only in a ‘proper 
way’. His superiors thought differently. On the advice of Michielsen, a request 
for recognition was turned down. A new effort was made to establish a body 
that tailored to the set conditions but the initial gusto had evaporated. Only 
thirty people enlisted. None of the initiators of the original plan was among 
them. They were only prepared to join if they received the rank they them-
selves had assumed in the League of Law and Order. The sarcastic comment 
was that it would have made the League look like the Venezuelan army.1
Other volunteer corpses, including those in Buitenzorg, Sukabumi, Padang, 
and Medan were recognized, as was the new one in Bandung. They received 
financial support from Batavia to help contribute to the training of their mem-
bers. Officers were allowed to buy pistols and sabres at a discount. A small 
number of bullets was provided for free for training purposes. Such corps 
were not large. The one in Sukabumi had 150 members. That in Medan con-
sisted of about 200 members.
The animo to form armed volunteer corps faded away in the middle of 
0 Java-Bode, cited in De	Indische	Gids 1914, II:1.
1 De	Locomotief, 26-11-1914.
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September, when it transpired that the Netherlands had still not become 
involved in the war and no native disturbances of any significance had erupt-
ed. Calls to found them grew far less and existing corps in the course of time 
became invisible. There was no money to maintain uniforms and arms and 
some corpses had difficulty in actually getting their members participate in 
exercises. Those which did survive turned exercises into pleasant social out-
ings. Brass bands accompanied members on marches through towns, before 
the members assembled in the local club, where afterwards they had pea soup. 
The meetings of the Medan corps was described as ‘a nasi goreng and cask 
beer gathering of friends’ in May 1916.2 It was considered absolutely incapa-
ble of suppression any unrest in the region. 
Energies now turned to campaigns to help the noodlijdenden, the destitute, 
in Holland, of whom it had become clear from the news telegrams there were 
many. The general opinion was that living conditions in Holland had become 
extremely difficult. A letter to the editor in De	Locomotief in early August, at a 
time when reports about conditions in Holland were still scarce, spoke about 
a ‘general panic’ and about everybody, including those who lived far away 
from the theatre of war being forced ‘to fight for self-preservation, namely to 
ensure they did not die because of lack of foodstuffs, of which the prices have 
now risen extravagantly’. Within weeks even more alarmist stories began 
to circulate. These warranted a new request for information by Idenburg in 
order to put the minds of the population in the colony at rest. On 24 August, 
referring to newspaper reports about the scarcity of foodstuffs and the mass 
unemployment in Holland, he wired Pleyte and ask for a reliable picture of 
the situation. Using the information he received, Idenburg had an announce-
ment published in the Javasche	Courant. It announced that the minister of the 
colonies had wired him that the financial and economic problems created by 
the war were diminishing, but that because of a lack of raw materials and 
export prohibitions unemployment was growing.
At this moment the first initiatives had already been taken to collect money 
for the destitute in Holland and for the ‘thousands upon thousands in the 
country and especially in the big cities without work’.4 To help such people 
De	Locomotief, the first to do so, issued an appeal, suggesting that people in 
the Netherlands Indies should follow the example of railway employees in 
Holland, who set aside a small portion of their wages to assist the poor. The 
contributions had to be sent to De	Locomotief, mentioning ‘For the Netherlands’. 
In September when the first Dutch newspapers with reports about the situa-





letter claimed that conditions in the motherland were far worse than had been 
imagined. It was believed that unemployment and mobilization had taken a 
high toll. Some must even have thought that the reservists called up for mili-
tary service did not receive any pay at all, or if they did no more than a trifle: 
And then we ask ourselves what do the women and children have to live on? – and 
who takes care of the old, and the infirm, in short of all whose breadwinners watch 
over our independence, and because of this cannot provide for their relatives? And 
this is only the beginning, how long will it last? Do not forget: the winter is almost 
here. Compared with this silent want, this inglorious suffering of hunger and cold, 
we in the Indies do sit in Abraham’s lap.5 
Later, when the childrens festival of Sinterklaas was approaching, this was 
used as an extra occasion to appeal to give generously. In the misery that had 
gripped Holland, the children’s parties there would certainly be less festive 
than in the colony.
A fever to do something for the destitute in Holland seemed to grip the 
Dutch community. Money-boxes were placed in shops, restaurants and clubs, 
and even at the pavilion ‘The woman’ at the Colonial Exhibition. Apart from 
this, a great many activities were organized which had as an additional bonus 
that the boredom of everyday life was alleviated a little. In Cirebon, and this 
city was no exception, there was, as one of the inhabitants described this, a 
‘ground swell’ of initiatives. People, ‘even the most shy and modest artists’ 
were busy rehearsing Dutch country dances, planning a soccer match, or 
preparing for cabaret, theatre, and music performances. Cirebon which had 
appeared moribund seemed to have come to life. Its inhabitants rejoiced in 
the quarrels between the various committees which were planning similar 
events.6
Many responded favourably to the appeals all over the Netherlands Indies 
to help the destitute in Holland. In Yogyakarta the civil militia parted with 
eight thousand guilders. In Batavia the proceeds of the annual horse-races 
were reserved for the cause. In Semarang a painter, Th.B. van Lelyveld, offered 
two of his paintings as a prize in a special lottery. In the same city, the proceeds 
of an aeroplane-merry-go-round were also earmarked for the poor in Holland, 
while a standholder at the Colonial Exhibition had an advertisement pub-
lished in the newspapers promising that when a customer bought a certain 
number of cigars, he would put aside one-tenth of the money received to help 
people in Holland. In Surabaya one-fifth of the proceeds of the film ‘Room no. 
0’, a piquant picture, people then thought, after a story by the French vaude-
5 Circular letter, cited in De	Locomotief, 15-9-1914.
6 De	Locomotief, 11-11-1914, 1-11-1914.
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ville author Georges Feydeau, was set aside.
Soldiers were not left behind. In Semarang European soldiers in the gar-
rison issued an appeal to their comrades. They stated that ‘though our income 
is not large, and our pay is small we can (and let us all do so) set aside a trifle 
for the many families which have seen their breadwinners leave to fulfil their 
duty to their Motherland’. In Surabaya the Navy organized a special day 
of which the proceeds went to the destitute in Holland. On the cultural side 
visitors were entertained by music of the sailors’ pluckband ‘Stella Bella di 
Soerabaja’ (Stella Bella in Surabaya) and by Ambonese soldiers performing 
Alfurese dances. For the more military inclined there were models of German 
howitzers to be admired and they could attend a machine-gun demonstra-
tion. Theatre groups of soldiers or non-commissioned officers, such as De 
Vriendenkring, Circle of Friends, in Magelang, and Aceh in Banda Aceh, held 
special performances. In Salatiga the association of European non-commis-
sioned officers Ons Belang, Our Interest, asked their members to surrender 
one day’s pay.
Collections pure and simple were not forgotten. In Buitenzorg women went 
from door to door ‘to ask people, albeit without any pressure’ to part with a 
monthly donation.8 Among those who promised them a ‘liberal monthly 
contribution’ were Michielsen and Idenburg. Idenburg committed one percent 
of his salary. In Semarang the example of the Buitenzorg ladies failed to strike 
a chord. It was reasoned that it was much hotter there and walking around 
for any length of time might demand too much of women. It would be better 
to ask employees of trading firms to do the hard work. Because of the war 
they had time enough to spare. Even so, and this was much applauded by a 
journalist from De	Locomotief, women in Semarang did raise money. They did 
so not by going from door to door, but by collecting money at outdoor cafés 
and similar venues.
Clothes were also collected. The Salvation Army did so, and in Java a Mrs 
Ter Horst-den Boer put an appeal in newspapers asking for used wearing 
apparel and underclothing. She was convinced that many Europeans could 
easily spare some clothes. On arrival in the colony most had brought along 
clothing too warm to wear in a tropical climate. A naai-commissie, sewing 
committee, in Utrecht reacted with pleasure when a shipment of three crates 
reached them. ‘Overcoats, men’s and boys’ clothes, children’s shoes, precisely 
everything that was needed most’ had been sent. Unemployed seamstresses 
had been engaged to transform old and new clothes into ‘practical articles of 





Civilians in the Netherlands Indies organized fancy fairs, soirées	 variées, 
concerts, and cabarets. Sometimes professional artists were the main attrac-
tion, like the negro singer and dancer Jumbo in Semarang, but more often than 
not civil servants and other dilettantes did the lion’s share. Soccer matches, 
sometimes with teams of European civil servants taking part, tombolas, 
bazaars, and children’s parties and shows, all with the same aim, completed 
the picture. 
Outside Java people were busily involved in similar activities. In Celebes 
the Makassaarsche	Courant issued an appeal for prizes for a lottery. In Medan 
a cinema parted with its proceeds on Queen’s Birthday. The Association for 
Women’s Suffrage in the same city organized a collection in the plantation 
belt. Within a few days 5,000 guilders had been collected; a sum which took 
De	Locomotief weeks to collect. In the weeks to come the Ladies’ Committee, 
as it was referred to, remained among the most successful in raising money. 
In Medan, the Deli Automobile Club, in an act of almost perfect neutrality, 
also donated a hundred guilders each to the Red Cross in Holland, Belgium, 
Germany, France, and Great Britain.
In the middle of September, after news about the relief committee estab-
lished in The Hague at the instigation of Queen Wilhelmina had reached Java, 
the scattered initiatives were coordinated. In Batavia the Centrale Comité voor 
Hulpverschaffing (Central Committee for Relief) was constituted. Chaired by 
J.B. van der Houven van Oordt, Deputy Chairman of the council of the Indies, 
it counted Michielsen and Pinke among its members. Idenburg assumed the 
office of honorary chairman. As the committee was intended to be a national 
one, symbolizing the unity of all the inhabitants of Netherlands Indies irrespec-
tive of race, a Javanese and a Chinese also sat on the board. Simultaneously 
Dutch civil servants were asked to support similar initiatives at their posts. The 
response was great. Local committees were founded all over the Archipelago. 
In Java, following the example set by the central committee, Javanese and 
Chinese notables became involved. The former were usually represented by 
the Regent or the head of a district, and sometimes also by the most important 
religious functionary of a regency, the head penghulu. In Yogyakarta the Prime 
Minister, Ario Adipati Pangeran Danoeredjo, and the Captain of the Chinese, 
Yap Hong Sing, sat on the local committee. In Surabaya the Regent, R.T.A. Niti 
Adiningrat, and the Major of the Chinese, Han Tjiong King, were among the 
members. The same happened with the special women’s committees which 
were formed. Members of their boards included the wife of the Regent and 
the wife of the head of the local Chinese community.
Occasionally Arabs also found their way onto the committees. In Surabaya 
it was their Captain, Syech Ahmad bin Abdoellah Bobsaid, who joined. He 
energetically set about his task, calling together meetings in the local Arab 
club, Al Arabijjah, where those attending, about a hundred persons, were 
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presented with a subscription list they could sign if they wanted to contrib-
ute. Arabs and Chinese also organized separate drives for money to help the 
poor in Holland. Sometimes the results of the fund-raising among Foreign 
Orientals were impressive. In Semarang the Chinese Major titular donated 
10,000 guilders. Nevertheless, it is questionable whether all Chinese donated 
as generously as they might have done. Explaining the poor results of a collec-
tion in Cirebon a Chinese trader in the town pointed out that the Chinese (and 
the Arabs) could have afforded much more, but that they were discouraged 
from doing so by the discrimination to which they were still subjected. The 
correspondent of the De	Locomotief added that this view mirrored that of the 
‘educated section of the Chinese community’.40 In Yogyakarta in early October 
at a meeting of Arabs and people from Bengal, 12,125 guilders was collected. 
An equally large sum – 1,500 guilders – was raised by the Armenian com-
munity in Surabaya. In Surabaya another joint Arab-Bengali drive resulted in 
2,10 guilders.
Such sums were much larger than the proceeds of many of the European 
initiatives. These usually generated a few hundred guilders at most. Some 
Dutch people gave generously, and in this respect the plantation belt in 
Sumatra stood out, but contrary to what the many initiatives taken might have 
suggested, Dutch people on the whole were not overly generous. Newspaper 
editors and correspondents who reported about what happened in their cities, 
and in doing so were also inspired by a certain scorn of the rich, often pointed 
out that contributions usually came from the less well-to-do and that rich peo-
ple were very reluctant to part with their money. One of the reasons for the 
disappointing results was that the Dutch in the colony feared bad times ahead 
and were determined to hold on to their money. They were reluctant to pay 
the higher entrance fees for special theatrical performances and other events, 
or stayed home because they did not consider the cause important enough 
to brave the heavy rains, which were also to ruin bazaars and other open-air 
events. 
The destitute in Holland remained a major focus for charity, but it was not 
long before additional causes thrust themselves to the fore. Newspaper reports 
and telegrams about the German advance in Belgium and about the many 
Belgian refugees who fled to Holland made people increasingly aware of how 
stricken by the war Belgium was. Belgium Committees were constituted, and 
collections and charitable performances organized for the Belgian Red Cross, 
for financing an auto-ambulance, for widows and orphans of Belgian soldiers, 
for destitute Belgian infants (this organization had its headquarters in Holland 
and a branch in Batavia) or more specific for the destitute Flemish population. 
40 De	Locomotief, 25-2-1915.
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Sometimes the Belgian consuls took the lead. Among their initiatives was the 
sale of lace made by Belgian war widows in the larger cities of Java. There were 
even anonymous gifts to allow Belgians in the Netherlands Indies to travel 
home. In early December Yogyakarta was the scene of Belgen-dagen (Belgians 
Days). Women wearing a cockade of the Belgian national colours made a col-
lection. Many took part, and for some among the general public this proved too 
much. It was reported that at the club old men playing cards ‘cursed the war 
more than ever before’.41 The proceeds of the Yogyakarta Belgen-dagen were 
modest: 500 guilders. The idea of sending an ambulance to the battlefields in 
Europe was contemplated. With this purpose in mind, in Batavia an Insulinde 
Red Cross was founded. The effort did not bear fruit. The charity network 
was far-flung and events were even organized by a Netherlands Indies Relief 
41 De	Locomotief, 9-12-1914.
Italian patriotism in the Netherlands Indies. Trade mark (998) of  
an Italian export company. (Javasche	Courant 1916.)
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Committee for the Destitute on Curaçao, an island where the consequences of 
the war were far worse than in the Netherlands Indies. In Batavia the proceeds 
of the Pasar Gambir Fair of 1915 went to this cause. 
Such noble intentions were thwarted by chauvinism. Not all Dutchmen 
were in favour of collecting money for Holland. The objectors argued that it 
should not be forgotten that the colony had also suffered from the economic 
effects of the war. There might come a moment that people would regret 
money having been sent to Europe, as large sums would be needed to sup-
port a growing number of unemployed and needy in the Netherlands Indies 
itself. The colonial economy should in no way be weakened by transmitting 
money to Holland.42 Others came up with a compromise, suggesting that part 
of the money should go to Holland and an equal or lesser amount should be 
set aside to be used should an emergency arise in the Netherlands Indies. To 
accommodate such voices, at its inception the Central Committee for Relief 
had already stated that were the colony to suffer in the same way as Holland 
was doing the money collected was to be used in the Netherlands Indies; not 
precluding that some of the money would go to the people in the colony who 
experienced financial problems because of the war. In some cities two sub-
scription lists circulated; one to give money to the destitute in Holland; the 
other to give money to the recently unemployed in the colony. To cater for all 
and everybody’s wishes, it was even suggested having three different collect-
ing boxes placed at main roads (to be removed at night): one for Europeans in 
Holland; one for Europeans in the Netherlands Indies; and one for natives.4
Other Dutch people only wanted to give money to help their poor com-
patriots, or accused the Belgians collecting money of thinking about their 
fellow-countrymen only. Consequently, in Surabaya it was initially decided 
that people were to be given the choice to decide themselves for whom they 
wanted to give a donation in a door-to-door collection: the poor in Holland; 
the destitute in the colony, or the Belgians. Later, yet another solution was 
found. Money was collected for ‘destitute Dutch people and Belgian refugees 
in Holland’. The destitute Dutchmen in Belgium, on whom a committee in 
Brussels had taken pity formed a special category. Money for them was also 
collected in the Netherlands Indies.
In total in the remaining months of 1914 almost 400,000 guilders was raised 
for the destitute in Holland. In March 1916 the amount had reached 900,000 
guilders. By that time indigenous Indonesians, Chinese, and Europeans were 
again enthusiastically organizing charity functions for victims of natural disas-
ters in Java and in Holland. Severe flooding in Java in early 1916 increased the 
pressure to transform committees established to help the destitute in Holland 
42 Bataviaasch	Nieuwsblad, cited in De	Locomotief, 1-8-1914.
4 Oetoesan	Hindia, 2-10-1914.
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into general committees which could spend part of the money collected in 
the Netherlands Indies. The Curaçao Relief Committee was disbanded in July 
1916.
As had been the case during the Boer War and the Russo-Japanese War, the 
attitude of the public and of the press was one of the main concerns of authori-
ties in Holland and in the Netherlands Indies. Films, plays, and music came 
under close scrutiny by the central and regional colonial authorities in their 
drive to be assured that foreign nationals were not offended or did not became 
agitated. The commander of the army banned the playing of ‘It is a long way 
to Tipperary’ by army music corpses in March 1915. In Batavia the local censor 
forbade war films and newsreels showing marching soldiers and members of 
the European royal houses. A film about Napoleon was also off limits. The fact 
that such restrictions were not completely ridiculous was shown in January 
1915 when Germans in Bandung took offence at a film they considered an 
insult to their Kaiser.44 The ban may also have been inspired by the fear of 
fights in cinemas between over-excited Europeans of different nationalities. 
The showing of newsreels was allowed at restricted viewings with only 
congenial nationalities in the auditorium, occasions often used for fund-rais-
ing. One such event, in the Palace Cinema in Batavia in March 1915 to raise 
money for Red Cross societies of the Allied showed that such fears were not 
unfounded. De	Locomotief wrote about a’ singing and whistling demonstration’ 
against Germany. It was one of the moments seized upon by Dutch people 
who were not caught up in the anti-German mood in the colony to testify to 
their more moderate opinions. What in their opinion had made the event the 
more repugnant was that the Deputy Chairman of the Council of the Indies, 
the commander of the colonial army and other senior Dutch civil and military 
authorities had been invited by the Belgian Consul and had been forced to wit-
ness the manifestation of Allied patriotism. De	Locomotief called the event one 
of those incidents which touched the seamy side of our neutrality.45 In Batavia 
uniforms were also forbidden on stage. 
Films, plays, and music were a minor irritant. Much more attention was 
paid to newspapers. One of the major fears of the authorities was that a vocal 
press or a press in which ship and troop movements were reported would 
result in problems for the Netherlands in its relations with the great powers of 
the day. One difference was that since 1906, when the ‘Regulations on printed 
matters in the Netherlands Indies’ dating from 1856 had been changed, the 
power of the authorities to intervene had markedly decreased. The colonial 
government no longer had the power to punish authors of articles which 
44 De	Locomotief, 8-1-1915, 15-1-1915.
45 De	Locomotief, 1--1915, 18--1915.
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were considered to be politically dangerous, or to take special action against 
publishers who had made such publications possible. As in Holland, the 
authorities could only bring a lawsuit and had become fully dependent on the 
considerations of the civil court.
The reforms of 1906 had been a gesture to placate the European public in 
the Netherlands Indies and to satisfy the liberal disposition of the Parliament 
in The Hague. The new legislation initially benefited most and above all the 
Dutch-language press. There were Chinese and native newspapers at that 
time, but in general they were well behaved and did not pose the colonial 
administration many problems. Within a year this changed. An increasingly 
bold native, Chinese and Indo-European press gave the colonial authorities 
cause to regret the new freedoms which had been created. There was much 
lamentation among government officials in the Netherlands Indies about poli-
ticians in The Hague, who were unfamiliar with conditions in the colony and 
did not realize that the natives needed a strong hand. These ill-advised people 
had, as the Council of the Indies put it in 191, ‘in an ill-starred moment’ 
removed the provisions which had allowed the government to act against an 
unruly press.46
Before August 1914 the presence of the native press had become the prin-
cipal argument wielded by those in favour of reintroducing some form of 
administrative justice; the more so after Idenburg, unable to put an end to the 
publications of the Indische Party, and seeing no other possibility to stem the 
flow of its agitation, had decided to banish its leaders. It was only after the war 
had started that the exploits of Dutch-language newspapers were mentioned 
by the colonial government and the regional civil servants as a major reason 
to look for more effective instruments to keep the press in check. A press that 
refrained from offending belligerent nations and did not hold any news that 
could endanger Dutch neutrality was what the government rather optimisti-
cally had in mind. The journalists of the Dutch-language newspapers wanted 
something else. Informing their readers about the course of the war and 
expressing prevailing feelings in society, was their aspiration.
The two goals did not tally. As late as May 191, the British Ambassador 
in The Hague noted that the Dutch authorities did everything they could to 
prevent the papers stirring up the people, who he believed were ‘strongly 
anti-Hun’. He observed that the Dutch government ‘always lives in terror lest 
some incident should occur which would carry the population off their feet’.4 
A similar fear had the colonial authorities in its grip. To cope, at the outbreak 
of the war Batavia and The Hague had not confined themselves to general 
warnings about the risk the nation ran if ‘excessive sympathy’ was shown for 
46 Advice of the Council of the Indies of 8-11-191, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb.  1-9-1915 46. 
4 Townley to Cecil, 0-5-191, PRO FO 800 195.
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one or other of the belligerents. They also had tried to keep journalists who 
disregarded such appeals in check.
In the Netherlands Indies the Secretary General of the colonial adminis-
tration in the middle of August sent a circular to the newspapers in which 
he outlined the special role the press should play in upholding neutrality. 
He wrote that though the Governor General realized that it was ‘completely 
unnecessary’ to do so, Idenburg had nevertheless requested him to inform the 
press that he trusted that journalists would be willing to observe ‘great objec-
tivity’ in writing about the war.48 A section of the press was not impressed. 
They doubted whether the restraint editors were asked to show mattered 
much. World Powers intent on declaring war on the Netherlands did not 
need any excuse. Nevertheless, some editors-in-chief vowed to cooperate. 
One of them was J.E. Stokvis of De Locomotief. Using the occasion to lash out 
at colleagues who thought differently, and who by chance he did not happen 
to like, Stokvis pointed out that deliberately insulting a belligerent was despi-
cable. It was not justified by exalted references to the freedom of the press, as 
resorted by some of his fellow-editors. At all times ‘journalistic licentiousness’ 
posed a danger. This was all the more true with the war now in full swing. On 
another occasion, Stokvis argued that if the powers were ill-disposed towards 
the Netherlands and they could not take issue with the correct attitude of the 
Dutch government, they would use a critical or insulting press as their excuse 
to act. It was the duty of the press to support the government in guarding 
neutrality and avoid everything that could give a potential aggressor a cause 
for complaint. This was all the more a necessity ‘in a country where the inter-
national contacts are many and the irritability runs high’. The press should 
show restraint and caution at a time in which its influence could potentially 
be greater, but also more fatal.49
It proved to be extremely difficult to persuade the press in Holland and 
the Dutch-language press in the Netherlands Indies to refrain from publishing 
articles which offended nationals of the belligerent nations. Almost from the 
outbreak of the war the German Acting Consul-General, Windels, protested 
about articles and cartoons which depicted Germany as the aggressor. As in 
Holland, many Dutch people in the Netherlands Indies blamed Germany for 
the war. The invasion of Belgium and the horror stories about the conduct of 
German troops in Belgium had greatly contributed to this attitude (see also 
Elout 1920). A ‘pure-blooded Dutchman’ wrote on a postcard in September 
to the German Consul that all good Dutchmen hated Krauts.50 The German 
Consul received more letters of this ilk. After he lodged a protest, the police 
48 De	Locomotief, 14-8-1914.
49 De	Locomotief, 1-10-1914, 5-12-1914.
50 Windels to De Graeff, 29-9-1914, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 18-12-1914 P24.
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were instructed to try to identify the sender. In one case, but there may have 
been more such instances, a copy of an anonymous letter, with the contested 
passages rendered illegible, was distributed. A reward of one hundred guil-
ders was offered.51 
The anti-German mood did not mean that the Dutch had suddenly 
become pro-British. The Boer War was still fresh in people’s memories. In the 
Netherlands Indies, probably the same could be said as Louis Raemaeckers 
of De	Telegraaf told a journalist on the Morning	Post about public opinion in 
Holland: German defeats were greeted with the ‘Marseillaise’ and not with 
Rule	Britannia.52 According to a reader of De Locomotief, the fact that many 
blamed Germany was occasioned by the same ‘sense of justice that the Dutch 
had felt when trampled on by the English-Transvaal War’ and who had been 
deeply shocked in August 1914 by the perfidity of the German nation against 
Belgium.5
The Dutch colonial press which in times of peace could not be said to have 
been a model of moderation mirrored these sentiments. Using strong words 
Dutch-language newspapers in the Netherlands Indies attacked the Kaiser 
and the crimes supposedly committed by the German army. Their particular 
‘tropical style’ contributed to the popularity of their newspapers, but for the 
senior Dutch administrators who had to cope with the consequences it was not 
easy to come to terms with this. In November 1916 the Attorney-General was 
to postulate that editors of the more important Dutch-language newspapers 
were ‘so busy that in the hot climates where they execute their profession, 
after a shorter or a somewhat longer period, they became virtual neurotics’.54
Of the largest newspapers, the Het	Nieuws	van	den	Dag	voor	Nederlandsch-Indië 
(The News of the Day of the Netherlands Indies), the Bataviaasch	Nieuwsblad of 
Karel Zaalberg, and the Soerabaiasch	Handelsblad of Van Geuns and G.J. Boon 
followed an anti-German course. B.J.O. Schrieke was to qualify them as ‘rab-
idly Allied’.55 Throughout the war Het	Nieuws	van den	Dag remained one of 
the newspapers which most disturbed the colonial administration with its 
vehemently anti-German tone. Its editor in 1914, Karel Wijbrands, made no 
secret of his hatred of Germans. He wrote that ‘he would like to strangle a 
German after every dessert, and would like to hear his death-rattle’ (Baars and 
Sneevliet 1991:60). His successor in 1915, W.K.S. van Haastert, likewise well-
known for the derogatory way in which he wrote about Indonesians, also left 




54 Attorney-General to Van Limburg Stirum, 2-11-1916, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 14-6-1919 26
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Het	Nieuws	van	den	Dag used the ‘most offensive qualifications’ and bore wit-
ness to a ‘pitiful one-sidedness’.56 Only the Bataviaasch	Handelsblad followed a 
pro-German editorial policy. Among its contributors, writing under a pseudo-
nym, was Emil Helfferich (Helfferich 1948:26). The British retaliated. After 
some time the Bataviaasch	Handelsblad was denied access to Reuter’s telegrams 
(Bosma 1995:169). In Semarang De Locomotief tried to strike up a moderate, 
balanced tone. From the outbreak of the war and true to his convictions, its 
editor-in-chief, Stokvis, did his utmost to remain impartial. In explaining his 
position he made a distinction, and in this he was not the only one, between 
the German people, who were to be admired for their cultural and economic 
achievements, and the Prussians. It was the latter who had to be feared, and 
who made a German victory a danger to Holland and the Netherlands Indies. 
A defeat of Germany was equally to be deplored as this would mean the ruin 
of German culture.5
Stubbornly Stokvis refused to condemn the Germans as the only nation capa-
ble of extreme violence in a war, even when in the first months of the war the 
facts seemed to prove him wrong. His efforts only enraged some of his readers. 
A French reader – un	ami – took offence at his observation that it would be better 
to wait and see how the French and British soldiers behaved in enemy territory 
before coming to the conclusion that ‘war plunder’ was an exclusively German 
disposition. Un	ami	wrote that the French had not murdered women, children, 
old people, and priests when Algerians and Tunisians had fired on their troops. 
They also had not reacted in such a way in the Crimea, Syria, or Indochina, 
nor in Morocco where boiling oil had been poured on French troops. A Dutch 
military man agreed with Stokvis. In doing so he provided some insight into 
how the Dutch army behaved. He claimed that it was standard practice in the 
Dutch colonial army after it had encircled a house or a fortification of ‘subver-
sives’ to riddle it with bullets when a warning to come out into the open was 
not obeyed, not bothering whether women and children might still be in the 
house. He stressed that such behaviour was part and parcel of the entourage 
of war. The difference with what had transpired in Belgium was that there the 
incidents had happened after an enemy place had already been taken.58 Other 
readers took offence at Stokvis’s reaction to the First Battle of Ypres in October 
and November 1914. German shelling was widely blamed for the destruction 
of incomparable historical monuments in the city. Stokvis, refusing to promote 
the idea that ‘plundering of old cities was an exclusively German undertaking’ 
in De	Locomotief, reacted by pointing out that Allied troops had done the same 
at Dixmude. A discussion followed whether Dixmude was ‘a beautiful old city’ 
56 Monsanto to Van Limburg Stirum, 15-1-191, NA, Kol. Geheim, Mr. 191/16x.
5 De	Locomotief, 19-9-1914, 29-10-1914.
58 De	Locomotief, 9-11-1914, 11-11-1914, 1-11-1914, 14-11-1914.
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or a simple village devoid of any monuments, and about what had occasioned 
the initial damage to the town, an Allied or a German bombardment.59 The 
anti-German newspapers also did not take kindly to the editorial policy of De	
Locomotief. Het	Nieuws van	den	Dag accused De	Locomotief of having yielded to 
German influence and indirectly – this was the conclusion Stokvis drew from 
the fact that Het	Nieuws	van	den	Dag had deliberately mentioned the first names 
of the journalists of De	Locomotief – of being Jewish.60 
In a sense the Germans who had already taken up residence in the 
Netherlands Indies before the outbreak of the war felt trapped. In 1916 the 
Hamburger	Nachrichten published a letter from a German trader in Surabaya. 
He wrote that because of anti-German sentiments among the Dutch in the 
Netherlands Indies, many Germans intended to leave the colony once the 
war was over.61 Confronted with an anti-German public opinion and a gen-
erally hostile Dutch-language press, the German community launched its 
own periodical Die	 Deutsche	 Wacht,	 Niederländisch-Indische	 Monatschrift	 für	
Kolonialpolitik,	 Volkswirtschaft	 und	 Völkerrecht. The first issue appeared on 1 
January 1915, the birthday of the Kaiser. Its publisher was a bulwark of German 
patriotism which had been founded on the same day, the Deutscher Bund in 
Niederländisch-Indien, and was granted recognition as a legal organization 
by the colonial government two month later. President of the Deutscher Bund 
was Theodor Victor Zimmermann. Deputy President was Emil Helfferich. At 
the end of the year 8 Germans had joined the Deutscher Bund. Twelve hun-
dred people had subscribed to Die Deutsche	Wacht.62
Finding a printer for Die	Deutsche	Wacht had not been an easy job. Dutch 
printing houses did not want to have anything to do with the German initia-
tive. Finally the Dutch company G. Kolff and Co. declared it was prepared to 
take on the job (Mohr 1948:24-5). In the articles in it much of the blame for 
the war was put on the unfair British reaction to Germany’s rise in the world 
as a political and economic power. To justify the publication of Die Deutsche	
Wacht, it was explained that before the war no need had ever been felt for 
such a special publication. Germans and Austrians had been quite happy with 
the Dutch newspapers. With public opinion turning against Germany and 
Austria-Hungary, the situation had changed. The Germanic voice had to be 
heard. Nevertheless, it gave a reassurance that in appreciation of the hospital-
ity enjoyed by the German community in the Netherlands Indies, Die Deutsche	
Wacht would show restraint.
Die Deutsche	Wacht was not the only German initiative to propagate the 
59 De	Locomotief, 21-1-1915, 2-1-1915.




German point of view. Around the same time it was launched, the first 
issue of Oorlogsberichten	 uit	 Duitsche Bladen (War Reports from German 
Papers) appeared in Surabaya. Its editor was W. Müller. Not surprisingly De	
Locomotief, referring to the biased reporting on the war in the Netherlands 
Indies, welcomed its publication.6 However, such initiatives did not mean 
that the European community had been devoid of information highlight-
ing the position of the Central Powers. After the first mail from Holland 
had reached the colony, reports could be copied from German and Austrian 
newspapers. Another source was the German news agency Wolff (which 
reached Java by mail, meaning that the Wolff war telegrams were at times 
published with a delay of two months) and the Ostasiatische	Lloyd, published 
in Shanghai. In Surabaya Van Geuns had been succeeding in obtaining 
‘German telegrams’ from Shanghai since the beginning of September. He 
claimed that this cost the Soerabaiasch	 Handelsblad between 1,00 and 1,400 
guilders per month. In view of this Van Geuns accepted financial assistance 
from the German consulate in that city. Later De	Locomotief suggested that he 
had been bought by the Germans. Van Geuns persisted in claiming that he 
had concluded a purely business deal which had not influenced the editorial 
policy of the Soerabaiasch	Handelsblad.64 
The position taken by many of the Dutch-language newspapers also both-
ered Idenburg. He was repeatedly confronted with protests from the German 
mission, while Residents received complaints by the local German consuls. 
Idenburg feared that an anti-German press could well endanger neutrality. It 
did not take him long to find out that there was little that the colonial authori-
ties could do. In Holland and the Netherlands Indies charges were brought 
against journalists and authors on the grounds of their anti-German writings. 
Usually acquittal followed or at most a very light sentence, even when the pub-
lic prosecution had demanded one year’s imprisonment. In the Netherlands 
Indies Idenburg could try to have journalists convicted for a violation of the 
articles in the Penal Code which made the dissemination of hatred punishable 
by law. Among the offences listed, these so-called haatzaai articles covered 
the generation and stimulation of feelings of hostility, hatred, or contempt 
‘between different groups of the population of Dutch subjects or Residents 
of the Netherlands Indies’. This formula had been deliberately chosen in the 
belief that by speaking about groups the article would cover conflicts between 
the numerous distinct groups which made up colonial society.
In May 1915 the High Court of the Netherlands Indies dashed these hopes 
completely. The court interpreted the word groups in such a way that it did 
6 De	Locomotief, 28-1-1915.
64 De	Locomotief, 1-2-1915, 4-2-1915.
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not refer to the many groups, distinguishable by religion, ethnic origin or what 
ever other criterion used, but to the three formal legal categories that made up 
colonial society: Europeans, Foreign Orientals and natives. Significantly the 
High Court had ruled in this way not in a case that concerned an article in the 
press that could have upset the relations between Dutchmen, Indo-Europeans, 
Chinese, or natives, for which the haatzaai articles had been devised, but in 
dealing with one which was imbued with an insulting, anti-German tone. The 
High Court overturned a decision of the Court of Justice of Batavia of January 
1915, which had sentenced the editor of Het Nieuws	van	den	Dag, G. van Loon, 
to eight days’ imprisonment for publishing an article in November the previ-
ous year. In it Van Loon had compared the treatment of German and Austrian 
women and children by the British authorities in the Straits Settlements to the 
fate of the civil population of Louvain, who after occupying German troops 
had been fired at on 25 August and transported to Germany to work there 
as labourers: ‘They were left no choice by the modern Huns. Are the English 
not aware that there still exists something like an eye for an eye, a tooth for a 
tooth. If yes, why not practise this maxim at the present time?’ The Batavian 
court had passed the sentence because in its opinion the article had aroused 
or promoted feelings of hatred and animosity between Belgians, Germans, 
Austrians, and Britons residing in the Netherlands Indies. The High Court 
argued that under the term ‘groups’ could only be understood groups that 
existed legally at the time of the proclamation of the haatzaai articles. It was of 
the opinion that the public prosecution had – taking the chance circumstances 
in force at the time of the prosecution as a starting point – given a wrong and 
arbitrary explanation of the term groups.65
The ruling of the High Court put the colonial administration in an awk-
ward position. Before May 1915 it had succeeded in having newspapers 
moderate their tone by threatening them with legal action. This approach 
could no longer be used. Newspapers were now free to lash out in an increas-
ingly aggressive tine against Germany. Batavia had lost the legal means to 
act against such articles. This was made patently obvious when the German 
consulate drew attention to an article published in Het	 Nieuws	 van	 den	 Dag 
at the end of October 1915, in which the Germans were called ‘riff-raff [...] 
excommunicated by the whole of the civilized world because of the mas-
sacres at Louvain, at Dinant etc. [...]. [B]eing accessory to the butchering of 
the Armenian population’, their hands dripping ‘with the blood of innocent 
murdered victims!’66 Windels protested that the newspaper had heaped the 
‘worst possible insults on the German people’.6 He requested the matter be 
65 See for the decision of the High Court, Indisch	Tijdschrift	van	het	Recht 1915:64-5.
66 Het	Nieuws	van	den	Dag, 2-10-1915.
6 Windels to Hulshoff Pol, 29-10-1915, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb.  1-4-1916 26.
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prosecuted. Reluctantly the Attorney-General had to conclude that the ruling 
of the High Court had made it highly unlikely that a court case would have 
any success.68 Windels was not pleased. In 1916 a number of times he sent a 
letter of complaint to the colonial administration deploring the ‘increasingly 
more offensive inflammatory press attacks’ on Germany in the Netherlands 
Indies. Windels could not believe that the haatzaai articles were unusable. 
What was written in the newspapers was of such a nature that it created dis-
trust of law-abiding Germans in the Netherlands Indies.69 Anew Van Limburg 
Stirum and his advisers considered what action they should take. Once more 
they decided against legal steps. 
Idenburg felt fairly sure that he was faced with a very serious problem. 
In his view abusive anti-German articles might well become a matter of life 
and death of the nation. Windels was not the only one to have protested. 
From Vienna Idenburg had learned that the Austrian government was far 
from pleased with reports about the war in the Netherlands Indies. Anxiously 
Idenburg wrote to Pleyte in January 1916 that newspaper articles could endan-
ger the existence of the state. Governments were held responsible for what 
they permitted the press to write.0 His successor, Van Limburg Stirum (count 
John I, as he came to be called), soon to be alternately praised and reviled 
for his self-willed resolution, shared Idenburg’s concern. In view of the anti-
German articles in the colonial press and mentioning Het	Nieuws	van	den	Dag 
specifically by name, in one of his first letters as Governor General he pleaded 
with Pleyte for an amendment to the haatzaai articles and for the penalization 
of offensive writings and cartoons.1 The Attorney-General agreed. Convinced 
that the anti-German tone of some of the Dutch-language newspapers could 
jeopardize relations between the Netherlands and Germany, he suggested – 
admittedly an unruly native press was also lurking at the back of his mind – a 
special system with a press council and a number of warnings before banning 
a publication for a certain period of time or forbidding an editor to write.
Van Limburg Stirum saw a complex of factors at work. The anti-German 
articles, the attacks on government policy, the propensity of the Dutch to write 
with contempt about the other population groups, and that of nationalist jour-
nalists to write articles which were considered to incite hatred against the colo-
nial government and the Dutch, all formed good reason for him to be in favour 
of specific legal means to curb the press. In Holland, where the government 
was confronted with a similar impotence to act upon anti-German statements, 
it was decided not to amend the Penal Code. Van Limburg Stirum wanted to 
68 André de la Porte to Idenburg, 9-11-1915, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb.  1-4-1916 26.
69 Windels to 1st Government Secretary, 29--1916, NA, Kol. Geheim, Mr. 191/16x.
0 Idenburg to Pleyte, 20-1-1916, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb.  1-4-1916 26.
1 Van Limburg Stirum to Pleyte, 18-4-1916, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb.  1-8-1916 15.
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persist. In the Netherlands Indies, specific circumstances had to be taken into 
account. The main difference between motherland and the colony was that in 
the Netherlands Indies Dutch authority was superimposed on what in those 
days were still called alien races. Maintenance of law and order over a hetero-
geneous population demanded ‘a more severe orderliness’ and permitted ‘a 
restriction on the greater freedom of the individual than in the mother coun-
try’.2 Insults directed towards people belonging to another group, including 
citizens of another power, were intolerable. In contrast to his predecessor, Van 
Limburg Stirum did not stress Dutch neutrality or the need not to offend the 
belligerents. His main reasons for being so concerned were public order and 
the interests of the state.
As a consequence of the position taken by Van Limburg Stirum, his legal 
advisers found themselves fully occupied with the problem. Part of the dis-
cussion about the haatzaai articles, but not the main focus, revolved around 
the question of whether terms like Boches, Huns, and barbarians, could and 
should be considered slander. An extension of this was whether it would in 
any way be possible to act against articles in which Germans, or for that mat-
ter Britons, were imputed to be infested with all kind of moral faults because 
of the way German or British soldiers behaved in Europe, but to which the 
author in order to avoid prosecution immediately added the rider that such a 
qualification did not refer to Germans or Britons Resident in the Netherlands 
Indies. In The Hague Pleyte also turned his full attention to finding a fool-
proof phrase. His solution was to threaten anybody who publicly expressed 
feelings of hostility, hatred, and contempt with punishment. This was the right 
and proper way to deal with the Dutch journalists who insulted natives and, 
conversely, with people like Soewardi and Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo. Pleyte 
was sure that the formula could also be used to take action against journalists 
who used words which elicited formal protests from Envoys.4
The haatzaai articles were not reformulated. Finding the right formula and 
solving differences of opinion took more time than the Great War was to last. 
Because of the failure of the haatzaai articles a prosecution no longer formed 
the main goal for all. At the beginning of 191 the then Attorney-General, H.V. 
Monsanto, pleaded against this. Law suits should not be initiated. The press 
in the Netherlands Indies should remain free in its evaluation of the war in 
Europe, irrespective of the words its representatives chose. Monsanto stressed 
this included gibes and the use of derogatory names for Germans, which 
could so often be read in Het	Nieuws	van	den	Dag. Prosecuting the newspaper 
2 Van Limburg Stirum to Pleyte, 18-4-1916, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb.  1-8-1916 15.
 Note Attorney-General to Van Limburg Stirum, 2-11-1916, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 14-6-
1919 26.
4 Note Pleyte, 5-4-1916, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb.  1-4-1916 26.
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for such language would be to accord too much honour to the editor.5
Nevertheless, Idenburg, Van Limburg Stirum, and Pleyte did not stand 
idly by while the Dutch-language press insulted Germans and vehemently 
attacked the measures the colonial government took to avoid the impression 
that one or another of the belligerents had received a preferential treatment. 
In January 1915, a report sent from Japan by Pabst to army headquarters in 
Batavia prompted Idenburg and Pleyte to decide to try to exert influence on 
the Malay and Dutch-language press in the Netherlands Indies. Pabst had 
called attention to rumours circulating in Tokyo that, in an effort to lure Japan 
away from the Allied camp, Berlin had promised it part of the Netherlands 
Indies. Alluding to this, Pabst suggested that in order to show the outside 
world the absurdity of such a German offer, it should be made widely known 
that the population of the Netherlands Indies did not desire another overlord 
and certainly not a Japanese one. When the realization dawned abroad that 
the inhabitants of the colony were prepared to underline their pro-Dutch 
sentiments with deeds, it would be understood that it would be difficult to 
honour such a German promise.
Pabst’s report impressed Idenburg and Pleyte. It induced them to accel-
erate existing plans to start a secret press offensive aimed at improving the 
image of the Netherlands Indies abroad. An additional reason to make such a 
move was that a bad press abroad, especially in Japan, could turn into a public 
campaign for the occupation of the Netherlands Indies. Cuba was a case in 
point. The Dutch also saw proof of their fears in what had happened in South 
Africa. In 1918 the former Senator P.J.J.S.M. van der Does de Willebois argued 
that the British assault had been preceded by a campaign in the British press 
– according to De Waal Malefijt almost completely groundless – against the 
suppression of the natives in the Boer republics.6
In The Hague and assuring himself of financial support by the Departments 
of Foreign Affairs and Agriculture, Industry, and Trade, Pleyte, on the advice of 
Idenburg, called in the help of H.J. Kiewiet de Jonge, a Resident of Dordrecht. 
Kiewiet de Jonge was chairman of the Algemeen Nederlandsch Verbond voor 
de Bestrijding van Onjuiste Beoordelingen en Berichten in de Buitenlandsche 
Pers (General Netherlands League to Counter Incorrect Judgements and 
Reports in the Foreign Press). During the Boer War, the League had set up a 
press office. The Dutch government had already enlisted the help of the office 
in 1906 during a military expedition against Bali and had continued to do so 
if and when the occasion arose. The plan was that through this agency, news-
papers in the Netherlands Indies and the foreign press could be influenced 
and be provided with articles and information, concealing that its source was 
the Dutch government. It took some time before concrete steps were taken. 
5 Monsanto to Van Limburg Stirum, 15-1-191, NA, Kol. Geheim, Mr. 191/16x.
6 Handelingen Eerste	Kamer 191-18:560.
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In August 1916 Rinkes’s leave in Holland was used to develop a strategy. A 
former employee of the Dutch diplomatic agency in Cairo, N. Spijkman, was 
sent to Batavia – ostensibly as a tourist, though this was a disguise he dropped 
almost immediately after arrival – to accomplish what Spijkman himself called 
‘great political intentions’. To keep his contacts with his employees secret, 
Spijkman addressed his first telegrams about his work in Java to his mother; 
asking her to convey his messages to ‘Dordrecht’, that is Kiewiet de Jonge. In 
its wires to Java the Ministry for the Colonies likewise used the alias to trans-
mit Kiewiet de Jonge’s directions. 
Shortly after his arrival, Spijkman found employment with the Neder-
landsch-Indisch Pers Agentschap (NIPA, Netherlands Indies Press Agency). He 
became its manager in April 191, after another editor, D.W. Berretty, had left 
to found his own news agency, the Algemeen Nieuws en Telegraaf Agentschap 
(ANETA, General News and Telegraph Agency). Though Spijkman launched 
himself energetically on the task, most of his activities came to naught. One of 
the reasons for this was that ANETA was much more successful than NIPA. 
Spijkman blamed his failure on the fact that Berretty was an Indo-European, 
which give him easier access to the colonial administration and the Dutch-lan-
guage newspapers. Spijkman even tried to convince his superiors that ANETA 
formed a political threat and should never be allowed to monopolize the news 
service about Holland in the Netherlands Indies and vice versa. He stressed 
that as an agent of Reuter’s and as an ‘Indo-organization’, ANETA represented 
a hazard, as this made the news agency biased in favour of the British view-
point and towards the political aspirations of the Indo-European community 
to become independent of Holland.
Spijkman was likewise unsuccessful in helping Batavia in changing the 
way in which the Dutch-language newspapers wrote about Germans and 
Germany or about the action taken by the authorities to uphold Dutch neutral-
ity. Spijkman was to state a number of times in his reports that the manner in 
which newspapers commented on the latter matter was anti-national and char-
acterized by ‘infamous slander and reproaches’.8 In 191 when Van Limburg 
Stirum summoned him to ask for advice about how to change this, Spijkman 
had to admit that he could do nothing, fearing the temper of the newspaper 
journalists and the way they fought out their differences of opinion.
 Report Spijkman no. 1, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 2-9-1918 H9.




On 14 August 1914 the Resident of Batavia sent a letter to the leaders of the 
Sarekat Islam under his authority. In view of the war in Europe and its reper-
cussions for the colonial economy H. Rijfsnijder deemed a word of caution 
necessary. If there was ever a moment to realize the objectives of the Sarekat 
Islam, goals which Rijfsnijder hastened to stress were highly valued by the 
colonial administration, it now was the time to do it. The harvest in his terri-
tory had been good and food would still be available for months, but wisdom 
was required. A shortage of food – the ‘most terrible of all disasters’ – might 
eventuate were irresponsible waste of food not prevented. The age-old tradi-
tion among Muslims of selling off their remaining stock of food to raise the 
money necessary to celebrate the end of the Fasting Month with joy and lustre 
bode an additional reason for prudence. Rijfsnijder explained that nobody 
should be disturbed in this jollity, but that in contrast to previous years people 
should practise drastic retrenchments. They should spend as little as pos-
sible on celebrating this important day in the life of Muslims. In view of this 
Rijfsnijder impressed upon his correspondents that it is ‘your task, no your 
duty’ to explain ‘seriously and with all your powers of persuasion’ that trou-
bled times lay ahead. Members of the Sarekat Islam had to be made aware that 
they had to cut their coat to suit their cloth; and that secondary crops had to 
be planted.1 Other Dutch residents, all cognizant of the fact that the end of the 
Fasting Month was approaching, made similar appeals for thrift. At times they 
also pointed out the detrimental consequences runs on the bank had on small 
traders and on the estates which had to pay their workforce. 
Within days, as one Dutchman in West Java described the situation, 
Indonesians were gripped by a perang (war) fever. They were eager to learn 
where Hungary and Italy were located (Germany, Great Britain, France, and 
Russia were more familiar), and what sea mines, fights between fighter planes, 
and wireless telecommunication meant. In the cities, Indonesians who were 
1 Rijfsnijder to Djajadiningrat and others, 14-8-1914, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb.  9-3-1916 26.
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well-versed in Dutch translated the telegrams posted in front of the offices of 
Dutch-language newspapers for their fellow-countrymen. Elsewhere in the 
cities and in the countryside people crowded around literate Indonesians, 
who, as was the common practice also in the days of peace, read out aloud 
reports in the Malay press, which covered the war as intensely as the Dutch-
language newspapers did. Malay newspapers partly copied their reports 
from Dutch-language newspapers and informed their readers in detail about 
speeches delivered in the European capitals, about the reactions in the Middle 
East and in the British and French colonies, and about the developments on 
the war fronts. Like the European population, in the first weeks of the war 
Indonesians began to speculate about the possibility that Holland would be 
dragged into the war and the consequences this would have for the colony. 
Some were sure that such a war had already started. In North Celebes it was 
rumoured that the Japanese had occupied Batavia. In Java anxiety augmented 
when the Malay newspapers published the false report that the Netherlands 
and Germany were at war.  
Witnessing from close by how nervously the European community reacted 
to the news from Europe, trends set by Europeans such as hoarding and dis-
trust of paper currency were copied. The People’s Credit Banks which were 
run by the government came under pressure from customers who wanted to 
withdraw their savings or who, afraid that dire times were on the way, asked 
for credit. In order to cope the managements of local branches were instructed 
not to pay back deposits before the end of the term of notice had expired and 
not to provide new loans should they suspect that the money would be used to 
buy food.3 In a sense indigenous Indonesians were worse off than Europeans. 
Unaccustomed as they were to visiting a bank, some fell victim to persons who 
convinced them that paper money was no longer legal tender and offered them 
less for their bank notes than the nominal value. They might get nine guilders 
in coins for a note of ten. Others, disquieted by the steep increase in prices, 
made great financial sacrifices in order to hoard food. Many were also forced 
to borrow money. The shops they used to patronize had stopped providing 
credit. Higher costs of living, the prospect that commodities such as rice, salt 
(imported from Egypt), batik textiles (dependent on the import of cloth from 
Holland and chemical dyes from Germany), sugar, and matches – an item fre-
quently mentioned in Dutch-language as well as Malay newspapers – could 
soon become too expensive to buy added to the unease. Disquiet was fortified 
even more by rumours about massive lay-offs, a possibility which was also 
discussed in the Malay press. Superstition played a role as well. In Bali some 
were sure that they had seen a star with a tail, a bad omen. 
3 Circular of the Adviser for the People’s Credit System (Feiten 1916:52).
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Indonesian social and political leaders did their best to reassure the popu-
lation and to prevent a panic. Tjokroaminoto was one of them. In an effort 
to stop all kinds of ‘nonsense’ from spreading, at a number of meetings he 
explained that the battlefields were far away – twenty-eight days at least –, 
that the Netherlands was not a party to the war, and that there were no indi-
cations that this was to change.4 When the rumour that the Netherlands was 
already at war took hold, Oetoesan Hindia, of which Tjokroaminoto was edi-
tor-in-chief, cautioned its readers to trust only official communiqués.5 Oetoesan 
Hindia also printed the soothing announcements published by the colonial 
government intimating that there was no reason whatsoever to fear that the 
Netherlands would become involved in the war or that the delay in shipping 
meant that a famine was imminent. The measures taken by the colonial gov-
ernment to assure the domestic supply of rice and to restore faith in paper 
money were explained at length. One of the points Oetoesan Hindia made was 
that Indonesians, in contrast to Europeans, did not need imported foodstuffs. 
They could live on a simple meal of rice and salt. So, there was no reason to 
worry. The government had seen to it that there was enough rice for the popu-
lation, and Egyptian salt could surely soon be replaced by salt from Madura, 
which, it was added, anyway, had the added advantage of being cheaper.6 
The request by the authorities to the press that it should not write about the 
belligerents in negative terms was duly noted. It was actually seized upon to 
point out the special mission of Oetoesan Hindia. The war in Europe was not 
the newspaper’s concern. What was important was to underline its negative 
consequences for the Javanese, such as the prospect of mass lay-offs and rising 
prices. Oetoesan Hindia warned that expensive times lay ahead. Members of 
the Sarekat Islam and other Muslims should organize their finances with care. 
They should be thrifty.7 
Individual members of the Sarekat Islam took up the plea for thrift. They 
presented this as one of the indications of progress. Many Sarekat Islam branch-
es held special meetings to discuss the rocketing prices of foodstuffs and to 
advise their members on how to act in those difficult days. Occasionally, and 
this was a real novelty, women were specifically invited to attend such Sarekat 
Islam meetings. After all it was they who did the shopping. People were urged 
not to indulge in unnecessary expenditure to celebrate the end of the Fasting 
Month. They should refrain from spending money on fireworks and expensive 
clothes.8 The appeals seem to have been successful. Either from free will or by 
4 Oetoesan Hindia, 23-9-1914.
5 Oetoesan Hindia, 18-8-1914.
6 Oetoesan Hindia, 18-8-1914. 
7 Oetoesan Hindia, 4-8-1914, 15-8-1914.
8 Oetoesan Hindia, 29-8-1914.
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necessity, in various places the end of the Fasting Month was celebrated more 
soberly than before. There were fewer fireworks than usual. During meetings 
members aired their complaints and worries about the high level of prices. In 
Semarang one of them even ventured the opinion that the moment might be 
nigh when he would have to steal and rob to procure rice for his family. A sug-
gestion that the branch should buy rice and distribute it among its members 
was rejected by the chairman. The logistics seemed insurmountable. It would 
be better to ask the Resident to fix prices. Additional meetings were organized 
in the city to impress upon members that paper currency had not lost its value, 
and that they should not exchange notes for coins at a loss.  
The disruption in international trade, rising prices, and the prospect of 
mass unemployment encouraged speculations among the European commu-
nity about large-scale unrest when Indonesians were to become impoverished 
in great numbers or no longer be able to afford the high prices of basic com-
modities. Indonesians could also run in trouble in yet another way. Tempted 
by high prices, they might sell all the rice they had and then be forced some-
time later when prices had gone up still further to buy rice themselves. Aware 
of this possibility, within days after the outbreak of the war Dutch civil serv-
ants impressed on the people living in their territories the need to hold onto a 
stock of rice for their own consumption in the months ahead. Other warnings 
were also issued. The Resident of Semarang in a meeting with European trad-
ing firms and Chinese shopkeepers pointed to the consequences of deliber-
ately forcing up prices. This was a dangerous game. The native population 
and others in straightened circumstances might end up in a situation in which 
they found themselves tempted to appropriate food by force. Riots and rows 
with Chinese could well lie in store.9  
Some Europeans remained optimistic. In a report from West Java to De 
Locomotief it was adducted that the crisis caused by the European war did not 
affect natives in the least. They were used to times of hardship and would 
continue to till the soil as they always had done. Javanese peasants did not 
need any money, nor did they consume expensive foodstuffs or sweets such as 
milk, butter, chocolate, and tinned food. Villagers would react to rising prices 
in their traditional way: ‘They first eat rice once a day, thereafter once every 
two days supplementing it with cassava, sweet potatoes, or maize, then they 
do not eat rice at all – before they resort to wantonness [...]’.10  
Opinions like this were rare. As the words of the Resident of Semarang 
indicate, anxiety about how the population would react was coupled with the 
fear that the relationship between the natives and Chinese would deteriorate. 
9 De Locomotief, 10-8-1914.
10 De Locomotief, 12-8-1914.
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In the early days of war, some Chinese even feared an uprising among the 
indigenous population (Idenburg en De Graeff 1920:370). Though the anti-
Chinese riots which had been so frequent in the previous years had abated, 
incidents might easily re-erupt. Javanese and other groups could blame 
Chinese shopkeepers, who controlled much of the retail trade, and intermedi-
ate traders for the rise in the cost of living. This was indeed what happened. 
People began to suspect that the argument that prices had risen because of 
the war was a pretext and had nothing to do with the truth. In Java solidarity 
among the Javanese was stressed as a means to cope with the difficult times. 
It was essential to consider the plight of fellow-Javanese, not that of other 
‘nations’.11 From Situbondo a correspondent of Oetoesan Hindia noted that the 
cooperative shops which had been established before the war (and which were 
often far from being a success story) had not raised their prices. He noted that 
such behaviour was in sharp contrast to the practice in Chinese-owned shops. 
In other reports in Oetoesan Hindia about how expensive life had become, it 
was also suggested that this was caused by articles sold in Chinese shops. 
Sometimes it was stated that the rising price of rice was certainly a deliberate 
ploy of the rich, the leeches, to hurt the poor, that is the Sarekat Islam sup-
porters. What other reason could there be? In Southeast Asia there was no 
war, which meant that rice could be shipped to Java from Siam without any 
problem. The authorities had to intervene and put an end to the rising prices. 
If not it would be impossible to maintain public order.12 
If Indonesians grew export crops, they could and would blame Chinese for 
the falling prices they received or for the loss of marketing opportunities. In 
Cirebon, for instance, a centre of the production of beans and peas, Chinese 
wholesalers awaited the coming harvest in the middle of August with trepi-
dation. Export had been prohibited, but were Chinese middlemen to refuse 
to buy beans and peas from the Sundanese producers, or, as it was hinted in 
Oetoesan Hindia, were to pay a ridiculously low price, this might be interpreted 
by the local population as extra proof that the Chinese were scheming to bring 
about their economic ruin.13  
Plagued by worries which had arisen in the past couple of years by the 
activities of the Sarekat Islam, and to a lesser extent by those of the Indische 
Partij, the Dutch themselves did not feel safe either. The establishment of 
Law and Order Leagues was one outward and visible sign of their apprehen-
sion. Rumours about an impending uprising was another. The Dutch asked 
Javanese and other Indonesians they knew how they thought the population 
would react were the Netherlands to become involved in the war. Oetoesan 
11 Oetoesan Hindia, 13-8-1914.
12 Oetoesan Hindia, 5-8-1914, 6-8-1914, 11-8-1914, 19-8-1914, 12-8-1914.
13 De Locomotief, 15-8-1914; Oetoesan Hindia, 17-8-1914.
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Hindia concluded that such behaviour was evidence not of some sudden 
upswelling of anxiety but of deeply rooted fears.14 The Fasting Month exac-
erbated such worries. Europeans nurtured the idea that this was the period 
in which Muslims could become especially restless and in which malcontent 
dissatisfied with Dutch rule might more easily resort to violence than at other 
times of the year. It was predicted that there was a good chance riots could 
erupt around 25 August when the end of the fasting was celebrated; partly 
because at that moment Muslims would realize that they could not afford to 
buy as much food and clothing as they had been accustomed to do in the past. 
The worst affected regions might well be those with many estates. In Java and 
in Sumatra such worries were reason enough to be increasingly alert, and this 
also applied to the authorities. 
Keeping pace with this apprehension, particular attention was paid to the 
Chinese and Malay newspapers. Michielsen, unaware that Idenburg already 
had taken such a step, asked the Director of Education and Religious Affairs, 
G.A.J. Hazeu, to have ‘teachers of native languages’ investigate whether unde-
sirable opinions were being expressed in the non-European press.15 Hazeu 
14 Oetoesan Hindia, 7-11-1914.
15 Idenburg to Pleyte, 6-8-1914, Verslag omtrent de belangrijkste militaire maatregelen sinds 31 
Juli j.l. getroffen, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 12-9-1914 P18, 18-1-1915 P.
G.A.J. Hazeu (KITLV 3953)
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was able to re-assure him. Reports were ‘of a moderate and calm nature’. No 
indications had been found of a ‘less favourable disposition’ towards Dutch 
rule.16 On the contrary, it soon became clear that editors testified to their loy-
alty in ‘often touching ways’ (Van der Weijden 1916:28). Hazeu’s assessment 
was only partly right. News about the war had not improved the image of 
the West. Nationalist newspapers and periodicals posed the rhetorical ques-
tion whether the war being fought in Europe was a manifestation of the much 
acclaimed Christian civilization. The conclusion of such articles was that the 
West had lost any right to treat Muslims and other Indonesians as inferior 
beings or as barbarians. Europeans were also well aware that the war had not 
added to the prestige of the West in Asia. 
Michielsen and others should not have worried about the initial reactions at 
the outbreak of the war. Contrary to the trepidation expressed by Europeans, 
Indonesians did not seem to have considered the tension in the world as a 
portent to rise up in rebellion. The prospect that another nation might take 
over the position of the Dutch was not overlooked, was even perhaps expected 
but no plans were made to exploit the situation to cast off the Dutch yoke. 
Educated Indonesians fostered no illusions about the outcome of an armed 
conflict between the Netherlands and the contemporary powers. They knew 
that the Dutch stood no chance. If anyone wanted to maintain Dutch rule, pray-
ing that the Netherlands was to stay out of a war was the only option open to 
them. Oetoesan Hindia commented that it was a law of nature that the weaker is 
devoured by the stronger, and that the stupid is swallowed up by the clever.17 
The usurpation of a Dutch colonial overlord by one power or another does not 
seem to have appealed to many at the time. It was even reported from Java that 
Javanese told their fellow-countrymen stories about how badly the indigenous 
population was treated in British colonies. It was said that no non-Europeans, 
not even the rich ones, were allowed to own their own houses there.18  
Though names were seldom mentioned in the press and in speeches, the 
Indonesians also thought Japan was the most likely aggressor. The editors 
of Oetoesan Hindia could understand Tokyo’s motives for desiring territorial 
expansion, because Japan was said to be unhappy with the fact that part of 
Asia was occupied by Europeans. They put Japan’s motives on a par with the 
intention of the Allied to chase Turkey out of the European continent. Later, 
in 1916, the article by Yosaburo Takekoshi was quoted in detail in Oetoesan 
Hindia, complete with remarks about how rotten Dutch rule was, but mainly 
16 Verslag omtrent de belangrijkste militaire maatregelen sinds 31 Juli j.l. getroffen, NA, Kol. 
Geheim, Vb. 18-1-1915 P.
17 Oetoesan Hindia, 9-5-1916.
18 De Locomotief, 22-8-1914.
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as an appeal to the Dutch authorities to realize how great the threat was. 
Oetoesan Hindia explained that for a variety of reasons there was no love lost 
for the Japanese. Japanese were Buddhists, were apparently not looking for 
ties of friendship with the autochthonous population, were condemned by 
the Chinese, and were at war with Germany and Turkey.19 The following year, 
in October 1917, a brawl with some Japanese was the occasion for the same 
newspaper to remark that such people were already behaving as if they had 
become the foreign oppressor. A few days later it was observed that especially 
outside Java, the Japanese behaved objectionably.20 
In the eyes of the leaders of the nationalist movement, those of Boedi 
Oetomo first and foremost, it would be best to have everything remain as it 
was. They and others were disquieted by the news which had reached the 
Netherlands Indies about the fate suffered by the populations in European 
countries which had been invaded; first Belgium and later in the war, Serbia. 
A new foreign ruler would be a change for the worse. One of the arguments 
advanced for this was that the huge amount of money which had already 
been spent to teach Dutch to Javanese, the language through which Javanese 
could gain access to modern science, would be wasted. Were the Netherlands 
to be replaced, the Javanese would have to learn a new language to commu-
nicate with the new ruler. In that instance all the efforts and money poured 
into learning Dutch would have been wasted. Such comments would seem 
to indicate that the Ethical Policy the Dutch government had embarked upon 
since the turn of the century had made its mark. In 1915 Boedi Oetomo lead-
ers toured Java to convince the people not to consider the Dutch their enemy. 
They suggested to their audiences that, after a rule of three centuries, the 
Dutch might be expected to be familiar with the needs of the Javanese. Not 
all that was longed for had been reached, but a start had been made. Reforms 
took time. Some of the leaders of the Sarekat Islam expressed similar views. 
Much was still to be improved, and here were plenty of government measures 
which should be undone, but the colonial government had their support. They 
often turned to the point that strong language might have been used in the 
past to criticize colonial conditions, but that reforms had to be achieved by 
peaceful means. Evolution not revolution was what they had in mind.  
In line with this position, in the weeks after the outbreak of the war 
Oetoesan Hindia carried a number of statements in which loyalty and the duty 
to defend Dutch rule was stressed. In the middle of August, in a statement 
printed in larger type, the editors sang the praise of Idenburg, lauding him 
as the person who had seen to it that the bond between the Dutch Kingdom 
19 Oetoesan Hindia, 9-5-1916.
20 Oetoesan Hindia, 9-10-1917.
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and the population of the Netherlands Indies had grown stronger. Thanks to 
his policy feelings of loyalty and affection had been implanted in the hearts 
of the Javanese. The upshot was that to assure the safety of the fatherland the 
Javanese were prepared to ‘attack a sea of problems, to climb a high mountain, 
to enter a sea of fire’ to assist the Dutch, who ‘for three hundred years had 
guided and protected’ them.21  
The pro-Dutch feelings were also displayed in a plethora of spontaneous 
manifestations. There could have been even more, had local Dutch authori-
ties in some cases not refused permission to hold meetings to testify to native 
loyalty to Dutch rule. In the Moluccas, but this was a partly Christian region, 
students in confirmation classes vowed that, as the Acting-Resident chose to 
put it, they were prepared to go to Holland to ‘give their lives for the protec-
tion of QUEEN and Motherland’. In the same region, in a circular letter the 
Ambonsch Studie-Fonds (Ambonese Study Foundation) begged the Ambonese 
in the colony, soldiers and civilians, to be prepared to ‘fight for a free and inde-
pendent Netherlands’. Appealing to ‘the attachment to the country which we 
have to thank for our development, our prosperity’, it was recounted how for 
centuries Ambonese ‘had fought under the Dutch tricolour’.23  
In Java, the island where nationalist sentiments had been most obvious 
in the previous years, many spoke out in support of Dutch rule. In Bandung, 
Sundanese civil servants vowed to stay at their posts whatever might happen. 
They would do all they could to calm down their compatriots and prevent 
unrest. In Magelang, Javanese civil servants publicly testified to their loyalty 
to Dutch rule. To remove all doubts about the loyalty of the Javanese bureauc-
racy, if there were any, those present at a meeting of the Regents’ Union in 
Semarang in November gave testimony of their support. They assured the 
Dutch Queen that ‘under all circumstances [the] native population, [...] grate-
ful for Her Majesty’s beneficent reign, [...] shall remain loyal and cooperative in 
maintaining Netherlands Rule over these colonies’. The initiative for the state-
ment had come from the chairman of the meeting, Pangeran Ario Adiningrat, 
Regent of Demak. When he explained that it was important in these times of 
war that the Dutch government be presented with some token bearing witness 
to the fact that the population desired to remain loyal to Dutch rule and were 
willing to support it in those difficult times, everybody present agreed.24 
The most important leaders of the Sarekat Islam and Boedi Oetomo were 
not to be outdone. Early in August Oetoesan Hindia carried an article by Mas 
Ngahebi Dwidjosewojo, teacher of Javanese at the Teachers’ Training College 
21 Oetoesan Hindia, 14-8-1914.
 Boer to Idenburg, 15-6-1915, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 5-8-1915 Z10.
23 De Locomotief, 17-9-1914.
24 Idenburg to Pleyte, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 25-11-1914 N23.
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in Yogyakarta, and a prominent member of Boedi Oetomo. In it, Dwidjosewojo 
presented his views about the best way to maintain domestic peace. After stat-
ing that he was convinced that the Dutch would remain in control of Java and 
would not lose the island to Germany, Great Britain, or Japan, Dwidjosewojo 
called for the unity of all inhabitants of Java, of whatever race. He stressed 
that it was everybody’s duty to follow government instructions, as these were 
inspired by no other aim than the desire to protect the welfare of the people: 
‘Though it is our right to condemn wrongful regulations, it behaves us now to 
be careful with this right and all the more so do we have to be careful in air-
ing our criticism’. Rice traders in particular should follow the directions of the 
government. If they were determined only to pursue huge profits and the war 
was to drag on, turmoil would be the outcome. Dwidjosewojo feared that the 
rising price of rice, together with growing unemployment and cuts in wages, 
would encourage social unrest: ‘There will be no war, but disorder manifest-
ing itself in many thefts, assaults, robberies, and such like’.25  
Sarekat Islam leaders reacted in the same vein. If anything they wanted to 
25 Oetoesan Hindia, 13-8-1914.
Celebrating the Queen’s birthday at a ‘native school’ (Gedenkboek 1923)
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help. In Surakarta the President of the local board sent a letter to the Dutch 
Resident explaining that in those ‘difficult days’ the Sarekat Islam wanted 
to testify to its loyalty to Dutch rule. He asked what assistance its members 
could give. The answer was disappointing. The Resident wrote back that the 
Netherlands was neutral and that consequently no help was yet required.26 
In Blitar, after having been informed about the cancellation of festivities on 
Queen’s Birthday, the Sarekat Islam branch organized a mass prayer session 
on that very day. Thousands attended the ceremony on the alun-alun where the 
principal Islamic leader of the region said a prayer in which he asked for God’s 
blessing ‘in these dark days’ on the Netherlands and Queen Wilhelmina.27 The 
meeting concluded with a large slametan, a communal meal, where rice, sam-
bal, and chicken was served on 400 large plates.  
The government could also count on the loyalty of the representatives of 
the Chinese community. In their effort to reach a normalization of prices, civil 
servants had received the support of the Chinese business community, equally 
anxious to restore normal economic conditions. In Semarang it was a Chinese 
trader who had initiated the fall in the rice price by offering a large quantity 
of rice for a moderate price. Elsewhere leading Chinese traders had done their 
best to restore public faith in paper currency. They pledged that whenever 
possible they would conduct financial transactions in banknotes and not in 
coins. At various places, for instance in the area of the West Coast of Sumatra 
and in Batavia, Chinese formally testified to their loyalty to Dutch rule. When 
Idenburg visited Magelang in November, the Chinese quarter in town was 
awash with Dutch flags and those of the Chinese Republic.28  
With the Sino-Japanese War still firmly in mind and in reaction to the bul-
lying of China by Japan, the Chinese if anything were giving vent to their 
anti-Japanese sentiments, and in extension of this to an anti-Allied disposition. 
Though the Dutch often singled out the Chinese-Malay press as producing 
the most unruly and inflammatory newspapers, these came out in support 
of Dutch rule. Djawa Tengah explained to its readers that they had to support 
the government if the Netherlands Indies were attacked. In 1916 Warna Warta 
wrote that the Chinese were in no doubt that they would be worse off if Dutch 
rule was replaced by that of another power. At the same time both newspa-
pers pleaded for a change in colonial policy. Djawa Tengah pointed to the legal 
discrimination of the Chinese and natives in contrast to the European status 
of the Japanese. Assistance in a Dutch war effort by Chinese and indigenous 
Indonesians would be more readily forthcoming if Batavia really were to take 
the interests of these population groups to heart. Warna Warta reminded people 
26 De Locomotief, 21-10-1914.
27 De Locomotief, 9-9-1914.
28 Koloniaal verslag 1915:13-4; Oetoesan Hindia, 29-8-1914; De Locomotief, 13-11-1914.
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of the Chinese who had been killed in recent years by the government.29 
In November 1914 after Japanese troops had landed on the German-held 
Shantung Peninsula, pamphlets written in Chinese started to circulate. They 
called for a boycott of Japanese products, of which Chinese shops were the 
main distributors. Initially the government and others, and this may have 
been wishful thinking by people afraid to offend Japan, reported that on the 
whole the effect of the appeal was negligible. Anti-Japanese sentiments grew 
when Tokyo delivered a note to China – the Twenty-One Demands – aimed 
to bring China fully within the Japanese sphere of influence, in January 1915. 
Brandishing the threat of an invasion, it called for the recognition of Japan’s 
hold on the port of Ch’ing-tao and Manchuria; and demanded that China 
turn to Japan for loans as well as military and financial advisers. News of the 
Japanese note caused a wave of nationalist feeling among the Chinese in the 
Netherlands Indies. Rich Chinese subscribed to bonds issued by the Chinese 
government. They and their less affluent countrymen could also contribute to 
collections. Some of these were made by children from Chinese schools. Apart 
from such financial support, there were also appeals to return to China to fight 
for the fatherland.  
Because of irritation caused by the Twenty-One Demands, the boycott took 
a more uncompromising form. Shopkeepers were visited at home to urge them 
to stop selling Japanese goods. Sometimes these pleas were backed up by ver-
bal threats or anonymous letters. When advertisements for Japanese products 
were displayed on shop fronts these were smeared with tar and dirt. The hous-
es of the shopkeepers received similar treatment. The colonial government was 
not pleased with such an upsurge in Chinese sentiments. It started a police 
investigation to find out who were the driving force behind the hostile actions. 
It, and in this it was joined by a wider section of the Dutch community, feared 
that the boycott might upset the relationship with Japan. After a complaint by 
the Japanese Consul Batavia also sent one of its civil servants on a tour through 
Java to calm people down. He explained that China and Japan had come to 
an understanding and begged that the Chinese, as guests in the Netherlands 
Indies, should not put their host in an awkward position. In Medan a writ for 
libel was taken out against a newspaper, Sumatra News, because it had written 
about the ‘guileful and savage Japanese people’ who looked down upon the 
Chinese. Three people were convicted to two months’ imprisonment.30 
Even the people associated with the Indische Partij proclaimed their loy-
alty. At the time of the Onze Vloot agitation, the editors of De Expres had 
already been quick to stress that the Netherlands Indies should be defended 
29 Djawa-Tengah, cited in De Locomotief, 17-2-1915, Warna Warta, cited in De Locomotief, 28-3-
1916.
30 Indisch Tijdschrift van het Recht 1916:435-44.
IX  Loyal subjects 243
and administered by people living there. On one occasion the newspaper had 
written that 30 million inhabitants of Java were certainly capable of raising an 
army strong enough to defend the island.31 De Expres had also not opposed 
an ‘Indies fleet’, a fleet of which the strength had been decided upon by the 
people of the Netherlands Indies, in a colonial parliament. The Navy they had 
had in mind was one that tAllied with the ideal of becoming independent of 
Holland, of the Indië los van Holland campaign. What had been rejected was 
‘a Dutch fleet built with Indies money’ which would, it was true, be employed 
to defend the Netherlands Indies, but which did so only in the interests of 
people in Holland and not of those in the colony.32 
At the outbreak of the war such ideals resurfaced. In De Indiër an Indonesian, 
Soemataram, lamented the fact Indonesians ‘can’t handle a sabre, and can’t 
shoot’. This was the upshot of a stupid Dutch mistake. Because they had been 
afraid that Indonesians would use these weapons against their own master, 
Indonesians now could not come to the assistance of the government in 
defending the colony against ‘a land-hungry neighbour or a blood-thirsty and 
rapacious European country’.33 The best defence of the Netherlands Indies, 
or rather Java, which was the area foremost in the minds of many people, 
was to entrust this to the people who lived there. It could not – and this point 
was also stressed by others – be left to ‘mercenaries’, to Dutchmen and other 
Europeans. Such soldiers would have to fight in an alien country and in alien 
surroundings. They would lack the determination to defend the Netherlands 
Indies which would inspire local inhabitants, defending their homeland. 
Douwes Dekker himself, to whom as he would write to Pleyte, it was ‘a 
tormenting thought to have to remain idle while I know that my country is in 
danger’, rushed from Switzerland to The Hague to offer his help in defending 
Java against an aggressor.34 On 19 August he sent Pleyte a wire from Geneva. 
He was unshakeable in his belief that not dreadnoughts, but the arming of the 
people, was the answer to prevent, as he expressed this, the Japanese exploit-
ing the Javanese in the way the Dutch had done in the nineteenth century. To 
underline his opinion Douwes Dekker postulated that an army composed of 
committed men, familiar with the countryside had been the main reason the 
Boer Republics had been able to resist the superior forces of the British for such 
a long time.35 After a month when he still had received no reply – the telegram 
never reached Pleyte – Douwes Dekker travelled to The Hague to present his 
plan to the Minister of the Colonies in person. Venturing that more countries 
31 De Expres, 10-3-1914.
32 De Expres, 25-2-1914.
33 De Indiër I, 43:205.
34 Douwes Dekker to Pleyte, 22-9-1914, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 23-9-1914 F19.
35 De Indiër I, 52:245-7.
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might become involved in the war and stressing that the defence of the mother-
land was a citizen’s right and not merely his duty, Douwes Dekker suggested 
that he could bring his personal influence to bear to establish a volunteer corps 
of ‘many thousands of Indiërs’.36 Pleyte turned the offer down. Perhaps rather 
undiplomatically, on 22 September, he fobbed Douwes Dekker off saying he 
was not in favour of arming a population, of whom most were still at a low 
level of development. The real reason for the refusal was that Pleyte could do 
without the assistance of a ‘hot-headed’ Douwes Dekker, a person ‘who can 
only find peace in a position which is linked to the war’. Pleyte was sure that 
Douwes Dekker’s only motive for his offer to establish a volunteer corps had 
been to seek publicity to further his own plans for the colony.37 
Apart from the manifestations of solidarity, the appeals to collect money 
for Holland were also taken up outside the white European community. De 
Locomotief had calculated that though most Javanese could not give very much 
the proceeds of such actions could be enormous. If each of the 6 million house-
holds were to give two and a half cents, they could still raise 150,000 guil-
ders.38 The question was, and the happenings at the time of the celebrations of 
Dutch independence were still fresh in people’s mind, how should money be 
collected among the Indonesians. Any impression of coercion should be scru-
pulously avoided. De Locomotief suggested that the solution was easy. Money-
boxes could be placed at strategic places outside the villages. Crossroads 
frequented by the population would be a convenient place to do so. Were 
boxes to be placed in the villages, villagers might feel obliged to donate. The 
authorities were also sensitive to the problem. When they learned that police 
officers in Yogyakarta had started a collection among the Javanese inhabitants, 
they ordered them a few days later to return the money to the people. 
It was not only the Indonesian and Chinese notables who sat on the cen-
tral and regional Committees for Relief who were active in the collection of 
money. Others also joined in. At a Boedi Oetomo meeting in Semarang one 
of those present, praising the colonial government for the support it gave to 
‘our efforts to progress and to become humans’, suggested that Boedi Oetomo 
should try to organize native support for the unemployed in Holland.39 The 
Regent of Jepara had yet another argument why Javanese should collect 
money for the poor in Holland. Each time there had been a natural disaster in 
the Netherlands Indies, Dutch people had been ready to give money to help. 
Now it was the turn of the natives to dip into their purse; or, as he stated at a 
meeting of the Semarang committee: ‘Where the elder brother acts in this way, 
36 Douwes Dekker to Pleyte, 19-8-1914, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 23-9-1919 F19.
37 Note Pleyte, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 23-9-1914 F19.
38 De Locomotief, 28-9-1914.
39 De Locomotief, 14-9-1914.
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the younger brother should not be left behind now that the Netherlands is in 
distress’.40 He admitted that appeals to donate money might be interpreted by 
the ordinary Javanese as a touch of gentle coercion, but did not mind. When 
the objective was so good such conduct was tolerable. 
Occasionally Sarekat Islam stalls were put up at fancy fairs organized by 
the Dutch community to raise money for the poor in Holland. In other places 
wajang orang performances were staged. In Magelang students of the OSVIA 
put on a Stamboel performance. It was a big disappointment. Only thirty 
 people attended.  
On Saparua, one of the islands in the Moluccas, 2,500 guilders were col-
lected to be sent to Queen Wilhelmina to help the poor in Holland. These 
native Christians, their Dutch minister wrote, ‘distinguish themselves to a 
particular extent by their loyalty to the Dutch Government and by their love 
for Her Majesty the QUEEN and Her House’.41 He attributed this loyalty to the 
influence of the Gospel of Christ that had stimulated their notions of solidarity 
with their fellow-Christians in Holland at a time when distress was mounting 
there. In Java the Regents’ Union reserved 3,000 guilders for the destitute in 
Holland as a token of allegiance. 
Such loyalty and enthusiasm was not universal. The initiatives to collect 
relief money for Holland irritated some. Though one of the stated aims was 
that people in the colony should not be excluded from help, not everybody 
was entirely convinced that this would indeed be the case. Dissatisfaction 
was especially great among the Indo-Europeans, who once again detected 
proof they were being discriminated against. Voices of discontent could also 
be heard from among the Javanese. It was Javanese labour which had made 
possible the profits which permitted the transmission of money to Holland. It 
would only be just if part of the money collected were to go to the poor in Java, 
for instance to the wives and children of those who had died of the plague. In 
Surabaya, reminding the local relief committee of its pledge that money was 
also being collected for destitute Indonesians, seventeen foremen who had 
been fired after the outbreak of the war applied for financial assistance. In the 
same city rich pilgrims, probably Arabs, offered the Sarekat Islam a consid-
erable amount of money – it is a pleasure, a correspondent of De Locomotief 
wrote, finally to be able to say something praiseworthy about these people – to 
assist Javanese who had suffered from the economic consequences of the war. 
Their money did not have to be used immediately. Families were taking care 
of the newly unemployed.42 The local Sarekat Islam also tried to help. It made 
preparations for an investigation into the number of indigenous people who 
40 De Locomotief, 28-9-1914.
41 Wesseldijk to Boer, 14-6-1915, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 5-8-1915 Z10.
42 De Locomotief, 14-11-1914, 16-11-1914.
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had become unemployed and contacted a schoolteacher to assist in establish-
ing a special organization to help them.43 
One obvious cause for Muslims to collect for was the Red Crescent. Shortly 
after Turkey had become involved in the war, Oetoesan Hindia wrote that what 
Muslims should do was to give charitable aid, which the Red Crescent was 
more than willing to accept. The newspaper said that this was in accordance 
with the neutral stand adopted by the Dutch government.44 The initiatives to 
raise money for the Red Crescent, which at times received the overt support 
of German and Austrian consuls, were various. In Surabaya, in a gesture of 
criticism of the drive for Holland, a number of Arabs, British Indians, and 
indigenous Indonesians took the initiative to collect money for the destitute 
43 De Locomotief, 7-12-1914.
44 Oetoesan Hindia, 17-11-1914.
D.A. Rinkes
IX  Loyal subjects 247
in Turkey. To this end a map of Europe with the topographic names in Latin 
and Arabic script was sold. The map was prominently advertised in Oetoesan 
Hindia. In the advertisement it was pointed out that on the map people could 
look up where the battle-sites in Europe were located. As an extra attraction 
to tempt people to buy the map it was claimed that the map was the first one 
of Europe using Arab script printed in the Netherlands Indies. Part of the pro-
ceeds went to the Red Crescent. In Bandung, in February 1916, the proceeds of 
a cinema show with newsreels about the war went partly to the Red Crescent, 
partly to the German and Austrian Red Cross, and partly to destitute Javanese 
and Chinese inhabitants of the city.45 The following month the Malay-Chinese 
newspaper, Sin Po, organized a viewing of newsreels in Batavia to raise money 
for the Red Crescent. The collections for the Red Crescent were quite suc-
cessful. At the end of 1917 over 23,000 guilders had been collected. Even in 
Dutch New Guinea, at that time hardly a place with a large concentration of 
Muslims, sly traders, it was reported, sold articles for the Red Crescent.46 
Chinese also organized special drives to raise money for the poor in 
Holland. The heads of the Chinese quarters went around to collect money, 
while the political elite, the Chinese officers, targeted the wealthy segment 
of the Chinese community. Various Chinese associations organized perform-
ances. A Chinese theatre in Pekalongan gave a special show for the needy in 
Holland. This was repeated in Semarang where people could attend a Malay 
play performed by a Chinese theatre group. In Yogyakarta a Chinese opera 
was staged to raise money for the Belgian refugees who had fled to Holland. 
In Pangkalan Brandan in North Sumatra the proceeds – 900 guilders – of a soc-
cer game between two Chinese teams went to the poor in Holland. 
Yet another way in which sections of the indigenous population testified to 
their support of Dutch rule was by offering their services in the defence of the 
colony. Steps were taken to establish indigenous volunteer corpses, in Malay 
initially translated as tentara merdika or free army, just as neutrality sometimes 
was rendered as kemerdikaän, freedom. For those who wanted to join an addi-
tional incentive was, as it was for Douwes Dekker and his political associates, 
that in this way they could show that they were ordinary citizens no different 
from the white Dutch community, perfectly capable of doing their bit if the 
country were in danger. They were people whose voices should be taken into 
account. 
The first suggestion that such a corps be established came up in Magelang. 
45 Oetoesan Hindia, 5-2-1916; Rinkes to Idenburg, 9-7-1915, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 23-9-1915 
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46 G. Simon, Neuzeitliche Strömungen im niederländisch-indischen Islam, cited in Koloniaal 
Tijdschrift 1917, I:702.
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The topic was raised after Europeans in the town had discussed the possibil-
ity of forming their own local corps on 8 August. On 9 August the Javanese 
– among them, according to a report in Oetoesan Hindia, many former sol-
diers, civil servants, devout Muslims, and members of the Boedi Oetomo and 
Sarekat Islam – called their own meeting, chaired by the Regent. The meeting 
decided that everybody who was ‘sound in wind and limb’ should enlist in 
a volunteer corps and assist the ‘Company’, that is the government, when 
danger threatened. Women did not have to stay behind. The Regent sug-
gested that women could make themselves useful by forming an association 
of their own to take care of the provisions for their husbands who had joined 
the corps. This decided, the Regent explained that the next step to be taken 
was to ask the government to supply thousand rifles. Soldiers should instruct 
the volunteers how to use these and how to march. His words were greeted 
with a roar of applause. The Dutch Resident was less enthusiastic. He did his 
utmost to temper the excitement when the Regent informed him about what 
had been decided. It made no sense to hand out umbrellas before the rain had 
started. Matters were not yet serious enough to justify the establishment of a 
volunteer corps. What was more, it might be impossible for the government 
to provide the rifles requested. The regular army might need all the fire-arms 
available. Plans had to be changed. Instead of a volunteer corps, a shooting 
club was founded. ‘Europeans, native civil servants and chiefs, as well as other 
prominent and well-to-do natives’ could join.47  
Similar initiatives were taken in Sidoarjo, where the local chairman of the 
Sarekat Islam suggested the establishment of a volunteer corps consisting of 
Sarekat Islam members, in Buitenzorg, in Kedu, and in Bandung. In Bandung 
it was a physician, Haminsar, who in conjunction with Soetan Muhammad 
Zain, Abdoel Moeis, and Wignjadisastra (the latter two former members of 
Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo’s Comité Boemi Poetra) appealed to the Javanese 
in the city to form a special native ambulance corps, open to both men and 
women. He himself would become its president. The name chosen for the 
organization Djaga-baja, the title of Javanese village police officials, indicates 
that the aims went further than just offering medical services. Envisaged was 
an ordebond, which had to prevent disturbances not by the use of force, but by 
persuasion. Members saw it as their task to remove unnecessary concern from 
and not present wrong information to, as a Dutch newspaper phrased this, 
the ‘simple people’.48 For some this was not enough. At one of the meetings in 
Bandung where the scheme was discussed, an Indonesian – he was described 
as a native who had left government service because he could not cooperate 
47 Oetoesan Hindia, 14-8-1914; De Locomotief, 12-1-1915.
48 Preanger-bode, 18-8-1914, cited in De Locomotief, 18-8-1914.
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with his old-fashioned chief – raised the question of why the Indonesians in 
the ambulance corps were not fitted out with arms.49 As many of his compatri-
ots were likewise to argue, he wondered whether the natives were not trusted 
by Batavia to defend their own motherland.  
In the estate belt of East Sumatra, the request to constitute an armed corps 
to maintain law and order and to fight a foreign enemy came from the Sarekat 
Islam. As in Magelang the Dutch Resident tried to dissuade the initiators from 
continuing with their plans. An additional reason for his reluctance may 
have been that one of the advisors of the Sarekat Islam branch, an Arab, had 
urged that the permission of the Turkish sultan should first be asked. The 
Resident told the initiators that before they proceeded any further, they had 
to prove that people really were prepared to join. It would have been bet-
ter if he had held his tongue. At the end of August a well-attended meeting 
took place in the Oranje cinema in Medan. The chairman of the local Sarekat 
Islam, Mohamed Saleh, delivered a glowing speech in which he suggested 
that though the immediate danger seemed to have passed, nothing was ever 
certain. Japan had entered the war, and the Netherlands could still be dragged 
into it. Ending his speech with ‘Long live the Netherlands and its colony!’, he 
asked his audience to join him in this declaration and to sign a form promis-
ing to honour the obligations enjoined upon those entering a volunteer corps. 
Loud and lengthy applause, mixed with cheers ‘Long live the Netherlands’ 
greeted his words.50  
In the western part of Sumatra, in Fort de Cock, it was Maharaja Soetan 
Casajangan Soripada, who called a meeting of Indonesian heads, civil serv-
ants, and ‘well-to-do citizens’ in the club Madjoe (Progress) at the end of 
August. Casajangan had lived in Holland and had acquired a certain fame 
by founding organizations such as the Het Eeuwige Juliana Instituut voor de 
Eenheid en Vooruitgang van Grooter Nederland (The Eternal Juliana Institute 
for the Unity and Progress of the Greater Netherlands). The theme of his 
speech not unnaturally tied in with this. Prosperity in the Archipelago could 
be attributed to ‘Father Government’, and the interests of the population were 
closely linked to those of the government. He asked himself how the people 
could protect their own interests and those of the government if they had no 
weapons. As happened elsewhere, his suggestion that a corps of volunteers be 
formed was greeted with great enthusiasm by the audience. Four days later a 
formal request signed by eighty people was presented to the Assistent-Resident. 
The next day a party was organized, attended by the Assistent-Resident to ‘seal 
49 De Locomotief, 22-8-1914.
50 Sumatra Post, cited in De Locomotief, 7-9-1914; Note Schrieke 30-4-1917, NA, Kol. Openbaar, 
Vb. 14-2-1918 38. 
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the affection and loyalty of the natives to the Government’.51 In Makassar 
‘Christian natives’ rAllied to form a volunteer corps. In Medan a missionary 
wanted to recruit among the Christian Chinese.  
The top leaders of the nationalist movement were more cautious. Boedi 
Oetomo convened a meeting of branch leaders to decide in which way loyalty 
and devotion to Dutch rule could best be expressed. Leaders of other organi-
zations were also invited to attend. The meeting, which took place in the 
Stadstuin (City Garden) of Semarang on 13 September, did not produce the 
result the board had intended. Between three and six hundred people attend-
ed (the lowest estimate coming from Oetoesan Hindia, the highest from De 
Locomotief).52 The debate centred on what concrete support could be given to 
the government if the Netherlands Indies were to be attacked. Dwidjosewojo 
explained what was at stake. The drive for colonies in the past few decades 
had not left him unimpressed. He pointed out that in the 1910s more countries 
were actively engaged in acquiring colonies than ever before. This meant that 
were the Netherlands to become involved in the war, a new foreign overlord 
would be likely to take over rule in Java. The Dutch army and Navy certainly 
did not have the wherewithal to repel an invasion. Dwidjosewojo wondered 
whether a new colonial ruler would mean an improvement in the fate of the 
Javanese. Since the turn of the century, the colonial government had begun to 
take the welfare of the population to heart, irrespective of the race to which 
they belonged. Citing examples of such new efforts, Dwidjosewojo men-
tioned the schools established by the colonial government. The schools were 
of ‘great assistance to the progress of the natives [as they meant] the opening 
of the door which leads to progress’. Were the Netherlands to continue on 
this path, ‘real progress’ would certainly be the result. The Javanese would 
become the equal of other peoples. Were another nation to take the place of 
the Netherlands, the future would be jeopardized. A new master could treat 
his new possession with less consideration and act in the spirit of the late but 
not lamented Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie. 
Dwidjosewojo fervently argued that this meant that it was the duty of the 
Javanese to defend their island against outside aggression. But how? Though 
Javanese had known how to wage war and how to use weapons less than 
100 years ago, they had lost this skill. Donating money was a possibility, 
but: ‘Generally speaking, we have no money, we are poor, so in that way we 
also cannot help; so far we have made other races rich by our labour’. These 
words were greeted with loud applause. In the weeks to come Tjokroaminoto 
and others would also reiterate these two points. Colonialism had paid to 
Javanese expertise in waging war. Colonialism had also made them poor. In 
51 De Locomotief, 9-9-1914.
52 De Locomotief, 14-9-1914; Oetoesan Hindia, 15-9-1914.
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Semarang, Dwidjosewojo concluded that what remained to be done was what 
the Javanese had always done. They could contribute their bodies and the 
labour of their hands and feet. They could act as transport workers or join an 
ambulance. This was what they could offer the Dutch government and army 
in times of war.53 
Dwidjosewojo had been cheered, but critical voices were also raised at the 
Boedi Oetomo meeting. Not everybody agreed with the Dwidjosewojo’s eager-
ness to rush to the assistance of a Dutch war effort. Some of those present used 
the occasion to plead for political reforms. One of them, Raden Soemarsono, 
called a declaration of loyalty out of order. The pledge could only be given 
by leaders who really represented the people, in other words by an elected 
parliament. Another who took the floor was Raden Soedjono, chairman of the 
Sarekat Islam in Semarang. He also made it clear that in his opinion the initia-
tive taken by Boedi Oetomo was superfluous and beside the point. With some 
sarcasm Raden Soedjono pointed out that what Dwidjosewojo had suggested 
was no different from the so-called gugur gunung services, a special corvée 
the government was entitled to ask from the population if an emergency or 
disaster threatened. In the past the Javanese had always complied with such a 
demand and they would offer their labour again were they ordered to do so. 
The whole crux of the matter was not how to help the Dutch, but how to shield 
Javanese society from the consequences of the war. Plans should be developed 
to prevent the population suffering. Money could be saved, stocks of rice built 
up, or the area under cultivation expanded. 
Soedjono’s words triggered off a lively discussion in which Tjokroaminoto 
also participated. Speaking, as he stressed, as a private person because he had 
not been able to consult the other members of his board, Tjokroaminoto ruled 
out assistance to the Dutch army. Retribution for such help from an invader 
would be severe. Civilians who did help might experience the same fate as 
the population of Louvain. If Indonesians were intent on improving their 
military skills, they could always become a soldier. There were other ways to 
help the Dutch. Indonesians could refuse to act as transport workers for the 
enemy. They should also decline to act as spies for an invader, even if large 
sums of money were promised as a reward. Above all, God had allowed the 
war and people should pray to Him that the Netherlands would not become 
a party to the war. As other nationalists, Tjokroaminoto used the occasion to 
stress that the natives were not skilled in using arms. He turned this observa-
tion into a plea to the government to take measures to redress this and expand 
the possibilities open to Indonesians to undertake military training. He also 
underlined, and his words were greeted with much applause, that under the 
53 De Locomotief, 14-9-1914; Oetoesan Hindia, 15-9-1914, 23-9-1914.
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present circumstances the colonial authorities should do something to earn the 
cooperation of the indigenous population. Batavia should be more receptive 
to the suggestions advanced by the Sarekat Islam, Boedi Oetomo and other 
organizations. Unity of all the population groups would be what counted in 
a confrontation with a foreign enemy. Confronted with such dissident voices, 
the leaders of Boedi Oetomo gave in. They concluded that the meeting could 
not come to any decision. 
The opposition to the proposals of the Boedi Oetomo board were indica-
tive of the mood of many supporters of the nationalist movement. In the early 
days of the war opposition like it did not receive the attention it should have, 
as such opinions were overshadowed by the many demonstrations of loyalty 
and the pledges to assist the colonial authorities in maintaining law and order. 
Even in Aceh, local leaders stated that they were prepared to fight for Holland 
wherever they should be sent. In view of all this, Idenburg had been able to 
wire Pleyte a few days before the City Garden meeting took place that the 
political conditions were good and that the natives ‘without exception [were] 
very loyal’.54 This observation ended up a fortnight later in the Queen’s speech. 
She stated that the attitude of the native population left nothing to be desired. 
Various speakers in Parliament used the occasion to praise the loyalty of the 
natives. One of them, Van Deventer, suggested that when peace returned the 
Indonesians should be rewarded for their stance by allowing them to have a 
share in the administration of the colony. It goes without saying that this was 
with a rider stating that all depended on their cultural and intellectual devel-
opment. Oetoesan Hindia was pleased. It reacted by writing that the Dutch had 
finally begun to understand. The promise was a good sign.55
Manifestations of loyalty in themselves already served Dutch defence. In 
an attempt to show the outside world how pro-Dutch the local population 
was – Pabst had convinced Idenburg that this was necessary – in early 1915 
Rinkes and the Residents of the Moluccas and the Minahasa were asked to list 
all manifestations of loyalty since the outbreak of the war. Rinkes was given 
additional instructions to try to influence the native press. The following 
year the campaign was stepped up after the arrival of Spijkman, who offered 
articles entitled ‘The Dutch voice’ free of charge to Kaoem Moeda, Sinar Djawa, 
Oetoesan Hindia, and other Malay newspapers. 
Support for the Dutch did not abate. In an ‘atmosphere of robbery and 
murder on a large scale’, as one Indonesian sketched the situation in a Dutch-
language newspaper in Batavia, the Dutch were still needed to protect and 
54 Atjeh-Nieuwsblad, cited in Oetoesan Hindia, 19-9-1914; Idenburg to Pleyte, 9-9-1914, NA, Kol. 
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guide the population on its path to independence.56 It was a fairly gener-
ally expressed opinion. To become the object of war would be no pleasure; 
it would bring great misery.57 In reaction to the uproar Yosaburo Takekoshi’s 
article had created Oetoesan Hindia wrote in 1916 that ‘we may expect nothing 
good if a Foreign Power should come bursting in and brandishes the torch 
of war in our motherland, violates our daughters, exterminates our cattle, 
destroys our properties, and sacrifices everything to its own interest, which, 
moreover, is absolutely not ours’. There was only one slogan: ‘Orange for ever. 
Long live the Queen.’58 At other moments love for the Dutch tricolour was 
stressed. In September 1916 a representative of the central board of the Sarekat 
Islam reminded his audience that people should not forget that were Dutch 
rule to be threatened, the population would also find themselves into a tight 
corner.59 Nevertheless, in spite of such opinions which fell reassuringly on 
Dutch ears, gradually as the war progressed, less accommodating voices could 
be heard. The catalyst was developed by the Dutch administration to involve 
Indonesians in the defence of the colony. Reacting to the plans, Indonesians 
were quick to point out that much was still amiss in colonial society, and that 
concessions by the colonial administration were called for before such a native 
militia could be considered. 
56 De Indische Gids 1915, II:1300-2.
57 Oetoesan Hindia, 5-2-1916, 6-2-1916.
58 Oetoesan Hindia, cited in De Locomotief, 15-3-1916.




At various meetings the calls to assist in the defence of the colony highlighted 
not so much the question of native volunteer corpses, but that of the estab-
lishment of a militia (the contemporary term for an army of conscripts). The 
campaign to establish a native militia came to be known as the Indië Weerbaar 
(Resistant Indies) movement. It was propagated in the colony with an inten-
sity comparable to that of the Onze Vloot campaign in Holland.
Conscription had been toyed with for decades. The first suggestions for 
a European militia dated from the 1880s, when a militia had been advanced 
as an alternative to the existing citizen militias (a sort of voluntary police 
force). A native militia was first discussed in 1907. Between 1907 and 1914 the 
issue was raised from time to time. One of the persons to do so was P.C.C. 
Hansen. Under the pen-name of Boeka in 1909 he published an article, ‘Indië 
Weerbaar’, in De Indische Gids about a guerrilla war fought against a foreign 
invader by a Javanese voluntary militia, commanded by Javanese. One of 
the advantages Hansen saw was that members of such a militia were accus-
tomed to the climate in Java. Japanese soldiers were not. In a sense it was a 
daring proposition. Hansen pleaded for rifle drills for the militia members. 
Apparently still harbouring lingering doubts about how far Javanese could be 
trusted, he cautioned that good care had to be taken to see that the number of 
rifles in circulation in Javanese society remained small (Boeka 1909).
Initially, the colonial authorities reacted pretty lukewarmly to suggestions 
about forming a native militia. Mounting international tension on the eve of 
the World War brought about a change in attitude. Batavia and The Hague 
came to see a native militia as a useful addition to the regular army. The many 
manifestations of loyalty formed yet another reason to consider the forma-
tion of such a force. That the military in the Netherlands Indies was in favour 
became clear in 1914 when a ‘staff-officer’, that is Major J. van der Weijden, 
indeed a member of the General Staff of the colonial army, wrote an article in 
the Java-Bode in support of a native militia. Van der Weijden tried to convince 
his readers that recent developments had proved that a native militia did not 
necessarily have to be a public danger. He explained that it would not create a 
force of ‘enemy soldiers’ as some feared. In his argument Van der Weijden dis-
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closed that the authorities had gone far beyond concluding that conscription 
was possible. They had grown convinced that a militia would cement interra-
cial solidarity: ‘Standing side to side in the defence of the Archipelago against 
alien violence will strengthen the bond between Dutchmen and Natives’.1 
The manifestations of loyalty after the outbreak of the war had indubitably 
impressed Van der Weijden. On another occasion he wrote that these pledges 
‘from all circles and layers of Native society’ had proved that the population 
would not turn against the Dutch were a foreign enemy to invade Java. The 
‘incorrigibly anxious’ had been mistaken (Van der Weijden 1916:29).
Conscription – to be confined to Java and the Minahasa – emerged a hotly 
debated issue during World War One. The idea was for a militia of Europeans 
and Javanese, but not the Chinese. As the immediate pre-war years had 
shown as a group the Chinese were too restless. The Arabs were also excluded 
because they were distrusted for religious reasons and for the putative influ-
ence they might exert on the Muslim population. Conscription would open a 
reservoir of potential soldiers and would cost less than the recruitment of fresh 
professional soldiers. This, of course, was an important argument in its favour. 
Another plus point was the realization that new volunteers for the colonial 
army might not be forthcoming once the Netherlands Indies was actually at 
war (Van der Weijden 1916:21-2). Fringe benefits were deployed to convince 
doubters that a militia was a useful institution. One, and this was an argument 
advanced by Europeans and Javanese alike, was that military training would 
encourage discipline, neatness, and personal initiative among the Javanese. 
Bearing this in mind some went as far as to plead for compulsory gymnastics 
in the schools the Javanese children attended to prepare them for such military 
service.
Leaders of the Sarekat Islam and Boedi Oetomo were among those who 
argued that a militia was a good way to instill discipline and to improve the 
physical condition of the young people. Boedi Oetomo leaders expressed the 
hope that a militia would restore the military prowess the Javanese had once 
possessed in days long past. Military training might revive the ksatria, the 
warrior class, spirit of the past. Another argument frequently mentioned in 
favour was that the stature of the Javanese would be improved if they showed 
that they were prepared to make sacrifices for the defence of their country. 
Acceptance as trusted soldiers was presented as a way to bring the Javanese 
a step further on the road towards emancipation. Enhancing the role of the 
Javanese in the defence of the colony would, to borrow contemporary par-
lance, be one of the ways to ensure that the Javanese would become full human 
beings. This was considered so important that just after Austria-Hungary had 
1 Java-Bode, cited in De Indische Gids 1914, II:1733.
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declared war on Serbia, Boedi Oetomo announced that at a party meeting in 
August it would discuss the possibility of the establishment of a lower mili-
tary school for natives.2 It was argued that a military school would contribute 
to the emancipation of the Javanese, and would improve their standing in 
relation to the other population groups which made up colonial society. The 
voices of the Javanese leaders were not crying in the wilderness. Similar views 
were not unheard of in the Indo-European community, where Insulinde mem-
bers from Surakarta had already spoken out in favour of a militia at the end of 
1912. They stressed that conscription would be a good way to improve the lot 
of the poor Indo-Europeans, who were loafing around idly.3
Some of the questions raised about a native militia were of a technical 
nature. One, and this point had already been raised in 1909, was the absence of 
a register of births for the Javanese population. The absence of such a register 
made recruitment a complicated matter. One solution suggested was to call up 
Islamic boys a certain number of years after circumcision. Another possibility 
considered was to leave recruitment to the village heads. A more important 
reason to worry was that the absence of a register of births would allow young 
Javanese men (except for the educated ones, of whom it was easier to keep 
track) to dodge conscription or to desert melting away in the masses.
The main issues which the militia discussion raised were different. They 
centred on political and security implications. Defence had to be strength-
ened, but it might be dangerous to arm natives to accomplish this. Some 
Dutch people found this a real dilemma. One newspaper wrote that ‘[w]ithout 
the energetic support of a Native militia we will lose our colony to a foreign 
enemy and with that Native militia to an internal enemy’.4 People who aired 
such an opinion were not very impressed by the manifestations of loyalty. 
They doubted whether the Javanese would actually rally to the assistance of 
the Dutch in a real crisis. To some the vows of loyalty were nothing but an 
insignificant gesture by a few intellectuals. They believed that the masses had 
no opinion at all. Others were distrustful of the intellectuals. In 1916 when the 
Resident of Kedu suggested that the students in the highest class of the OSVIA 
should receive training in markmanship, the Governor General seemed posi-
tively inclined. When he asked senior civil servants in the field of education 
for their opinion about such training of students of eighteen years and older 
– as had been introduced in some European countries – the answers were 
diverse. Some were in favour. Others advised against. They warned that it was 
exactly among these young Indonesians that the ‘dissatisfied elements’ were 
2 De Locomotief, 30-7-1914.
3 De Locomotief, 13-6-1915, cited in De Indische Gids 1915, II:1467.
4 De Indische Gids 1917, I:664.
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to be found.5 Experiments were started, but only on a small scale, and limited 
to young European men.
Those sympathetic to the emerging nationalist movement, among them 
senior advisers of Idenburg, showed more of an inclination to support plans 
for a native militia. They usually considered only the conscription of young 
men who belonged to the intellectual and social elite of Javanese society; 
though this selection criterion was often disregarded in the heated debates 
which followed. The editor of De Locomotief, who could also not agree with the 
blunt refusal of some Residents to discuss native volunteer corpses, suggesting 
that if the government trusted the nationalist movement it should not with-
hold the arms and military training they asked for from the population. There 
was no danger in doing so as long as the colonial government did not embark 
on a policy which alienated the population. 
Many at the time considered Javanese to be poor military material. Because 
of the militia plans, a volte-face was required. The dreams some Dutch people 
in the Netherlands Indies and in Holland fostered about a people’s army of 
Javanese resisting a foreign invasion were very wide of the mark of the widely 
held views about the soldierly qualities of the Javanese. Therefore it is not sur-
prising that Major Van der Weijden commented in 1916 that a Javanese could 
make a good soldier. To underline his statement he recalled the fierce resist-
ance which Diponogoro had mounted during the Java War in the 1820s. When 
Javanese realized that their existence was at stake, they would fight as bravely 
as the Japanese. Van der Weijden’s conclusion was clear: ‘The Javanese is not 
inferior, he is being made inferior by us’ (Van der Weijden 1916:31).
The idea of a militia consisting of fierce Javanese provided the Dutch with 
new comfort and confidence. The editor of De Locomotief speculated about a 
defence mounted by millions of Indonesians. Blatantly conjuring up an image 
of savages, he posed that ‘the people not bound by Western civilization nor 
by uncomprehended law of war [would] present the intruder with a defence 
which will appear to be an invincible obstacle for many of his operations’.6 In 
Holland the newspaper Algemeen Handelsblad wrote that without arming the 
natives the colony would be lost. A militia would make the difference: ‘When 
a fleet of submarines is on guard in our Indian waters, and this is backed up 
by an army of 3 million Javanese, with yet another several 100,000 Malays, 
Manadonese, Ambonese, Timorese, the evil lusts of whoever it is, will cer-
tainly be somewhat tempered’.7
Others remained unconvinced. The idea that the Javanese population was 
5 De Locomotief, 16-9-1916; Creutzberg to Van Limburg Stirum, 26-10-1917, NA, Kol. Openbaar, 
Vb. 14-6-1918 17.
6 De Locomotief, 26-11-1914.
7 Algemeen Handelsblad, cited in De Indische Gids 1916, I:611.
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to be fitted out with arms filled them with horror. A reader of a Dutch news-
paper in Holland who had lived in the Netherlands Indies wrote in a letter 
to the editor that natives were unsuited for the task of defending the colony, 
and that they would remain so in the near future. According to him, this was 
not the greatest weakness of the conscription plan: ‘The brown brother [...] 
with the weapons in the hand is simply not to be trusted’. Needless to say, 
the author of these words was no advocate of political and social emancipa-
tion. Emancipation would only speed up the ruin of the Dutch. Life in the 
colony was already characterized by what he considered to be increasing 
recalcitrance, anti-social unmanageability, and a love of boyish protests. His 
conclusion was that the ‘brown brother’ hid his racial hatred with ‘Eastern 
disingenuousness’. The better educated he was, the better he succeeded in 
hiding his true feelings.8 In Java itself the Nieuws van den Dag, viewing any 
emancipation of Indonesians with mistrust if not with downright hostility, 
especially remained vehemently opposed throughout.
In the plans of Batavia and The Hague, a militia in Java should be confined 
to young men with a certain level of education. The main reason to opt for 
such an educational criterion was that military service had to be as short as 
possible. The feeling was that within such a period (initially eight-and-a-half 
months was proposed) simple farmers could not be turned into good soldiers, 
especially because they carried an extra handicap as they did not understand 
the language of instruction used in the army, Malay. Not so long before mili-
tary experts had even argued that it would take up to six years to turn a native 
– that is a Javanese – into an ‘employable combat soldier’.9 Educated Javanese 
would cause fewer problems. They were said to be able to become good sol-
diers in the same relatively short span time as it took the lower classes in the 
Holland to achieve this (De Greve 1913:9). Moreover, the military would not 
be pleased if it had to cope with ‘a great many stupid fellows’.10 Some coun-
tered that such ideas left eligible for conscription only a category of Javanese, 
who, like the Dutch, as a group were too small, and had many civil servants 
among its members, people who could be ill-missed in their job.11 Owners of 
sugar estates and tobacco factories also raised concerns. They feared the con-
sequences for the colonial economy if young Javanese were withdrawn from 
the workforce because they had to enlist for military service.
To drum up support for a militia it was decided to launch a propaganda 
drive. Idenburg assigned Rinkes this special task in the spring of 1915. He 
was to propagate the idea of a militia through the native press and in public 
8 De Maasbode, cited in De Indische Gids 1917, I:789.
9 Rapport 1913:94.
10 De Locomotief, 26-11-1914.
11 Bataviaasch Handelsblad, cited in De Indische Gids 1916, II:962. 
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lectures. Consequently, even the Commissie voor Volkslectuur, the Committee 
for the Spread of Popular Literature, became involved in the organization of 
lectures about the need for a native militia. Local Dutch and Javanese civil 
servants were likewise mobilized. What happened after this resembled the 
agitation that had surrounded the Onze Vloot propaganda. Japan was singled 
out as the main threat and Dutch-Japanese relations suffered as a conse-
quence. In their eagerness to depict the seriousness of the danger posed by 
Japan, the Dutch expressed their opinions so bluntly that Tokyo took offence. 
Japanese aggression was frequently mentioned, and they were not choosy 
in their vocabulary, as the most important reason to improve the defences 
of the Netherlands Indies. The tone was so unbridled that some feared that 
if the Indië Weerbaar advocates did not take care to mince their words, the 
campaign would do more harm than good for the future of the Netherlands 
Indies.12 One of the persons who expressed apprehension was the Dutch 
Envoy in Tokyo, D. van Asbeck. He inquired in The Hague whether nothing 
could be done to put an end to the offensive reports about Japan in the Dutch-
language newspapers in the middle of 1916.
The Japanese Consul General of course protested. He was provided with an 
excellent opportunity to do so at the end of 1916 when a Japanese Resident of 
the Netherlands Indies, Yoroyoshi Minami, who had reacted in kind to Dutch 
bombast was prosecuted. Minami, editor for Japanese affairs of what in colo-
nial jargon was called the Chinese-Malay newspaper Pertimbangan, had com-
mented on the maltreatment of a Japanese citizen by the police in Semarang. 
In an article entitled ‘Siapa lebih kedjam’ (Who is more cruel), Minami (who 
did not speak Dutch) stignatized campaigners of Indië Weerbaar as instigators 
who had been ordered by Batavia to blaze abroad that Japan had acted cruelly 
in Korea and Taiwan. Minami also noted that in Indië Weerbaar propagandists 
presented Japan as an expansionist and cruel nation while they remained silent 
about the fact that European Powers had robbed Asians of their independence 
with the sole aim of lining their own pockets. Minami had also intimated that 
in order to keep the natives stupid and so be able to continue the exploitation 
of the Netherlands Indies, the Dutch government did all it could to prevent 
the development of friendly relations between Japanese and Chinese. He had 
even accused the Dutch government of having stimulated the Chinese boycott 
of Japanese products for this very purpose.13
Within a week after the article had appeared in the Pertimbangan of 18 
September, the colonial authorities opened an investigation. What had offend-
ed senior civil servants and other Dutchmen most was that Minami would 
12 De Telegraaf, cited in De Indische Gids 1917, II:935.
13 De Locomotief, 28-9-1916; Warna Warta, cited in Koloniaal Tijdschrift 1917, I:112-3; De Indische 
Gids 1917, I:701.
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have appeal to Indonesians, prompting them to organize and resist Dutch 
rule: ‘The first thing you must do is to start a movement to make the whole 
of the Indies strong, not to repulse an attack by Japan, but only truly to gain 
freedom; one has to rise; at present the Netherlands cannot obtain weapons 
from abroad; always impress your freedom on future generations’.14 During 
Minami’s trial, part of the discussion focused on the word bergerak Minami had 
used. Soon, pergerakan was to become the general word to denote the national-
ist movement. In 1916 Dutchmen were not sure what to make of such a word. 
Did bergerak mean opstaan, to stand up or to rise, in the sense of to rebel?15 No 
Indonesian had rebelled against Dutch rule. This, the public prosecutor main-
tained was not because of Minami, but only to the ‘indifference and high level 
of civilization and development and impartiality and so forth of the readers of 
the newspaper’.16 The public prosecutor pulled out all the stops to show how 
spiteful Minami’s article had been, and how it fitted in with the actions of the 
enemies of Dutch rule: Minami’s words saying that many Japanese had died 
for the Chinese revolution; Takekoshi’s anti-Dutch articles; and the praise in 
Pertimbangan by Darnakoesoemo of Douwes Dekker as a saviour who one day 
would return to rescue his people. He also did not fail to mention that Darna-
koesoema was a former editor of De Expres. Minami himself denied that he 
had done anything wrong. He only admitted that his tone had been somewhat 
sharp. This he attributed to a severe attack of malaria fever when he had writ-
ten the article and to the fact that he had fallen very ill when, not understand-
ing the instructions, he had taken three quinine tablets three times, instead 
of three times one. The article had to be finished and Japanese were used to 
continue to work till they dropped down. Minami was sentenced to one year’s 
imprisonment, half of what had been demanded. The court had found a very 
important mitigating circumstance: Minami was ‘a half-hearted loudmouth 
and not much more than an instrument in the hands of others’.17
Malay and Chinese newspapers copied Minami’s article. They also drew 
attention to the reaction of the Japanese Consul General, Matsumoto, who 
demanded that Minami should be expelled immediately and not after he 
had served his sentence. Another demand made by the Consul General was 
the prosecution of the radical protagonists of the Indië Weerbaar movement. 
Among them were the editors of those Dutch-language newspapers which 
were most outspoken in depicting the Japanese threat and hence were guilty 
of sowing hatred against Japan and the Japanese in the eyes of the Consul 
General. He warned that if no action were taken, the safety of Dutchmen in 
14 Pertimbangan, cited in De Locomotief, 28-9-1916.
15 De Locomotief, 14-11-1916.
16 De Locomotief, 16-11-1916.
17 De Locomotief, 22-11-1916.
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Japan might no longer be guaranteed. Batavia did not yield to Japanese pres-
sure. No editors were prosecuted. Minami had to serve his sentence. After his 
release, Minami returned to Japan in October 1917. By then Pertimbangan, the 
‘Organ of all oppressed races’, had already ceased to exist.
Accusations of haatzaai and subversion had led to the conviction of Minami, 
who banged the table demanding proof of the accusation during his trial. The 
Attorney-General and the judge may have been so eager to sentence him that 
his trial set a judicial precedent. For the first time it was deemed unnecessary 
to prove that the accused had consciously intended to sow hatred to find him 
guilty. The Director of Justice took the precedent as a sign that judges were 
alive to the dangers louring over law and order in the colony.18 Indonesians 
and Chinese had other ideas. They seized upon the heavy sentence to present 
examples of Dutchmen who had insulted the feelings of non-Europeans and 
had got off scot-free.
Following in the footsteps of what had happened in the German com-
munity in the Netherlands Indies, the hostile press led to the foundation of a 
Japanese weekly. It was written in Malay and named Tjahaja Selatan, Southern 
Glow. The paper aimed to present a better image of Japan. Tjahaja Selatan 
wanted to counter what the editors described as the false reports and falla-
cious opinions about Japan which were published in the Netherlands Indies 
press. After some initial problems – all the Chinese contacted with a view to 
becoming editor-in-chief refused the offer – the first issue appeared in May 
1916. Editor was Fukuda. The anti-Japanese Chinese-Malay newspaper Sin 
Po wrote that Fukuda had owned brothels in Singapore and that he was an 
alcoholic. Sin Po also claimed that the Bank of Taiwan had provided Fukuda 
with 1,200 guilders starting capital.19 After thirty weeks Tjahaja Selatan went 
bankrupt.
Relations with Japan did not suffer alone. Another consequence of the pro-
militia campaign was that domestic political discussions gained a new dimen-
sion. To many of the nationalist leaders who were aware of the weak posi-
tion of the Netherlands Indies and the disquiet the war had caused among 
the Dutch, the militia debate provided an excellent opportunity to press for 
political and social reforms. They wanted better health care, an improvement 
in hygiene, and better education. With growing force it was stressed that the 
colonizers, the civil servants and the members of the business community, 
should change the way they treated the general population. Oetoesan Hindia 
in July 1917 wrote, for instance, that it depended on the attitude of European 
18 Note Director of Justice, 28-12-1916, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 14-6-1919 26.
19 De Locomotief, 16-6-1916.
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civil servants whether the Indonesian population would remain loyal to the 
Dutch, or would welcome another foreign ruler. When Europeans stopped 
acting in a superior way and started to treat natives as their equal, the Dutch 
did not have to fear that the ‘Japanese peaceful penetration’ would take seri-
ous root among the population.20 In a similar vein and arguing that there 
was very little ‘love’ lost among the people for the colonial government, in 
September 1918 it was stated that Dutch civil servants should start to treat 
the population as their younger brothers and not as slaves. Dutch companies 
should stop acting in a way which caused only resentment.21
Indonesians stressed that equal duties implied equal rights. The implica-
tion was that support for a militia was coupled with demands for a representa-
tive body in the colony. Compulsory education would often be mentioned as 
a second concession the Dutch government had to make in return for a native 
militia. Had this been put into practice it would have proved a very expensive 
gesture. According to a contemporary estimate, it would cost between 100 and 
150 million guilders; six to ten times the existing budget for education (Van 
Reigersberg Versluys 1917:18).
Most inclined to support a militia were the members of the central board 
of Boedi Oetomo, the organization from which supporters most of the draftees 
would have come were recruitment to be limited to young men with a certain 
level of education. Four of its members – among them Dwidjosewojo – went 
on a tour throughout Java to drum up support for a militia from local branches 
in June and July 1915. They wanted to explain to the population that the war in 
Europe had shown that ‘peaceful citizens of a neutral state can be disturbed in 
their peace and tranquillity with wife and children by foreign intruders [and] 
how human rights are simply trodden on, in one word how over there the 
right of the strongest has asserted itself enormously’.22 
The delegation did not win the popular support it had hoped for. It 
returned with a long list – twenty-six points in total – of objections and condi-
tions advanced by Boedi Oetomo members and others who had attended the 
meetings they had addressed. Among these were pleas to end legal and social 
discrimination first, have conscription preceeded by the establishment of a 
representative body, and have compulsory education preceed conscription. 
People had also argued that the Javanese were already taxed to the limit. They 
could not shoulder yet another burden (which was countered by the argument 
that come what may the Javanese had to carry the financial costs of a war and 
20 Oetoesan Hindia, 11-7-1917, IPO 28/1917.
21 Neratja, 18-9-1918.
22 Hoofdpunten van de door de afgevaardigden v/h hoofdbestuur der Boedi Oetomo te hou-
den voordrachten over de wenschelijkheid van de invoering van militieplicht onder de inlanders 
van Java en Madoera, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 13-5-1916 27.
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that a militia was far less expensive than a large professional standing army). 
At meetings others had pointed out that conscription was in the interests of 
the rich and the government only, the poor had little to gain from it. Still oth-
ers worried that pupils would not complete their education if finishing school 
meant that they ran the risk of being drafted. They had also met with disbe-
lief. The government would never allow a militia. Its soldiers would certainly 
chase the Dutch away.23
The same was experienced by Abdoel Moeis when he toured West Java in 
August 1916 to get support for the Indië Weerbaar movement from the local 
Sarekat Islam branches. Opposition at the meetings he addressed was great. 
Nobody wanted to become a soldier, to be ordered to a battlefield. ‘I stood 
almost alone, and was taunted and called a traitor to my country’, he wrote 
in a report to the Preanger-bode.24 People roared when he tried to explain to 
them how much they would suffer were another nation to take the place of 
the Dutch. Nevertheless, using all the powers of persuasion he had succeeded 
in having meetings speak out in favour of Indië Weerbaar.
Such reactions reflected the general mood. Members of the Boedi Oetomo 
accused their leaders of serving as instruments of Dutch rule (Radjiman 
1917:148). If the truth be told Javanese had flocked to the meetings. They had 
done so partly to vent their opposition, and partly after some urging by mem-
bers of the Javanese civil service to attend. A militia was not a prospect that 
appealed to the Javanese if it touched their own fate. When Batavia sounded 
out the opinion of the Residents and Regents in Java, the conclusion was that 
enthusiasm among the population was like a damp squid. The Director of the 
Civil Service feared that the mood among the educated Javanese was even less 
favourable.25 
Javanese nationalist leaders used the militia campaign first and foremost as 
a political instrument. Their support for a militia was because they saw it as a 
means to enforce reforms. This was particularly clear in August 1915 during 
a conference of Boedi Oetomo in Bandung, where the militia was one of the 
main points on the agenda. Again strong reservations were the order of the 
day. Those present made no secret of their opinion that Boedi Oetomo, which 
had only a few thousand members at most, could not speak on behalf of the 
Javanese population, especially not when what it had to say concerned an 
issue which was to touch the lives of many. Only a representative body could 
reflect the opinion of the people. In line with this, a motion was carried which 
expressed support for conscription only conditionally. Stressing that it was 
23 Ringkasan pendapat lezing-lezing oetoesan hoofdbestuur B.O. tentang militie-plicht boeat 
boemi-poetra, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 13-5-1916 27.
24 Preanger-bode, cited in De Locomotief, 8-9-1916.
25 Tollenaar to Idenburg, 26-11-1915, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 13-5-1916 27.
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essential that law and order remained undisturbed for the gradual advance-
ment of the Javanese, and that the people be obliged to assist in this effort, 
the necessity of a native militia was acknowledged. In return, the colonial 
government should pay a price to gain the cooperation of the population. In 
view of the many objections and because of the uncertainty of what concrete 
form conscription would take, the population had to be consulted before any 
further steps were taken. This meant that a representative body should be cre-
ated.26 In the Dutch-language newspapers it was reported that the motion was 
received with thunderous applause.27 
Reservations among members of the Sarekat Islam were even greater. 
Only a minority of the branches in Java – according to Abdoel Moeis only 
20 out of 120 – were in favour.28 Nevertheless, the central board decided to 
acquiesce in the plan. Using the opportunity to stress that the party’s ultimate 
aim was independence under the protection of the Netherlands – an objective 
which might be threatened were the Archipelago to be occupied by another 
country – in August 1916 a resolution was drafted which called for reforms 
and a change in attitude on the part of the Dutch. It was observed that Dutch 
civil servants and other members of the European community were far from 
being paragons of the Ethical Policy. They continued to treat the population 
with contempt and disdain. Observing that ‘the delusion of superiority of 
the Dutch’ and the arbitrariness in the behaviour of both Dutch civil serv-
ants and private persons had caused displeasure and resentment among the 
population, the colonial government was urged to act to find ways to remove 
the causes of popular discontent. Only then could it be assured that if the 
Netherlands Indies were invaded ‘the displeasure and resentment will not 
elicit resistance from the population, unwillingness to place their trust in the 
government, making the task of the state more difficult’. In conclusion it was 
stated that the ways to improve the defence of the colony was a matter to be 
decided on by a Parliament, elected by the people of the Netherlands Indies. 
Admitting that it would take time to form such a representative body, and 
that international developments might make the establishment of a militia a 
compelling necessity, it was asserted that conscription should at the very least 
be coupled with an improvement in the civil rights of the population. This 
was the only way the people would consider conscription ‘a national duty’ 
and would accept it without feelings of ‘aversion and resentment’. The Sarekat 
Islam board presented compulsory military service as the lesser of two evils. 
Improving the defence of the Netherlands Indies indubitably would result in 
additional taxes. The native population, living ‘in very miserable economic 
26 Motion Boedi Oetomo meeting, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 13-5-1916 27.
27 The Preanger-bode, cited in the De Indische Gids 1915, II:1613. 
28 De Locomotief, 19-1-1917.
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circumstances’ could ill afford to bear such extra financial burdens.29 
The fact that such critical voices were so openly and frequently expressed 
puzzled the editors of newspapers in Holland. Up to that moment they had 
received from the Netherlands Indies only reports about manifestations in 
support of Dutch rule in such troubled times, and had enthusiastically wel-
comed such tidings as an indication that the colony was ruled in a right and 
proper fashion. Was the resolution of Sarekat Islam a threat, as the Nieuwe 
Rotterdamsche Courant maintained, or, as Het Vaderland put it, a warning?30 
Another conclusion was that ‘people over there’ had deceived the Dutch in 
Holland by reporting only on proponents of a militia, ignoring the opposition 
to it.31
In their coupling of conscription with political reforms Indonesians pre-
sented the Dutch with a problem. There were those who agreed that politi-
cal concessions had to be made in return for conscription. ‘Remember the 
Philippines’ was no longer heard as a slogan, but to some Dutch people, and 
Idenburg was among them, the Dutch should rule the colony in such a way 
that the population would realize that they would only be worse off were 
another country to replace Dutch overlordship.32 Elaborating on the theme 
that it was the attitude of the people which in the last resort would determine 
whether the Netherlands could hold on to its colony, some Dutch people 
began to express their disappointment in fact that too little had been done to 
secure the loyalty of the Indonesians. The Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad wrote that 
had such a policy been followed, it would have rendered the cry ‘Asia for 
the Asians’ ineffective as a political slogan.33 In De Locomotief it was initially 
argued that conscription should be restricted to the intellectuals and the urban 
well-to-do. If they aspired to full civil rights, this implied that they had to 
shoulder full civic duties.34
Others found the link between a militia and political reform less obvious. 
They pointed out that both the Javanese and the Dutch would suffer were the 
Japanese to take over. Or, as a report by a senior naval officer about the strength-
ening of the Dutch fleet stated, the Japanese had ‘completely different views 
about the rights to which an oppressor is entitled than civilized Westerners 
are entertaining’.35 In the eyes of these Dutch people, this observation made 
the demand for political concessions irrelevant. Some also grumbled about 
29 Motion Central Sarekat Islam, 29-8-1916, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 15-11-1916 Q14.
30 De Indische Gids 1917, I:490-5.
31 Koloniaal Tijdschrift 1917:236-8.
32 Orgaan der Vereeniging ‘Indië Weerbaar’ 1-3:13.
33 Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad, cited in De Indische Gids 1916, I:608.
34 De Locomotief, 15-9-1914.
35 Note Tijdeman, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 1-12-1914 Q23.
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the lack of appreciation shown for their good intentions. Another reason put 
forward as grounds to refuse concessions in return for conscription was the 
economic and social development of the population the colonial government 
wanted to achieve. Had the aim of the Dutch presence still been the exploita-
tion of the colony, as it had been before 1900, matters would have been differ-
ent. Now that Javanese benefited from Dutch rule there was nothing wrong in 
having them have to serve their country (Van der Weijden 1916:24-5).
There was also some irritation. In expressing their opinion, some Javanese 
did not behave as servile people and did not hesitate to bring home their point in 
plain, unsubmissive language. Their initiative in daring to formulate demands 
in this way did not go down well in the European community. The journal of 
the Nederlandsch-Indische Officiers Vereeniging (Netherlands Indies Officers 
Association) asserted that when the indigenous population fully realized that 
the loss of the Netherlands Indies would be as great a disaster for them as for 
the Dutch, they would recognize that it was not becoming to ask first ‘what do 
we get in return’ before agreeing to a militia.36 This lamentation was uttered 
in relation to what had happened during a debate organized by the Indische 
Krijgskundige Vereeniging (Indian Military Association) in the military club 
Concordia in Batavia in April 1916. Forty Indonesians had attended. On this 
occasion, at which General De Greve, pleading for a general conscription of 
Javanese, had conjured up a picture of ‘farming soldiers or drilling farmers’ 
much in the fashion of the later people’s armies, four of them had given a 
talk.37 One was Satiman, who described life in the military barracks as hell on 
earth and argued that much was demanded of the native population, while 
nothing was given in return. He was immediately put in his place by Captain 
W. Muurling. Muurling said that the distrust in the good intentions of the 
Dutch administration which such words implied was completely unfounded. 
Indonesians should be aware that the government had frequently shown that 
it acted in a fair and just way and would certainly continue to do so in the 
future. Satiman (and the other Indonesians who had addressed the meeting 
in a similar vein) should not forget that they were guests at the meeting. The 
journal of the Netherlands Indies Officers Association concluded that, in view 
of ‘the sympathetic attitude of a large part of the native population in August 
and September 1914’, what had been said at the meeting had come as a disap-
pointment. The Indonesians who had taken the floor surely did not belong to 
the ‘most enlightened members of Native society’.38
The Indië Weerbaar drive reached its climax in the summer of 1916. In 
July 1916 the Comité Indië Weerbaar was formed. H. s’Jacob, chairman of the 
36 De Indische Gids 1916, II:968.
37 De Indische Gids 1916, I:774.
38 De Indische Gids 1916, II:968.
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Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Batavia, was appointed its President. 
Deputy Chairman was M.C. Koning, the manager of the KPM. The commit-
tee had two secretaries. One was H.G. Brandon. The other was W.V. Rhemrev, 
a retired Indo-European captain in the colonial army. Among the organi-
zations supporting the committee were the Boedi Oetomo, Sarekat Islam, 
the Regentenbond (Regents Association), and Narpo Wandowo (Union of 
Princes). Insulinde refused to join. Elsewhere in Java committees were found-
ed, on which Indonesians and Chinese, preferably the Regents and the heads 
of the Chinese community, also sat. At times, and how could it be otherwise, 
such committees organized fancy fairs, music and theatrical performances, 
and other events to raise money. Stirred up by the nationalist sentiments 
evoked by the campaign, and by the stress laid upon improving the defence of 
the colony, individuals also did their bit. In Semarang people who thought it 
unfair that money was being collected only for ambulances in Europe started 
a drive to finance a ‘Red Cross car’ for the colonial army. An Ambulance 
Committee Central Java was formed. The familiar scene was repeated. Once 
again ladies visited offices to collect money and a soirée was organized in the 
club. The Indische Lloyd promised free insurance for the ambulance. The De 
Locomotief also threw its weight behind the campaign and put inserts in its 
copies in an effort to convince people to donate money. In West Java three tea 
planters donated 1,800 guilders. The money was intended to be used to buy a 
machine-gun for the army.39 
The committee certainly displayed a talent for organization. Its campaign 
was scheduled to reach its climax on 31 August 1916, Weerbaarheidsdag, 
Defence Day. In the days leading up to that date, mass gatherings were held 
in cities all over Java to explain an Indië Weerbaar motion. The resolution read 
that the war had pressed ‘upon every nation the inexorable lesson that it had 
to be capable of organizing its own defence and if so needed [to be] ready to 
maintain its independence with its own forces and energy [...]’. Noting that the 
state of defence of the Netherlands Indies filled ‘everybody who is revolted 
by the possibility of an eventual overpowering and all the fatal consequences 
thereof with feelings of the deepest disappointment and perturbation’ the 
motion stressed the ‘vital interest of enabling the Netherlands Indies to defend 
itself on land and sea speedily and thoroughly’.40 In order not to lose the sup-
port of the central board of the Sarekat Islam, the term militia was not men-
tioned in the resolution.
Yet more meetings were held on Queen’s Birthday to express formal sup-
port for the motion, and where Dutch people, but not only they, expressed 
patriotic feelings. On 31 August care was taken not to hold the meeting in the 
39 De Locomotief, 11-9-1916, 18-9-1916, 27-9-1916, 11-10-1916.
40 s’Jacob to Wilhelmina, 2-9-1916, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 9-9-1916 N1.
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evening. It was a Thursday, and malam djoemat, the evening before Friday was 
an especially sacred time for many Muslims.
All meetings, on 31 August and before, were a patent manifestation of 
nationalist feelings. Dutch flags were displayed and red-white-blue Indië 
Weerbaar posters were pasted up all over towns. It was reported that the 
meetings were all well attended, and that more people had turned up than 
expected. In Semarang, former non-commissioned officers wearing their deco-
rations and accompanied by a band marched through town on 31 August. In 
Bandung hundreds of Indonesians did the same. Members of the volunteer 
corps marched in the van. The parade ended at the alun-alun, where gymnastic 
displays put on by European soldiers and a drill by Ambonese soldiers, pre-
ceded the actual meeting. In Surabaya, where the driving force behind the Indië 
Weerbaar movement was S.J. Hirsch, the President of the influential Algemeen 
Syndicaat van Suikerfabrikanten (General Syndicate of Sugar Producers) that 
is the association of administrators of sugar estates, the meeting took a spe-
cial form. In the four corners of the Municipal Gardens Europeans, Natives, 
Chinese, and Arabs assembled and each group was addressed by its own rep-
resentative. For the Europeans the speaker was J.G. Boon of the Soerabaiasch 
Handelsblad. Thereupon the crowds walked to the music pavilion in the centre 
of the park where Hirsch read the resolution with a loud voice.
Everywhere in Java all seems to have gone as planned. In smaller cities like 
Sukabumi, Salatiga, Purworejo, and Purwakarta thousands of people attend-
ed. Nevertheless, imperfections could be spotted, indicating that among Dutch 
people enthusiasm was not as great as the reports would have us believe. In 
Surakarta the brother of the sunan attended a meeting on 27 August, as did 
many princes of the royal courts. The manifestation could be counted a suc-
cess, but it also had all the hallmarks of a failure. Many Javanese, Chinese, 
and Arabs attended – reportedly 10,000 in total –, but only a few Dutch people 
were present. The chairman of the meeting spoke publicly about a disgrace.41 
In Makassar no meeting at all was held. Nobody wanted to organize it. The 
same had happened in Magelang, a garrison city.42
Outside Java Indië Weerbaar also won support. In Banjarmasin the drive 
resulted in the establishment of a European volunteer corps, 39 persons 
strong.43 In Aceh a committee had drawn up a motion urging for measures 
witch would result in a Weerbaar Indië, a defensible Netherlands Indies, as 
soon as possible. It was reported with some pride that thanks to the telephone 
the text had been transmitted to Dutchmen all over Aceh in no less than two 
days. By phone people could also express their support to the motion. On 31 
41 De Locomotief, 27-8-1916, 28-8-1916.
42 De Locomotief, 1-9-1916, 7-9-1916.
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August a few hundred people assembled in the Juliana Club in Banda Aceh, 
the capital, to express their support. All were Dutch. No Acehnese, Chinese, 
or Arabs were present. They had not been invited. The excuse was that the 
organizers of the meeting had been in such a hurry that they had forgotten 
to invite representatives of the non-European population. The Dutch people 
present were addressed by the Governor, Lieutenant General H.N.A. Swart, 
who quoting President Theodore Roosevelt, impressed upon his audience 
that no one who was not prepared to die for a holy cause was worth living. 
The national anthem resounded in the club.44 The mistake of not inviting 
non-Dutch people was redeemed in October, when 500 people, Europeans, 
Chinese, and Indonesians, attended a meeting on 15 October at which an Indië 
Weerbaar committee was constituted in Banda Aceh. For those who did not 
understand Dutch, the Dutch speeches were translated by Mohamad Djam, 
adviser to the local Sarekat Islam, who took the opportunity to urge his fel-
low-Indonesians to join the new association. Indonesians should realize what 
the consequences would be, were the rule of the Dutch to be replaced by that 
of another power. Electing a board of which Mohamad Djam, a number of 
Acehnese, and a local Chinese were to be among the members, was no prob-
lem: ‘The Governor, practical as always, suggested that he would suggest the 
persons for the board. Agreed was shouted as one voice.’45 
In West Sumatra the call was taken up by those who wanted to defend tra-
ditional customs against any further Islamization of society. They harnessed 
Orange, loyalty to the Dutch Queen, and Indië Weerbaar to this struggle.46 In 
East Sumatra where feelings of insecurity were especially acute and a drive 
had been started to induce European men to join volunteer corpses, support 
had a wider base. In Medan a meeting was organized by Je Maintiendrai on 31 
August. Je Maintiendrai had been founded earlier the same month. Its inaugu-
ral meeting had been marred by an embarrassing incident. As someone from 
Medan wrote in a telegram to De Locomotief the Assistent-Resident had been 
unadroit ‘clumsy’ enough to invite a Japanese to attend because he wanted to 
remove the impression that it was an anti-Japanese manifestation. The Dutch 
people present decided otherwise and rejected the Japanese in question from 
the meeting.47
Chairman of Je Maintiendrai was H. Ketner, head administrator of the 
Hollandsch-Amerikaansche Plantage Maatschappij (Holland American 
Plantation Company) and one of the initiators. Among its board members was 
the chairman of the local Boedi Oetomo branch. The main aim of the associa-
44 De Locomotief, 12-9-1916, 30-10-1916.
45 De Locomotief, 30-10-1916.
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tion was to provide the East Coast of Sumatra with a Weerbaarheids-verenig-
ing (Defence Association). True to the conviction of its founders that the East 
Coast of Sumatra was economically important enough not to be abandoned 
in the event of war, the Medan meeting passed a slightly different resolution. 
It called for the speedy establishment of a militia and for a strong defence not 
only of Java but also of the other islands of the Archipelago.48 The resolution 
was received at the 31 August meeting amid loud cheering and the singing 
of the ‘Wien Neêrlands bloed’ ‘(He who has Dutch blood) the then Dutch 
national anthem.49 Within months Je Maintiendrai would have 1,150 Dutch, 
931 Indonesian, and 37 Chinese members, and 15,760 guilders in hand.50 
As was the case with the Sarekat Islam and Boedi Oetomo in Java, the 
board members of Je Maintiendrai were more inclined to express support for 
a militia than were the rank and file. The latter displayed some radical tenden-
cies. This became evident in September 1916 when a meeting to promote the 
aims of Je Maintiendrai was held in the Oranje Bioscoop in Medan. The chair-
men of the local branches of the Boedi Oetomo and Sarekat Islam spoke out 
in support of Je Maintiendrai. The audience could not agree wholeheartedly. 
One of those present flatly appealed that any backing be refused, as long as the 
population was treated unfairly by the colonial administration. To substanti-
ate his words he mentioned that the Indonesian members of the municipal 
council were still appointed, and that roads in the Indonesian quarters of town 
were neglected, while those in European neighbourhoods were well kept.51 
On 31 August 1916 the most important meeting of all took place in Deca Park 
in Batavia, opposite the palace of the Governor-General. The Indië Weerbaar 
leaders had looked forward to the meeting with some misgivings. They had 
realized that Indonesians had seized upon their movement to voice their own 
demands. Hence during a preparatory meeting the organizers had decided 
that it ‘was self-evident that debates in which deviant opinions are defended’ 
would not be tolerated.52 Voices of protest might detract from what they had 
in mind and might even doom the meeting into a failure. It even made one of 
proponents of Indië Weerbaar, D. van Hinloopen Labberton, doubt whether 
it was wise to hold a public meeting. Whatever the manifestation was it was 
not a failure. If we may believe the Batavia correspondent of De Locomotief 
this could not be attributed to the efforts of s’Jacob, the chairman of the Indië 
Weerbaar committee. His opening speech, much too long and spoken in a soft, 
48 Ketner and Schadée to Van Limburg Stirum, 8-8-1916, Ketner and Schadée to Pleyte, 31-8-
1916, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 9-9-1916 N10, Vb. 23-11-1916 C15.
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uninspired voice, had almost ruined the meeting. Almost nobody had been 
able to hear what he had said. That the thousands for whom s’Jacob’s words 
had been inaudible had not rioted the correspondent attributed to the fact that 
they were natives.53 What he believed had saved the day was the speech by 
Soetan Toemenggoeng, assistent-wedana of Senen. He had brightened up the 
mood conspicuously. Enthusiasm had reached a climax when ‘the small, sym-
pathetic native’ waving the Dutch flag had cried out ‘Hidoeplah SBM Koningin 
Wilhelmina!’, Long Live HM Queen Wilhelmina.54 s’Jacob had erred even more 
in the eyes of the Batavia De Locomotief correspondent. When the motion had 
come up, s’Jacobs had asked those who were against to leave. How could he 
have suggested this? In the crowd it was impossible to leave.55 
Whatever his own performance s’Jacob afterwards proudly wired Queen 
Wilhelmina that dozens of native and Chinese societies – 43 to be exact – had 
sent representatives to the meeting.56 He estimated that between 10,000 
and 15,000 people had attended. De Locomotief was also impressed by the 
‘tremendous crowd’. It wrote that 10,000 people had been present, among 
53 De Locomotief, 4-9-1916.
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them ‘strikingly many ladies and natives’. The resolution had been accepted 
with ‘thunderous applause’.57 What had transpired at the Deca Park greatly 
impressed Van Limburg Stirum. In a lengthy wire to Pleyte, he called attention 
to a ‘remarkable sign of evolution in native thought’ and in the relationship 
‘between different classes and with us’. Van Limburg Stirum was convinced 
that the main reason why a militia received such massive support was that 
people realized that Dutch rule was the best guarantee for political and social 
development. Hence, he also wired that ‘in native minds obtaining political 
rights and attaining higher social and political standing are intimately con-
nected with a militia’.58 
In The Hague the government published a statement. It was full of praise 
for the ‘peculiar’ meetings of 31 Augustus. It was explained to the full to the 
Dutch public that these should be seen as manifestations of the ‘progressive 
development of native society and of the changes in the relationship between 
the different population groups as well as with the Motherland’.59 Pleyte also 
had a message for Van Limburg Stirum, which he had to convey to s’Jacob and 
Ketner. It must have brought the Dutch community in the Netherlands Indies 
down to earth with a jolt. The ‘extraordinary burdensome circumstances of the 
day’ did not allow for more than modest steps to be taken to strengthen the 
defence of the Netherlands Indies.60 The message was not exactly encourag-
ing, which was indeed the reaction from somebody in Aceh, and he was not 
the only one to draw this conclusion.61 Queen Wilhelmina praised the Indië 
Weerbaar campaign in her Queen’s speech. She had the same sobering mes-
sage.
The meeting in the Deca Park over, the Indië Weerbaar committee dissolved 
itself. Within months a new committee took its place. A committee to set up an 
association to promote the defence of the Netherlands Indies was founded in 
January 1917, again with the goal of achieving the participation of all popula-
tion groups. The initiators were concerned not only with military defence of 
the colony but also with its economic resilience. Chairman was K.A.R. Bosscha, 
manager of an estate near Bandung and a member of the Indië Weerbaar com-
mittee in that city. Among the members were Rhemrev, Van der Boon, the 
chairman of the Batavia branch of Onze Vloot, E.H. Carpentier Alting, E.A. 
Zeilinga, W. Muurling, R.A.A. Achmad Djajadiningrat and J.A. Soselisa. The 
association was formally founded on 31 August 1917. 
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In between there was one matter that remained unresolved. Before 31 
August Indonesian leaders who supported the movement had already made 
it clear that they wanted to send a delegation to Holland to plead the Indië 
Weerbaar cause. They saw a trip to Holland as a good tactic to have their voice 
and their demands heard there. s’Jacob, and probably Van Limburg Stirum, 
did not like it. s’Jacob’s worst fear was that the visit of a deputation would spoil 
the intentions of his committee. When the idea had come up, he could only 
agree because he considered the task of his committee finished after the Deca 
meeting. If the nationalist leaders wanted a deputation to travel to Holland, 
so be it.62 The matter was not solved so easily. After rumours had spread in 
Batavia about discord in the Indië Weerbaar committee, which to the chagrin 
of the press always met behind closed doors, its secretary, namely Brandon, 
explained in a letter to the newspapers in that city at the end of September that 
the committee had been dissolved but that it wanted to help to organize the 
trip for the deputation.63 The secretary took great care to stress that the depu-
tation and the Indië Weerbaar motion were two separate matters. It was also 
emphasized that sending a deputation to Holland was something the ‘native 
associations’ valued very much, and that ‘most European groups’ did not see 
the good of it. In spite of these words the committee more or less took over. 
It ‘ordered’ the delegation to present the motion to the Queen, the Minister 
of the Colonies, and the States General. It also suggested that the deputation, 
as it came to be called, would be chaired by D. van Hinloopen Labberton. De 
Locomotief wrote that the Deputation was the ‘most expensive postman con-
ceivable’.64 A Chinese-Malay paper concluded that Van Hinloopen Labberton 
was going along as a baboe, as nanny.65 Others used the same qualification. Van 
Hinloopen Labberton was ‘an expensive sea baboe’.
A second baboe to be suggested by the committee was Idenburg. To see that 
everything went smoothly in Holland Idenburg was indeed asked to act as the 
delegation’s mentor in Holland. This suggestion had the full support of Van 
Limburg Stirum. Idenburg’s role as ‘protector’, as Van Limburg Stirum styled 
this, was essential. In Holland the deputation would need such a person, 
somebody who could give moral support and counsel. At all costs it should be 
avoided that the mission be a failure. That would only result in a ‘new core of 
malcontents’.66 Pleyte had to explain in Parliament that Idenburg’s role should 
not be interpreted as an attempt to censor the delegation or to keep a check on 
what its members said and did.
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Another reason for involving Idenburg was that Van Hinloopen Labberton, 
who had just become a teacher at the newly founded Bestuursschool, an insti-
tution intended for the further training of civil servants, was controversial. 
‘Labby’ had been a contributor to Het Tijdschrift and stood out as teetotaller 
in a European society with a preponderance for heavy drinks. He was also 
a staunch supporter of the association ideal and a theosophist. Because of 
his views he had to live with the nickname ‘the astral rabbit’. His conduct 
irritated people on both the left and to the right. Members of the Dutch com-
munity considered him a ‘hyper-ethicist’. People of a leftist inclination held 
a somewhat different view and called him a theosophical imperialist. At the 
outbreak of the war Van Hinloopen Labberton had given talks about world 
peace. He soon changed his mind and became one the main protagonists of a 
militia. According to one of his critics, he had ‘travelled over Java wearing a 
head-cloth and speaking high Javanese to win over the hearts of the Natives’ 
(Semaoen 1918:86). He advocated conscription as an institution by which to 
educate the population and give the Javanese more self-confidence.67 For Van 
Hinloopen Labberton a militia had become a matter of faith. As Muurling 
had done, he criticized the Javanese speakers at the meeting in Concordia for 
the bluntness with which they had demanded political reform. He was also 
among those Dutch people who were most outspoken in his denunciations 
of Japan, doing his best to picture as vividly as he could the cruel nature of 
Japanese rule in Korea and Formosa, depicting Japan as a ferocious animal.68 
Minami had even singled him out by name as the fiercest anti-Japanese orator 
in Indië Weerbaar.
Van Hinloopen Labberton could also not count on much sympathy from 
Van Limburg Stirum and his advisers. They did not rate his qualities highly. 
He could only be entrusted with simple tasks: arranging accommodation; 
organizing visits; financial management; and drawing up time schedules. 
s’Jacob explained in a telegram to the former Governor-General that Idenburg’s 
role would be ‘of value in preventing mismanagement and causes of disap-
pointment’. Idenburg, as would become crystal clear was afraid of the political 
implications of the deputation’s trip to Holland, and was not overjoyed by the 
offer. He accepted, but only on the condition that Van Hinloopen Labberton 
gave his consent and would take no initiatives during his stay in Holland 
without consulting him first. Van Hinloopen Labberton promised to do so.69
In the delegation the Boedi Oetomo was to be represented by Dwidjo-
sewojo, the Sarekat Islam by Abdoel Moeis (a member of the Indië Weerbaar 
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committee in Bandung), the Regents Association by Raden Temenggoeng 
Danoesoegondo, Regent of Magelang (who as the oldest member of the depu-
tation would be presented in Holland with a royal decoration), and the Union 
of Princes by Pangeran Ario Koesoemodiningrat, the brother of the Sunan of 
Surakarta. 
The aims of the deputation received the formal support of the colo-
nial authorities. In his correspondence with the Ministry of the Colonies Van 
Limburg Stirum expressed the hope that by this ‘extraordinary action from 
the native side’, more attention would be paid in Holland to the complaints 
heard among the population about the absence of political participation, 
the lack of educational opportunities, and the legal insecurity of the indig-
enous population. He saw an additional advantage in the fact that a plea for 
stronger defence conveyed by natives could not fail to make an impression in 
Holland.70 His view was shared by the management of the Javasche Bank. In 
the bank’s report for 1916-1917 it was noted that 
the war urges that in the interests of the Netherlands in the colonies every atten-
tion is concentrated on the development of the population of the Netherlands 
Indies in a direction which satisfies the modest demands of the population as well 
as meeting the necessary demands for the retention of the colonies.71 
In conclusion it was stated that such a policy could not but cement the unity 
among the various population groups.
Nevertheless, Batavia entertained doubts about the mission and refused 
to act in haste. The members of the deputation had wanted to leave on the 
first sailing opportunity; on the Goentoer on 13 September. Batavia delayed the 
departure of the deputation by several months. The Indië Weerbaar committee 
initially explained that the reason for the delay was lack of sailing opportuni-
ties and the need to prepare the visit to Holland with care.72 The Minister of 
the Colonies had to be given time to consult with the Queen first.73 In its letter 
to the newspapers it finally admitted that the delay had been at the request 
of Van Limburg Stirum. It was announced that the deputation would depart 
in January.74 In retrospect, Abdoel Moeis considered the delay a blessing in 
disguise. At the time of the Indië Weerbaar drive H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto had 
been ill, and the party had been in too much disarray to counter the anti-Indië 
Weerbaar propaganda among its members, which Abdoel Moeis attributed 
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to outsiders. Since then the central board had succeeded in consolidating its 
influence. The result was that the number of branches which supported the 
sending of a deputation to Holland had swelled from 20 to 80.75 Tjokroaminoto 
had indeed succeeded in winning branches over. He had addressed meeting, 
explaining that Indië Weerbaar formed part of the campaign for emancipation 
and that it was a duty of a nation to be able to defend itself. Popular as he was, 
his words carried weight.
Though initially the Indië Weerbaar committee rejected any such sugges-
tions, stressing that it had 24,000 guilders at its disposal, a sum insufficient to 
pay for extra members, the deputation now had two additional members. One 
was Rhemrev, one of the two secretaries of the Indië Weerbaar committee, and 
the source of the discord among its members. Rhemrev had been added to the 
delegation after, on the initiative of one H.F. Neuman, a resident of Batavia, 
a number of ‘Dutch’ organizations, probably at the instigation of Rhemrev 
himself had pleaded for his inclusion as ‘a Dutchman born here’; a qualifica-
tion indicating how sensitive Indo-Europeans were about their position in 
society.76 The campaign to include Rhemrev was supported by the Nieuws van 
den Dag and other Dutch-language newspapers. To put it mildly, Rhemrev was 
not a modest man. He was proud that he was a Companion 4th Class of the 
Military Order of William and presented himself as the ‘Dutch representative’ 
in the deputation. He even claimed that he had been the initiator of the Indië 
Weerbaar drive (Rhemrev 1917:1-2). His supporters, and Rhemrev himself, 
used the term during his stay in Holland, calling him the Father of Indië 
Weerbaar, or in Malay Bapa I.W.77
Rhemrev’s joining the deputation radically changed its nature. It was 
no longer a deputation representing the native and nationalist segment of 
the population. His inclusion was also used in vain to try to get rid of Van 
Hinloopen Labberton, who whatever his faults might have been, was a 
staunch supporter of the gradual emancipation of the Indonesian population. 
It was argued that with Rhemrev on board it was no longer necessary for Van 
Hinloopen Labberton to go along. When this failed, another move, initiated by 
Neuman, was to plead for the inclusion of representatives from the Minahasa 
and the Moluccas, regions where Christianity had made its mark, and where 
the indigenous associations were much more moderate than in Java. 
The second drive was partially successful. The second addition to the depu-
tation was F. Laoh, an employee of the KPM and President of the Perserikatan 
Minahassa, an organization which claimed to have 12,000 members, some of 
them soldiers from North Celebes. The authorities had initially overlooked this 
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union when the mass meeting in Batavia was planned. Though in September 
the Indië Weerbaar committee had indicated that other groups were welcome 
to join the deputation, and had revealed that such requests had been made by 
the Minahasan and Ambonese communities no representative from Ambon 
was included. People from the Moluccas were very disappointed. One news-
paper wrote that the omission was a disgrace: 
Doesn’t the Committee know that an enormous amount of Ambonese blood has 
been spilled for the Netherlands in battles in Aceh, Lombok and Jambi? Had it not 
been Ambonese who had captured the rulers of Bone and Gowa, and who had 
killed the Batak archrebel, Singa Mangaradja?78
On 3 January 1917, the members of the deputation boarded the Sindoro for the 
voyage to Holland. The gangplank was decorated with flags and flowers. Half 
the deck had been reserved to enable people to say goodbye. Abdoel Moeis 
had left his place of residence, Bandung, two days before. He had been seen 
off by hundreds of members of Sarekat Islam. To the accompaniment of music 
the crowd had marched from his house to the railway station. In Batavia he 
joined a dinner for the deputation hosted by s’Jacob, whom Abdoel Moeis 
described as ‘the president and soul’ of Indië Weerbaar. The first port of call 
was Padang, the city Abdoel Moeis had left eleven years before. The quay was 
thronged with people. The members of the deputation disembarked to attend 
a meeting where the aims of Indië Weerbaar were explained. Abdoel Moeis 
took the opportunity to see his family and friends. The Sindoro delayed her 
sailing by a few hours to allow him more time with them. A second call was 
made in Sabang. Here the members of the deputation were received in the 
Sabang Setia (Loyal Sabang) a club ‘for all subjected nations’.79
During the long voyage the Indonesian members of the deputation expe-
rienced the harsh realities of what colonial relations in those days meant. 
Abdoel Moeis noted that the European passengers refused to sit at the same 
table as the natives. He himself was shunted by 90 per cent of the passengers. 
The reason was that he was not just a native but that he was seen as one of the 
leaders of a rebellion that had taken place in Jambi.80
The Sindoro sailed through the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. Having tra-
versed the Mediterranean Sea, she sustained heavy damage near Gibraltar. 
During a storm she struck a rock and began to make water. All passengers 
were brought ashore. Rhemrev and some other members of the Deputation 
thought it safest to stay in Gibraltar till the Sindoro was repaired and could 
continue her voyage to Holland. The more adventurous, among them Van 
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Hinloopen Labberton and Abdoel Moeis, decided to travel on overland via 
France, Switzerland, and Germany. It promised to be a hazardous journey. 
They would try to reach the Netherlands, it was reported from Madrid.81 In 
fact, they arrived in Holland in the evening of 5 March, ahead of the other 
members of the Deputation. While in Switzerland Van Hinloopen Labberton 
and Abdoel Moeis addressed the Dutch community in Geneva. Abdoel Moeis, 
for whom it was the first occasion on which he addressed an audience in Dutch, 
used the opportunity to criticize the Chinese in the Netherlands Indies. He 
explained to his audience that the Sarekat Islam had been founded in reaction 
to the way in which Chinese middlemen exploited the small man. He made no 
bones about the fact of how arrogantly Chinese had begun to behave, caught 
up as they were in the thrill of the political developments in China’.82 After 
his arrival in Holland, he touched upon this theme at various meetings. On 
one occasion he called attention to the fate of Javanese who had fallen victim 
to the pernicious practices of rice brokers (not mentioning that most of them 
were Chinese) who bought rice on speculation at a low price before the har-
vest from peasants who were pressed for money. Reports about Abdoel Moeis’ 
speeches complemented by the assessment that he intended to set the Javanese 
against the Chinese reached the newspapers in the Netherlands Indies via the 
Dutch press. Confronted with such reports, Abdoel Moeis had to deny that 
he had tried to stir up the Javanese against the Chinese. He defended himself 
by stating that he had wanted to stand up for the oppressed people and had 
wanted to demonstrate that one of the aims of the Sarekat Islam was to have 
indigenous Indonesians enter the wholesale trade. His words did not suffice 
to stop a campaign against him in the Chinese-Malay press, which continued 
well into 1918.83 
In Holland a cautious Idenburg had seen to it that the police kept the mem-
bers of the delegation under surveillance. Names of people who visited them 
were noted down. Police supervision was somewhat relaxed when a socialist 
Member of Parliament, J.W. Albarda, protested. Pleyte tried to reassure him. 
Idenburg had only asked for help from the police to protect them from ‘acci-
dents in the street’.84
Almost at once Dwidjosewojo and Abdoel Moeis clashed with Idenburg. 
From the very beginning Idenburg had made it clear that he would not acqui-
esce in members of the deputation holding speeches or participating in politi-
cal demonstrations before they had been received in audience by the Queen 
81 De Locomotief, 1-3-2002.
82 De Indische Gids 1917, I:489-90.
83 Oetoesan Hindia, 14-9-1917, 15-9-1917, 17-9-1917; Neratja, 9-11-1918, 25-2-1918, 6-3-1918, 7-3-
1918; Tichelman 1985:641, 645.
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and by the Minister of the Colonies. Were they to do so he would withdraw 
as councellor of the Deputation and put an advertisement in Dutch newspa-
pers explaining the reasons why he was no longer prepared to act as such. 
When true to their conviction and also in accordance with the brief Boedi 
Oetomo and Sarekat Islam had given them Dwidjosewojo and Abdoel Moeis 
ignored Idenburg’s demand and in public spoke about the political conces-
sions the Dutch would have to make for a militia a conflict was born. A meet-
ing Idenburg had arranged with members of the Dutch States General and the 
Council of State in April was cancelled. Idenburg had hoped that the members 
of the delegation would have been able to give vent to their ‘political heart’ 
on this occasion. In return in the meantime they should not address political 
meetings. Abdoel Moeis and Dwidjosewojo had stated their conditions. They 
demanded that after the meeting with the members of the States-General they 
could report on what had been discussed in the periodicals of the Sarekat 
Islam and Boedi Oetomo. They said that this was an obligation to their parties 
they had to honour. Practically their resolve to honour their obligations meant 
the end of Idenburg’s role as ‘protector’. He refused to act ‘as impresario or 
host at a public meeting’. A second reason for Idenburg’s unwillingness to go 
ahead with the meeting was that Abdoel Moeis had addressed a gathering in 
the Zuid-Hollandsche Koffiehuis (South Holland Coffee House) before the 
deputation had been received in audience by the Queen. On hearing about 
Abdoel Moeis’s speech, Idenburg had immediately sent a letter to the deputa-
tion in which he announced that he severed all ties with them. Rhemrev called 
the cancelling of the meeting with members of the States-General ‘a punish-
ment’ for Abdoel Moeis’s behaviour. He claimed that it was thanks to his 
efforts that Idenburg had not withdrawn his assistance completely, and that 
Idenburg had not informed the newspapers about the conflict.85
The deputation were received in audience by the Queen. At the meeting 
on 20 March her husband, Prince Hendrik, was also present. Idenburg had 
planned a nice ceremony. First, Pangeran Ario Koesoemodiningrat read the 
Javanese version of the Indië Weerbaar resolution. Thereupon Danoesoegondo 
read a Dutch translation. Finally, Van Hinloopen Labberton presented the 
text to the Queen. After the ceremony Koesoemodiningrat, Van Hinloopen 
Labberton and Idenburg were received privately by Queen Wilhelmina. 
Koesoemodiningrat expressed the loyalty of the Sunan. Van Hinloopen 
Labberton translated his words. Idenburg looked on. Later, the resolution 
was also presented to the Queen Mother, Emma, and to the chairmen of the 
Parliament and the Senate.
Relations with Van Aalst and other leading businessmen and industrial-
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ists were much better. They embraced the deputation. The members were 
received at the office of Van Aalst’s NHM. One of the highlights in this respect 
was a diner hosted by Van Heutsz – who wanted a large submarine fleet sup-
ported by reconnaissance cruisers, a large army and a native militia86 – in the 
Koningszaal of Artis. The dinner was attended by J.Th. Cremer, Idenburg, 
and a number of other politicians. The government was represented by 
Treub, not by Pleyte. It was a unique occasion: the very first ‘political ban-
quet’ attended by Indonesians in Holland. Political (and not just witty) din-
ner speeches were held. Van Heutsz used the opportunity to expound his 
views about the relationship between motherland and colony and to plead 
for a strong military defence of the colony.87 Another speaker, J.Th. Gerlings, 
prepared the Indonesian delegates for what they could expect in Holland. 
Wording the general mood of the Dutch establishment Gerlings explained 
that he (and he added that Van Deventer who had died in September 1915 
would certainly have agreed with him, were he still alive) did not consider the 
Javanese mature enough for a real representative body with legislative power 
(Rhemrev 1917:10).
Members of the deputation also were invited to countless dinners and 
addressed meetings organized by a great variety of organizations: Onze Vloot, 
the SDAP, the Sociaal-Democratische Partij (SDP, Social Democratic Party, 
soon to become the Communist Party in Holland), the Indische Vereeniging, 
association of Indonesian students, the Indologen-Vereeniging, association of 
colonial civil servants and so on. They also went to the air base Soesterberg, 
where Abdoel Moeis, Rhemrev, and Van Hinloopen Labberton had their 
maiden flight, and attended military exercises and parades, where, one critic 
wrote, they were shown ‘how far the European civilization is advanced in 
destruction and killing’.88
Idenburg’s fading into the background provided Abdoel Moeis and Dwidjo-
sewojo with ample opportunity to call attention to the political reforms the 
Boedi Oetomo and Sarekat Islam deemed necessary. What De Locomotief 
had feared in advance happened. In September De Locomotief had asked the 
deputation to state what its programme was before it left for Holland. It had 
written about ‘gratitude’ and ‘a sense of decency’ on the part of its members 
which would prevent that the Indië Weerbaar motion would not be made 
subordinate to political demands, but had not been sure.89 Dwidjosewojo and 
Abdoel Moeis spoke frankly about the reforms which they felt were essential 
in the Netherlands Indies. They warned, as Abdoel Moeis did, that Holland 
86 De Locomotief, 12-3-1917.
87 Koloniaal Tijdschrift 1917:643-6.
88 Weekblad voor Indië, 19-8-1917, reproduced in Poeze 1986:115.
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would feel the consequences were the Dutch to dare to use an iron fist against 
a people in the process of awakening. Their speeches, probably contrary to 
what De Locomotief had expected, were received with benevolence. Sympathy, 
with exceptions of course, reigned.
It did not escape people’s attention that Abdoel Moeis, who like Soewardi 
probably was convinced that providing the Dutch public with information 
about the colonial situation would eventually make Holland more responsive 
to the demands for political and economic emancipation in the colony, did 
not have much to say about the defence of the Netherlands Indies. His true 
theme was political change. This should not have come as a complete sur-
prise. Abdoel Moeis’s newspaper, Kaoem Moeda, had already sent a telegram 
to a Dutch Member of Parliament in May 1916 explaining what Indonesians 
wanted: ‘We Javanese demand equal rights for strengthening our energy to 
defend India belief our demand will draw attention of kamers [Parliament] 
letter follows’.90 Abdoel Moeis and Dwidjosewojo even impressed Soewardi, 
who himself was a confirmed opponent of Indië Weerbaar, and had first 
thought them to be toadies (Poeze 1986:115).
Laoh was determined not to be left behind. He drew attention to the dis-
crimination experienced by Minahasans, pointing out that Minahasan soldiers 
received less pay than their European colleagues. Laoh told Pleyte and others 
that Minahasans would accept a militia only after statute labour had been 
abolished.91
The frankness of the Indonesian members of the deputation upset colonial 
die-hards, who had not kept abreast with the trend political developments 
had taken in the Netherlands Indies. It also worried members of the general 
public who could only think about Indonesians as ‘slavish and docile’.92 To 
such people who had read about the many pledges of loyalty, the words of 
the members of the deputation came as a shock. It was the first time that 
Indonesians publicly vented their disenchantment with colonial relations in 
Holland. They did not bother to mince their words and left no doubt that 
they had no intention at all of meekly complying with government wishes. 
Nevertheless, after he had returned to Java, Abdoel Moeis expressed his sur-
prise about how ‘calmly’ the Dutch public had reacted to the ‘harsh words’ 
spoken by the members of the deputation.93
While demanding change, Dwidjosewojo and Abdoel Moeis took great 
pains to explain that for the moment they still considered Dutch rule the best, 
and that they were prepared to assist in upholding it. Not doing so – and 
90 De Locomotief, 9-5-1916.
91 De Indische Gids 1917, I:806-7; Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1917-8:1485; Ratu Langie 1917.
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Independence – would only mean that another power would take over from 
the Dutch. As was becoming clear in the political debate in Java, this stance set 
the members of the deputation apart from the radical left in Holland and in the 
Netherlands Indies. When Abdoel Moeis and DwidjoSewojo, accompanied by 
Soewardi, attended a socialist May Day demonstration, they politely refused 
the invitation to join the ranks of the anti-militarist movement. The latter did 
not seem to understand that had DwidjoSewojo and Abdoel Moeis agreed, it 
would have removed one of their principal means of gaining concessions from 
the Dutch government. They probably also rattled their audience by saying 
that Indonesians were worse off than the proletariats in Europe. Indonesians 
were oppressed and subjugated at one and the same time.
The visit to Holland ended in discord. Rhemrev was to blame. He was 
the odd one out, a conservative. In 1919 Rhemrev would go on to found De 
Oranjebond van Orde (Orange Union of Law and Order) and in 1933 would 
become one of the leaders of the Nederlandsch-Indische Fascisten Organisatie 
(Netherlands Indies Fascists Organization). Matters were not helped by him 
making no secret of the fact that he did not consider a native militia an ineluc-
table element of the Indië Weerbaar movement. He stigmatized a native militia 
as an absurdity, a danger to the evolution of the colony and quoted the report 
of the State Commission of 1912 which had stressed that such an institution 
was utopian (Rhemrev 1917:10, 12). He also spoke in a derogatory way about 
the fighting capacity of the Javanese. All this led him to conclude there was no 
need at all to grant any political concessions. Rhemrev left no stone unturned 
to stress that his views were what the Indië Weerbaar aspired to. The move-
ment aimed to achieve a strong defence of the colony, not at wresting political 
concessions from The Hague. The granting of political rights would not sud-
denly transmogrify ‘minors’ into adults. Rhemrev even accused the Indonesian 
members of the deputation of corrupting the aims of Indië Weerbaar. He could 
not deny that at a certain moment political rights would have to be granted 
to Indonesians, but as so many other contemporary Dutchmen he maintained 
that this was something far in the future, when Indonesians were ripe for 
it. As far as he was concerned the main reason the deputation had visited 
Holland was to win support in the motherland for a strong defence of the 
Netherlands Indies, and nothing else. Stressing that the Netherlands Indies 
was ‘the mainstay of Dutch national prosperity’, Rhemrev wanted promises 
and money from The Hague (Rhemrev 1917:6). The Netherlands should not 
withhold from the Netherlands Indies ‘the sword it had already needed for 
such a long time for its own self-defence and not for imperialistic purposes’ 
(Rhemrev 1917:8).
Rhemrev’s views generated enormous tension among the members of the 
deputation. He especially clashed with Van Hinloopen Labberton and with 
Abdoel Moeis, the most outspoken member of the deputation (Drooglever 
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1980:109). During his time in Holland Rhemrev never let a chance slip by to 
belittle Van Hinloopen Labberton. He refused to recognize him as chairman of 
the deputation and revealed that former Governor General Van Heutsz and G. 
Vissering, the President of the Central Bank, rated Van Hinloopen Labberton’s 
intellectual qualities low. Rhemrev even made a fool of Van Hinloopen 
Labberton in public. This happened during a meeting in The Hague of the 
Vereeniging ter Beoefening van de Krijgswetenschap (Association for the 
Study of Military Science). After Van Hinloopen Labberton and other mem-
bers of the deputation had spoken, Rhemrev took the floor. He related how 
he had rebuked Van Hinloopen Labberton when the deputation had been 
received by the Queen. According to his story, which was denied by Van 
Hinloopen Labberton, while they were waiting for the Queen to make her 
appearance, Van Hinloopen Labberton had been seated in the second row. 
When Van Hinloopen Labberton had tried to take up a seat in the front 
row, Rhemrev had pulled on his jacket and had told him that he ought to be 
ashamed, and had ordered him back to his place in the second row. Rhemrev 
finished up his story by stating that Van Hinloopen Labberton had complied, 
pale with anger.94
The differences of opinion between Rhemrev and Abdoel Moeis were 
clear but how deep the antagonism was had been kept from the public but it 
could no longer remain secret when it came to a head after the deputation had 
boarded the Rijndam to return to Java via the United States. Most of the pas-
sengers of the Rijndam were colonial civil servants and army officers with their 
families. Surrounded by kindred spirits, Rhemrev abandoned all pretence of 
tact. He did not hide his profound dislike of Van Hinloopen Labberton, and 
shortly before the Rijndam reached San-Francisco insulted the Javanese mem-
bers of the Deputation. During a lecture on board for which he had dressed, as 
he had also done in Holland, in army uniform complete with his decorations, 
he told his audience that the Javanese were too stupid to hold a rifle. Abdoel 
Moeis, who was in the audience, reacted furiously. He accused Rhemrev of 
trying to blacken the deputation’s aim, adding that he regretted this all the 
more because Rhemrev ‘likes to pass as a Westerner, but for seven-eighths has 
native blood in the veins’.95 
After the deputation had returned in Java, Rhemrev was expelled from 
the movement. Disgusted by Rhemrev’s words, Indonesian protagonists of 
a militia began to differentiate between a Van Hinloopen Labberton and a 
Rhemrev Indië Weerbaar movement. They praised Van Hinloopen Labberton 
as a friend of the Indonesians.96 Rhemrev and Van Hinloopen Labberton 
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continued to quarrel, not least in the press; one of the many personal feuds in 
colonial society. The row became so heated that Rhemrev sent two seconds to 
Van Hinloopen Labberton in November 1917 to challenge him to a duel with 
swords. Van Hinloopen Labberton responded by saying that he was prepared 
to take on the challenge, but only after a military honour council had ruled 
that Rhemrev was an honourable person first. It was not done to fight duels 
with dishonourable persons. The duel never eventuated. Rhemrev took Van 
Hinloopen Labberton to court. He accused him of libel and of having called 
him ‘dishonourable’ in November 1918. Called as witnesses were s’Jacob, 
Dwidjosewojo, Abdoel Moeis, Laoh, and other leaders of the Indië Weerbaar 
movement.97
In the end, when it had become clear that conscription of Europeans was to 
precede that of the Javanese, the Europeans also spoke out against a militia. 
Even Je Maintiendrai protested. It founded a committee which was given the 
task of studying whether conscription would still be necessary if the existing 
volunteer corps were transformed into weerbaarheidscorpsen, fighting units. 
The protest was joined by the Deli Planters Association.
Much of the opposition came from Indo-Europeans. They were afraid that 
the positions they would have to leave to do military service would have 
been taken over by others when they returned to civilian society and began to 
worry about the opportunities European conscription would provide for the 
advancement of Javanese in white-collar jobs. It was argued that if a person 
had diplomas military service posed no problems. It would be a different 
story for people ‘who had started a career in trade or elsewhere fresh from the 
primary school’.98 Fear of life in the barracks and the amoral connotation this 
held also haunted some. Conscripts would spend their pay on ‘pleasures’, and 
could never be completely protected from the atmosphere in the barracks of 
the colonial army. To do something about this, in November 1917 a meeting 
was organized by the Central Council of Roman Catholic Social Unions to dis-
cuss the ‘moral well-being’ of the drafted soldiers, who were all in ‘the most 
dangerous phase of their developmental years’.99 
The discussion about a native militia had one important result. A quasi-rep-
resentative body was founded. The demands of the nationalist organizations 
may well have speeded this up. A representative body for the Netherlands 
Indies had been contemplated since at least 1893. That such a council be given 
a really democratic nature had been one of the demands of the Comité Boemi 
Poetra. During the discussions about a militia, Pleyte had given the assurance 
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that no conscription of Javanese would take effect before such a parliament 
had been created. A Volksraad (People’s Council) was formed under the law 
passed in 1916 and inaugurated in Batavia in May 1918. It had thirty-six mem-
bers, partly elected by the members of the local councils and partly appointed 
by the Governor General. Among them were well-known advocates of a militia 
like s’Jacob, Van Hinloopen Labberton, Pabst, Dwidjosewojo, Abdoel Moeis, 
and Laoh. Tjokroaminoto was also a member. The gesture proved futile. As 
the People’s Council had merely an advisory function and had no deciding 
vote, opponents of a native militia continued to press for the establishment of 
a real parliament before conscription could be considered. Distrust of Dutch 
intentions had not evaporated. At the first session of the People’s Council in 
June 1918, one of its members, Abdoel Rivai, said that he had heard people 
speculate about whether the People’s Council would not again be abolished or 
its competence be reduced still further after the war had ended and the danger 
to the colony had passed.100 
Before the People’s Council was established, a European militia had already 
been instituted by an ordinance in March 1918. The event signified the begin-
ning of the end of the age-old institution of the civil. The conscription of 
young European men started much to the dismay of a number of members 
of the People’s Council, especially the Europeans and Indo-Europeans. They 
wondered whether the colonial government had not broken its promise about 
consulting the council first about a militia, and why such a haste was thought 
necessary.
In July 1918, the first 665 European conscripts in Java were called up. They 
were sent to the ‘cooler’ garrisons in Buitenzorg, Malang, and Bandung. To the 
dismay of the professional European soldiers, the conscript soldiers were put 
up in separate quarters. Separated or not, they wore a uniform. This meant 
that they could personally experience how civilian colonial society discrimi-
nated against European soldiers. Conscripts were barred from access to coffee-
houses and the like (Van Heekeren 1919b:142).
Some tried to evade military service by migrating to other islands. Estate 
companies sent their younger staff to Sumatra and recalled their older employ-
ees to Java. It was rumoured that this policy was also followed by some gov-
ernment offices.101 Those who tried to evade conscription and were caught 
were sentenced to seven days’ imprisonment, after which they still had to join 
the militia.
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The Turkish factor
In 1914 relations between Istanbul and Berlin had been cordial for decades. 
German officers had acted as instructors in the Turkish army since 1883. They 
had assumed this role after France, defeated in the Franco-German War of 
1870-1871, had been unable to honour a request from Istanbul to resume the 
training its army officers had provided up to 1870. Ties were strengthened 
even more after Germany embarked on her Weltpolitik in 1897. The Ottoman 
Empire became one of its targets, one of the places on the globe where the 
German Empire stepped up competition with the other powers, in particular 
with Great Britain. 
Kaiser Wilhelm II did his bit to foster good relationships and lure Turkey 
into the German sphere of influence. He visited Turkey twice, in 1889 and 
1898. During the 1898 visit every effort was made to cement relations with the 
Sultan, his ministers, and senior officials (Palmer 1993:190). The Kaiser did his 
utmost to praise Islam. To show his appreciation of the past exploits of Islam 
he visited the grave of Saladin and commissioned a marble tomb to be built to 
hold the mortal remains of this legendary hero of the Crusades. Wilhelm’s visit 
paid off. He was called the ‘Protector of Turkey’, and was hailed as the ‘per-
sonal and political friend of His Majesty Abdulhamid’.1 Wilhelm II not only 
presented Turkey with a marvellous new tomb of Saladin; he gave Istanbul a 
fountain. When it was unveiled in 1901 Germany sent an impressive military 
and naval delegation to the city. The Kaiser himself sent the Sultan a flattering 
letter. He complimented him on the way he upheld ‘the dignity of his throne 
and the prestige of Islam’. W.F.H. von Weckherlin, the Dutch Envoy, reported 
that the festivities bore the ‘character of a renewed big fraternization party’. 
The Envoy continued by reporting that on both sides the impression was 
given ‘that Turkey had only one single unselfish friend in the world’.3 It was 
1 Van der Staal Piershil to De Beaufort, 3-10-1898, Von Weckherlin to De Beaufort, 3-1-1900, 
NA, BuZa, Politieke gezantschapsrapporten Istanbul.
 PRO FO 800 143.
3 Von Weckherlin to De Beaufort, 8-1-1901, NA, BuZa, Politieke gezantschapsrapporten 
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not the only time that Von Weckherlin had drawn attention to the ‘more than 
hearty disposition of the Sultan towards the German Emperor’.4
German industry, not least Krupp, profited. It appears the only intention 
not accomplished was Berlin’s request to have Turkey part with an uninhab-
ited island in the Red Sea to serve as a German coaling station. It was only a 
minor setback. During Wilhelm’s tour the foundations were laid for a number 
of German projects which were inspired by a mixture of prospects or perhaps 
dreams of rich profits, feelings of national pride, and the pressure of interna-
tional competition and mutual envy. They concerned the lines of communica-
tions which as objects of international rivalry were closely associated with the 
delineation of spheres of influence all over the world. The principal loser was 
Great Britain. There were two main German achievements. The first was the 
concession to build the Berlin to Baghdad Railway, linking the Mediterranean 
with Baghdad, and ultimately with the Persian Gulf, the ‘most important 
undertaking of German “Weltpolitik” of all’ (Gründer 1999:18). When com-
pleted, it would provide Germany with a direct railway line between Berlin 
and the Persian Gulf, threatening the British position in India and giving 
Germany an overland route to Asia as an alternative to British-controlled sea 
routes. The second was a telegraph cable line connecting Istanbul with Central 
Europe. There was also a third, minor German coup, which likewise undercut 
the British economic position. The Deutsche Levant Linie signed a contract 
with the Hamburg-Amerika Linie to start a regular service between Istanbul 
and New York in 190. Four years later a shipping line between Germany and 
the Persian Gulf followed.
The consequence of these close relations had been the development of 
a strong pro-German and anti-British faction in the Turkish military and 
government. The presence of German military officers, described by the 
British Ambassador, Sir Gerald Lowther, as the backbone of German influ-
ence in Turkey, was instrumental in this. In the Turkish army officers had 
gained prominence who had been trained either in Turkey or in Germany by 
Germans. With a note of envy Lowther had to report back to London in 1909 
that the Turkish government relied on the army, and that its officers ‘looked 
towards and admired the military efficiency of the German army’. In their 
campaign to win Turkish sympathy the Germans had made good use of a 
recently established paper in Istanbul, the Osmanischer Lloyd, to denigrate the 
British. The Osmanischer Lloyd let no opportunity slip to draw attention to arti-
cles in the British press critical of the new Turkish regime. Lowther described 
its contents as ‘malicious and fabricated innuendos about British designs and 
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machinations, evidently intended to poison the native mind against us’.
The crucial moment for Turkey to decide whether to stay neutral or to join 
the German side in war came on 10 August 1914. On that day two German 
warships, the battle cruiser the Goeben – described by a British naval historian 
as ‘one of the Kaiser’s newest, fastest, and most powerful warships’ (Halpern 
1994:3) – and the light cruiser the Breslau hotly pursued by British and 
French warships took refuge in the Dardanelles. The two of them made up the 
mediterranean division of the German Navy. Reuter’s erroneously reported 
that both German warships had been interned and that their guns has been 
decommissioned. The news agency presented the news as a major victory for 
the British Navy. Reuter’s claimed that the safety of shipping in that part of 
the world had been as good as assured.7 This was rather wide off the mark. 
In Istanbul the government announced that the two ships had been bought 
by Turkey from Germany to compensate for two dreadnoughts which Turkey 
had ordered in Great Britain, but which London had commandeered after 
the outbreak of the war. The confiscation had been a serious blow to Turkey’s 
national pride. The two dreadnoughts, the Sultan Osman and the Reshadieh, 
had become the object of a patriotic drive. To finance their purchase, the 
Turkish government had mounted a nation-wide campaign to collect private 
donations. Compared to it, the Onze Vloot drive in the Netherlands paled 
into insignificance. Civil servants, already hard hit by a delay in the payment 
of their salaries, parted with one month’s pay, Abdulhamid was said to have 
pledged a large sum, and all over the country local committees were set up 
to urge people to contribute to the national cause. Foreign firms and their 
employees were not immune to what the new Dutch Envoy Van der Does de 
Willebois called extortion. They were ‘most impudently’ told how much to 
contribute.8 
After they had sailed into Turkish waters the Goeben and Breslau were 
renamed. The Turkish flag was hoisted on both warships on 1 August. The 
crews entered Turkish naval service and donned Turkish uniforms, complete 
with a fez. At the end of October both ships took part in a surprise bombard-
ment of Odessa and Sebastopol on the Black Sea coast. The Turkish Empire 
had entered the war. Three weeks later on 11 November Sultan Mehmed V 
proclaimed a holy war. There was not a shadow of a doubt left that religion 
obliged all Muslims in the world to side with Turkey and its two allies. To 
renege was a sin (Snouck Hurgronje 191:11). Leaflets about the holy war 
were dropped over the battlefields in Europe by German aeroplanes.
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Though neutral, the Netherlands did not escape being mentioned as a 
target in the holy war. A Universal Proclamation to All Peoples of Islam 
was published in November. Besides addressing itself to the subjects of the 
Triple Entente, the proclamation called upon the 40 million Muslims in the 
Netherlands Indies to free themselves from the colonial yoke, and to kill or 
chase away the semi-civilized Dutch.9 The Dutch Envoy only got hold of an 
English pamphlet in May 191 and protested. In June Turkish and Arab news-
papers carried an article, ‘Rectification of a mistake’. The rectification said 
that the mention of the Netherlands Indies had been an error, the result of a 
mistake and an oversight.
Prior appeals by the Ottoman Empire for international Muslim solidarity 
in its struggle against its foes, and the realization that Muslims elsewhere in 
the world looked up to the Sultan for protection and guidance, had given 
Europeans cause to fear Turkish subversion among their Muslim subjects. 
The Dutch could mention concrete examples of Ottoman prestige and its con-
sequences. An Acehnese delegation had travelled to Istanbul in 188 to offer 
Sultan Abdulaziz suzerainty over Aceh. In 1873, and again to the horror of the 
Dutch government, Abdulaziz considered mediation in the Acehnese-Dutch 
conflict.
After the accession to the throne of Sultan Abdulhamid II in 187, the 
emphasis on the role of the Sultan as Caliph, as the spiritual leader of the 
Muslim world, assumed a more conspicuous form. During the Russo-Turkish 
War of 1877, Istanbul tried to arouse international feelings of Muslim solidar-
ity in Russia and Afghanistan by declaring the conflict with Russia a holy war 
(Palmer 199:10). The ill-fated outcome of this war for Turkey had led to the 
first apprehension in the Netherlands and in Great Britain of Turkish inten-
tions in their colonies. Ottoman agitation might try to incite Muslim subjects 
in European colonies to avenge Turkey’s defeat, which the European Powers 
were accused of allowing to happen.
Out of this remodelling of Ottoman policy and fuelled by the occasional 
alarmist rumours grew the fear for pan-Islamism, a concept that was much 
more a European than a Turkish invention. The term was a Western one, 
coined along the lines of pan-Slavism and pan-Germanism. Some Muslims 
even called pan-Islamism ‘a mare’s nest discovered by The Times correspond-
ent at Vienna’. 10 In Germany, where the joining in union of the ‘German Holy 
War’ and the Islamic Dschihad needed some explaining, thoughts tended in 
the same direction (Galli 191:, 1). In retrospect, pan-Islamism has also 
9 Snouck Hurgronje to Loudon, -1-191, 3-7-191 (Gobée and Adriaanse 197-, II:187-8, 
190-7). 
10 Evans 1987:1, citing Browne 1904.
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been dismissed as a creation of the British India Office.11 A similar role in 
presenting pan-Islamism as a daunting, realistic threat can be ascribed to the 
Dutch Ministry of the Colonies, especially to Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje, 
a renowned Dutch Islamologist, who in his capacity as Adviser for Native 
Affairs to the Governor General was the main architect of Dutch Islam policy 
around the turn of the century. In Snouck Hurgronje’s opinion any manifesta-
tion of pan-Islamism, whether it took the form of anti-Dutch articles in the 
press in the Middle East, efforts to underline international Muslim solidar-
ity, or attempts to promote an Islamic culture, contained a hint of danger to 
European Power in the Islamic world. 
Snouck Hurgronje considered a resolute and unequivocal response essen-
tial to combat what he believed was the core of pan-Islamism: the guardi-
anship of the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire of the Muslim world, even in 
regions where European nations ruled. He never tired of explaining that such 
a notion was a fallacy. The international Islamic community did not have a 
spiritual leader, a person whose position was comparable to that of the Pope. 
For years Snouck Hurgronje remained the most formidable proponent of alert-
ing the world to the dangers of pan-Islamism. Admired as one of the world 
most famous and knowledgeable experts on Islam – a man who had stayed in 
Mecca and had published extensively on Islam in and outside the Netherlands 
Indies – he had the ears of both the Governors General and the Ministers of 
the Colonies. The Dutch Ministers of Foreign Affairs were less impressed by 
his drive. Their interests were different. Besides law and order in the colony, 
the nature of their office meant they had to take other considerations into 
account. As far as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was concerned, fears of pan-
Islamism and Turkish ‘machinations’ and ‘intrigues’ were exaggerated. Its civil 
servants could not understand why the study of a few Arab youngsters from 
Java in Istanbul on the suggestion of the Turkish Consul in Batavia, an issue 
which had led to a public outcry in the Netherlands around the turn of the 
century, was supposed to be of far greater danger to the established order in 
the Netherlands Indies than the tens of thousands of pilgrims who travelled 
to Mecca for the hajj each year. 
Mutual irritation between the Ministry of the Colonies, envied because of 
its generous budget, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was the result. In May 
1900, for instance, an aggravated Minister W.H. de Beaufort requested for the 
time being to be spared of the suggestions of Snouck Hurgronje about how 
to react to anti-Dutch newspaper articles in the Middle East. Cremer refused 
to comply with such ‘a surprisingly formulated request in correspondence 
11 Niemeijer 197:38, quoting Storrs 1937.
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between colleagues’.1 Snouck Hurgronje, who, as a contemporary wrote, was 
‘a very capable and a very irascible man’, at times added fuel to the fire.13 He 
reacted with venom each time others seemed to question the dangers of pan-
Islamism, or if they disregarded his advice in whatever other way. In 190 
when he was informed that an employee of the legation in Istanbul had spo-
ken well about an Arab boy from Java who was studying in that city, Snouck 
Hurgronje dismissed the evaluation out of hand. The information was irrel-
evant. What counted was that such students were scions of some of the most 
pan-Islamic families in Java and were raised in an anti-Dutch spirit. He was 
sure that on their return they would propagate the political viewpoints taught 
to them. Snouck Hurgronje was not surprised that students from Java made 
a favourable impression. In Istanbul they had learned ‘with Turkish dexterity 
to take advantage of the ignorance of the representatives of the Netherlands 
in Turkey of circumstances in the Netherlands Indies to dish up perfidious 
stories’.14
The ideas of pan-Islamism, whatever these may have been – it was a ubiq-
uitous spectre just as nowadays Islamic fundamentalism is – should not be 
allowed to spread to the Netherlands Indies. Association with Western culture 
was the ultimate goal for the colony. Islamic culture was antithetical to this 
goal. Every indication that – in their daily life not in their religion – Muslims 
preferred Islamic or Eastern ways to Western ones was seen as a setback on 
the road to civilization and an indication of an anti-Dutch mentality. Schooling 
and clothing, with the fez to some acquiring an almost subversive image, 
became yardsticks by which to measure loyalty to the Dutch or the severity of 
the infection with pan-Islamic ideas. Charity fell into the same category. For 
people who themselves raised money so enthusiastically for the victims of the 
Boer War, collecting money for causes like the construction the Hejaz Railway 
between Damascus and Mecca, on which work had started in 1900, could only 
be a political statement. In Snouck Hurgronje’s eyes the appeals to Muslims, 
including those outside the Ottoman Empire, to contribute generously were 
an inextricable part of a pan-Islamic plot. No better plan could have been 
envisaged to demonstrate the political unity of all Muslims without arousing 
conflicts with the Colonial Powers than the collecting of money for the Hejaz 
Railway.1 In the Egyptian paper Al-Liwa the Dutch efforts to hamper collec-
tions for the Hejaz Railway were contrasted with the collections made in the 
1 De Beaufort to Cremer, --1900, Cremer to De Beaufort --1900, NA, BuZa A-dos. 190, box 
40.
13 De Indische Gids 1900:3.
14 Van Bijlandt to Ellis, 17-4-190, Note Snouck Hurgronje 1--190, NA, BuZa A-dos. 190, box 
41.
1 Snouck Hurgronje to unknown addressee, 1-11-1904, Snouck Hurgronje to Rooseboom, 
8-7-1904, NA, BuZa A-dos. 190, box 40; Gobée and Adriaanse 197-, II:17.
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Netherlands Indies for the marriage of Queen Wilhelmina.1
Alleged pan-Islamic activities garnered plenty of the attention in Holland 
and the Netherlands Indies. Seeking religious education in Mecca was viewed 
with suspicion, enrolling at schools in Cairo, where the famous Islamic uni-
versity Al-Azhar was located, was frowned upon, but going to Istanbul, the 
political centre of the Ottoman Empire was perhaps the worst crime a Muslim 
in the Netherlands Indies could commit. Such concerns were not confined to 
the Dutch. In Amsterdam a Sumatran from Palembang, Abdoel Rivai, who 
had come to Holland to continue his medical studies and would become 
a member of the People’s Council in 1918, was also upset. In July 1900 he 
launched a bi-weekly, Pewarta Wolanda, the Netherlands Reporter. The aim of 
this Malay-language periodical, published in Amsterdam and distributed in 
the Netherlands Indies, was to ‘try to decrease the influence of Turkey among 
many Mohammedans in the Indies’.17 Intended to be distributed among 
Indonesian rulers, civil servants and the well-to-do classes, Pewarta Wolanda 
would do this in part by convincing parents to send their children to the 
Netherlands and not to Istanbul for their education.
The apparent support of the pan-Islamic ideal by the German Kaiser was 
also abhorrent to the Dutch. During his 1898 visit, Wilhelm II had flattered 
the Sultan by referring to his position as Caliph. In Damascus, at the end of 
his tour, he had stated that Abdulhamid II ‘and the 300 million Muslims scat-
tered across the globe who revere him as their Caliph, can rest assured that 
the German Emperor is, and will at all times, remain their friend’ (Hopkirk 
1994:3-4). It was a remark which alarmed those Dutch people who were 
haunted by the spectre of pan-Islamism. The Dutch newspaper the Nieuwe 
Rotterdamsche Courant singled out the Kaiser’s words as the reason why an 
anti-Dutch press campaign had been resumed in the Ottoman Empire.18
Unsure of the loyalty of the Muslim population in the Archipelago, the 
concept of pan-Islamism held an especially threatening connotation for Dutch 
colonial administrators, Snouck Hurgronje first and foremost, and many 
among the general Dutch public were also alarmed. They suspected that 
pan-Islamism, propagated by the Sultan and his advisers at Istanbul, was 
geared to impress upon Muslims in the European colonies that the Sultan 
was the supreme authority whom they had to obey. This made the European 
nations governing such regions at the best vassals of the Sultan, and at worst 
the unlawful rulers. In Java and other regions firmly under Dutch control, 
the aim of pan-Islamic propaganda did not necessarily have to concern 
1 Al-Liwa -1-1901, cited in Rooseboom to Cremer, --1901, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 7-3-1901 
D.
17 De Locomotief, 1-7-1900.
18 Cited in De Locomotief, 17-1-1898.
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ousting the Dutch. As the Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant formulated it in 
1898 the aim might be to force upon the Netherlands a contract stipulating 
that ‘we Christians can remain in our possessions, but [have to] recognize 
the supreme authority of the Mohammedan Sovereign’.19 Reassuringly the 
Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant noted that it was an illusion to expect that such 
an ideal would ever be realized. Nevertheless, pan-Islamism could produce a 
sea of troubles. 
Elsewhere in the Archipelago, where rulers in desperation sent or tried to 
send deputations to Istanbul to ask the Sultan’s help against the Dutch, pan-
Islamism could fortify resistance against the advance of Dutch colonial rule. 
Those who feared pan-Islamism as an obstacle to a further Dutch expansion in 
the Archipelago saw the danger first and above all loom in Aceh. Other sultan-
ates in Sumatra, Borneo, and Celebes were also considered to be vulnerable 
to pan-Islamic propaganda. Rumours about moral support and even military 
support from Istanbul could, and did, stimulate resistance to Dutch rule.
Around 1910 the fears had abated somewhat. Fewer incidents involv-
ing alleged pan-Islamic agitation were reported, maybe because Snouck 
Hurgronje had left the Netherlands Indies to return to Holland in 190. His 
successor, G.A.J. Hazeu, did not consider himself an expert on Islamic affairs. 
He preferred to occupy his mind with other scholarly activities. The respite 
was short. The wars fought against non-Muslims at the beginning of the 1910s, 
in Libya against Italy in 1911, and in the Balkans in 191 and 1913, gave rise to 
a new wave of international Islamic sympathy for the plight of the Ottoman 
Empire. In India, Muslims, vowing of their loyalty to the British Crown, pro-
tested against the position taken by London in the Balkan Wars, which they 
felt amounted to a war against the Balkan Muslims.0 Others in India, who 
spoke more rashly, simply talked about wars between Muslims and Christians 
(Sareen 199:8). In the Netherlands Indies a rise in pro-Turkish sympathy was 
observed at the time of the Turco-Italian War. Feelings intensified during the 
Balkan Wars, when Turkey had to gird itself against four Christian nations. 
The Young Turks in Istanbul deliberately raised the issue of Muslim solidarity 
and announced that they would collect money outside Turkey to strengthen 
the army and Navy.1 They warned that not only the Ottoman Empire was 
threatened, but Islam itself was also in peril. Sympathy in the Netherlands 
Indies translated itself into concrete deeds. Portraits of the Sultan and his 
son decorated walls of houses. Donations were readily forthcoming. One of 
the organizations to which the money went was the Alhilal Alahmar (Red 
19 Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, cited in De Locomotief, 7-11-1898.
0 De Expres, 3--1914.
1 Dutch Envoy in Istanbul to De Marees van Swinderen, 3--1913, NA, BuZa A-dos. 190, box 
4.
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Crescent) founded in Batavia at the end of 191. Despite all this, D.A. Rinkes 
could reassure Idenburg. The donations had come mostly from Arabs and 
from natives in the coastal cities. A much smaller amount of money had been 
collected in the Netherlands Indies than in the Straits Settlements.
The Balkan Wars were fought at a time when the founding of the Sarekat 
Islam and the large following the organization had attracted had again made 
Dutchmen wary of the power of Islam as a symbol of anti-Dutch propaganda. 
Agitation from abroad would only fuel such sentiments. To exacerbate such 
feelings, on the eve of the Great War rumours circulated of visits to the 
Netherlands Indies and other colonies in Asia by Turkish spies, allegedly 
former army officers, who were suspected of wanting to sound out the atti-
tude of the local Muslims towards the Sultan.3 In the Dutch Senate, Van Kol 
claimed that the Young Turks had spent millions on pan-Islamic propaganda. 
He was worried. In 1911 Van Kol had personally observed that nobody in the 
Dutch legation in Istanbul had the capacity to keep track of such activities.4 
In Parliament W.H. Bogaardt singled out the Turkish defeats in the Balkans as 
the main reason for the revival of pan-Islamism. He said this in an attempt to 
demonstrate that the revival of Islam in the Netherlands Indies had nothing to 
do with increased Christian missionary activities, which was argued by many 
who castigated Idenburg for what they called his Christianization policy.
The entry of Turkey into the war on the side of Germany exacerbated such 
worries. Snouck Hurgronje, who had moved to Leiden in Holland and acted 
as adviser to the Ministry of the Colonies, was especially upset. The Universal 
Proclamation to All Peoples of Islam, or the Jihad Document, prompted him to 
resume his campaign against pan-Islamism with renewed vigour. His quarrels 
with the Dutch politicians and civil servants who did not follow his advice also 
acquired a new dimension. In a number of letters to the Ministry of the Colonies, 
he stressed that the pamphlet condoned the idea that a holy war was not only 
one waged by armies, but could also be pursued by gangs of robbers and take 
the form of individual assassination attempts. The affair fortified Snouck 
Hurgronje in his conviction that the Dutch legation in Istanbul was staffed by 
nincompoops; an opinion he had uttered with a certain degree of regularity 
for more than fifteen years. The Dutch Envoy had laid hands on the proclama-
 Van der Does de Willebois to Marees van Swinderen, 3--1913, -3-1913, NA, Kol. Openbaar, 
Vb. 1--1913 9; Advice Rinkes, 13--1913:4.
3 De Locomotief, 1-1-1913.
4 Handelingen Eerste Kamer 1913-14:349.
 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1913-14:8.
 Snouck Hurgronje to Pleyte, 3-7-191, -10-191, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. -8-191 B11, Vb. 
-3-191 L3.
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tion much too late. Consequently the venomous message had circulated freely 
for months also, Snouck Hurgronje was sure, in the Netherlands Indies. What 
upset him even more was that the rectification had been formulated in such a 
way that the readers were given the impression that it was only because the 
Dutch government had recognized the Turkish Caliphate that the Netherlands 
Indies was excluded from the appeal to Muslims to rise up in rebellion against 
their colonial overlords.7 Indignantly Snouck Hurgronje pointed out that in 
the Arab version of the rectification it was written that the Netherlands should 
not have been included among the targets for murder and robbery, because of 
its correct behaviour towards the Caliphate. There was only one interpretation: 
the Netherlands stood into a subordinate position to the Caliphate.8 When it 
came to the crunch it did not matter much whether the Netherlands had been 
explicitly mentioned or not. Convinced that a holy war had been nothing more 
than a historical concept for many Muslims, Snouck Hurgronje blamed the 
pamphlet for the revival of medieval, fanatical incitement of religious hatred.9 
Irately he pursued his crusade. As late as 1917 he was still writing about the 
proclamation in a Dutch colonial scholarly journal (Snouck Hurgronje 1917).
So intense was his fear of pan-Islamism, Snouck Hurgronje urged for a ban 
on the pilgrimage in 191. He pointed out that Muslims under Western rule 
were subjected to zealous preachings of an unprecedented intensity in Mecca. 
There was only one remedy. The pilgrimage should not be allowed to be 
resumed before the appeals for a holy war had stopped.30 Prestige also played 
a part in Snouck Hurgronje’s considerations. At the outbreak of the war the 
Turkish government had withdrawn the capitulations, the commercial trea-
ties governing extraterritorial jurisdiction, on 1 October. Foreigners no longer 
enjoyed a special legal status and it was not out of the question that Muslims 
from the Netherlands Indies would witness the Dutch Consul in Jeddah being 
treated discourteously by the local authorities. Merely issuing a warning to 
Indonesian Muslims that the journey was hazardous and that time spent in the 
Hejaz would only lead to financial and other problems would be inefficacious. 
Muslims – and Snouck Hurgronje stressed that experience had proved him 
right – would disregard such a warning. They listened only to the Arabs and 
other persons who arranged their pilgrimage and who profited from it.
Pleyte and Idenburg refused to abandon a pilgrimage policy in which no 
obstacles were put on the way of Muslims in the Netherlands Indies who 
wanted to perform the hajj.31 Batavia feared that such a prohibition would lead 
7 Snouck Hurgronje to Loudon, -9-191 (Gobée and Adriaanse 197-, I:131-4).
8 Snouck Hurgronje to Pleyte, 3-7-1914, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. -8-191 B11.
9 Snouck Hurgronje to Pleyte, -3-191, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. -3-191 L3.
30 Snouck Hurgronje to Pleyte, 3-7-191, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. -8-191 B11.
31 Pleyte to Snouck Hurgronje, -8-191, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. -8-191 B11.
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to discontent and be used by pan-Islamic propaganda. Snouck Hurgronje did 
not see why. He was sure that such a measure would be understood because 
the Dutch authorities had never made any effort to obstruct the hajj in the 
past; forgetting, or perhaps unaware, of the fact that the regulations issued in 
the past to regulate the voyage and to protect the pilgrims against financial 
misfortune and other troubles had been met with fierce criticism. Snouck 
Hurgronje was furious that his advice was not followed. A very serious argu-
ment of his had been treated disparagingly. It had been tossed aside heedlessly 
as if it had originated from an ignorant office clerk.3
Batavia did not issue a ban on the pilgrimage. Nor did the colonial authori-
ties in British India, who had even more reason to fear Turkish and Islamic agi-
tation. Nevertheless, as no pilgrim ships of Dutch or British companies sailed 
after the outbreak of the war the pilgrimage from the Netherlands Indies 
virtually came to a halt after 1914. Europeans saw an unintended advantage. 
Patterns of expenditure would change, mitigating somewhat the effect of the 
rising costs of living for the indigenous population in the Netherlands Indies. 
To be on the safe side and to dissuade Muslims from trying to travel to the 
Middle East, the General Secretary issued a widely distributed notice in May 
191. The message was copied in both the Dutch-language and the vernacu-
lar press. To underline the advice to postpone a pilgrimage till after the war, 
Muslims were warned that rising prices and a depreciation in the currency of 
the Netherlands Indies had made a stay in the Arabian Peninsula much more 
expensive than it had been in the past. Muslims were also informed that all 
buoys and beacons had been removed from the harbour of Jeddah and that 
in view of this, Dutch shipping companies – the Nederland, Rotterdamsche 
Lloyd, and Oceaan – had stopped their service to Jeddah. Pilgrims could 
travel only with companies of which there was no guarantee that their ships 
would turn up at Jeddah in time for the return journey home. The fact that 
the Turkish government had withdrawn the capitulations was also brought to 
bear in the argument. The notice explained that, as a consequence, the Dutch 
consulate might not be able to offer the usual protection and assistance. All 
in all, sufficient reason for a ‘serious warning’ not to make one’s way into 
‘danger and trouble’.33 The Dutch who had become deadly scared of the new 
manifestations of Islamic zeal regarded the warning as not worth the paper 
it was written on. The Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, – and some suspected 
Snouck Hurgronje of having written the article himself – pleaded for a ban in 
early 191. It expressed the same fear of spiteful indoctrination that Snouck 
Hurgronje had adduced. The ‘political consequences of the war for Islam’ 
3 Snouck Hurgronje to Pleyte, 3-7-191, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. -8-191 B11.
33 Javasche Courant, 7--191.
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should be of overriding importance in formulating a hajj policy, not the dif-
ficult living conditions in Mecca. Without guarantees that pilgrims from the 
Netherlands Indies would not be exposed to incitement against Dutch colonial 
rule the pilgrimage should be forbidden. The Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant 
also wrote that there was nothing wrong with such a temporary ban. It did 
not curtail the freedom of religion. A ban would only be regretted by persons 
who gained financially from the hajj.34
To dissuade prospective pilgrims even more, the readers of the notice of 
the General Secretary were reminded of the repatriations of the pilgrims in 
1914. After Turkey had entered the war, 8,000 pilgrims and others who had 
wanted to return to the Netherlands Indies had to be repatriated under diffi-
cult circumstances. Despite all the uproar, most pilgrims had been able to take 
passage on Dutch ships and had left the port of Jeddah before the middle of 
November. After this manoeuvre had been accomplished, the Dutch Consul, 
J. Wolff, assumed that there would no longer be much for him to do. He had 
decided to leave for Holland. Though the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had 
not responded to his request to be allowed to go on leave – the communica-
tion between Jeddah and The Hague had already been cut for one and a half 
months – Wolff had decided take his annual leave without waiting for formal 
consent. He had assigned the administration of the consulate to the secretary-
dragoman, had left enough money to pay the salaries of the staff for eight 
months (in gold, as the war had disrupted international finance), had taken 
the remaining money with him, and had embarked on the last Dutch pilgrim 
ship that left the port of Jeddah on 0 November 1914.
At that moment there were still about 1,00 pilgrims from the Netherlands 
Indies in Jeddah. They had made the outward journey from Penang or 
Singapore aboard ships sailing under British, Russian, Chinese, or Japanese 
flags, had a return ticket, but had been unable to find passage home. Not all 
the blame for this could be laid at the feet of the war. Under normal circum-
stances shipping companies sailing from the Straits Settlements had also failed 
in the past their obligation to offer pilgrims a return journey within weeks 
of the end of the hajj ceremonies. Because ‘a very large number of pilgrims’ 
had fallen victim to this, the Straits authorities were actually in the process of 
sharpening the sanctions against such companies. They had presented new 
legislation on this score as late as November 1914.3 
Wolff painted a gloomy picture of what lay in store for the Muslims from 
the Netherlands Indies who had not been able to leave the Arabian Peninsula 
or did not want to do so: 
34 Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, cited in De Indische Gids 191, I:7 and De Locomotief, 3--
191.
3 Proceedings 191:B 83.
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The fate awaiting those left behind is pitiable. Jeddah is cut off from the outside 
world, there is no longer any post and telegraph connection and the supply of 
foodstuffs, on which the Hejaz, which itself produces next to nothing is depend-
ent, has stopped. [...] The pilgrims who at present are almost all without means are 
faced with hunger and misery and they should not count on the support and actual 
sympathy of the selfish native population.3
The fate of the remaining pilgrims had not been as bad as predicted. The 
Ministry of the Colonies was able to inform the Governor General that the 
remaining pilgrims had left for home at the end of December.
Early in 191, all or at least most of the regular pilgrims had returned 
safely to the Netherlands Indies. Many of those who had failed to board the 
Dutch pilgrim ships in November 1914 had made their way to Singapore on 
board of merchantmen of the Ocean Steamship Line, which had taken on 
passengers irrespective of the company with which they had booked their 
return passage.37 While they were home, thousands of other Indonesian 
Muslims who had taken up residence in the Hejaz for a prolonged period of 
time had remained behind. Most of them – it was estimated that their number 
amounted to about 3,000 – had settled there to study religion. Others either 
lived off a pension, had found a job related to the pilgrimage, or had found 
employment as traders or servants. For these people the hardship Wolff had 
predicted arrived with a vengeance. Many ran into financial trouble. For those 
whose earnings depended on the hajj, income dwindled when fresh pilgrims 
stayed away. 1914 had already been a bad year for them. The situation would 
only worsen. Financial support from relatives at home to help them through 
difficult times was no longer forthcoming. There was no way of sending 
money to the Middle East. If they still had Netherlands Indies currency, their 
money soon became almost worthless. Netherlands Indies currency was diffi-
cult to change. Even when this was still possible the value had depreciated by 
one-quarter in November, to become even more worthless as time progressed. 
The consequence was that many Muslims from the Netherlands Indies had 
little choice other than to resort to begging, to take on work as a coolie, or to 
sell their possessions, including their wardrobes and religious books. It was 
reported that people who had once been rich were forced to eat rice mixed 
with corn.38
To alleviate the fate of those Muslims who had stayed behind in the 
Arabian Peninsula and to facilitate their return a Comité Menoeloeng Hadji 
Bermoekim di Mekah (Committee to Help Hajjis Living in Mecca) was set 
up in Batavia. It consisted of five members, all of them prominent: R.A.A. 
3 Wolff to Idenburg, 18-11-1914, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 8-1-1914 40.
37 De Locomotief, 18-3-1918.
38 Oetoesan Hindia, 0-4-191.
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Achmad Djajadiningrat (Regent of Serang), H. Hassan Moestapa (chief peng-
hulu in Bandung), R. Pengoeloe Tafsir Anom (chief penghulu in Surakarta), 
Tjokroaminoto, and Rinkes. As the colonial administration tried before it, in 
an attempt to dissuade Muslims from making the pilgrimage the Committee 
issued a circular letter alerting the Muslim population to the disturbed situ-
ation in the Hejaz. Muslims were warned that Mecca and Medina ‘were not 
at all safe and tranquil, food was expensive, and sometimes was not available 
at all.’39 It was also explained that many Indonesian Muslims living in Mecca 
had been forced to contract debts to pay for their keep. When new loans were 
unavailable, they had been forced to resort to begging. To help such persons 
the Committee offered its services as an intermediary between Muslims in the 
Netherlands Indies and their relatives in the Middle East. People could report 
to the Committee how much money they wanted to transfer and to whom. 
The Committee would undertake to see to it that the money reached its des-
tination. Though he could not promise that the money sent to the Committee 
would reach Jeddah, Rinkes gave the assurance that the donors would not run 
the risk of losing their money because of acts of war.40
Because of the strenuous efforts of the colonial administration and of the 
local branches of the Sarekat Islam, the circular achieved a wide distribution 
all over the Netherlands Indies. Malay newspapers also published it. Many 
informed the Committee that they wanted to send money to the Hejaz. The 
problem which remained was how the Committee was to accomplish this task. 
A bill of exchange or a cheque was out of the question. The only option was 
to send the money to Jeddah by ship. Doing so, had the additional advantage 
that Muslims who wanted to return to the Netherlands Indies could board 
the ship for their return journey. The plan coincided with the intention of 
the colonial government, conscious of the fact that the living conditions of 
most of them had become intolerable, to evacuate as many of the Indonesian 
Muslims as possible from the Arabian Peninsula. In the summer of 191 four 
Dutch ships, requisitioned for the purpose by the Dutch government, sailed 
to Jeddah. The shipping companies ran no financial risk. Batavia guaranteed 
them 100 guilders per passenger; an amount which, of course, later had to 
be repaid by the Indonesians after they had been repatriated for free. A cash 
sum of 100,000 guilders in English gold was taken along. Most of the money 
– 8,000 guilders – had been received by the Committee and was intended for 
specifically named persons in the Hejaz to allow them to buy daily necessities, 
to settle their debts, and if some money was still left to pay for their fare or part 
of it. The rest had come from other donations and should be used to help out 
39 Djamaah Djawa jang bermoekim di Mekah.BRON??
40 Rinkes to Idenburg, --191, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 3-9-191 19.
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those who most urgently needed financial assistance.41
 Wolff was ordered to return to his post to arrange the repatriation. He was 
responsible for seeing that all went well in Jeddah. His task was not easy. He 
had to arrange that those who could not pay for their passage signed a decla-
ration of debt. To spare him to have to write thousands of such declarations, 
forms were printed in Java and sent to Port Said, where Wolff was detailed to 
collect them. In Port Said he was also to receive a list of how much money had 
to be handed over to whom, plus the 100,000 guilders. The transfer of money 
had to take place in the greatest secrecy in Port Said. Were the British to find 
out, they would certainly confiscate the money. It was contraband destined for 
enemy citizens. London did not even allow monetary remittances to destitute 
Muslims from the Malay Peninsula living in Mecca.
All the efforts to collect money and the administrative fuss and bother it 
entailed were for nothing. Wolff had to take the cash back to Holland with 
him. In Java nobody had given the consequences of the sudden distribution of 
such a large amount of money among the Indonesian community in Jeddah a 
second thought. Nor had Wolff. On arrival in Jeddah he realized that handing 
over the money was too risky. Rinkes, as he himself had done, had thought 
that Wolff could hand out the money and still keep it secret that a shipment of 
gold coins had arrived. This proved impossible. When the moment of transfer 
had almost arrived Wolff feared that if people learned that he carried such a 
large amount of money with him, the repercussions could be dreadful. The 
first problem was the local authorities in Jeddah who because of the war either 
had only received half of their salary or sometimes nothing at all. If they were 
to find out they might well demand their share. The situation could become 
desperate were the inhabitants of Mecca to get wind of the shipment. They 
could well frustrate the repatriation. Hard hit by the drying up of the stream of 
pilgrims, they were highly disappointed that the four Dutch ships only came 
to fetch people and had no fresh pilgrims on board. Wolff did not rule out 
that, notwithstanding the miserable circumstances in which the Indonesian 
Muslims had to live the authorities in Mecca even would try to keep them 
there as a kind of security. They might try to hold the pilgrims hostage in an 
attempt to force the Dutch government to send fresh pilgrims and more money 
for those Muslims from the Netherlands Indies who still lived in Mecca.4
Wolff succeeded in convincing the Turkish authorities, (and judging from 
a letter to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in The Hague this must have cost 
him a load of food and tobacco) that the ships were the last opportunity for 
the Indonesian Muslims to leave, that debts had to be suspended, and that 
41 Kindermann to Wolff, 9--191, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 3-9-191 19.
4 Wolff to Idenburg, 3-8-191, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 3-9-191 19.
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it would be best to allow the Muslims from the Netherlands Indies to return 
home and not to force them to remain till debts had been paid.43 Four ships 
left Jeddah to transport 4,00 Muslims back to the Netherlands Indies in 
August 191. It is likely that Muslims from the Malay Peninsula, who found 
themselves in the same dire straits as those from the Netherlands Indies were 
among the passengers. In Kedah the rumour went round that the only way 
for pilgrims from the Sultanate to return home was to pass themselves off as 
Dutch subjects.44
Less than one hundred of those repatriated had a return ticket. So many 
of the others did not have money to pay for the fare that Wolff decided that it 
was a hopeless task to ask them all to sign a declaration of debts. He wrote to 
Idenburg that registration should take place in the port of disembarkation.4 
Convinced that his mission was accomplished, Wolff closed the consulate. He 
went to Holland. The Indonesian staff joined the repatriated Muslims on their 
voyage to the Netherlands Indies.
About ,000 Indonesians refused to leave. They were made to understand 
that they stayed on their own risk and that they could no longer count on help 
from the Dutch government. The same position was taken the following year 
when the British government complained about the many ‘destitute Javanese 
pilgrims’ in Mecca who had to be fed by an Egyptian relief foundation and by 
the Sharif of Mecca. The British government informed The Hague that these 
pilgrims claimed that they had not been given enough time to wind up their 
business affairs in 191 before the Dutch ships left. Only a few, about one 
hundred, had succeeded in leaving. They had boarded a relief ship especially 
sent by an Indian Committee in Bombay. Of the others, many had become 
dependent on special eating-houses arranged for the poor where at dawn por-
ridge and sometimes also some bread was doled out. London asked for a ship 
to be sent to take them home. The Hague initially refused to help. The British 
government was told that there had been a misunderstanding. Most of the 
Muslims were not Javanese but people from other parts of the Archipelago or 
children of pilgrims. It was a curious argument. Javanese pilgrim was a gener-
al term to denote pilgrims from all over the Netherlands Indies. Nevertheless, 
a British request could not be ignored. Reluctantly the Dutch authorities 
came to the conclusion that they had no other choice but to send two ships to 
Jeddah to repatriate the about 1,00 Indonesian Muslims still there, and also 
to pick up some of those who had made it to Bombay, but had been stranded 
there.4 Because Wolff, by now promoted to Consul General in Jeddah, was 
43 Wolff to Loudon, 4-8-191, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 3-9-191 19.
44 Adviser Kedah to Lee Warner, 13-3-191, ANM HCO Kelantan 3/191.
4 Wolff to Idenburg, 3-8-191, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 3-9-191 19.
4 Koloniaal verslag 1917:17-8.
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‘elsewhere’ Rinkes, who happened to be on leave in Holland, was ordered to 
Jeddah. Money the Committee to help hajjis living in Mecca had still in hand 
was used to buy fabrics in the Netherlands Indies from which the pilgrims to 
be repatriated could make their own clothes during the trip home. The first 
ship left Jeddah on  December 191, a second one on  January 1917. Each 
carried about 00 Muslims.47 Part of those who returned made a sorry impres-
sion. According to a pitiful report in the Soerabaiasch Handelsblad ‘they had 
lived on alms, on what often was tossed to them or what they found in the rub-
bish dumps of the holy city’ during their three-year stay in Mecca. ‘They went 
well-fed, strong, with ample clothing, and full of enthousiasm. They have 
returned much less in numbers, thin, their bodies dragged in rags and sorrow 
in their hearts.’48 Nevertheless in one and the same breath it was observed 
that especially the women looked lively, and that many of them had children 
who were born in Mecca. As during the repatriation operation in 191 Batavia 
stood surety for the fare of still one hundred guilders. When the authorities 
tried to collect the money, it turned out that, in Kediri at least many of those 
who had been repatriated Muslims had given a false address.49 
Pan-Islamism raised greater concern in Great Britain, Russia, and France than 
it disturbed the Netherlands. The proclamation of a holy war was aimed in 
the first place at their Muslim subjects. For the Triple Entente Powers it was 
essential to deny that the war had anything to do with religion, and to give 
as much publicity as possible to Muslim leaders who testified to their loyalty 
to the Allied Powers. All three issued lengthy statements blaming German 
political machinations for the fact that Turkey had joined the war. In India, 
the British statement was issued and published in the Gazette of India and 
translated into the major languages spoken by Great Britain’s Muslim subjects 
in India and Southeast Asia. Great pains were taken to highlight how great a 
role Germany had played in setting the Ottoman government and Muslims 
in Turkey and other countries against Great Britain. The story of the Goeben 
and Breslau was retold, but a discreet veil was drawn over the commandeer-
ing of the two Turkish dreadnoughts ordered in Great Britain. Acts of Turkish 
aggression against the British position in Egypt and of the attempts to fer-
ment unrest among British Muslim subjects everywhere in the British Empire 
were exposed to the full light of the day. All this propaganda was geared to 
lead to the inevitable conclusion that German machinations were to blame for 
Turkey’s participation in the war. The opportunity was seized to stress that no 
German act or word could ever change the loyalty of the 70 million Muslims 
47 De Locomotief, -1-1917, 8-1-1917.
48 De Locomotief, -1-1917.
49 De Locomotief, 19--1917.
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in India, Africa, and the Malay States who lived under the protection of the 
most exalted banners of justice.0 In this and other statements, the British 
government reiterated that ‘His Majesty’s most loyal Moslem subjects’ could 
be sure that the war had nothing to do with religion and the holy places of 
Islam would not be attacked.1
Statements issued by the British government were supplemented by others 
from Islamic leaders and rulers in the colonies. A host of Indian rulers and 
organizations pledged their material and military support to the British cause 
in September. When Turkey entered the war a new cascade of statements 
poured in. In an attempt to dissuade waverers from taking the side of Germany 
and Turkey, pro-British manifestations and declarations by Muslims were 
given the full glory of publicity. Again these included statements by Indian 
rulers. The initiative for the new round of pro-British statements in India had 
come from the Aga Khan. In his own declaration, he expressed his ‘deep sor-
row’ that the Turkish government had joined the side of Germany and ‘acting 
under German orders is madly attempting to wage a most unprovoked war 
against such mighty sovereigns as the King Emperor and the Tsar of Russia’. 
The Aga Khan laid the full blame on Berlin and Vienna. Germany and Austria 
were depicted as the enemies of Islam. The war was not ‘the true and free will 
of the Sultan but of German officers and other non-Moslems who have forced 
him to their bidding’. Austria had taken Bosnia. Germany ‘has long been plot-
ting to become the suzerain of Asia Minor and Mesopotamia’.
Muslims in the Malay Peninsula, where with the exception of the Straits 
Settlements British rule was only decades old, also had to be convinced not 
to take the side of Germany and Turkey. There was a possibility that they 
might form a fertile target for German and Turkish agitation. The Malays 
were Muslims, and they had been joined by Indians who had migrated to 
the Peninsula in large numbers. The loyalty of the Chinese who were unequi-
vocally anti-Japanese was another source of worry. Requests were sent to the 
colonial administrations in Colombo, Hong Kong, and India for circulars or 
pamphlets to be produced in the vernacular languages ‘to prove the justice 
of the British cause in the present war’ to Chinese and Indians living in the 
Malay Peninsula.3 The statement of the Aga Khan was distributed among the 
Malay Muslims. The same was done with like-worded expressions that it was 
the ‘bounden duty at this critical juncture to adhere firmly to their old and 
0 ANM HC 173/14.
1 Notification issued by the Government of India indicating the policy of His Majesty’s 
Government in respect of the Holy Places (ANM SoS 37/191).
 ANM HC 173/14.
3 Secretary to the High Commissioner to the Colonial Secretary of Colombo, 14-1-191, ANM 
HCP 9/191.
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tried loyalty to the British government’ or sentences with a similar purport.4 
The aim was first and foremost to ensure the loyalty of the Indians who lived 
in Malaya; in particular the ‘Sikhs, Punjabis, Pathans and Tamils of the petty-
trading and coolie classes’.
To make certain of the loyalty of the indigenous Malay population, their 
rulers and the Sultan of Brunei were provided with the same information. The 
result was reassuring. The Malay rulers pledged their loyalty and that of their 
subjects. The Sultans of Perak and Selangor and the Yang di-Pertuan Besar of 
Negeri Sembilan signed a joint statement on  November 1914. They forbade 
their citizens ‘to render any assistance whatever to Turkey’ or ‘to raise or be 
influenced by any agitation in favour of participation on the side of Turkey’. 
The fourth ruler of the Federated Malay States, the Sultan of Pahang, was irate 
about the listing the names of the four rulers in the preamble. As was the custom, 
the order had been determined by the date the states had come under British 
protection. The Sultan of Pahang was mentioned third and concluded that the 
Sultan of Perak, whose name came first, had been put in a position of superior-
ity over him.7 Offended he issued his own statement. The Sultan observed that 
the Federated Malay States ‘had never gained any advantage from the Turkish 
Government’, and said he was sure that ‘the inhabitants of this State of Pahang 
have felt and understood the abundant prosperity, happiness and freedom they 
have enjoyed since Pahang came under British Protection’.8
Among the rulers of the Unfederated States, the Sultan of Kelantan held a 
public service in which prayers were said for the success of the British army. 
The Sultans of Johore and Trengganu also expressed their loyalty to the British 
Crown. To prove his sincerity the Sultan of Kelantan put his personal army 
at the disposal of the British. In Singapore the British military Commander, 
Brigadier General Dudley Howard Ridout, turned to the most influential 
Muslim leader in the city, the head of the Arab community, to convince him 
of the evils of the Ottoman Empire and the vile role of Germany. His tactic 
seemed successful. The Arab in question abandoned his initial pro-Turkish 
stance (Othman 1997:). A few months later, in March 191, leaders of the 
Muslim community in Singapore also sent message of loyalty to the British 
King (Shennan 000:77). As subsequent developments would show, such 
statements said nothing about the disposition of the larger Muslim commu-
nity, and maybe also nothing of that of its signatories.
4 Telegram of Viceroy of India to Secretary of State, ANM SoS 37/191.
 Secretary to the High Commissioner to the Secretary to the Government of India, 14-1-191, 
ANM HCO 9/191. 
 Proclamation, -11-1914, ANM HCO 180a/1914.
7 Under Secretary Federated Malay States to Secretary to the High Commissioner, -11-1914, 
ANM HCO 180a/1914.
8 Proclamation Sultan of Pahang, ANM HCO 180a/1914.
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The British extended their efforts to try to counter Turkish and German propa-
ganda to the Netherlands Indies. One of the reasons prompting them to do 
so was that the Arab community in Southeast Asia was a highly international 
one, interknit by many business and family links between the Arabs who had 
settled in the region. The Consul General in Batavia made sure that British 
statements justifying the war with Turkey found their way into the Dutch-
language press, from which they were copied by the Malay-language newspa-
pers. In other press releases, he drew attention to the section of a speech King 
George V had delivered at the opening of Parliament in London in which the 
King had said that the war with Turkey had been forced upon Great Britain. 
The many statements by Muslim leaders and organisations in support of the 
British cause and denouncing the stand taken by Istanbul were not overlooked. 
Other releases drew attention to vows made by Muslims in Sierra Leone, and 
by the chief cadi of Cyprus, who had defended the war against Turkey and 
had hailed the fact that the island had been annexed by Great Britain.
Of course the German and Turkish consuls in the Netherlands Indies tried 
to gainsay these statements. They disqualified other British information as 
‘false reports’ by the British consuls and by Reuter’s. German propaganda 
was designed to create the impression that the statements of Indian rulers in 
favour of Great Britain had been forced upon them. As an illustration of the 
pressure exerted by the British, it was reported that the Aga Khan had been 
forced to board a ship sailing to Europe, and that his friends forcibly tried to 
prevent this.9
Judging from the reaction in the Javanese press, the British propaganda 
efforts were not very successful. In Dutch-language newspapers and in their 
own Malay-language newspapers Indonesians could read about Islamic lead-
ers in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere who supported the Turkish holy war 
appeal. The information about the pro-British vows of Indian rulers was 
received with suspicion. At best, it was suggested that the rulers had been 
duped by Allied propaganda.
British propaganda even seems to have been counter-productive. In ret-
rospect, in 1917 Schrieke concluded that Muslims in the Netherlands Indies 
had reacted with scorn when they learned about the statements of loyalty 
to British rule. The Islamic press almost without exception had considered it 
impossible that a real Muslim would fight against Germany or Turkey.0 The 
Malay-language press indeed reacted to British propaganda with dismay. A 
poem in the Semarang Sarekat Islam newspaper Sinar Djawa declared that 
rulers who remained loyal to the British were egoists.1 Oetoesan Hindia copied 
9 Lokal Anzeiger, cited in De Locomotief, -1-1914.
0 Note Schrieke, 30-4-1917, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 14--1918 38.
1 De Locomotief, 3-1-1914.
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an article from Le Petit Hindoestani which stressed that true Muslims did not 
attach any value to what the Aga Khan did or said. The Aga Khan was not a 
Sunni Muslim like Muslims in the Netherlands Indies. He was the leader of 
a Shi’ite sect, who dressed as an Englishman, and with a chin shaven clean 
as a whistle, enjoyed the night life of London. Reports in the press about 
Indian troops – and a number of elephants – who were on their way to the 
battlefields of Europe did not improve the British image either. In November 
1914 the Sumatra Post in Medan received a letter from a reader. He wondered 
whether it was true that England had assured itself of the assistance of other 
nations with fine promises and money, and when this did not help by caus-
ing agitation. His sarcastic conclusion was: ‘All possible tribes, regardless of 
from which part of the earth and from which race or rough hordes are armed 
by England and fight as English soldiers – if possible all wild animals from 
English colonies are brought to France and are set on the Germans – because 
England wages war for justice and civilization’.3 Later, a pamphlet distrib-
uted among the Arab community in Batavia which drew attention to the joy 
of Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina over the liberation of Mecca from 
Turkish rule was greeted with a strong protest by Oetoesan Hindia. Readers 
were reminded that in the Netherlands Indies too a firm faith in the Caliph of 
Islam was essential.4
The denials of British reports by the Turkish Consul in Batavia were con-
sidered more trustworthy. Oetoesan Hindia wrote that they confirmed what 
had been suspected all along. The Turkish government had committed no 
wrongdoings. Turkey was supported by its genuine subjects and by genuine 
Muslims in the rest of the world. The British information about the support of 
Islamic leaders and about German and Turkish schemes to incite the Muslim 
population in British India and elsewhere to rebel were dismissed as being 
inspired by fear. The British press releases were put to use to draw attention 
to the repressive nature of British (and of French) rule. Perhaps in order not 
to sound too rebellious it was added that British rule was worse than Dutch 
rule. To illustrate this, a point was made of the fact that in the Netherlands 
Indies the government supported the indigenous population in its efforts to 
establish schools. Rebellions were not the fruit of inflammatory pamphlets, 
but were inspired by cruel suppression and by injustice. If the British govern-
ment trusted its subjects in India, why did it have to undermine the esteem 
of Turkey. Bomb attacks in India were presented as another indication that 
Great Britain could not count on the support of the population in its colonies. 
 Oetoesan Hindia, 14-11-1914.
3 De Locomotief, 4-11-1914.
4 Oetoesan Hindia, cited in Koloniaal Tijdschrift 1917:391.
 Oetoesan Hindia, -11-1914, 10-11-1914, 1-11-1914.
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On another occasion Oetoesan Hindia suggested that Great Britain had not 
entered the war to come to the assistance of Belgium. It had been prompted 
by far more selfish reasons.
The anti-British propaganda produced by M.M. Rifat, an American citizen 
of Egyptian origin who was living in exile in Geneva, made a greater impres-
sion on Muslims in the Netherlands Indies. Rifat was editor-in-chief of the 
Patrie Egyptienne, which displayed the motto ‘Egypt for the Egyptians and by 
the Egyptians’. Just after the outbreak of the war Rifat had addressed a letter 
to the German people. In it he expressed his sympathy and admiration for the 
German Emperor, the German army, and the German nation on behalf of the 
Muslim population of North Africa, Turkey, Persia, and India. The tenor of his 
writings was that while England kept India, Egypt, and other Oriental coun-
tries in political and economic servitude, while France murdered people in 
Morocco, and while Italy waged a war of extermination in Libya, the German 
and Austrian people had testified to their friendship for the peoples in the 
East. Rifat also postulated that Belgium had made the mistake of opposing 
Germany because its government had been misled by false promises and 
reports spread by the Triple Entente. After having made this observation, Rifat 
appealed to the Eastern nations to give Germany and Austria all the financial, 
moral, and armed support they could. A victory for Germany and Austria 
would be a victory of Asia and Africa over the pirates of the Triple Entente. In 
a second public letter which was addressed to the German Chancellor, Rifat 
listed the crimes committed by ‘perfidious Albion’. In the name of freedom 
Great Britain had bombarded Alexandria in 188, had violated the neutral 
status of the Suez Canal, had attacked the peaceful Somalis on the pretext of 
fighting the Mahdi, and had stimulated the carnage in the Balkans. It had also 
waged the Opium War on China, and in cahoots with the barbaric Russians 
had divided up Persia. In short, the history of the British Empire was one of 
‘gigantic intrigues, deceitful tragedies, treacheries, which had cost the lives of 
millions of innocent peoples’.7 Statements like those made by Rifat did not 
pass unnoticed. In the Netherlands Indies they were seen as an indication of 
what people under colonial rule really thought. 
The at times naive efforts by the British to stir up anti-German feelings 
among Muslims also failed. A British communiqué was published in London 
in early 191. It was forwarded to the press by the British Consul General in 
Batavia. The communiqué drew attention to German documents which had 
been seized in German East Africa, in which plans were discussed to promote 
the breeding of pigs and to forbid teachers to perform Islamic religious func-
 Oetoesan Hindia, 1-10-1914.
7 Au peuple allemand 1-9-1914; Rifat to Bethmann Hollweg, 17-9-1914 (De Indiër 1-0/1:33-
4). 
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tions, such as acting as circumciser. Oetoesan Hindia published the report in 
full. The editors did not believe a word of it.8 Attacks on Turkey in European-
language newspapers elicited the same response. They were received with 
dismay. In 1917 the Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad called Enver Pasha ‘The Great 
Murderer of the Armenians’. A Malay newspaper reacted by pointing out that 
the Commander-in-Chief in Europe and therefore the man responsible for the 
ill-fated military offences at the front, Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, did 
the same kind of work. He should be honoured with the same qualification.9 
Enver Pasha was a ‘Turkish hero’ to Muslims in the Netherlands Indies.70 
As reactions indicate, Turkish participation in the war meant that Muslims in 
the Archipelago were generally pro-German and anti-British. This disposition 
was strengthened even more by the anti-German sentiments prevalent among 
the Dutch people living in the Netherlands Indies. The Dutch-language news-
papers which were most despised for the abusive way they wrote about the 
indigenous population were also the most fiercely anti-German in tone.
Haunted by the pan-Islamic spectre the Dutch in the Netherlands Indies 
were not sure what the consequences of Turkey entering the war would be 
for law and order. With an undertone of relief, the Ministry of the Colonies 
concluded in its report to Parliament for 191 that the influence had been nihil. 
There had been no stirrings of unrest.71 This was not to say that there had been 
no trouble at all. Occasionally the war and what was dubbed pan-Islamism did 
function as an extra incentive to resist Dutch rule. Support from or for Turkey 
became an actual rallying cry in some regions. In the eastern part of Celebes, 
at that time still a troublesome island for the Dutch, a hajji who claimed to act 
on the instructions from Istanbul had called together villagers and had urged 
them to rise up in rebellion in November 191. He foretold that Turkish rule 
would soon replace that of the Dutch.7 In Jambi people awaited the arrival of 
a ‘kapal Stambul’, a Turkish warship, to help them in their rebellion against 
Dutch rule in October 191. In Pasir, on the East Coast of Borneo, Muslims also 
counted on Turkish support to oust the Dutch.73
The vernacular Muslim press made no secret of on whose side it stood. 
Simultaneously editors and contributors usually stressed that they were loyal 
subjects of the Netherlands and would remain so. One of the most outspoken 
newspapers in this respect was Kaoem Moeda, of which Abdoel Moeis was 
8 Oetoesan Hindia, 13-4-191.
9 Pantjaran Warta, 10-7-1917, IPO 8/1917.
70 Oetoesan Hindia, 0-4-191.
71 Koloniaal verslag 191:17-8, 1-.
7 Koloniaal verslag 191:3c.
73 Koloniaal verslag 1917:xi; Note Schrieke, 30-4-1917, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 14--1918 38.
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editor-in-chief. It was, to quote Rinkes, vehemently pro-Turkish.74 Another 
Sarekat Islam newspaper, Sinar Djawa, held a poem written by ‘Politicus’ 
attacking Great Britain and Russia. Russia was the chief culprit:
Russia is a very strong empire
But stupid and very malicious
The cause of all misfortune 
Which has now engulfed the world
Because the Russians sided with Princip,
A man with a dishonest heart
Who killed two persons
A youthful royal couple.
Such words went too far for Batavia. The poem was considered to be capable 
of inciting hatred between Christians and Muslims. Prosecution was con-
sidered. The editor of Sinar Djawa flew to the defence of Politicus. He was 
a Muslim, but not a very devout one. There had been no malicious intent. 
Politicus had written the poem because he had been deeply upset by sto-
ries about Muslims in Baku who had prayed for the defeat of Turkey. He 
thought it unthinkable that Muslims would desire the destruction of fellow-
Muslims.7
One of the most radical Islamic periodicals of those days was Medan 
Moeslimin. In its first issue Medan Moeslimin used the Turkish war effort and 
the sacrifices this implied to impress upon its readers that the Muslims in the 
Netherlands Indies should show the same perseverance in their own strug-
gle in which they were engaged. Oetoesan Hindia also strongly sympathized 
with the Turkish cause. In the opinion of its editors after the Ottoman Empire 
had entered the war it had become impossible for true Muslims to remain 
impartial bystanders to the slaughter in the faraway West. To reassure Dutch 
administration Oetoesan Hindia added that this did not mean that it would 
resort to acts which would endanger Dutch neutrality.7 Oetoesan Hindia 
referred to Turkey as the Caliphate of the Muslims in the Netherlands Indies. 
It ‘embodied Islam’, the ‘image of Islam’, the only Islamic region in the world 
which had maintained its independence; all qualifications which could not but 
horrify those fearful of pan-Islamism. 
From the very beginning Oetoesan Hindia and other Malay newspapers 
advised their readers not to fall victim to deceit. They were cautioned that 
many of the news telegrams which reached Java contained lies. They did not 
74 Report Rinkes, -7-191, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 17-9-191 4.
7 De Locomotief, 3-1-1914, 4-3-191. Gavrilo Princip was the murderer of Prince Franz 
Ferdinand and his wife.
7 Oetoesan Hindia, cited in De Indische Gids 191, I:43.
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escape the attention of the British censor. War was not waged only on land 
and on sea, but also with the pen and the telegrams.77 Readers were informed 
that one consequence was that at a time when in actual fact Germany had 
conquered half of Belgium, Allied telegrams mentioned only Allied victo-
ries.78 To acquire a more balanced view readers should also take notice of the 
German telegrams from the Wolff News Agency. Oetoesan Hindia published 
these telegrams. It did not do so arbitrarily. It also did its best to supplement 
the Wolff telegrams with information gleaned from other sources. Among 
these were telegrams of the Lloyd Othman, which Oetoesan Hindia copied from 
newspapers in the Middle East. Another valued source for Oetoesan Hindia 
was China Press. Editors at times apologized that recent issues had not yet 
reached them.
Muslims in the Archipelago cheered Allied setbacks. Gallipoli provided the 
perfect occasion. A three-column article on the front page of Oetoesan Hindia 
explained that the defeat of the Allied forces showed one should not look 
down upon the community of God. Praise was due to the ‘Islamic army’ for its 
courage, to the German army for the assistance given, and to ‘our Caliphate’ 
for the way it had organized the Turkish army. The author of the article, who 
was not a member of the editorial staff of Oetoesan Hindia, lashed out against 
Reuter’s and the reports Reuter’s had published about the defeats of the 
Turkish army and the critical situation in Istanbul. Reuter’s was ‘the great liar’, 
‘the transmitter of gossip’, and ‘a master at lying’. Shamelessly it only ‘spread 
lies’. Decent newspapers should not publish the Reuter’s nonsense (here the 
editors of Oetoesan Hindia who did copy the Reuter’s telegrams added between 
brackets ‘steady on, sir, steady on’).79
Such feelings were shared by a significant portion of the Arab community 
in the Netherlands Indies. Their anti-British disposition was an additional 
source of worry to the colonial authorities. Because of the religious esteem 
in which the Arabs were held by the population, they had given cause for 
concern for decades. Again it had been Snouck Hurgronje who had stirred 
up the hornets’ nest. He had held Arabs in the Netherlands Indies and their 
‘accomplices’ in the Straits Settlements responsible for many of the contested 
press articles and the other forms of agitation, which he inevitably saw as part 
and parcel of a pan-Islamic scheme. Snouck Hurgronje suffered no illusions 
about why the Arab community was hostile to Dutch rule. One of the reasons 
he mentioned was that some Dutch civil servants were real Araberfresser. 
Another was that Arabs were classified as Foreign Orientals. As such, like the 
Chinese, they were obliged to live in a special quarters in a town, which were 
77 Oetoesan Hindia, 7-11-1914.
78 Oetoesan Hindia, 10-9-1918, 1-11-1918.
79 Oetoesan Hindia, 17-1-191.
XI  The Turkish factor 313
often located in the more unhealthy 
neighbourhoods. The ‘equalization’ 
of the Japanese had offended them 
as much as it had the Chinese.
Arabs were Ottoman subjects. In 
their subsequent struggle for eman-
cipation, the Arabs had turned to 
the Turkish government for sup-
port. The colonial administration 
had a real problem here. In view 
of growing discontent, something 
had to be done to remove its causes 
and soothe-ruffled Arab feathers. 
Disgruntled Arabs might indeed 
teach the Muslim population ‘rev-
erence for the Lord of the Believers 
and awareness of their rights 
against a tyrannical Government of 
unbelievers’, but such an outcome 
would be all the more dangerous 
as a new Indonesian intelligentsia with a Western education was emerging 
and tended to be drawn to precisely those larger cities where the Arabs were 
living.80
In 1917 the colonial authorities were convinced that the pro-German dis-
position of Arabs, and their suspected role in augmenting pan-Islamic and 
anti-Dutch feelings were reason enough to instruct the local Dutch civil serv-
ants to gather information secretly about the political inclinations of the lead-
ers of the Arab communities in their territories.81 Internment the moment the 
Netherlands was forced to enter the war was also considered. In the opinion of 
the then Commander of the colonial army, De Greve, all Arab males between 
sixteen and sixty years of age should be locked away in camps without delay 
to maintain law and order among the natives if Germany were to become the 
enemy. Such a mood was easier said than done. There was one problem which 
made De Greve waver: the nationality of the Arabs. Most of them came from 
the Hadhramaut, present-day Yemen. Because of the developments in the 
Middle East by 1917 Batavia was uncertain about whether the Hadhramaut 
still formed part of the Ottoman Empire or had become a British protector-
ate. If the Arabs were British subjects and the Netherlands entered the war on 
80 De Locomotief, 7-11-1898; Snouck Hurgronje to Van der Wijck, 1-11-1897 (Gobée and 
Adriaanse 197-, II:11).
81 Circular 1st Government Secretary, 4-4-1917, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 1-9-1917 H11. 
Angel and Turkish flag. Trade mark of 
a Chinese coffee trader in Palembang. 
(Javasche Courant 191 Trade mark 7949.)
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the side of Great Britain, they could 
hardly be interned, even though 
their pro-German sympathies were 
well known. Given the opposite 
scenario with Great Britain as the 
enemy and Arabs considered to be 
British nationals, internment would 
be unnecessary. In this eventual-
ity the Dutch colonial army would 
have to protect the colony against 
the very real threat of a British inva-
sion. Soldiers would have more 
important tasks to perform than 
guarding pro-German and thus 
harmless Arabs.8 The Governor 
General refused to heed De Greve’s 
suggestion. Under no circumstanc-
es would he allow mass internment 
of Arabs. He thought it sufficient 
that if war were to break out only 
those Arabs who posed a real dan-
ger should be imprisoned.
Belying such misgivings about 
the disposition of the Arab commu-
nity, its leaders expressed support 
for the established colonial authori-
ties. As they did in the Malay 
Peninsula, Arab leaders in the Netherlands Indies participated in the fund-
raising (even for the British Prince of Wales National Relief Fund). As among 
the Chinese, feelings were at the very least mixed. Arabs took the initiative to 
collect money for organizations like the Turkish Red Crescent. In view of the 
many actions for the destitute in Holland and for the Belgian Red Cross, such 
collections could hardly be forbidden. Nevertheless, the Dutch Minister of 
Foreign Affairs must have frowned somewhat when the Turkish Envoy in The 
Hague handed over ,3 guilders for flood victims in Java in 191. Oetoesan 
Hindia saw in the gesture a clear sign of the strengthening of the material and 
spiritual bond between the Netherlands and the Caliphate.83
Collections were allowed, but only on the condition that they did noth-
ing to damage Dutch neutrality and that no money was given to the Turkish 
.8 De Greve to Van Limburg Stirum, 1-3-1917, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 1-9-1917 H11.
83 Oetoesan Hindia, -4-191, 11-4-191.
The religious leader from Mekkah. Trade 
mark of a trading company in Batavia. 
(Javasche Courant Trade mark 71.)
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state.84 Rinkes was even present 
at one of the meetings organized 
by the Arab community to raise 
money for the Turkish Red Crescent 
in April 191. After the Turkish 
Consul had invited him to take 
the floor, he had commended the 
cause. One of the unintended con-
sequences of Rinkes’s speech was 
that Indonesians Muslims began to 
send money to him. More impor-
tantly Dutch people were out-
raged. Their reaction showed that 
they had not been able to shake off 
the paranoia of the beginning of 
the century. Pan-Islamism and the 
Caliphate continued to haunt their 
thoughts. When what Rinkes had 
done became known the Java-Bode 
lamented: ‘Where are the days of 
a Snouck Hurgronje and Hazeu?’8 
Arabs should only be allowed to 
collect among Arabs, not among 
the natives. Support for the dis-
semination of pan-Islamism in the 
Netherlands Indies amounted to treason. The Java-Bode called it a disgrace that 
Rinkes had been present at such a dreadful meeting. Were the Netherlands to 
enter the war on the side of the Allies the country would reap the bitter fruits 
of Rinkes’s ‘careless talk’. Measures were taken against Alhilal Alahmar in 
December 191. After an Arab newspaper published in Batavia had written 
that Alhilal Alahmar was determined to support the Turkish Empire in its 
struggle, the Attorney-General banned the organization on the grounds that its 
activities were in violation of Dutch neutrality.8 In a special circular letter he 
once again stressed that there should be strict supervision to ensure collections 
were made only for humanitarian ends, not for political purposes.
There was more for the Dutch to be gloomy about. The following month 
at a mass meeting in Surabaya portraits of Queen Wilhelmina and the Turkish 
Sultan were displayed on the same level. This was an affront. To rub the insult 
84 Attorney-General to Idenburg, 7-10-191, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. -1-191 44.
8 Java-Bode, cited in De Indische Gids 191, II:191-.
8 Opkomst 197:400, 439; Mandal 1997:.
Trade mark of an Arab trader combin-
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in, Tjokroaminoto had been delighted. He had the audacity to call Wilhelmina 
the temporal ruler and the Sultan the Caliph. Again the Java-Bode protested. 
The government should eliminate any doubts among Muslims that there was 
only one ruler in the Netherlands Indies. Batavia had to do its utmost to sup-
press an upsurge of pan-Islamic sentiments. No sanctions were taken against 
Tjokroaminoto. Rinkes only gave him a ‘very serious lecture’. Flags also 
entered the picture. At times there was confusion about the Sarekat Islam flag. 
With its crescent and star, the symbols of Islam, the Sarekat Islam flag resem-
bled that of Turkey. The close resemblance resulted in a temporary ban by the 
authorities on flying the Sarekat Islam flag in 1917. Members of the Sarekat 
Islam were at a loss to understand why.87 
87 Oetoesan Hindia, -9-1917, IPO 39/1917.
chapter xii
The German menace
During the Russo-Japanese War, the Netherlands Indies had run the risk of 
becoming a base of operations for one of the belligerents. The same happened, 
albeit somewhat differently, in the initial years of the Great War. Berlin did all 
it could to exploit its alliance with Turkey. One of the results was the combined 
effort of the German government and Indian revolutionaries to subvert colo-
nial rule in the British colonies and protectorates. The scheme had its origin 
in San Francisco with the Ghadr (Mutiny) movement. The Ghadr movement 
had been founded in 1913 by an Indian exile, Har Dayal, a twenty-three-year-
old former Oxford student. Its name recalled the Indian Mutiny of 1857 and 
explained the aims of the movement. Members fanned out over the world from 
the United States to accomplish what Ghadr stood for. Before the war, Indian 
refugees in San Francisco had already put out feelers to find out whether 
Berlin was prepared to support an insurrection in British India with weapons 
and money once war between Germany and Great Britain had been declared. 
The initiative had come from Har Dayal. Berlin responded positively. Both the 
Kaiser and General H.J.L. von Moltke, the chief of the German General Staff 
at the beginning of the war, had no difficulty imagining what could be accom-
plished by inciting Muslims in India and the Near East to rise up against Great 
Britain once Great Britain and Germany were at war (Ferguson 2001:213). 
In Chicago, Los Angeles, Washington, New York and other American cities, 
German diplomats, other German citizens, and people of German descent 
started to cooperate with Indians to plan an uprising in the British colonies. 
Soon after the first contacts had been made Har Dayal was arrested by the 
American authorities. He broke bail and fled to Switzerland, then the refuge of 
all kinds of agitators from all over the world (Hopkirk 1994:48-50). Geneva was 
the home of the Club of Egyptian Patriots, a group of anti-British Egyptians 
meeting once a week in the house of Rifat. Others were active in Zurich. Here 
a group styling itself Pro India, which had chosen ‘India without the English, 
India for the Hindus’ as its motto, had been founded in 1912. Its members 
included E.F.E. Douwes Dekker’s old acquaintances Walter Strickland and 
Shiyamaji Krishnavarma. Pro India published a magazine under the same 
name. 
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The idea of hurting Great Britain, France, and Russia by instigating unrest 
among their Muslim and Hindu subjects gained new momentum after July 
1914. The scheme was enthusiastically supported by the Kaiser and Von 
Moltke. No time was lost effectuating a plan. The combined force of anti-
colonial propaganda, calls for a holy war, feelings of religious solidarity, and 
agitation by agents recruited by the Germano-Indian conspiracy was a power-
ful factor in undermining British rule. After Turkey had entered the war it 
assumed even greater proportions. Coupled with rumours about Allied set-
backs in Europe and the reports of the enormous number of soldiers who died 
on the battlefields, the Germano-Indian plot created plenty of unrest in British 
colonies. France was also not spared the effects of the anti-Allied propaganda. 
In Madagascar people inspired by ‘fallacious literature’ tried to poison the 
officers and non-commissioned officers of the French troops stationed in the 
island. They failed.1
With the Ottoman Empire as its enemy Great Britain had to exercise great 
prudence in employing Indian and other Asian soldiers abroad. Anti-British 
propaganda made the task all the more urgent. Revolutionary Indians set out 
to foment unrest among Indian soldiers specifically and among the Indian 
population at large. Rebellion was the ultimate aim. In Asia Ghadr agents 
targeted Indian units in India, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Burma, Penang, and 
Singapore (Sareen 1995:10). In France and Belgium the British Army had to be 
on its guard against activities of agitators intent on dissuading Indian soldiers 
from fighting against Germany.
In India and the Malay peninsula some of the Muslims soldiers were 
already reluctant to fight the Turkish army. If given a choice, they would have 
preferred to fight on the side of the sultan, the symbol of their religion. As a 
consequence the loyalty of a number of Muslim units could not be trusted. 
The officers commanding the Indian troops were well aware of this. They 
distributed their own translations of the statement by the British government 
published in the Gazette of India, underlined the British position in speeches 
to the troops and in private conversations with Indian officers, and gave their 
troops numerous assurances that the war had nothing to do with religion 
(Sareen 1995:286, 496, 579).
At a higher level, army command made assiduous efforts to ensure that 
units known for the strong Islamic disposition of their soldiers were not 
ordered to battlefields where they might have to fight Turkish troops close to 
the holy places of Islam (Smurthwaite 1997:165-6). Special care was taken with 
regiments recruited among the Muslim frontier tribes. The Viceroy of British 
India, Lord Charles Hardinge, reported to London that these troops were ‘so 
1 De Locomotief, 21-2-1916.
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far fanatical’ that, in contrast to Muslim soldiers from elsewhere, they did not 
‘like fighting against the Turks.’2
At times marching orders created unrest among Indian soldiers who did 
not want to fight Turkish troops. In Singapore, the Malay States Guides, made 
up of Sikhs and Muslim soldiers from India, were stirred up by anti-British 
propaganda by civilian compatriots in the city (Shennan 2000:89). They ini-
tially refused to go to East Africa and fight for Great Britain at the front in 
December 1914. Army command did not want to utter the word mutiny and 
spread the word that fear had inspired the soldiers, not Ghadr propaganda 
(Sareen 1995:11). Despite downplaying the incident army command consid-
ered the incident serious enough to send an ‘India Agent’ to Singapore. His 
mission was ‘to probe the state of native feeling’ in the city (Sareen 1995:691). 
The following month a corporal from the mule battery of the Malay States 
Guides sent a letter to the Turkish Consul in Rangoon. He vowed that he and 
other soldiers were ready to fight for Turkey and asked the Turkish govern-
ment to send a warship to Singapore to fetch them. The letter was intercepted 
by British intelligence in Burma. The corporal was hanged.3 In Rangoon, a 
Ghadr-inspired mutiny could only be prevented at the last moment in January 
1915. The incident was frightening enough for the British to institute a new 
‘citizen-force’. In Basra, in present-day Iraq, soldiers of the 15th Lancers who 
‘refused to fight fellow Muslims (Turks) in the Holy Land of Islam, although 
they were prepared to fight them anywhere else’ mutinied in February 1916 
(Menezes 1997:117). 
The most impressive act of disobedience fuelled by a combination of 
German propaganda and religious feelings took place in Singapore in February 
1915. Indian Muslim soldiers of the 5th Light Infantry Battalion rose in rebel-
lion on 15 February. They were among those Indian troops the British were 
most hesitant to send to the Middle East or even to station in predominantly 
Muslim surroundings. Earl Kitchener, the British secretary of State for War, 
had considered the battalion ‘too Mohamedan for service in Egypt.’4 Many of 
its soldiers, as did those of the Malay States Guides, attended the Kampong 
Java mosque, which was one of the centres of anti-British and pro-Turkish 
propaganda; and where the statements of loyalty to British rule had made no 
impression. Afterwards the British described the imam of the mosque as ‘a 
well-known and most dangerous character’ (Sareen 1995:40).
German prisoners of war also did their bit. Until two days before the muti-
ny, soldiers of the 5th Light Infantry had guarded the Tanglin Camp where the 
2 Hardinge to Nicholson, 1-3-1915, PRO FO 800 377.
3 Proceedings 1916:C 169; Ban Kah Choon 2001:28.
4 Report from Brigadier-General Ridout, General Officer Commanding, Singapore, with 
remarks on proceedings of Court of Enquiry (Sareen 1995:691).
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German prisoners of war and civilians were held. It was clear to the Germans 
that the loyalty to the British of the soldiers of the 5th Light Infantry and of the 
Malay States Guides who had initiallly guarded them was questionable. In one 
of the barracks a picture of Kaiser Wilhelm was displayed prominently which 
the ‘Corporal of the Guard used to salute’ (Shennan 2000:93). Lauterbach, the 
detained Emden officer, related how they had called out to him ‘Emden officer, 
Emperor Wilhelm, Enver-Bei, Islam, hurrah!’ after Turkey had joined the war 
(Lauterbach 1918:20). The prisoners did their best to exploit such feelings. 
Ridout recalled how ‘about the middle of January [...] German Prisoners [...] 
were in the habit of saying prayers at sundown in Mahommedan fashion, and 
pretended to recite the Koran’ (Sareen 1995:699). Such acts had convinced the 
mutineers that the Germans in the camp were Muslims. Stories that Germans 
had converted to Islam, and that the Kaiser’s daughter would marry the sul-
tan’s eldest son circulated (Sareen 1995:122). The Germans also fuelled tales of 
‘German ascendancy and loss of British prestige’ (Sareen 1995:4). There was 
talk among the soldiers that the days of the British Empire were numbered. 
Soon there would be ‘a German Raj instead of a British Raj’ (Sareen 1995:79).
Pro-Turkish propaganda fell in willing ears. For various reasons discipline 
in the 5th Light Infantry was slack. Discontentment was high. On the top 
of this after the outbreak of the war rumours ‘of the most lurid character’ 
had begun to circulate. The Governor of the Straits Settlements, Sir Arthur 
Henderson Young, blamed British ‘panic-mongers’, who had spread tales of 
‘ruthless warfare’, of British failures, and of ‘long lists of casualties’. The sto-
ries had reached the ears of ‘the ignorant and discontented’.5 Another observa-
tion Young made was that discipline ‘lax for sometime, had crumbled away 
completely under the influence of pessimists, alarmists, rumour-mongers, and 
preachers of fanaticism’.6 Afterwards the chairman of a Court of Enquiry, E.C. 
Ellis, concluded that German propaganda had also played a role. He stated 
that German influences had been at work among the men of the 5th Light 
Infantry, as they have been throughout the whole of the Far East, including 
India, with the object of ‘stirring up dissension and alienating our native sub-
jects from their true allegiance to His Majesty the KING’.7
Events came to a head when the soldiers received orders to be ready to 
be transported overseas. A pep talk by Ridout had a negative effect on the 
soldiers. Young explained later that ‘[c]redulous, pessimistic and suspicious, 
they misinterpreted everything’.8 Afraid that they would have to fight Turkish 
soldiers in the Middle East or would be sent to Europe, where they were sure 
5 Proceedings 1916:C 169.
6 Proceedings 1916:C 170.
7 Proceedings 1916:B 47-8.
8 Proceedings 1916:C 170; Ban Kah Choon 2001:3.
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that he ‘who does not fall in battle will die from the cold’, part of the 5th Light 
Infantry rebelled (Lauterbach 1918:21). In actual fact, they were to be trans-
ferred on the troop ship Nore to Hong Kong out of harm’s way. The soldiers 
had been informed about this, but the news had not quenched the confusion 
about their destination. It was now of little account. Some of the soldiers had 
become convinced that while Germany was winning the war, Great Britain 
no longer had any use for them. The British ‘would send them away and sink 
them’ (Sareen 1995:79).
The rebels took control of part of the city. British men, women, and children 
took refuge on the P&O Lines steamer the Nile. Dutch people fled to KPM 
ships in port. The British found themselves in a precarious position. The 5th 
Light Infantry, which had transferred to Singapore less than a year before, was 
the main military force on the island. Those Europeans eligible for military 
service had left to fight in Europe. For that same reason the number of soldiers 
stationed in Singapore had been greatly reduced. Law and order was in the 
hands of Malay and Sikh policemen. They remained loyal. 
Twenty-seven British were killed by the mutineers. The rebellion could 
only be put down three days later, after a Russian, a French, and a Japanese 
cruiser, alerted by wireless, had come to lend assistance. The sultan of Johore 
with his own personal army also made his contribution.9 Forty-seven muti-
neers were sentenced to death and shot. Some ninety were banished to the 
British penal colony in the Andaman Islands (Stockwell 1988:46). The trials 
were conducted in public. Ridout wanted to make sure that everyone realized 
that ‘the men were being tried for mutiny [...] and not, as alleged for refusal 
to go to Turkey’ (Sareen 1995:17). Those soldiers of the 5th Light Infantry, who 
had remained loyal were given the choice between imprisonment or service 
at the front. In July 1915 they were sent first to West and then to East Africa to 
fight the Germans. The Malay States Guides ‘renewed’ their offer to fight at the 
front. In September Young could mention that they were ‘proceeding gladly 
on active service’.10 Later they were sent to the front in Aden. The German 
prisoners were moved to Sydney. The Muslim community of Singapore 
pledged its loyalty to the British rule. One of the lasting consequences of the 
mutiny was that plans were drawn up for the creation of the Special Branch in 
Singapore (Ban Kah Choon 2001:8).
The inquest into the mutiny indicated that all the British had attempted to 
assure the loyalty of their subjects in their colonies had had at the most limited 
effects. The conclusion was that ‘Singapore, together with the neighbouring 
States enjoy[ed] a wide-spread and unenviable notoriety as being a focus for 
9 Proceedings 1916:C 170.
10 Proceedings 1916:C 170.
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Indian seditionists’ and harboured ‘many rank seditionists of Indian national-
ity among its Residents’ (Sareen 1995:39).. The mutiny had weakened British 
prestige on the Malay Peninsula. Convinced that Great Britain was being 
defeated in Europe and that all British troops had left for Europe, the scene 
was considered to be ripe for a rebellion against British rule (Ban Kah Choon 
2001:48, 53). Insecurity assailed the British. The Singapore mutiny stirred up 
older feelings of British insecurity, stretching back the Indian Mutiny. Some 
of the soldiers of the 5th Light Infantry were ‘Hindustani Mohammedans [...] 
indeed of the same breed exactly that was the worst for cruelties to our women 
and children during the great mutiny of 1857’.11 The realization dawned that 
‘natives [were active] throughout the whole of India, throughout the whole 
of the Far East, [...] paid by German gold’.12 The governor of the Straits 
Settlements, Young, had to admit that feelings in the local Muslim community 
‘were stirred deeply’. A ‘vast majority’ remained loyal, but ‘there were also a 
few fanatics who preached extreme doctrines of religious hate’.13
The mutiny made a great impression in the Netherlands Indies, where 
people feared that the rebellion might form a source of inspiration to Muslims 
on the opposite side of the Straits of Malacca to rise up (Bauduin 1920:84-5). 
A new foe also had made its appearance: mutinous native soldiers. The com-
position of the colonial army, with its core of Indonesian soldiers, occasioned 
some people enormous concern. Others realized that none of the larger cities 
any longer had fortresses in which the whole European population could 
take shelter if native troops were to mutiny.14 The developments in Singapore 
also were grist to the mill of those Dutch people who opposed the setting up 
of a native militia. News about the rising disquieted the population of Pulau 
Tujuh, where food was again boarded.
Initial reports about what had happened in Singapore tended to be confus-
ing. They spoke about riots between Japanese and Chinese, and about Indian 
soldiers who had risen in mutiny because they had not been sent to the front. 
The idea that Dutch people might have been killed aroused anxiety. Batavia 
was blamed for remaining silent and giving no information about the fate of 
the Dutch community in Singapore.15 Initially Idenburg and Pinke decided to 
concentrate the fleet at Tanjung Priok (without the Tromp, which was having 
her periodic overhaul). When the seriousness of the situation in Singapore was 
realized, the whole squadron was ordered to the Riau Archipelago to be able 
to act immediately if Dutch lives had to be protected. 
11 R.C.D. Bradley to E.J. Lugard, 28-9-1933 (Sareen 1995:782).
12 Proceedings 1916:B 47-8.
13 Proceedings 1916:C 169.
14 De Locomotief, 16-3-1915.
15 De Locomotief, 19-2-1915, 23-2-1915, 25-2-1915.
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Another consequence of the mutiny was the Dutch Navy had to patrol the 
waters between Singapore and Sumatra in attempts to capture Germans who 
might be fleeing from Singapore. This, was the ‘courteous’ way Pinke, sure 
that there would be no legal reasons to imprison the Germans after question-
ing, had suggested Idenburg should react to a telegram from the governor 
of the Straits Settlements asking for their internment of the Germans (Teitler 
1986:127). In February, the Germans had already almost completed an escape 
tunnel in Tanglin Prison, but did not have to use it. The mutiny gave them the 
opportunity to escape by boat. British ships were also searching for the fugi-
tives. They stopped Dutch merchantmen and inquired whether their crew had 
spotted a fishing boat manned by Europeans. In their efforts the British also 
distributed pamphlets promising a reward of $ 1,000 per person for the cap-
ture of the escaped Germans in the Malay Peninsula and Netherlands Indies. 
Anti-climactically the only Europeans briefly arrested were three Dutchmen 
from Medan on holiday in Penang, whose Dutch was taken for German.16 
The mutineers had been confident that the German prisoners would join 
their rising. One of the first acts of the mutinous soldiers had been to march to 
the prison camp to set the Germans free.17 Most German prisoners were more 
scared to death by the mutineers than that they be inclined to sympathize with 
their action. They hid the British in the camp, tended to the wounded, and pre-
ferred to stay where they were. Afterwards the British praised these Germans 
for their ‘correct behaviour’ (Sareen 1995:41). One exception was a small group 
of eleven Germans, formed of crew members of the Emden and some leading 
businessmen. One of them was Lauterbach. According to Lauterbach’s own 
account, the Indian soldiers had asked him to become their leader. Rating 
the chances of success low, he had refused. The Germans fled to Karimun. In 
Sumatra the group split. Lauterbach and two other Germans went to Padang, 
where they were welcomed by the German Consul. Others went to Medan. 
They also were not arrested. Unarmed, they were not considered a threat. A 
report of the escape was published in the Deutsche Wacht.
Lauterbach, whose name by this time had been mentioned by some of the 
mutineers as the person who had incited them to rise (the reward for his cap-
ture dead or alive had consequently been raised to $ 5,000) and his compan-
ions travelled on to Batavia. They boarded a Dutch steamer. To escape arrest 
should the ship be stopped by the British Navy they assumed Belgian and 
Danish nationalities. From Batavia Lauterbach went to Surabaya. On one of 
the German ships in port he met Möller of the Hörde. Möller had been moved 
on to Java as a precaution on one of the warships which returned to there after 
16 Deli Courant, cited in De Locomotief, 15-3-1915.
17 Koloniaal verslag 1915:69-70; Ban Kah Choon 2001:7. 
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the mutiny in Singapore in early March. He had been interned on parole in 
Bandung, a city with a large, patriotic German community. Undetected by the 
Dutch authorities he had made his way to Surabaya.18 Lauterbach and Möller 
managed to flee the Netherlands Indies. One of the persons who helped them 
to escape was an Arab. To the horror of the Dutch, Oetoesan Hindia praised the 
man as a person who wanted to fight for the Caliphate.19 Möller was killed by 
Bedouins in the Arabian Peninsula. Lauterbach reached Germany (Lauterbach 
1918:51).
The Straits Settlements and the Malay Peninsula were one target for Germano-
Indian agitation. India was another and more important one. In India in the 
early months of the war popular opinion expected that Germany certainly 
would defeat Russia first, and thereupon also perhaps Great Britain and 
France. Commenting on the mood among the population of India, Lord 
Hardinge confessed that this ‘is the sort of theory widespread in the bazaars 
and amongst the uneducated native classes, and [that] it does a lot of harm for 
it creates a feeling of uncertainty and unrest’.20
The plotters aimed at staging an armed uprising in Calcutta on Christmas 
Day 1915. They expected that the rest of India would follow. A second uprising 
was planned to take place in Burma. Arms were to reach the rebels in Burma 
via Thailand (Hopkirk 1994:179). The Netherlands Indies played a central role 
in these plans. Arms which had been bought in the United States had to be 
smuggled into India via the Netherlands Indies. To eschew the British cen-
sor, the Netherlands Indies was selected as a distribution centre for seditious 
literature. Inflammatory pamphlets which had been printed in San Francisco, 
Germany, and the Middle East reached British India and the Malay Peninsula 
via the Netherlands Indies. Sometimes crews of merchantmen and mail boats 
were bribed to smuggle such literature to the Netherlands Indies. In other 
instances, they were asked to mail them in the ports their ships called at along 
the way. It was also not unheard of for pamphlets to be sent directly from the 
United States by mail. Initially pamphlets, some of them written by Rifat, actu-
ally reached Java and Sumatra by ordinary British and Dutch mails. Pamphlets 
printed in Germany were sent to the German consulate in Amsterdam or the 
German Embassy in The Hague. Readdressed to Windels or members of his 
staff in Batavia, they were thereupon posted at Dutch post offices. Some of 
these parcel-post packages escaped the attention of the colonial censor. It was 
quite beyond the bounds of the imagination of postal officials that parcels 
18 Bijl de Vroe 1980:44; Pinke to Idenburg, 25-3-1915, Pleyte to Idenburg, 24-4-1915, NA, Kol. 
Geheim, Vb. 5-5-1915 P7, Vb. 24-4-1915 F7.
19 Note Schrieke, 30-4-1917, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 14-2-1918 38.
20 Hardinge to Nicholson, 8-7-1915, PRO FO 800 378.
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from Holland might contain seditious literature and should be checked. Often, 
pamphlets were deliberately printed on very thin paper so that they could be 
sent in bulk in innocent looking packages. Yet other pamphlets were sent first 
to the United States by Dutch mail. From there they were forwarded to the 
Netherlands Indies. 
Such surreptitious activities were carried out under the direction of the 
General Staff of the German Army in Berlin. The Military Attaché at the 
German Embassy in Washington, Captain Franz von Papen, also in charge of 
other acts of German sabotage and espionage in the United States, coordinated 
the procurement of weapons in the United States. Headquarters in Asia were 
in Shanghai. Both he and a second Military Attaché were also responsible for 
planning attempts on British ships in United States and Canadian harbours 
and on munition factories. The German operations in the Unites States suc-
ceeded in generating so much fear that in 1916 policemen had to guard the 
bridges in New York to prevent bombs being thrown from them.21 To assist 
in the planning and running of subversive activities in the British possessions 
in Asia, three departments were established: one in the Netherlands Indies, 
one in Siam, and one in Persia. All three were headed by members of German 
diplomatic or consular staffs who, when necessary could call upon the help of 
employees of German firms in the region and other German Residents.
In Batavia, where the plotters probably had received their latest instruc-
tions and information when the Choising arrived in Tanjung Priok on 5 August, 
suspicion focused on Emil and Theodor Helfferich (Shennan 2000:79). The 
Helfferich brothers were pillars of the German community in the Netherlands 
Indies. Owing to their position and their jobs, they had contacts all over the 
Archipelago. Emil Helfferich had started his career in Asia as an employee 
of Behn, Meyer and Co. in Singapore. A few years later he became Director 
of the Straits und Sunda Syndikat, a company founded in 1910 with German 
and Belgian capital which controlled tea, rubber, and coffee estates in Java and 
Sumatra. The relationship between the syndicate and Behn, Meyer and Co. 
was ‘friendly’ (Helfferich 1967:120). At the start of the war Emil Helfferich had 
been stationed in Singapore. He had been among a group of fifty Germans, 
men and women, including the German Deputy Consul and the manager of 
the famous Grand-Hotel de l’Europe, who had boarded the Dutch steamer 
the Rumphius on 6 August. Before the Rumphius could set sail, a British 
army patrol came aboard and forced them to disembark. All German men 
were declared prisoners-of-war. In the beginning of their captivity they were 
allowed to resume their pre-war life. If they signed a declaration in which they 
promised not to take up arms against Great Britain, and would not try to travel 
21 De Locomotief, 12-2-1916.
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to German territory, they would not be interned. Their only obligation was to 
report once a day. Emil Helfferich was one of the Germans who had signed 
the declaration. After the actions of the Emden had occasioned a vehement 
anti-German mood in the city, he was again arrested. He had been imprisoned 
in the Tanglin camp but had managed to escape. In Batavia he soon became 
one of the leading figures in the German community, which he was to remain 
till he left the Netherlands Indies in 1928. He is said to have been the person 
who, after his arrival, had succeeded in forging unity in the divided German 
community (Mohr 1948:275).
Emil’s younger brother, Theodor, was Director of the Batavia branch 
of Behn, Meyer and Co. To prevent any possibility that the British would 
seize the Behn, Meyer and Co. assets in the Netherlands Indies through the 
Singapore head-office, the branch was transformed into an independent lim-
ited company after the outbreak of the war (Helfferich 1967:143-4). Theodor 
Helfferich was also kaufmännischer Berater (commercial councillor) of the 
German Consulate General. In this capacity he was destined to take the place 
of Windels when something would happen to the Acting Consul General. As 
commercial councillor, Theodor Helfferich had access to the German code; 
though he still needed Windels assistance to decode messages. The Helfferich 
 brothers were supposed to have such a prominent role in the German com-
munity in the Netherlands Indies that the story went among its members 
that when war broke out between Germany and the Netherlands one of them 
would become Governor General of a German Indies (Bijl de Vroe 1980:52).
The Germano-Indian scheme made the Netherlands Indies a hub of anti-
British agitation in Asia. All sorts of schemes were hatched by the plotters. 
One plan, the brainchild of the German Consul General in San Francisco, was 
to send two British Indians to Batavia to start a newspaper to ‘supply false war 
news to British India’ and to set up an illegal radio station to communicate 
with partisans in the Straits Settlements.22 Anti-British literature, and occa-
sionally anti-French printed matter such as the one entitled Les Musulmans de 
l’Afrique du Nord et le ‘Djéhad’, which was sent to the Netherlands Indies was 
a more concrete problem to be tackled. The Dutch authorities in Holland and 
in the Netherlands Indies did all they could to prevent such shipments from 
reaching their destination; though no action was taken against Malay-lan-
guage newspaper which published excerpts of seditious pamphlets. Import 
bans were instituted.
One major reason to take some sort of immediate action was the desire to 
avoid complications with London. However, there were other reasons for the 
Dutch authorities not to sit still. Batavia was inspired by a sense of solidarity 
22 Pleyte to Idenburg, 28-5-1915, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 28-5-1915 R8.
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between the European Colonial Powers which felt they had to help each other 
if they were confronted with insurrections by the peoples they ruled. The 
Dutch colonial authorities were also not free of their own concrete fears in this 
direction. One was the concern that unrest in British India or the Malay penin-
sula would spread to the Netherlands Indies. Another was that the contents of 
the pamphlets, usually not of a very subtle nature, was quite shocking to the 
early twentieth-century European mind. There was no beating about the bush. 
In calls for the massacre of the British in British India sentences like ‘arise in 
wrath and slay them!’ were freely deployed. While most pamphlets directed 
appeals to Muslims, Hindus had their fair share. One of the documents 
seized, which had been sent from San Francisco to a member of the German 
Consulate General in Batavia, was written in Sanskrit and held a picture of 
Kali, the Goddess of Destruction.23 
Another disquieting fact was that Arabs and other Muslims in Java and 
Sumatra were among those to whom such pamphlets were addressed. In March 
1916 the Soerabaiasch Handelsblad observed that scores of anti-British pamphlets 
had been distributed among the native population.24 In next to no time the 
words Dutch and the Netherlands could be substituted where the text spoke of 
British and Great Britain. Sometimes the link was made directly, such as when 
the struggle of the British Indians against Great Britain was equated with the 
war the Acehnese fought against the Dutch. Some pamphlets were in Arabic, 
which only some Indonesian Muslims could read. Others were in Malay. One 
of those in Malay was entitled Seroean Party Nasional Hindia, The Appeal of 
the Indian Nationalist Party, maybe the reason why Arabs called it the ‘letter 
of Douwes Dekker’. The appeal drew attention to the wars Great Britain had 
waged to acquire new territory, including the Boer War, and announced that 
the moment to take revenge had arrived. To the alarm of the authorities, it was 
sent in large quantities to the Netherlands Indies by mail in 1915 and 1916. 
Among the addressees were local branches of the Sarekat Islam and training 
institutions for Indonesians. Copies of the appeal had been received by the 
Colleges for Native Civil Servants in Magelang and Madiun and the School 
for Native Teachers in Probolinggo. The pamphlet never reached the students. 
The parcels had been addressed to the school boards. Nevertheless, just in case 
the students might have read the appeal, the deputy Director of Education 
and Religion asked the heads of such schools ‘to neutralize the undesirable 
influence which the piece might elicit without making a fuss about the matter 
through a discussion with the students at a fitting moment.’25 
23 San Francisco Examiner, 10-7-1917.
24 Soerabaiasch Handelsblad, 9-3-1916, cited in De Indische Gids 1916, I:786.
25 Acting Director of Education and Religion to Idenburg, 14-2-1916, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 
12-5-1916 37.
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Some of the pamphlets were even penned in Dutch. A shipment to Windels 
from Holland was confiscated in early 1916. It contained about three hundred 
booklets originally published by the Indian National Party entitled Is Indië 
loyaal?, Is India loyal? (and a much smaller number of the French edition La 
fidélité de l’Inde envers l’Angleterre).26
The colonial authorities acted, fearing both German and Japanese intent, 
when they could. In July 1916 the rules for entering military buildings and 
installations were tightened in an effort to combat espionage. Two months 
earlier an even more important step had been taken. In May 1916 the Politieke 
Inlichtingendienst (PID, Political Intelligence Service), was established to coor-
dinate the gathering and evaluation of information from various sources about 
activities dangerous to the state reaching the government. The PID started 
modestly with a head, a deputy-head, and a clerk (as a suitable candidate for 
a higher administrative function could not be found). Its first head, Captain 
(of the General Staff) W. Muurling, revealed two years later that the PID had 
been founded to collect information about activities which posed a threat to 
neutrality.27 Though the service was first and foremost meant to keep track 
of foreign spies, an additional bonus was that domestic developments could 
be watched as well. Nevertheless, spokesmen of the government continued 
to stress that keeping an eye on the foreign enemy was the main object of the 
PID. Pleyte said this as late as February 1918, while a few months later the 
Director of the Justice Department stated that the PID did not concern itself 
with the nationalist movements, as long as these were not set on overthrowing 
the colonial government.28
The British were not impressed by the measures taken to prevent the 
Netherlands Indies becoming a hotbed of anti-British agitation. In February 
1917 a letter from the British Foreign Office to the Dutch Envoy in London 
stated that it was 
indeed notorious that in spite of the efforts of the Netherlands government, the 
Dutch East Indies have been a centre of intrigue and propaganda directed by the 
enemies of this country against British possessions in the Far East, and the object 
of the transmission of such seditious matter to the Dutch Islands is obviously that 
stores of such dangerous material may be accumulated at points in the East Asian 
Archipelago, whence they may be introduced into British possessions themselves 
by different hands and in quantities small enough to escape detection’.29 
The plot to use the territory of the Netherlands Indies as the intermediate 
26 Chef PTT to Uhlenbeck, 30-3-1916, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 27-6-1916 4.
27 Volksraad 1918:286.
28 Volksraad 1918:48-9.
29 British Foreign Office to Dutch Envoy, 10-2-1917, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 14-3-1917 49.
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station for gun-running and the smuggling of pamphlets placed the German 
community in the Netherlands Indies in the limelight. The then British Consul 
General in Batavia, W.R.D. Beckett, informed the colonial authorities in October 
1915 that the German consuls in Surabaya, Padang, and Celebes, former army 
officers who had found employment on estates, and members of the mercan-
tile community were implicated.30 A missionary in Nias, who Pinke was sure 
was ‘technically very skilled’ and who had been seen in Padang in the compa-
ny of officers of the Kleist, also attracted the attention of the authorities. Once 
again Batavia had to consider the prospect of German radio broadcasts.31
Though he was the recipient of shipments of seditious pamphlets, Acting 
Consul General Windels did not play a key role in the department’s activities. 
He attended some meetings, but did not greatly favour the Germano-Indian 
scheme. He considered the plans developed unrealistic and criticized the 
plot for its lack of proper organization and planning.32 Windels’s subordi-
nate role was acknowledged by the British. In their evaluation the Helfferich 
 brothers, not Windels, played the leading role in the Germano-Indian complot 
in the Netherlands Indies. Windels was depicted as weak and spineless.33 
In cooperation with the German Consul in Surabaya, the brothers had also 
planned Lauterbach’s escape. They had arranged for him to be able to flee 
the Netherlands Indies undetected by British spies. In return for their assist-
ance, they had asked Lauterbach to pass on a message in Shanghai, a port 
Lauterbach did indeed call at (Lauterbach 1918:80, 87).
Another person accused by the British of playing a leading role in the 
Ghadr scheme was August Diehn, a German businessman. Before the war 
Diehn had been manager and chairman of directors of the Singapore branch 
of Behn, Meyer and Co. In Singapore the British had arrested him on suspicion 
of having been the mastermind behind the exploits of the Emden. Imprisoned 
in Tanglin Camp Diehn had become one of the ringleaders of the patriotic 
German prisoners who had planned an escape and used the mutiny of the 
5th Light Infantry to seize their opportunity (Ban Kah Choon 2001:18). To 
tease the governor of the Straits Settlements, he had wired to Young ‘arrived 
safely’ when he reached the Netherlands Indies (Harper and Miller 1984:70; 
Helfferich 1967:139). The British described Diehn as ‘a man of ability and 
influence in Singapore, [who] had money at his command’ (Sareen 1995:40). 
30 Memorandum Beckett, 5-10-1915, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 26-11-1915 C14.
31 Kindermann to civilian and military authorities of Atjeh, Sumatra’s West Coast, Tapanuli, 
6-1-1916, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 9-12-1918 38.
32 Note Department A1 of the Ministry of the Colonies, 15-12-1916, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 18-
12-1916 Z16.
33 Note Department A1 of the Ministry of the Colonies, 15-12-1916, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 18-
12-1916 Z16.
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After his escape, the British called Diehn ‘one of the principal agents in 
Sumatra for fomenting trouble among British Indians’ who had a leading role 
in the gun-running scheme (Sareen 1995:699). They were sure that Diehn and 
the Helfferich brothers, with Theodor in the role of the prime conspirator, had 
drawn up concrete plans to smuggle weapons and literature into British India 
from the Netherlands Indies. They were also suspected of playing a vital role 
in providing agents in India with money.34
Initially the Dutch colonial authorities found it hard to believe that the 
Netherlands Indies was being used as a base to subvert British rule in India 
and the Malay peninsula. The efforts to supply the Emden with coal had taught 
them that Germany had prepared well for war, and that German consuls and 
other German residents in the Netherlands Indies had played a part in this, 
which only made Batavia all the more anxious about possible German anti-
Dutch activities in the colony. But this was a different matter. Nevertheless, 
Batavia felt compelled to follow up all the information provided by Great 
Britain about the plot. One of the persons about whom British intelligence 
alerted the Dutch authorities was a British Indian, Abdul Salam Rafiqi, or 
Abdul Selam, the name under which he became known in Java. The Dutch 
were told that one of his tasks was to act as a contact man between Theodor 
Helfferich and British Indians visiting Batavia to discuss the sending of arms 
and money to India. Abdul Selam had arrived in Tanjung Priok from Japan in 
October 1914. At first he had not attracted the attention of either the Dutch or 
the British. This changed within weeks of his arrival after Abdul Selam had 
sent a pamphlet to an Indian in Pahang in the Malay Peninsula by ordinary 
mail. The pamphlet called for self-government and appealed to Hindus and 
Muslims to rise up. One of the conditions which Great Britain had to meet to 
prevent an uprising of its Indian subjects was ‘to hand over to Turkey the bat-
tleships which if done would end any further trouble between the English and 
the Turks’ (Ban Kah Choon 2001:26). This pamphlet was Abdul Selam’s down-
fall. The British censor intercepted the letter. The postmark launched a British 
investigation. Abdul Selam was traced. The colonial authorities were informed 
and had Abdul Selam put under surveillance. A number of times, Abdul Selam 
was seen entering the German consulate. He was arrested in March after it had 
been discovered that he ordered the printing of an anti-British pamphlet at the 
press of Pantjaran Warta, a Batavian Sarekat Islam newspaper.
No charges could be brought against Abdul Selam. There was no legisla-
tion which dealt with plotting the overthrow of the government of a friendly 
nation (nor was there any such charge, the staff of the Ministry of the Colonies 
in The Hague pointed out, in British law). The writing, printing, and distribu-
34 Hopkirk 1994:97; Memorandum Beckett, 5-10-1915, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 26-11-1915 C14.
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tion of anti-Allied pamphlets could not be tackled judicially as the haatzaai 
articles referred specifically to the domestic situation in the Netherlands 
Indies. As long as it could not be proved that words had actually been put 
into practice and that plotters had concretely helped one of the belligerents, 
a person also could not be prosecuted for breaching Dutch neutrality.35 Nor 
could Abdul Selam be expelled. He had sufficient funds at his disposal. The 
Resident of Batavia, Rijfsnijder, suspected that the money came from German 
sources, but this was no crime either. Abdul Selam’s presence put the authori-
ties in a dilemma. Though Abdul Selam had not broken any law, Idenburg 
ordered his deportation. The decision was taken after the Attorney-General, 
G. André de la Porte, had alerted Idenburg to the implicit danger Abdul Selam 
posed: Great Britain would not stand idly by if people conspired against 
British rule in Asia on Dutch territory. The consequences could be so serious 
that Abdul Selam should be considered a danger to public law and order in 
the Netherlands Indies. Such a line of reasoning provided sufficient grounds 
to allow the Governor General to use his extraordinary power to ban aliens 
from the colony.36
The verdict threw Abdul Selam into a panic. Being put on a boat to a 
British colony meant being arrested on arrival, and, he feared, the death 
sentence. Even should he succeed in boarding a steamer to the United States 
which stayed clear of any British port – a very unlikely prospect – he would 
not escape arrest. The British Consulate General would inform the British 
Navy of his departure. The ship would certainly be stopped after she had left 
Tanjung Priok. In a last desperate effort to make Idenburg change his mind, 
Abdul Selam called on the help of Rinkes. When Abdul Selam met Rinkes, he 
made no secret of the fact that he had been engaged in anti-British activities. 
In spite of this Rinkes was sensitive to Abdul Selam’s predicament. He wrote 
to Idenburg that European Colonial Powers had to help each other, but that 
in the case of Abdul Selam ‘political detention’ could be considered. Rinkes 
did not overlook the possibility that Abdul Selam might resort to theft, arson, 
or other crimes to provoke imprisonment and escape deportation. Presenting 
himself as ‘just one of the many proclaimers of progressive ideas in British 
India’, Abdul Selam also personally wrote two petitions to Idenburg. He 
pledged that if he was interned in the Netherlands Indies, he would cease his 
agitation against the British and Dutch governments. His appeal was success-
ful. Abdul Selam was transported to Timor in August 1915.37
Around the time that Idenburg had to decide on Abdul Selam’s fate, the 
35 André de la Porte to Idenburg, 14-7-1915, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 8-9-1915 22.
36 André de la Porte to Idenburg, 14-7-1915, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 8-9-1915 22.
37 Rinkes to Idenburg 29-7-1915, Selam to Idenburg, 30-7-1915, 9-8-1915, NA, Kol. Openbaar, 
Vb. 4-10-1915 24.
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British Consul General, he himself alerted by the British Deputy Consul in 
Medan, Arthur Law Mathewson, asked the colonial authorities to put an end 
to agitation among British Indians on Sumatra’s East Coast. Copies of inflam-
matory pamphlets, which called for a holy war and contained sentences like 
‘Rise Indians rise’, had been sent from San Francisco to Sumatra by mail. The 
same had happened with issues of Ghadr, the organ of the Ghadr movement, 
of which the first number had appeared in November 1913. Printed in San 
Francisco, it ‘aimed at instigating Indians to revolt, [...] to inform public opin-
ion in America about the situation in India and to neutralise British propagan-
da in the United States and elsewhere’ (Sareen 1995:6). At that moment none 
of the senior Dutch colonial civil servants, not even Rinkes, had any inkling of 
what Ghadr was. They had never heard of the movement.
Response was swift. On the instructions of Idenburg, the entrance of British 
Indian migrants and visitors was temporarily restricted. The local authori-
ties were asked to act with prudence when Residence permits came up for 
renewal. As an additional measure the Dutch Resident instructed that British 
Indians who were returning to Sumatra from abroad had to undergo a body 
search. Their luggage should be checked carefully and the Indians themselves 
had to be kept under surveillance 38 To the delight of the Dutch authorities, 
it turned out Ghadr had been sent to Sumatra by British mail. The Indians 
who had received the newspaper turned out to be innocent. The investigation 
concluded that their disposition was strongly anti-British, but that they all 
were fairly well-to-do, peaceful residents. The Dutch civil servants could not 
imagine that they had been transformed into agitators.39
The investigation into the distribution of Ghadr in the territory of Sumatra’s 
East Coast was not completely fruitless. Cotton cloth printed with the portrait 
of the German Kaiser and pictures of German warships were confiscated. It 
had been bought in Batavia by an Indian shopkeeper. The Dutch civil servant 
who reported on the case considered the cloth quite harmless.40 Two Sikhs 
were also arrested. They had collected money ostensibly for religious and 
educational purposes, but there was a strong suspicion that their real intention 
had been not so innocent. The ‘Lieutenant of the Klingalese’, that is the head 
of the local Indian community, had alerted the local Dutch civil servant to the 
anti-British agitation pursued by the two. One of them, it turned out later, had 
visited Singapore at the end of 1914, where he had met soldiers of the 5th Light 
Infantry who had later risen in mutiny. From Singapore he had travelled on to 
38 André de la Porte to Idenburg, 14-7-1915, Kindermann to Van der Plas, 26-7-1915, Circular 
Van der Plas 30-8-1915, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 8-9-1915 22, Vb. 13-11-1915 35.
39 Obdeyn to Van der Brandhof, 21-8-115, Kindermann to British Consul General, 24-9-1915, 
NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 13-11-1915 35.
40 Obdeyn to Van der Brandhof, 23-8-1915, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 13-11-1915 35.
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Kedah to incite the population in the Sultanate against British rule. The British 
authorities were informed when the two were put on a ship to Penang.41
In the meantime more serious business was brewing. At the end of June 
1915 the Navy in the Netherlands Indies was put on full alert after Beckett 
had informed Batavia about the movement of an oil-tanker, the Maverick. The 
Maverick was owned by the Maverick Steamship Co. which used Behn, Meyer 
and Co. as its agent in Batavia. Beckett revealed that the Maverick was on her 
way to the Netherlands Indies and probably carried ‘large quantities of rifles 
and ammunition’ as her cargo. Her destination was Anyer on the Javanese side 
of the Sunda Strait.42 Beckett also transmitted the contents of an anonymous 
letter he had received from Bandung: ‘Is a steamer loaded with riffles and 
ammunitions worth ƒ 500,000 (five hundred thousand) for you to pay me?’ 
Additional information which, as it was suggested, might enable the British to 
avert a general rising would be provided for free. The sender recommended 
Beckett place an advertisement in Het Nieuws van den Dag for an experienced 
rubber planter for Perak when he had interest.43 Beckett did not take up the 
suggestion. Idenburg was against it. A few days later Beckett alerted the Dutch 
authorities to a second ship which might have weapons as her cargo: the 
schooner Henry S. She was on her way from Manila to Pontianak. 
Beckett urged resolute action. This was indeed taken, not least because 
Idenburg and his staff did not preclude the chance that the weapons might 
be used to arm Germans in the Netherlands Indies.44 This issue had already 
come up in May 1915 when Beckett had transmitted news that information 
had reached him from ‘official, unofficial and anonymous sources’ regarding 
a scheme of Germans in West Java to arm the Roon and other German mer-
chantmen to the colonial authorities. The ringleaders at whom he had pointed 
a finger were the captain of the Roon and two estate managers: Freiherr Hans 
von Devevere, a former officer in the German infantry, and Curt Opolski, a 
former German naval officer. Beckett had confessed at that time that the aim 
was not altogether clear to him. The intention was probably to enable German, 
Austrian, and Turkish nationals in the Netherlands Indies to escape to a 
German or Turkish port.45 The colonial administration had reacted quickly. 
Within days, an instruction had been sent out to the Resident of Banyumas 
to observe ‘the highest possible vigilance’. Other civil servants in whose ter-
ritories German steamers had sought shelter had also been informed. For a 
41 Obdeyn to Van der Brandhof, 31-8-1915, Obdeyn to Van der Brandhof, 13-9-1915, NA, Kol. 
Openbaar, Vb. 13-11-1915 35.
42 Beckett to Hulshoff Pol, 29-6-1915, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 17-8-1915 F11.
43 Beckett to Hulshoff Pol, 29-6-1915, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 17-8-1915 F11.
44 Pinke to Idenburg, 18-8-1915, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 4-10-1915 H12.
45 Beckett to Kindermann, 31-5-1915, memorandum Beckett, 5-10-1915, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 
17-8-1915 F11, Vb. 26-11-1915 C14.
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moment, Pinke had toyed with the idea of stationing a warship at Cilacap. He 
decided not to. Sending a warship might alert the Germans involved that the 
authorities were on to them.46
This time, armed with the information about ships with a cargo of arms 
sailing in the direction of the Netherlands Indies, the naval squadron put to 
sea to search for the Henry S. and the Maverick. The search was hampered 
somewhat because one of the larger Dutch warships, the Tromp, had to remain 
moored in the roads of Makassar. She had to be ready to be deployed against 
the ‘internal enemy’, who kept the Dutch forces in the island busy. As an addi-
tional precaution, Dutch civil servants stationed along the route the Maverick 
was supposed to take were alerted. Civil servants in ports where German 
steamers had anchored were asked to keep a close watch on these ships. 
Idenburg and Pinke feared that the weapons might be transhipped to these 
German merchantmen; also not excluding the possibility that the weapons 
were intended to arm Germans living in the Netherlands Indies in anticipation 
of a possible declaration of war between the Netherlands and Germany.
The voyages of the Maverick and Henry S. formed part of the Germano-
Indian plan to smuggle weapons into British India. The Maverick was sup-
posed to deliver 30,000 rifles and revolvers to Anyer; a destination her captain 
had imprudently disclosed to a local newspaper in Hawai’i. Fishing boats 
chartered by German accomplices in Batavia would take the cargo from Anyer 
to Bengal. The Henry S. was to carry 5,000 rifles and 500 revolvers which had 
been purchased by the German Consul in the Philippines. Her destination was 
Siam. Two German weapon instructors, and possible also an Indian Hindu 
agitator, were supposed boarded (Hopkirk 1994:180; Teitler 1986:198-9). 
Another way to try to smuggle weapons into the Netherlands Indies was 
to sent them along as cargo on Dutch ships sailing to the Netherlands Indies 
from New York and San Francisco. Instrumental in trying this venture was 
a firm called Schenker and Co., which had submitted 1,000 old Springfield 
rifles (they dated from 1865) to be sent to Java on Dutch vessels in 1915. The 
agent of the Dutch shipping line had not been happy about the business. He 
refused the cargo and alerted the American authorities. This was not an iso-
lated attempt. In view of this, Great Britain urged for a complete ban on the 
import of arms into the Netherlands Indies, except for those arms consigned 
to the colonial government. The Dutch government finally complied at the end 
of 1916. The export and import of private arms was banned.
Theodor Helfferich was informed about the arrival of the Maverick by secret 
German code at the beginning of June 1915. It appears that this intimation of 
46 Kindermann to Resident Banyumas, 2-6-1915, circular Kindermann, 2-6-1915, 5-6-1915, 
Pinke to Idenburg, 4-6-1915, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 17-8-1915 F11.
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arrival was all and that he had not received detailed instructions about how to 
proceed. His brother, Emil, chartered a motor-launch and set out in search for 
the Maverick in an attempt to meet her just outside territorial waters. In spite 
of the fact that the Batavian police kept a close watch on the brothers, Emil 
and his party managed to pass undetected. After eight days, Emil Helfferich 
returned to shore. The others continued the search in the Sunda Straits for 
another two weeks. They did not see the Maverick. Undetected either by the 
Germans on the lookout and by the Dutch warships patrolling the sea, the 
Maverick reached her destination. The Maverick was sighted riding at anchor 
at Merak on 19 July. The captain sailed on to Tanjung Priok the following 
day. The Maverick was searched but no weapons or seditious literature were 
found. The journey had been a complete failure. At the outset of her voyage 
the Maverick had failed to rendez-vous along the Mexican Pacific coast with 
a schooner from which she was supposed to load the rifles and ammunition. 
The seditious pamphlets she had had on board were burnt near Socorro Island 
after a British man-of-war had been sighted (Hopkirk 1994:180-4). The Dutch 
authorities did not know this. To be sure that no weapons had been stacked 
away on uninhabited islands in the Archipelago, the route which the Maverick 
had taken through the Celebes Sea, the Straits of Makassar and the Java Sea 
to Merak was retraced by Dutch warships searching for weapons hidden on 
shore.
The Henry S. was sighted near Paleleh on the north coast of Celebes on 7 
August. The Tromp reached her three days later. The following day a Japanese 
cruiser, the Akashi, appeared on the scene. From a distance her crew observed 
what was transpiring. The Henry S. had two Germans on board. One was 
Alfred Wehde, an American jeweller from Chicago, who was later to be tried 
in Chicago for his part in the conspiracy. The other was George Böhm, also 
an American, the quartermaster. When officers of the Tromp had searched the 
Henry S. for the first time, both had been absent. The Henry S. had suffered 
engine trouble and Wehde had gone to Manado by motor sloop in search of a 
tow. Böhm had had an unlucky fall and had been transported to a government 
coaling station nearby for treatment. Later Wehde told the Dutch naval officers 
that he had chartered the ship to collect curiosities for an art gallery in Chicago 
and to conduct ethnological research.47 
The voyage of the Henry S. had been as great a fiasco as that of the 
Maverick. No weapons were on board. The Dutch authorities were unsur-
prised. Information had already reached them from Manila that the arms had 
been removed by the American authorities and that the stated aim of the voy-
age was to collect ethnographica. The Henry S. had still set sail but after she 
47 Official report Commander of the Tromp, Geheim rapport van de verrichtingen van Hr.Ms. 
Tromp, 23-8-1915, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 13-11-1915 33.
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had left Manila her engine had broken down a number of times. Her sailors, 
almost all Filipinos, made a sorry impression on the captain of the Tromp. He 
reported that the crew of the engine room was ‘absolutely incapable of han-
dling the engine’, while the deck-hands ‘had little of sailors about them’. It 
seemed to him as if ‘they just had been fetched in from the jungle’.48 The Henry 
S. was stuck. Wehde’s trip to Manado to get a tow had been in vain. Pinke 
refused to let the Tromp tow the Henry S. to Manado. In desperation, Wehde 
turned to the Akashi for a tow to the Philippines. The captain of the Akashi 
refused. After he had convinced himself that the Henry S. was helpless and 
formed no threat to Allied interests, the Akashi sailed away. Wehde and Böhm 
were left with no option than to leave the Henry S. and to try to return to the 
Philippines by motor sloop to seek help. With the Maverick tied up in Tanjung 
Priok and the mission of the Henry S. foiled the surveillance by the Dutch 
Navy squadron could be discontinued in September. The Henry S. had to be 
kept under close watch till the end of October when she left the Archipelago. 
The Maverick remained moored in Tanjung Priok. Its owners were afraid that 
the British might seize her when she sailed. The Maverick gained the reputation 
of ‘a mystery ship’. Crew and officers were tight-lipped, but from what little 
they said it soon became clear that the Maverick had been involved in ‘one or 
another secret mission’ and that it had failed to rendez-vous with an American 
schooner.49 The crew and most of the officers were transported to Manila on 
another American ship. Dutch, Japanese, and British shipping companies had 
refused to take them on board. One officer went to Singapore, where he was 
arrested after a time. His lavish life-style and his requests by telegraph for 
more money had caught the attention of the Singaporese authorities.
The missions of the Maverick and Henry S. had failed, but this had not 
put an end to the Germano-Indian plan. In the remaining months of 1915, 
a number of people were arrested in Singapore and other British territories 
in Asia. They confessed to being involved in efforts to provide the rebels in 
British India with money from Batavia. Among them was Ong Sin Kwie, a 
Batavian Chinese merchant. Interrogated by the British he admitted that he 
had travelled to the Malay Peninsula in October to hand over 66,000 guilders 
to British Indians in Singapore or Penang. If he failed to meet his contacts, 
he had been instructed to travel on to Rangoon or Calcutta to hand over the 
money.50
To convince the Dutch authorities of the dubious role played by the 
48 Geheim rapport van de verrichtingen van Hr.Ms. Tromp, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 13-11-1915 
33.
49 De Locomotief, 8-9-1916.
50 Note Department A1 of the Ministry of the Colonies, 15-12-1916, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 18-
12-1916 Z16.
XII  The German menace 337
Helfferich brothers Beckett transmitted the information gathered from the 
interrogation of Ong Sin Kwie and others to the Governor General. In Holland 
Johnstone informed Loudon. He took the opportunity to add the warning 
that London held ‘the Netherlands government responsible for any prejudice 
caused to British interests by these machinations and reserve[d] the right to 
claim suitable compensation’.51
Notwithstanding British pressure no legal action was taken against Emil 
and Theodor Helfferich or other Germans. Batavia instigated an inquiry but 
nothing unlawful was unearthed. The Attorney-General, G.W. Uhlenbeck, 
interrogated Theodor Helfferich and Windels personally. He had to take their 
word for what they were. Both refused to hand over their correspondence 
about the Maverick prior to her arrival. Both explained to Uhlenbeck that if they 
did British agents might be able to break the German code, which the British in 
fact already had. Theodor Helfferich and Windels persisted that they had done 
nothing that was in violation of the neutrality of the Netherlands Indies. Both 
claimed that Emil Helfferich had gone in search of the Maverick because they 
suspected that she carried arms and wanted to order her captain to steer clear 
of territorial waters.52 Uhlenbeck also concluded that Ong Sin Kwie was inno-
cent and that he had gone to Singapore for legitimate business purposes. Ong 
Sin Kwie had been on his way to buy gunny sacks, which had become scarce 
in Java and of which British India virtually held a monopoly, in Calcutta. His 
confession in Singapore had been made under duress. Uhlenbecks’s conclu-
sions probably suited the Dutch authorities who were hesitant to start a court 
case against the Germans involved. As no weapons had been found aboard the 
Maverick, there was even less reason to prosecute them.53
The German community in the Netherlands Indies caused the authorities 
plenty of worry, of which their participation in the Germano-Indian plot was 
only one aspect. Germans and people of German descent were pretty ubiq-
uitous and could be found both in the business and estate sector and in the 
civil service. To illustrate the potential danger Germans posed, Het Nieuws van 
den Dag pointed out that they were employed in branches of industry which 
were vital to the defence of Dutch rule: the railways, the naval dockyards, and 
the post and telegraph service.54 Even more menacing was that the number 
of German soldiers in the colonial army was fairly large, and would remain 
so as German soldiers whose contract had ended could not return home and 
51 Johnstone to Loudon, 17-10-1916, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 18-12-1916 Z16.
52 Uhlenbeck to Van Limburg Stirum, 3-9-1917, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 10-1-1918 S1.
53 Van Limburg Stirum to Pleyte, 19-6-1917, Pleyte to Loudon, 24-9-1917, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 
22-6-1917 F8, Vb. 24-9-1917 Q11.
54 Het Nieuws van den Dag, cited in Oetoesan Hindia, 1-5-1916.
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were left with almost no other choice than resigning. Dutch people entertained 
grave doubts about the loyalty of the Germans living in the Netherlands 
Indies. At least one local civil servant, the Assistent-Resident of Kebumen, the 
son of a German officer, was questioned outright by his superior about how he 
would act were the Netherlands and Germany to go to war.55 German soldiers 
were distrusted even more. Dutch people were convinced that the German 
soldiers in the colonial army would refuse to fight in a war with Germany, if 
even worse they did not take the German side.
The question was how should the German soldiers be dealt with. It was a 
delicate subject, bristling with domestic and international implications. Plans 
were developed in the course of 1915 about what was dubbed in a rather 
veiled fashion freedom of movement of foreigners, which in the worst case 
meant internment. The fate of soldiers of German nationality was a contro-
versial point between Michielsen and the General Secretariat. Michielsen 
suggested that if war should come, soldiers and civilian employees in the 
Department of War with an enemy nationality should be stationed in islands 
outside Java, in Timor or in the Moluccas for instance, where they could do 
little harm. Another possibility was to concentrate them in parts of Java where 
they also could not hurt Dutch defence. The civil servants in the General 
Secretariat disagreed. The Dutch hold over Timor and the Moluccas was not 
yet so strong that the foreign soldiers could be sent there without a qualm. The 
General Secretariat also rejected the possibility that German soldiers should 
all be sent to certain places in Java. Internment was the only feasible course of 
action. All Germans in government employment and in the army should be 
dismissed and interned if war with Germany broke out. Michielsen could not 
agree. He challenged with the proposition that soldiers would never be able 
to set on the population against Dutch rule. Soldiers were an ‘instrument of 
repression’. For this very reason the population distrusted them and hence 
would pay them no heed. In Michielsen’s opinion civilians were the potential 
hazard. They could win the trust of the people. They should be interned. 
Conversely soldiers should be retained in the service; if for no other reason 
than that otherwise after the war no foreigners would be willing to enlist in 
the colonial army. The staff of the General Secretariat could not stomach such 
a suggestion. They considered it a disgrace to accept the services of people 
whose homeland was at war with the Netherlands.56
Nobody had to be interned, but everything was in readiness should that 
time ever come. In May 1916 Dutch regional civil servants were asked to com-
pile a list of potentially dangerous foreigners in their territory; that was for-
55 Verwijk to Van Limburg Stirum, 10-7-1916, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 16-11-1916 R14.
56 General Secretariat to Idenburg, 17-7-1915, Michielsen to Idenburg, 7-9-1915, NA, Kol. 
Geheim, Vb. 11-2-1916 Y1.
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eign males between sixteen and sixty years of age. One year later, in October 
1917, the question of whether persons who were interned and who had been 
in government employment were entitled to receive their salary came up. 
Nobody, not even in Holland, could give a clear-cut answer. It was not known 
how such matters were arranged in the rest of Europe.57
Some Dutch people believed the whole colonial army was a bulwark of 
pro-German sympathies. They suspected that Germans had made good use of 
the ties of friendship between Germany and Turkey and had managed to win 
the Indonesian Muslim soldiers onto their side. During a lecture in The Hague 
in 1918 one Dutch captain even ventured that since the beginning of the cen-
tury portraits of the German Kaiser (and of the Turkish Sultan) had adorned 
barracks all over the Archipelago. He warned that sympathy for Germany had 
been carefully cultivated among the Muslim soldiers.58
How much his statement reflected the actual situation is impossible to 
reconstruct. Certainly portraits of the Kaiser and his wife, of the Sultan of 
Turkey, and, albeit to a lesser extent, of Emperor Franz Joseph were popular 
among the civilian population. The Young Turks also had their admirers. In 
1918 a shopkeeper used the portrait of Enver Pasha as his trade mark. In the 
same year Enver Bei watches were for sale. Nevertheless, there was a distinct 
preponderance of pictures of the German Emperor and the Turkish Sultan 
on display. When government officials inspected the houses in the villages in 
Central Java in the course of the campaign to combat the plague at the end of 
1914, they discovered to their dismay that this was a very popular form of inte-
rior decoration. Concluding that the pictures of the German Emperor and the 
Turkish Sultan had not been distributed by ‘friends of the government’ por-
traits of the Dutch royal couple were at once ordered from Holland. The pic-
tures were to be distributed as an ‘antidote’ (Bijl de Vroe 1980:71). The Ministry 
of the Colonies embraced the mission. An order was placed for pictures of the 
Queen and the royal family with a Dutch printing-firm. They had to be bright 
and colourful. Pictures of Wilhelmina were available in the colony, (unfortu-
nately not, a civil servant observed, on matchboxes, which carried portraits of 
almost all monarchs in the world except of the Dutch sovereign) but natives 
did not buy them because they were too dull. At that time getting top-quality 
coloured prints was not an easy job. It took almost one-and-a-half years before 
the first shipment of 500,000 copies of a picture showing three medallions of 
Queen Wilhelmina, her husband, Prince Hendrik, and her daughter, Princess 
Juliana, was ready to be sent.59
57 De Jonge to Pleyte, 3-10-1917, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 10-10-1917 F12.
58 De Locomotief, 15-5-1918.
59 Pleyte to Van Limburg Stirum, 8-11-1917, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 8-11-1917 43; De Locomotief, 
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In the minds of the Dutch responsible for planning of the defence of the 
colony, Germans could pose a much greater danger in times of war than the 
Frenchmen and Britons living in the Netherlands Indies. Among the reasons 
why the Germans especially were distrusted was the suspicion, assiduously 
fed by the British, that leaders of the German community were actually plan-
ning for the moment when war should break out between the Netherlands 
and Germany. Germans were said to have already tried to incite the Muslim 
population and the Arab community in the Netherlands Indies to agitate 
against Dutch rule in the pre-war years. To prepare for a German take-over, 
they were supposed to have made good use of the cordial relationship 
between Germany and Turkey. Germans, Arabs, and leaders of the Sarekat 
Islam were alleged to have held meetings before August 1914 to discuss what 
to do when war broke out. It was claimed that they had continued to meet 
after August 1914.
Apprehension about German intentions was one of the main reasons for 
Idenburg to reject a suggestion by Pleyte in May 1915 to allow foreign con-
suls in the colony to send and receive telegrams in cipher. Pleyte hoped that 
by allowing ciphers, London could be persuaded to lift the restriction on 
telegrams between him and Idenburg, which also had to be sent in plain lan-
guage. Idenburg rejected the idea. He pointed out that ciphers would only be 
exchanged between him and The Hague if the Netherlands was a party in an 
international crisis. At such a moment the British cable companies would cer-
tainly not pass messages in cipher. Allowing Germany or Great Britain to use 
codes would give these two countries a great advantage over the Netherlands 
if war threatened. Their consuls in the Netherlands Indies might be better 
informed about the situation in Holland than he would be. Even more danger-
ous, here Idenburg was referring especially to Germany, was the fact that they 
might receive instructions freely on how to act after war had been declared. 
The ban on ciphers had to be accepted. It was an inescapable fate as long as 
the Netherlands was the weakest party in a conflict and remained dependent 
on British cables.60
Misgivings about a German scheme to undermine the Dutch rule peaked 
at the end of 1915, early 1916. Rumours about a German conspiracy involv-
ing Arabs, Chinese and members of the Sarekat Islam, and about the arrest 
of Tjokroaminoto because he was one of the plotters, led to all kind of wild 
speculations in what Emil Helfferich called the anti-German newspapers. One 
of the stories which circulated was that Javanese Regents and representatives 
of the courts of Yogyakarta and Surakarta had schemed to establish an Islamic 
state, protected by Turkey and with the Sunan of Surakarta as head of state. 
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Pieces of red paper would provide the sign that the time had come for blood to 
flow and that people were to rise up. Such reports were also published abroad. 
In Tokyo the Japan Times maintained that the Germans involved were held 
largely responsible for disturbances in the Netherlands Indies. In Holland De 
Telegraaf had the same story. Other newspapers in Holland were also sure that 
there was a ‘German complot’.61
Almost all the commotion concerned the so-called Buitenzorg affair or 
Buitenzorg conspiracy. The blame has to be laid at the door of the Assistent-
Resident of Buitenzorg, who accused five Germans of conspiring against the 
colonial state in January 1916. He claimed that he acted on information pro-
vided by a number of Arabs and Javanese Muslims who had come to him vol-
untarily and out of their own volition. Oetoesan Hindia reacted indignantly to 
the suggestion that the Sarekat Islam was involved in an attempt to overthrow 
Dutch rule. True, Indonesian Muslims were pro-German, because it was the 
ally of Turkey, but it was ‘a lie, treason, seditious, wicked’ to suggest that they 
looked to German help to rebel against Dutch rule. In the prevailing critical 
atmosphere, the Sarekat Islam stood 100 per cent behind the Dutch govern-
ment. As ‘leaders of the people’ the editors knew where their duty lay.62
Implicated in the Buitenzorg affair were two former employees of the 
Straits und Sunda Syndikat: Freiherr August von und zu Egloffstein, and 
Karl Ernst Keil. They were also former officers in the colonial army, who had 
respectively twenty-five and twenty years service in the course of which they 
had been awarded medals. Emil Helfferich was said to have been the leader 
of the complot. Keil was alleged to have chaired meetings in the Arab quarter 
of Buitenzorg to prepare for an Islamic state. He was supposed to have tried 
to convince the conspirators that they did not have to worry about arms and 
medical supplies. The German government had set aside money for this sort 
of thing. Keil was probably the ‘fat European gentleman’, who in reports fig-
ured as the person who at one of such meetings was pointed to by some of 
those present as the future king of Java in Dutch-language newspapers. He 
himself was claimed to have reacted by saying: ‘Here is the person who will 
become king. Germany is the strongest.’63 
On the initiative of Emil Helfferich the three tried to convince the Assistent-
Resident that the accusations were unfounded. When this failed, they appealed 
to the Governor General in a letter in the newspapers to instigate a judicial 
investigation. They vowed that they were loyal residents of the Netherlands 
61 De Telegraaf, cited in De Indische Gids 1916:791; De Locomotief, 21-4-1916, 22-4-1916, 19-5-1916, 
Oetoesan Hindia, 9-5-1916; Van Asbeck to Van Limburg Stirum, 26-4-1916, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 
13-6-1916 T7.
62 Oetoesan Hindia, 9-5-1916.
63 Het Nieuws van den Dag, cited in De Locomotief, 1-5-1916.
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Indies. Other Germans, Austrians, and Hungarians used the celebration of the 
Kaiser’s birthday to express their indignation about the affair in a telegram to 
Idenburg. They also asked for an official inquiry.
A similar case evolved in Sumatra. K. Bäumer, editor of the Sumatra-bode 
in Padang asked for an formal investigation into accusations that Germans 
held secret meetings in Sumatra and incited the local population and Arabs 
against Dutch rule. Germans were also said to be mapping strategic spots. 
Especially offensive to Bäumer, a German who lived for thirty years already in 
the Netherlands Indies, were insinuations about newspaper editors who tried 
to persuade Indonesian Muslims to side with Germany ‘when time had come’, 
because Germany was an ally of Turkey.64
The reports about German plots were grist to the mill of the anti-German 
press. For J.G. Boon, editor-in-chief of the Soerabaiasch Handelsblad since April 
1915, the affair formed the occasion to launch a campaign calling attention to 
the stirring by Germans among indigenous Indonesians, Arabs, and Chinese. 
He claimed that in every large city there was ‘great intimacy between the 
Arabs and our German guests’, which could not be attributed to interests of 
trade or ‘les beaux yeux des Arabes’ alone. Boon thought the logical expla-
nation was the existence of a German organization spreading anti-Dutch 
propaganda among Arabs and other Muslims. He appealed to the Dutch 
in the Netherlands Indies to assist in keeping track of Germans and noting 
their behaviour. The government should forbid contacts between Germans 
and Arabs, or Chinese and indigenous Indonesians hostile to Dutch rule. 
Another suggestion Boon made was to dismiss some of the German soldiers. 
He generously added that they could retain their pensions. Other German 
soldiers should be posted to faraway corners of the Archipelago where they 
could do no harm.65 The editor-in-chief of Het Nieuws van den Dag, W.K.S. van 
Haastert, hinted that the Sarekat Islam had been able to grow because German 
support and that its board had a secret ‘Young Turks’ agenda. The editors of 
Oetoesan Hindia reacted furiously. They denied that there was any truth in the 
allegations. Van Haastert was called a liar, a falsifier of facts, and a person 
full of sound and fury signifying nothing. Oetoesan Hindia suggested that Van 
Haastert should be arraigned for his deliberate attempt to sow hatred against 
the Javanese. By acting as he did, he formed a much greater threat to Dutch 
rule than either Germany or Japan.66 Because the colonial administration 
shared the suspicion that Germans cooperated with the Sarekat Islam no legal 
64 De Locomotief, 2-6-1916.
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action was taken against Van Haastert.67
The Soerabaiasch Handelsblad and Het Nieuws van den Dag were not alone in 
their condemnation. Abusive anti-German articles in the Dutch-language press 
now reached a peak. Windels spoke about a Pressefeldzug and about the almost 
daily disgraceful and libellous remarks in which all Germans were depicted 
as spies and traitors. He claimed that because of such pieces most Dutchmen 
had started to shun Germans. The argument suited him well. Windels’s point 
was that Germans had become an isolated, distinct group in the Netherlands 
Indies. This opened the possibility to use the haatzaai articles to bring a pros-
ecution against Het Nieuws van den Dag, the Soerabaiasch Handelsblad, and other 
anti-German newspapers.68
The Buitenzorg Affair proved a hoax. It was an act of revenge against Keil, 
known as a ‘stern landlord’ and absolutely no friend of the Sarekat Islam, by 
Arabs who had been evicted from his estate and who had gained the coopera-
tion of a number of Indonesians who shared their hatred of Keil. In December 
1916 the Court of Batavia ruled that there was absolutely no ground for a 
prosecution. There was no shred of evidence. The Germans had never been 
near any Sarekat Islam meeting. The Attorney-General decided to appeal. Not 
because he did not agree with the ruling, but to undo the damage done and to 
have an opportunity to lecture the press and praise the Germans who had been 
implicated. In his closing speech before the High Court the Attorney-General 
concluded that he deemed a ruling by the highest court necessary because 
the affair had ‘produced turmoil throughout the whole country, completely 
disproportionate to the facts [...] caused by the foolhardy undertaking of a few 
daily papers, which [...] had no scruples about giving a totally untrue picture 
[...] on the basis of worthless evidence’.69 He also accused the press of having 
published reports on secret meetings of Germans elsewhere in the Netherlands 
Indies to create the impression that Germans were also plotting there against 
Dutch rule, ‘reports usually so absurd that – would not the mind of many 
readers have been poisoned by prejudice – nobody would give any credence to 
them’.70 The Attorney-General praised the Germans who had been implicated 
(the name of one Schün had also been mentioned) as decent, quiet persons, 
whose service and loyalty to colonial society were without doubt. He did not 
forget to mention that the Arabs in Buitenzorg were equally quiet, decent per-
sons, and that the local Sarekat Islam was unquestionable.
Distrust of German intentions remained. The Governor General and his 
closest advisors knew about the Germano-Indian complot, other civil serv-
67 See NA, Kol. Geheim, Mr. 1917/16x. 
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ants and the general public who were unaware of it had been confronted 
with the pamphlets sent from abroad, and had probably also heard some 
rumours about meetings which would have been held. The Resident of Batavia, 
Rijfsnijder, continued to deem it necessary to remain on the alert for such 
German attempts as late as August 1918.71 The general public also continued 
to be suspicious. In its attack on De Locomotief in August 1916 Het Nieuws van 
den Dag did not fail to mention that it was strange that a newspaper which 
followed the ideas of Pleyte, who till he became Minister of the Colonies had 
been a commissioner of De Locomotief so completely had become an instrument 
of people who wanted the natives to rise in rebellion against Dutch rule.72 
An additional source of embarrassment to the colonial authorities was that 
Dutch Indo-Europeans had been recruited as agents by the Germano-Indian 
conspirators. This was one of the reasons Idenburg distrusted the German com-
munity. He was not only sure that was tried to incite the Muslim population 
and discontented Indo-Europeans against Dutch rule in the Netherlands Indies 
by Germans in anticipation of war between Germany and the Netherlands, 
he was convinced that they had especially tried to involve members of the 
Indische Partij and other Indo-Europeans in the plan to subvert British rule in 
Asia (Bijl de Vroe 1980:44, 83). In January 1916 he confided to his adjutant in 
January 1916 that Germans used members of the Indische Partij to smuggle 
revolutionary pamphlets into India (Bijl de Vroe 1980:83).
One of the reasons for Idenburg to draw this conclusion was that he had 
learned about the adventures of Douwes Dekker. Douwes Dekker had met 
leaders of the Ghadr Movement during his trip to Europe in 1910 and 1911. 
He had kept in touch with them and had asked them to contribute to Het 
Tijdschrift. With the support he still had in the Netherlands Indies Douwes 
Dekker was an attractive asset to the movement. Within days of the outbreak 
of the war, Ghadr leaders had made their first move to recruit Douwes Dekker 
as an agent. His old acquaintance Krishnavarma, who had likewise moved 
to Geneva, had sent him a postcard and had suggested a meeting. Before 
Douwes Dekker had made up his mind, Krishnavarma had called at his house. 
He brought along Har Dayal, who had also been one of the contributors to Het 
Tijdschrift. The three talked about the war. Douwes Dekker later confessed he 
had liked the initiator of the Germano-Indian scheme to undermine the British 
position in Asia. Har Dayal had struck him as ‘a man with a well-developed 
intellect’. More meetings with Har Dayal followed. They had long chats, often 
in Douwes Dekker’s house. These were homely meetings during which Har 
Dayal played with Douwes Dekker’s children. At first Har Dayal had held his 
71 NA, Memorie van Overgave Rijfsnijder, 2-8-1914.
72 De Locomotief, 11-8-1916.
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tongue about the Germano-Indian conspiracy. He had only left no doubt that 
he would leave no stone unturned to gain independence for India (Van der 
Veur 2006:314, 322-3).
After Turkey had entered the war, efforts to court Douwes Dekker were 
stepped up. A number of Indians, who all came with letters of introduction 
from Har Dayal, contacted him. Among them were Chattopadhyaya and 
Champakaraman Pillai, chairman and secretary of a National Committee of 
Indians Living in Berlin. They visited Douwes Dekker in December. Pillai, who 
was an editor of Pro India, told Douwes Dekker about the existence of a secret 
organization in Berlin which had been set up to stir up anti-British feelings in 
British colonies. He asked Douwes Dekker to join and to become the move-
ment’s representative in Zurich, the city to which Douwes Dekker had moved 
shortly before. Douwes Dekker’s task would be to distribute pamphlets from 
their committee in Zurich. Later, after the British had arrested him, Douwes 
Dekker claimed that he had refused. Whatever the truth, Douwes Dekker 
became more deeply involved when he received a telegram from Germany 
at the end of January 1915 inviting him to Berlin. He asked his wife what he 
should do. She was unhappy about it, but Douwes Dekker decided to accept.73 
He later told his British interrogators that his main motivation had been his 
deplorable financial situation: ‘At the time I got the wire we were in the last 
straits of wretchedness. My wife and children were about to leave me, and 
return to Java, chiefly because of our poverty and the absence of any means of 
livelihood in Europe.’74 
Another task Douwes Dekker was asked to perform was to assist in acquir-
ing Dutch passports from the Dutch consulate in Zurich for Indian and other 
agents of the conspiracy ordered to travel to the Netherlands Indies. Pillai 
and his friends had found out that the Consul spoke no Dutch or Malay. This 
would make it the easier for agents sent to the Netherlands Indies to pass as 
residents of the Netherlands Indies. In May Douwes Dekker helped to arrange 
the journey to the Netherlands Indies of a Batavia-born man of German origin 
by the name of C.F. Vincent Kraft. At the request of Pillai he also provided 
Kraft with a letter of introduction to a friend of his in Java. After his arrest 
Douwes Dekker claimed that he had added a note of caution in a secret code. 
He had not trusted Kraft and had not even been sure that Kraft was not a 
Dutch spy sent to report on him (Van der Veur 2006:323, 325).
Kraft boarded a Dutch mail boat in Genoa in May 1915. After arriving in 
73 After she had returned to Java Douwes Dekker’s wife would still be supported by the Tado 
Fund. In April 1916 she informed Insulinde that she was able to support herself and her children 
and no longer needed financial assistance (De Locomotief, 15-6-1916).
74 Secret statement, 24-1-1916, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 27-7-1916 25. See also Van der Veur 
2006:314, 322-3.
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Batavia he travelled on to Sumatra in the company of Douwes Dekker’s friend. 
Convinced that Kraft was a German secret agent, the latter left Kraft on his 
own in Medan. Without realizing this, Douwes Dekker had sealed his own 
fate by assisting Kraft to reach the Netherlands Indies. The British suspected 
Kraft and kept him under surveillance while he was in the Netherlands Indies. 
Kraft was arrested when he tried to enter Singapore the following month. He 
made a full confession and revealed all he knew about the Germano-Indian 
plot. Kraft was turned into a double agent. Under the guidance of British intel-
ligence, he continued to communicate with Berlin. He even returned to the 
Netherlands Indies as a British spy (Hopkirk 1994:188-9).
Kraft’s information would lead to Douwes Dekker’s arrest. When he was 
interrogated by the British authorities, Douwes Dekker remained vague about 
his involvement in the Germano-Indian plot. At first he admitted that he had 
discussed the smuggling of 30,000 rifles into British India with Pillai, but 
claimed that he had only gone along with this to see what financial gain it 
might bring him. He said that he even had suggested that when he provided 
with one million German marks he would buy rifles in Japan or the United 
States and arrange for them to be shipped to British India aboard a Dutch 
merchantman under a false bill of loading. Douwes Dekker stressed that the 
plan had never been executed.75 He also denied ever having played any part 
in the attempts to smuggle arms into Burma or India. The Berlin committee 
had only asked him to become an intermediary in the smuggling of seditious 
literature into India. He explained that the only reason he had agreed was his 
desperate need of money. He had no qualms about accepting the money. He 
knew that the schemers were financed by the German state. He claimed that 
he had had no intention at all of fulfilling his assignment. He had destroyed 
the pamphlets.76
Despite his denials, there can be no denying that Douwes Dekker was 
thrilled by some of the schemes suggested by the Indians. When they told 
him that they wanted to send a Javanese Muslim to Turkey to receive a fatwa, 
a religious ruling, ‘calling upon Moslems to remain loyal to their faith, and 
to do nothing which would act against the “Khalifa’’’, Douwes Dekker, had 
been elated.77 Before his exile in De Expres in 1912 there had been a report that 
some Muslims considered him the reincarnation of Muhammad (Glissenaar 
1999:85). A fatwa would raise his standing among members of the Sarekat 
Islam and other Muslims in the Netherlands Indies even more. Imagining 
how such a fatwa could boost his ‘democratic propaganda’, Douwes Dekker 
75 Spakler to Idenburg, 22-12-1915, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 11-2-1916 W1.
76 Secret statement, 24-1-1916, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 27-7-1916 25; Handelingen Tweede Kamer 
1917-18:1447. See also Van der Veur 2006:325, 363-8.
77 Secret statement, 24-1-1916, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 27-7-1916 25.
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had suggested that he himself should go to Istanbul. Pillai had been quick to 
point out that such a journey would not be of much use. Douwes Dekker was 
not a Muslim. Unable to perform the mission himself, Douwes Dekker wrote 
to a Javanese friend. He asked him to come to Holland as soon as possible. He 
could collect his travelling expenses at Douwes Dekker’s father’s house. Pillai 
never seemed to have posted the letter, nor to have remitted any money to 
Douwes Dekker’s father.
Douwes Dekker was arrested at the end of the year, after he had embarked 
on a journey to the Far East financed by the Germans. Around the time of 
Kraft’s arrest, Pillai and Chattopadhyaya had visited Douwes Dekker in 
Zurich and had asked him to become their agent in Bangkok (Ban Kah Choon 
2001:69). Douwes Dekker had agreed. As by now it was well known even in 
the Netherlands Indies, he had become fed up with life in Europe and wanted 
to return to Asia. Insulinde even contemplated sending him the proceeds of 
cinema shows to allow him to take up residence in Singapore.78
Before travelling to Bangkok, Douwes Dekker visited the United States and 
Japan. In connection with plans for his journey, he went to Berlin once more 
in July 1915. In Berlin he received his instructions and a code book from the 
German Foreign Office (Van der Veur 2006:318-9). The code book would allow 
him to keep in contact with the committee in Berlin by telegrams of which 
the contents at first glance looked like information about commercial transac-
tions. The Dutch Deputy Consul in Hong Kong, W.J. Quist, was to report a 
few months later that the code was a very clever one. Simple sentences had a 
completely different meaning to that which an innocent reader would make of 
it.79 The British were not fooled. Kraft had given them the code.
Douwes Dekker, who by now had been studying at the University of Zurich 
for a year and had passed his exams with flying colours – he was known as a 
diligent and energetic, albeit somewhat lonely person80 – left Rotterdam for 
New York in early September. He travelled in the guise of a commercial trav-
eller. To explain his departure he wrote to his landlord in Zurich that he had 
tried to be rehabilitated in Holland, that he had failed, and that he was tired 
of Europe. He wanted to go back to the Netherlands Indies.81 At the end of 
the month, Douwes Dekker arrived in San Francisco, still the centre of Indian 
dissidents. Here he met Rham Chandra Kanta Chakravarti, who was consid-
ered by the British to have become the leader of the conspiracy in the United 
States after Har Dayal had fled the country.82 From San Francisco Douwes 
78 De Locomotief, 21-12-1914.
79 Quist to Ruempol, 17-12-1915, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 22-4-1916 5.
80 Von Claparède-Crola to Van Panhuys, 27-1-1916, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 11-2-1916 W1.
81 Von Claparède-Crola to Van Panhuys, 27-1-1916, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 11-2-1916 W1.
82 British memorandum August 1918, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 27-9-1918 F9.
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Dekker sailed on to Japan, where he visited one of the leaders of the Indian 
Revolutionary Party in Japan, Heramba (Hermeba) Lal Gupta. Another of 
his contacts in Japan was Yusaburo Takekoshi, the author of the fiercely anti-
Dutch article which had so shocked the Dutch (Van der Veur 2006:322-3).
From Japan Douwes Dekker travelled on to Shanghai. By now, he was 
regarded as a highly suspicious character by the Dutch and the British gov-
ernment. Both were aware of his schedule. In Batavia the colonial authori-
ties suspected him of continuing his anti-colonial Indische Partij activities 
from abroad.83 To find out more, the Dutch Consul General in Shanghai was 
instructed to investigate who Douwes Dekker’s contacts were. He had to 
investigate more thoroughly if these persons were Germans, British Indians, 
Turks, or Arabs. Batavia was also very eager to know to whom Douwes 
Dekker sent letters in the Netherlands Indies. The British, knowing about 
Douwes Dekker’s part in the Germano-Indian plot, were so eager to arrest him 
that even a namesake of his was detained when he entered Great Britain.
Douwes Dekker’s next stop was Hong Kong. Here he was detained. 
Douwes Dekker fell ill and had to be admitted to hospital. He had syphilis, 
but the Dutch authorities were so well-bred they kept this a secret and had not 
corrected newspaper reports in Java that Douwes Dekker was suffering from 
dysentery (Van der Veur 2006:319-21). To prevent his escape, the head of the 
Hong Kong police had Douwes Dekker outer clothing removed. In an inter-
view with a journalist on the Sumatra Post who visited him in hospital, Douwes 
Dekker blamed British reprisals for his pro-German articles in the Dutch press 
for his arrest. That during his interrogations he had revealed everything about 
his contacts with the Indian conspirators, he attributed to his poor health. He 
said he had consumption. The journalist was struck by the ‘terribly emaciated 
face’ of ‘the father of the Indische Partij’.84 When he had recovered somewhat, 
Douwes Dekker was put on a ship to Singapore, where, still weak from his 
illness, he was arrested by the military authorities on arrival on 21 December 
1915. In the Netherlands Indies newspapers reporting on his arrest said that 
Douwes Dekker’s role in the smuggling of inflammatory pamphlets was pun-
ishable by British martial law with twenty years’ imprisonment.85
Batavia welcomed Douwes Dekker’s arrest. The Dutch Consul General in 
Singapore who, had alerted the Singapore authorities to the fact that Douwes 
Dekker was a ‘dangerous agitator’ as early as October, made it clear that the 
Dutch authorities ‘had no desire that Douwes Dekker should be released, in 
fact they hoped that the British authorities would detain him as long as they 
83 Ruempol to Dutch Consul General in Shanghai, 8-11-1915, NA, Kol., Vb. 22-4-1916 5.
84 De Locomotief, 24-1-1916, Oetoesan Hindia, 1-2-1916.
85 De Locomotief, 11-1-1916.
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possibly could’.86 This they did. Douwes Dekker remained in the Tanglin 
Prison till 1917 (Van der Veur 2006:334-51), when he was sent to San Francisco 
to testify in the ‘Hindoo cases’, the trials of eight Indian conspirators, includ-
ing ‘his friend’ Rham Chandra Kanta Chakravarti, as the latter was described 
by the San Francisco Examiner.87
In San Francisco thirty Germans, Americans, and Indians were sentenced 
for breaching American neutrality. The court case resulted in new embarrass-
ments for the Dutch government. Testimonies implicated Theodor and Emil 
Helfferich. As far as London was concerned what was disclosed at the trial 
was reason enough to remind The Hague in August 1918 of the accusations it 
had made in 1916. It was pointed out that there could no longer be any doubt 
that Dutch territory had been used as a base for German conspiracies against 
India.88 An accompanying memorandum stated that had the Helfferich broth-
ers been brought to trial, they would certainly have been convicted ‘for the 
evidence in the case proved clearly that Batavia was one of the principal 
scenes of the conspiracy and that Theodor Helfferich was the chief German 
agent at that place’.89 Especially Theodor’s remark to her supercargo shortly 
after the arrival of Maverick in which ‘he expressed regret that the cargo had 
not come and his disgust that the Maverick had arrived without it’, was seen 
by the British authorities (and by the Dutch counterparts when they learned 
about it) as proof of his complicity. The British government could also point to 
evidence that Theodor Helfferich had met representatives of the revolutionary 
movement in India in his house and had discussed the dropping of arms along 
the coast of India with them. It was also noted that such persons had simply 
found Helfferich’s address by looking it up in a telephone directory. In one 
case, one of them who should have been introduced to Theodor Helfferich by 
Abdul Selam (who at that time had been under arrest), had been directed to 
Helfferich by a ‘couple of Java gentlemen’. They had been waiting for a guest 
from India in the lobby of the hotel where Abdul Selam had been staying.90 
The evidence also showed that Ong Sin Kwie might not have been as innocent 
as the Attorney-General in Batavia had taken him to be. A telegram exchanged 
between the United States and Berlin had referred to the arrest of a Chinese 
friend of Theodor Helfferich.91 
Likewise unpleasant was that the German plot provided Takekoshi and 
86 Spakler to Colonial Secretary Singapore, 7-10-1915, Beckett to Hulshoff Pol, 10-5-1916, NA, 
Kol. Geheim, Vb. 11-2-1916 W1, Vb. 27-7-1916 25.
87 San Francisco Examiner, 10-6-1917. Van der Veur 2006:351-71
88 Townley to Loudon, 28-8-1918, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 27-9-1918 F9.
89 British memorandum August 1918, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 27-9-1918 F9.
90 British memorandum August 1918, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 27-9-1918 F9.
91 British memorandum August 1918, Note Department A1 of the Ministry of the Colonies, 
September 1918, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 27-9-1918 F9.
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other expansionist Japanese with yet another argument for the Japanese 
government to do something about the Netherlands Indies. It became one of 
the many arguments wielded by Takekoshi to demonstrate that Japan should 
somehow acquire Java and Sumatra. He presented a range of reasons: the 
failure to maintain neutrality during the Russo-Japanese War; the exploits of 
the Emden and the role of Germans in the Netherlands Indies in stirring up 
unrest in British India, which showed that the failure to maintain neutrality 
harmed other nations; the fact that the problems the Allied blockade posed to 
Germany showed that Japan as an industrialized nation also needed a colony 
in the tropics to supply the motherland with food and natural resources; and 
the possibility that after the war the Netherlands Indies could become a base 
for Japan’s enemies.92 
After the trial, Douwes Dekker returned to Singapore, where on the prom-
ise to refrain from political activities he took up residence in a modest hotel, 
the Hotel Van Wijk.
92 De Locomotief, 6-10-1916.
chapter xiii
The consequences of economic warfare
In the course of time more and more commodities were added to the lists 
of absolute and conditional contraband drawn up by the Great Britain and 
France. In September 1914 copper, lead, rubber, and hides became contraband 
(which as London pointed out in 1917 implied that horses were also contra-
band, as it was impossible ‘to export a live horse without his skin’).1 A month 
later jute was added. In December rubber and mineral oils were declared 
absolute contraband. In March, April, and August 1915 the axe fell on raw 
wool, copra (used for the production of oil and soap), and cotton respectively. 
The consequences of such announcements were drastic. Immediately prices of 
cotton and copra dropped sharply in the Netherlands Indies.
Great Britain and France, developing their measures in close concert, 
aimed at achieving full economic isolation of Germany and Austria-Hungary. 
In London and Paris depriving the enemy of imports was seen as one of the 
ways through which Germany and Austria-Hungary might be forced into sur-
render. Such a strategy had won strong support in the British Navy as early 
as 1907 (Ferguson 2001:125). Throughout the war the Allied Powers continued 
to attach great value to the economic blockade of the Central Powers. When 
Italy entered the war on the side of the Triple Entente in May 1915, the military 
advantage to the Allied cause was not rated highly at the Foreign Office in 
London. What counted was that one of the routes along which a considerable 
amount of commodities had reached Germany in the previous months was 
now closed.2
Great Britain and France controlled the sea, but they did not have control 
of the land borders of Germany. For diplomatic and economic reasons, they 
could not put an end to German imports from the northern neutral countries 
in Europe. Throughout most of the war the German economy remained strong 
enough to provide the neutral countries with coal, iron, chemical products, 
medicines, machineries, textiles and other commodities they urgently needed. 
1 Townley to Cecil, 18-11-1917, PRO FO 800 195.
2 Nicholson to Hardinge, 10-6-1915, PRO FO 800 378.
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This made an economic boycott of countries like Holland ineffectual, even 
counterproductive. Till well into 1917, policy makers in London and Paris had 
to take into account that an economic blockade of the neutral European states, 
with the Netherlands because of its location being one of the most likely tar-
gets for such a step, might force these countries into the German camp. The 
fewer the goods the Allied Powers allowed to enter the Netherlands, the more 
the Dutch had to turn to Germany for essential imports.
To the dismay of politicians and of the general public in Great Britain 
and France, and later also in the United States, a profitable trade developed 
between the neutral countries and Germany. A hostile press which attacked 
the profits Dutch people made from the trade with Germany helped consider-
ably to create an anti-Dutch mood in the Allied countries and in the United 
States. The Dutch sure in their conviction that they had done nothing wrong 
and that by showing a fair neutrality they had acted as citizens of a neutral 
country should, blamed the foreign newspapers, especially the tabloids, 
almost every time they were confronted by unpleasant reactions from the 
Allied Powers. A member of the Dutch Senate stated in February 1918 that the 
‘poisonous gasses of the tabloids’ had had a greater effect than ‘the poisonous 
gasses of German bombs in the trenches’.3
By November 1914 the heading ‘The economic war’ appeared above the 
war telegrams in the Dutch-language newspapers in the Netherlands Indies 
alongside others like ‘War at sea’ and ‘War in the sky’. Confronted with this 
special kind of warfare, the Netherlands had to find a way to accommodate 
both Allied and German demands, and from time to time had to parry severe 
threats from both sides. Berlin’s protests against the way the Netherlands 
maintained its neutrality were at times, as the British Ambassador in The 
Hague said, ‘guttural and menacing’.4 London did not eschew ‘bullying’, a 
word which after a while began to crop up in the correspondence between 
London and the British legation in Holland about the way the Netherlands 
should be treated. With Germany and Great Britain trying to starve each 
other into surrender, the Netherlands was caught between the devil and the 
deep blue sea. In its negotiations with Germany and Great Britain, the Dutch 
government had to make sure that the concessions made to one side did not 
offend the other. As the war progressed, this became increasingly difficult. The 
members of the Dutch government, especially the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Loudon, had to tread carefully. Great Britain had the power to make Dutch 
sea traffic impossible. Germany might well be able, as Loudon explained to 
London on various occasions, to occupy Holland before Allied forces had 
3 Handelingen Eerste Kamer 1917-18:191
4 Townley to Cecil, 17-3-1917, PRO FO 800 195.
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had a chance to come to its assistance.5 In London the Foreign Secretary, Sir 
Edward Grey, was sensitive to the argument. Unless the Allied Powers were 
in a position to assure the Netherlands that they could prevent an invasion 
by Germany, it would not ‘be fair in their own interests to suggest that they 
should cease to be neutral’.6
The Netherlands’ position in World War One resembled that of Turkey and 
China in the pre-war years, with Great Britain and Germany competing for 
control over its economy. Each had allies in the commercial and political elites. 
Of the two figures who dominated the Dutch business community, Van Aalst, 
the President of the Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij, and therefore with 
the fate of the colonial estate economy at heart, tended to align himself with 
the British. His main rival, A.G. Kröller, a Rotterdam shipowner and trader, 
maintained excellent relations with Germany. In the government Treub, who 
in concert with Van Aalst determined the bulk of Dutch trade policy, was con-
sidered to be not disinclined towards London. His colleague in Agriculture, 
Industry, and Trade, F.E. Posthuma tended to be pro-German. The same was 
said about the Prime Minister, Cort van der Linden. In Allied circles he was 
known as Caught unter den Linden.
Loudon was the first to receive threats and protests from London, Paris, 
and Berlin. Thrust into the limelight by the war the stature of his Department 
of Foreign Affairs changed. For a long time it had been a rather insignificant 
Ministry, greatly overshadowed by that of the Colonies. It was ‘a forgotten 
department’. People considered it to be ‘very stuffy’ (Colenbrander 1920:102). 
During the Russo-Japanese War it had even been considered incompetent. 
World War One changed all this. As Van Kol remarked in the Dutch Senate 
in 1918 the work of a Minister of Foreign Affairs no longer consisted mainly 
of ‘lunching, dining, having supper, and sauntering’.7 There was great praise 
for what Loudon had accomplished. According to the British Ambassador 
in 1917, Sir Walter Townley, he became ‘a sort of national fetish’ for keeping 
Holland out of the war.8 Loudon, who in the eyes of Townley was ‘inspired 
by a holy terror of Germany’ was not considered by the British to be some-
body who had ended up in the camp of their enemy because of this.9 On the 
contrary. Townley described him as ‘undoubtedly pro-Ally at heart, though so 
intent upon preserving his neutral attitude that it is hard to detect in his public 
acts much good feeling towards us.’10
5 Townley to Cecil 24-3-1917, PRO FO 800 195.
6 Grey to Johnstone 20-1-1915, PRO FO 800 69.
7 Handelingen Eerste Kamer 1917-8:474.
8 Townley to Cecil, 29-10-1917, PRO FO 800 195.
9 Townley to Cecil, 29-10-1917, PRO FO 800 195.
10 Townley to Cecil, 18-11-1917, PRO FO 800 195.
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Unable to control the German land borders, the best London and Paris 
could do was to prevent neutral merchantmen carrying transit goods to and 
from Germany. In this way they put an end to the export of colonial wares 
which had been declared contraband to Germany and Austria-Hungary from 
the Netherlands Indies. With British warships controlling international sea-
borne trade, London was virtually in a position to decide which commodities 
– including goods which before the war had been imported from Germany, but 
which Germany no longer supplied because of the war – could be transported 
to the Netherlands by neutral merchantmen. In The Hague, a key role in the 
supervision of Dutch foreign trade was played by Sir Francis Oppenheimer, 
the Commercial Attaché at the British Embassy. His job did not make him 
a popular figure in Holland. Oppenheimer was also disliked by the British, 
maybe because he was of German descent. His father was a German who had 
been naturalized. Referring to him in 1917 the British Envoy remarked that 
he had never ‘known a man so universally hated’.11 Oppenheimer who was 
tolerated in his function because he was an expert in his field, was ‘a horrible 
difficult question’; ‘an unfortunately unsympathetic personality’; a man who 
had ‘deplorable manners’.12 In Holland for a brief moment in the autumn of 
1915, the Allied effort to keep track of Dutch trade was assisted by an ‘anti-
smuggling bureau’ created by H.M.C. Holdert, the majority shareholder of the 
Dutch newspaper De Telegraaf. What its agents discovered about smuggling to 
Germany and Belgium was reported to the British and French Embassies.
British control of shipping in Asia was as tight as in Europe. All ships which 
entered and left ports in the Netherlands Indies were stopped. Sometimes they 
were ordered to sail on to Singapore for a closer inspection of passengers, 
cargo, and mail. Ships which sailed in the western part of the Archipelago 
were not exempt from searches. The problem was that the ships sailing 
between the ports of the Netherlands Indies had to leave the three-mile wide 
territorial waters. Usually the searches took place on the high seas, but ships 
sailing in colonial territorial waters were occasionally also arrested so that 
their cargo, mail, and passengers could be checked. This was usually done by 
British warships, and occasionally the Australians did the job. Japanese cruis-
ers did their share after May 1916.
The warships had every freedom to act. In the absence of a strong German 
fleet, they could sail as close to colonial territorial waters as they wanted. A 
‘distant blockade’ as in Europe, where British warships patrolled at a safe 
distance from German naval bases, was not necessary. Another difference was 
that in Asia cargo was not the first concern. The Germano-Indian complot 
11 Townley to Cecil, 17-3-1917, PRO FO 800 195.
12 Townley to Cecil, 17-3-1917, PRO FO 800 195.
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to foment unrest in India and the Malay Peninsula meant that mail and pas-
sengers were the prime target of the searches. One of the first questions asked 
when a ship was searched was whether there were Germans on board. Other 
suspect persons – including a German soldier in the colonial army and sailors 
of German ships stuck in the ports of the Netherlands Indies who had signed 
off – were also liable to be arrested. Mail was confiscated.
The Netherlands Indies was effectively cordoned off by the British Navy. 
When Bijl de Vroe accompanied Van Limburg Stirum on a sea voyage from 
Batavia to Semarang in October 1916, he noted in his diary how they passed 
‘the wretch of an English cruiser which stops and searches all ships’ after they 
had left port (Bijl de Vroe 1980:98). The ship on which the Governor-General 
and his adjutant travelled was not stopped. Informed about who was on 
board, the captain of the cruiser had a twenty-one-salute fired. Bijl de Vroe 
probably worded the prevailing sentiment amongst Dutchmen. Captains of 
Dutch ships made the best of it, adding an element of sport to the game. They 
tried to avoid an encounter with Allied warships and challenged their crews to 
find them. British captains took up the challenge, pleased with any distraction 
during what was often a very boring routine patrol.13 
In the Netherlands Indies the successive British Consuls General were the 
persons who determined what foreign trade was still allowed and what not in 
consultation with London. Another of their tasks was to keep track of enemy 
spies. They were well informed. The Consuls General and the other British 
authorities in Asia received their information from members of the British 
community in the Netherlands Indies, from the occasional Dutchman, and 
from a network of informants and agents. Kraft was one of their spies. Another 
asset was ‘a double agent known by the code name “Oren” born of a Swedish 
mother and a German father, working under deep cover within the European 
business community’ (Choon 2001:71). Until 1916 yet another good source of 
information was the British employees of the Eastern Extension at telegraph 
stations. Occasionally they sent information directly to Allied warships.14
One of the results was that when Dutch merchantmen were searched in 
Asian waters, it was sometimes known in advance that Germans or suspected 
Indians were on board or that Dutch people living in the Netherlands Indies 
carried mail for German friends and acquaintances to evade British mail 
searches carried by neutral ships. They and other Dutch Residents of the 
Netherlands Indies, who were suspected by the British authorities of being 
enemy agents, or as it was diplomatically phrased were ‘unneutral’, were 
arrested and taken off. One of the persons who fell victim to this was the 
13 Soerabaiasch Nieuwsblad, cited in De Locomotief, 11-1-1917.
14 De Locomotief, 28-3-1916.
Governor General J.P. graaf van Limburg Stirum (Van Gent, Penard and Rinkes  
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secretary of the German Consul General, R. Götte. Travelling from Tanjung 
Priok to Belawan he was taken off in the Straits of Malacca just outside ter-
ritorial waters in January 1916. The British had been waiting for him. Götte 
had known that it had not been safe for him to travel, but had taken the risk 
nevertheless. Another German had more luck. Travelling from Samarinda to 
Buleleng he was taken off and was interned in British Borneo in July 1916. It 
was the second time he was interned. He could prove that earlier in Singapore 
he had been released because of his age, he was fifty-four. The British set him 
free. They gave him a first class ticket to continue his journey. It was reported 
that the German in question was ‘very satisfied’ with the treatment he got.15 
Yet another such incident happened in August 1916. A Dutchman travelling 
from Padang to Batavia, who British intelligence had been told was carrying 
mail for ‘an enemy official in Batavia’, in fact letters from the German Consul 
in Padang to the German Consul General in Batavia, was taken off. After The 
Hague had protested, the British government explained that examining the 
many letters the person in question had in his possession would have delayed 
the Dutch steamer too long. No incriminating mail was found.16
British consular officials also succeeded remarkably well in keeping track 
of the flow of goods in ports in Holland and the Netherlands Indies; curtailing 
Dutch commerce accordingly. In September 1917 The Times wrote that Great 
Britain had ‘built up an extremely efficient intelligence service to keep watch 
over the “ins” and “outs” of the “blockade”’. London knew ‘pretty nearly eve-
rything there was to know about German’s war-time methods’, including ‘the 
tricks and false scent adopted in ordering goods’ in neutral countries.17
What lay in store for Dutch seaborne trade had dawned on people’s conscious-
ness in September 1914 when the first merchantman from the Netherlands 
Indies for over a month had reached European waters. It was the Tambora. 
Among her passengers were Idenburg’s wife and son, who had left for Europe 
in anticipation of the Governor General’s retirement. The Tambora had sailed 
from Tanjung Priok at the end of July. The voyage to Europe had taken much 
longer than it would have done under normal circumstances. On 5 September 
the Tambora was detained for one week at Brest, where she had to unload her 
mail and her cargo of rice, coffee, and tea. The incident was the first of its kind 
and made a great impression in the Netherlands Indies. Disquieted by the 
news, the two major Dutch shipping companies – the Rotterdamsche Lloyd 
and the Nederland – and export houses in the Netherlands Indies decided to 
15 De Locomotief, 25-7-1916.
16 De Locomotief, 18-8-1916; British Foreign Office to Dutch Legation, 9-2-1917, NA, Kol. 
Openbaar, Vb. 15-3-1917 3.
17 The Times, 10-9-1917.
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ship products such as rice, coffee, tea, and rubber to British and French ports 
only, and not to Dutch ports. The shipping companies were motivated by the 
fear that their precious ships might be taken as a prize. The Declaration of 
London of 1909 (which was never ratified) allowed freighters to be seized as a 
prize if more than half of the cargo consisted of contraband. Such a proportion 
could easily be reached after a Dutch ship had unloaded a part of the cargo in 
British or French ports. At that moment the Dutch business community had no 
clear notion of what Great Britain and France considered contraband. Neither 
had the Dutch government in The Hague nor Idenburg and his staff: ‘Please 
wire which colonial products (are) by belligerents considered contraband 
and if tea and rubber shipped in Dutch steamers and directly consigned to 
England run any risk’, Idenburg asked Pleyte in The Hague by wire in English 
on 10 September.18
Pleyte himself wrote a long letter to Loudon on 11 September 1914. He 
called attention to the ‘grave consequences’ for the colonial economy of the 
detainment of ships. The estates in the Netherlands Indies had survived the 
August crisis, but it was vital that their products reached their markets. The 
colonial economy had felt the consequences of war, but these did not have 
to be as drastic as they were in Europe. It would be a different matter if the 
export of products became impossible or was seriously hampered. Pleyte 
wrote gloomily that he agreed with those who predicted a total lay up of 
the carrying-trade between the Netherlands Indies and Holland. He asked 
Loudon to explain in London and Paris that French and British investments 
in the Netherlands Indies would likewise be hurt when this happened. To 
underline his point, he recalled how he and Idenburg had come to the assist-
ance to the estates in the early days of the war, irrespective of whether these 
estates were British, French, or Dutch. Pleyte was convinced Great Britain and 
France should be grateful for this and should appreciate the strict neutrality 
maintained in the Netherlands Indies.19
Loudon did try to persuade London and Paris to relax their supervision 
of Dutch seaborne trade. It was to no avail. Private initiatives proved more 
successful. Again Van Aalst played a crucial role. In view of the disastrous 
consequences the Allied contraband policy might have, a Commissie voor 
den Nederlandsche Handel (Committee for Dutch Trade) was formed in 
Holland in September 1914. It was chaired by Van Aalst and Kröller was one 
of its members. With the approval of Loudon, this Committee for Dutch Trade 
discussed the consequences of a blockade of the Dutch coast with the British 
Envoy, Alan Johnstone. To press home their point, the British Envoy was asked 
18 Idenburg to Pleyte, 10-9-1914, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb.11-9-1914 M18.
19 Pleyte to Loudon, 11-9-1914, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 11-9-1914 M19.
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‘whether it was necessary or indeed the intention to starve the Netherlands 
along with Germany’ (Houwink ten Cate 1995:26). 
This was not the aim of the Allied Powers. The solution was a limited liabil-
ity company, the Nederlandsche Overzee Trust Maatschappij (NOT, Dutch 
Overseas Trust Company), founded by the committee on 23 November 1914. 
The major Dutch banks and shipping companies cooperated in establishing the 
NOT (Van Dorp 1920:199). Van Aalst became chairman of its five-man-strong 
executive committee and of its larger executive board. Kröller was a member 
of the executive board. The goal of the Dutch Overseas Trust Company was 
to enable goods to be imported from abroad and from the Netherlands Indies 
into Holland which had been declared absolute and conditional contraband by 
the Triple Entente and to have the shipment of goods to the Netherlands Indies 
from Dutch ports proceed as smoothly as possible. Starting modestly with two 
office rooms in a bank building on the Kneuterdijk in The Hague within the 
space of little more than one year the NOT developed into a large organization, 
employing a thousand people, and with offices spread over fifteen houses (Van 
Dorp 1920:200). The NOT grew into an important institution. It would become, 
as C.A. van Manen aptly chose to use as the title of her publication about 
the NOT, the ‘centre of foreign traffic of the Netherlands during the World 
War’ (Van Manen 1935). In August 1917 the British Ambassador in Holland 
concluded that the NOT ‘had been able to set up a machinery of government 
which no real government could have established without legislative acts’.20
The British government selected the NOT and not the Dutch government 
as its trusted partner in regulating Dutch seaborne trade. Being the author-
ity which had the power to grant permission for Dutch imports and exports, 
the NOT functioned as an extension of British control. The advantage for the 
British was that Dutch ships with NOT cargo did not have to be searched, 
with the exception of mail of course, but this was a different matter. The task 
of the NOT was to ensure that contraband goods shipped to Holland did not 
end up in Germany; the NOT warned on various occasions after peace might 
have been reached or after the Dutch government had lifted existing export 
bans. This gave the trust the responsibility for the distribution of commodi-
ties imported from abroad in Holland. The final decision always remained 
in British hands. Before imported good could leave the warehouses British 
consent was necessary. Sometimes it could take months before permission 
was granted. Initially this concerned especially consignments distrusted by 
the British, which could be released only after the NOT had submitted docu-
ments showing that there was nothing wrong with the shipment. Later in the 
war other shipments had to wait for British consent as well and goods piled 
20 Townley to Cecil, 17-8-1917, PRO FO 800 195.
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up in warehouses in Holland. 
To prevent goods imported under its supervision being smuggled into 
Germany, the NOT employed an army of inspectors. Their task was to inspect 
the warehouses and the books of firms engaged in the import and trade of 
commodities which fell under NOT control. Were the inspectors to find out 
that goods had been re-exported to Germany, the import firm concerned 
would be fined and imports might be stopped. One of the instances on which 
the NOT imposed such sanctions took place in March 1916, when its inspec-
tors discovered that chocolate had been smuggled to Germany. The NOT 
immediately clamped down on the import of cacao. Hoarding was of no use. 
By circular the NOT warned about 30,000 Dutch import firms in August 1916 
that the bans of re-export to the Continental Powers would remain in force 
after war had ended. 
The NOT decided which goods from overseas could enter Dutch ports, in 
what quantities, and during which period. Had a shipment not been shipped in 
the period fixed by the NOT the permission became void. It could be renewed, 
but the ruling became a problem after some time when shipping opportunities 
became increasingly scarce. In compliance with the Allied contraband policy, 
the NOT issued permits for the import of these articles only for domestic use 
or for transit to other neutral countries. All imports of such goods had to be 
consigned to the NOT. Originally this only affected a selected number of arti-
cles, but gradually Allied bans and in step with this NOT involvement seemed 
to extend to almost all imports, including such items as rice wine and other 
spirits, cigarette-holders, rose bushes, calendars, and dog biscuits (Van Dorp 
1920:203). With respect to imports from the Netherlands Indies only quinine 
and cinchona bark did not have to be consigned to the NOT at the beginning 
of 1917. All other products had. 
The presence of the NOT made it possible for colonial wares from the 
Netherlands Indies which the belligerents had listed as contraband still to 
reach Holland, providing that they were addressed to the NOT Under the 
supervision of the NOT, the import of rice from the Netherlands Indies to 
Holland was resumed in January 1915. When cassava was declared contra-
band in March 1915, only shipments consigned to the NOT were transported 
to Holland.21 
Shipping companies were informed of the import bans and quotas imposed 
by the NOT. They in turn informed exporters in the Netherlands Indies that 
they refused to transport the goods concerned if no NOT certificate for import 
into Holland could be submitted. There must have been some loopholes. The 
shipping companies warned export firms in the Netherlands Indies that when 
21 Koloniaal verslag 1916:219-22.
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goods were still sent to Holland from the Netherlands Indies which did not 
comply to NOT regulations the risk was high that these would be returned 
to the port of shipment in August 1916. Naturally the NOT and the shipping 
companies would not bear these costs.
When a NOT permit became necessary for goods which had been free 
from import restrictions up to then, this usually meant that the batches which 
at that moment had already been ordered or sold but not yet shipped were 
included. Only when the exporter was blessed by the good fortune to have had 
his wares already loaded on board ship, was he sure that his wares could still 
be shipped to Holland. When the quotas fixed by the NOT had been reached, 
imports had to be stopped. In May 1915 this put a temporary end to the import 
of tapioca products and in November 1915 to that of maize and rubber from 
the Netherlands Indies into Holland. The Dutch government had no say in all 
this. All Pleyte and Idenburg could do was to plead. After the trust had called 
a halt to the export of maize, all Batavia could manage to do was, to give one 
example, to ensure that that consignments – in total 6,000 tons – which had 
already been sold and awaited shipment, could still be exported to Holland.
Initially, a few products which London and Paris still allowed to reach 
Holland undisturbed were free of NOT supervision. One of these was medici-
nal wares such as cinchona bark. Another was tobacco (as of mid-1916 restrict-
ed to tobacco from the Netherlands Indies, not from elsewhere); a product 
for which prospects had seemed especially grim at the outbreak of the war 
because its main market was in Germany and Austria-Hungary. Initially cof-
fee from the Netherlands Indies could also be freely exported to Holland. It 
fetched ‘fabulous prices’ in Germany and Austria-Hungary; not least because 
coffee from South America was listed as contraband. In October 1915 the NOT 
intervened when a Dutch freighter had hidden Brazilian coffee beans among 
coffee beans from Java. A special committee was instituted to check coffee 
arriving in Dutch ports. From that moment on, coffee from the Netherlands 
Indies had to be consigned to the trust, which inexorably also fixed import 
quotas. Around the same time, the shipment of tobacco had to be briefly 
restricted after an Amsterdam firm had literally used tobacco as a cover to 
smuggle rubber to Holland.
At the end of 1915 it was widely acknowledged that the NOT had become 
an indispensable adjunct to Dutch international trade. The annual report of 
the Dutch Kamer van Koophandel (Chamber of Commerce) for 1915 noted 
that colonial trade had adjusted grudgingly to the shackles of the trust. 
Unkind criticism had been the result, but gradually it dawned on more and 
more people that the NOT was ‘one of the necessary factors, which would 
enable the Netherlands as a big Colonial Power to continue to play the role 
of a buffer state without hurting the traffic between motherland and colonies 
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too much’.22 Even so the arrangements the NOT made with London were a 
constant source of criticism. People in Germany, and indeed some in Holland 
shared this view, saw the NOT as an ‘English institution’ (Treub 1920:163-4). 
In their eyes the establishment of the NOT meant that the whole Dutch transit 
trade had capitulated to Great Britain.
 
The NOT also played an essential role in the securing of imports from Holland 
in the Netherlands Indies. From June 1915, British exports to the Netherlands, 
with a few exceptions, were allowed only for articles consigned to the NOT or 
for those for which a special licence had been issued. This regulation was also 
in force for goods which had been ordered from Holland to be transhipped 
from Dutch ports to the Netherlands Indies.23 Incontrovertible the power to 
regulate exports and imports in Holland implied that the NOT had a large say 
in shipping. Van Aalst boasted that most ships fell under control of the NOT 
when he was interviewed by the correspondent of The Times in Amsterdam at 
the end of 1915.24 Pleyte had to admit in March 1917 that all negotiations about 
calling at British ports were conducted by the Trust.25
Even more vital to the colonial economy was that NOT permission was neces-
sary for imports from Germany to the Netherlands Indies. Aware that certain 
German goods were essential to keeping industries in the Netherlands Indies 
running, Great Britain permitted the placing of orders from the Netherlands 
Indies in Germany and Austria-Hungary, but imposed stringent conditions. 
In March 1915, Great Britain and France announced that they would seize 
all enemy goods on neutral merchantmen. Immediately the Committee for 
Dutch Trade contacted the British Embassy to work out a special arrangement 
for the Dutch colonies. At that moment the Dutch government was still brim-
ming with confidence, at least this is the impression it made on the outside 
world. Via a message in the Javasche Courant, the public was informed that 
the Committee had begun its negotiations and that the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs had informed his colleague of the Colonies that the British and French 
measures would probably not harm the supply of goods ‘of enemy origin’ 
to the Dutch colonies.26 The committee and the British government reached 
an agreement concerning ‘goods of enemy origin required for the factories, 
industries or public services of Dutch colonies which cannot be procured 
22 Koloniale Studiën 1916-17:157.
23 British proclamation relating to the exportation of all articles to the Netherlands during the 
present war, 25-6-1915, State Papers 1915:274.
24 De Locomotief, 3-1-1916.
25 Pleyte to Koninklijke West-Indische Maildienst, 19-3-1917, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb.19-3-1917 
13.
26 Javasche Courant, 9-4-1915.
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from other sources or the supply of which cannot suffer delay’ in July 1915.27 
Armed with what was known as a D-certificate, issued by NOT, such ‘licensed 
goods’ could be shipped to the Netherlands Indies without the risk of being 
confiscated. NOT took its responsibility seriously. The trust refused certificates 
for shipment if there was a shadow of a doubt about whether the goods met 
the requirements.
Within months, disagreement arose over the question of whether ship-
ments by the Dutch government were exempt from the obligation to acquire a 
NOT certificate. The confrontation came at the end of 1915. The villain of the 
piece was the shipment of chemical dyes. The importation of chemical dyes 
was highly important to the Netherlands Indies. The dyes were essential to the 
Javanese batik industry, which was already hard hit by the decreasing purchas-
ing power of the population. Traders and producers had been forced to close 
up shop. The industry should not have to risk any further decline. Alternatives 
were unavailable. Germany was the only source of supply of chemical dyes. 
Shortly after the outbreak of the war Berlin had issued an export ban expressly 
to hurt Great Britain, who was likewise dependent on German dyes. The con-
sequence had been felt immediately in Java. Firms resold dyes they received 
for a much higher price. Others held on to their stock in the hope of fetching an 
even higher price in the future, especially in Great Britain. Prices sky-rocketed. 
The price of a barrel of one such dyes, alizarin, rose from 63 to 2,000 guilders. 
Returning to the ways of the past and the use of natural dyes like indigo, sago, 
kudu and tegerang bark was not really an option. Production was too small, and 
domestic and foreign demand sent prices soaring. Another problem was that 
Javanese craftsmen would again have to learn how to work with natural dyes. 
The apparently sensible suggestion that bananas could be used as an ingredi-
ent to produce all kinds of colours – pink, yellow, brown, green – was only 
really considered seriously just before the end of the war.28
The colonial authorities took the matter very much to heart. Though the 
production also involved Arabs and Chinese, a decline in the batik industry 
would predominantly harm the prosperity of the Javanese population. After 
a ban had been issued on the export of artificial dyes from the Netherlands 
Indies, Berlin permitted the export of dyes to Java in a proportion equal to 
the export volume of 1913. A second condition was that NOT should not be 
involved in the purchase, the shipment to Java, or sale in the Netherlands 
Indies. Following the agreement, the Ministry of the Colonies allowed a 
number of private companies to buy a large quantity of dyes in Germany 
in exchange for tin. Batavia set a price limit in Java. To cut out a string of 
27 Oppenheimer to Van Vollenhoven, 6-1-1916, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb.20-1-1916 U.
28 Koloniaal verslag 1916:231-2; Clarke 1918.
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middlemen creaming off their profit, the European import firms agreed to 
open up the possibility for batik producers to buy dyes directly from them. 
Labelled government goods and addressed to the Governor General the dyes 
were shipped to Java by the Kawi in early November. When he learned of the 
shipment, the British Ambassador lodged a protest with Van Aalst. Johnstone 
asked for a copy of the licence issued by the NOT. He also demanded to know 
why the trust had allowed dyes to be exported. Johnstone stressed that under 
no circumstances could the goods leave port – which in fact the dyes did the 
next day – without his consent. He warned that the Dutch government should 
comply ‘in order that complications may not arise in this connection’.29 In his 
turn, Van Aalst impressed upon the Ministry of the Colonies that to prevent 
the arrest of outgoing ships, German goods could be exported when they had 
a NOT certificate. Van Aalst insisted this was in accordance with the agree-
ment the trust had concluded with the Allied authorities. 
Evidently the British government was seriously nettled. It was well aware 
of the fact that in other instances the label ‘government goods’ had also been 
used to circumvent British control over the export of German goods to the 
Netherlands Indies. In the previous months, the Ministry of the Colonies 
had been contacted by a number of firms, which had received orders from 
government departments in the Netherlands Indies, but which the NOT had 
refused to provide with a certificate. Some of the articles concerned had been 
transported consigned to the Governor-General as government cargo to the 
colony.
In unmistakable terms, Oppenheimer warned the NOT that this was 
untenable. Shipments by the Dutch government fell under the terms of the 
agreement concluded. In one of his letters he ‘kindly’ asked the NOT to take 
‘immediate steps’ to provide the ‘needful assurance’ that in the future the 
terms of the agreement would be obeyed. Oppenheimer added ‘privately’ that 
‘the large quantity of goods of enemy origin shipped under the Netherlands 
Government contracts’ had alarmed the British authorities. For the ‘smooth 
working’ of the arrangement, he should ‘be able to send home a very early and 
satisfactory reply’ to his letter.30
London now had the bit between its teeth. Oppenheimer, who confessed he 
did not understand why the Ministry of the Colonies had acted the way it had, 
as dyes could be exported through the intermediation of the NOT, continued 
to berate the NOT. He asked for copies of the export licence and for ‘definite 
figures’ regarding the requirement of the dyes in the Netherlands Indies in 
the previous years. Had the NOT indeed given permission for the shipment, 
29 Johstone to van Aalst, 5-11-1915, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb.16-11-1915 55.
30 Oppenheimer to Van Vollenhoven, 16-11-1915, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 20-1-1916 U.
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the Trust should provide him with guarantees that the dyes were for ‘bona-
fide use’, and that the Dutch government had adopted measures ‘to ensure a 
fair distribution and absolute consumption’ in the Netherlands Indies. Once 
again, he inquired into the measures the NOT had taken ‘to control any 
shipment made by the Netherlands Government to the Governor General or 
other consignees in the Dutch East Indies’.31 A few days later Oppenheimer 
returned to the subject. This time he wanted information about the distribu-
tion of the dyes. Did these go to the highest bidder, or to factories according 
to their known requirements?32 All this time the Ministry of the Colonies had 
remained immune to requests for information by the NOT. When it could do 
so no longer, its Secretary General suggested the NOT reply to Oppenheimer 
simply telling him that the dyes were destined for firms which had already 
been using them before the war and sold them to the native batik industry.33 
The shipment of dyes made London decide to put an end to the export of 
tin, which had served as a barter for the dyes, to Holland as a punishment. The 
export of German dyes to the Netherlands Indies was allowed to continue, but 
the quantities shipped were far from adequate to meet the demand. When the 
British Consul General in Batavia was not satisfied with the way Dutch firms 
in Java distributed artificial dyes, shipments were confiscated by the British in 
mid-1916 but within weeks shipping could be resumed. The colonial govern-
ment promised to buy the artificial dyes and act as sole distributor, using its 
civil servants and local banks which had especially been set up to lend money 
to indigenous business ventures.
The affair had put Pleyte, as he described this in a letter to Idenburg, in 
an ‘extremely painful’ situation.34 It was bad enough his department had to 
endure embarrassing inquiries by the Trust. In another respect it also found 
itself in an uncomfortable position. In Java the Batavian branch of the German 
firm Carl Schlieper had won a tender for the supply of hardware items like 
nails, screws, and gas pipes issued by the Engineering Corps in the middle 
of October. It was a large order: in total 1,500 tons. In The Hague its Director 
Walter Schlieper contacted the Ministry of the Colonies to ask for help. Pleyte 
decided to lend his assistance. His Ministry would take over the goods and 
ship them to Java as a government consignment. Oppenheimer nipped the 
enterprise in the bud. In a letter to the NOT he inquired about the name of 
the merchantman aboard which the shipment was to be transported to Java 
in January.35
31 Oppenheimer to Van Vollenhoven, 26-11-1915, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 16-11-1915 55.
32 Oppenheimer to Van Vollenhoven, 3-12-1915, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 16-11-1915 55.
33 Staal to De Beaufort, 8-12-1915, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 16-11-1915 55.
34 Pleyte to Idenburg, 11-1-1916, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 11-1-1916 R.
35 Oppenheimer to Van Vollenhoven, 6-1-1916, NA, Kol., Geheim, Vb. 20-1-1916 U.
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Oppenheimer’s request could only mean that Great Britain intended to 
search the ship and seize the cargo. Pleyte was at his wits’ end. His Ministry 
had made a promise but trouble lay ahead if it was honoured. His staff con-
sidered buying the goods and storing them at the Colonial Establishment in 
Amsterdam. This proved impossible. Wares there were already piling up. To 
rent special storage space was another way out, but Pleyte was against this. He 
confided to Loudon that such a move would make a strange impression on the 
Schlieper Firm and on the German government.36 Thereupon an investigation 
was mounted as to whether the Engineering Corps in Holland could use the 
goods. This also offered no way out. Pleyte tried to shelve a decision by ask-
ing Loudon to have the Dutch Envoy in London plead that the British Navy 
should not confiscate the shipment. The plea fell on deaf ears. In the end the 
Ministry of the Colonies had to go back on its word. Schlieper was informed 
that he himself had to be responsible for delivery. In order to obtain a D-certifi-
cate, Schlieper asked for a statement that goods were destined for the colonial 
administration. Pleyte did not raise any objections. ‘How the man will manage 
to carry it off is a matter of indifference to us’, he penned in a note.37 
British distrust meant that from the beginning of 1916 German goods 
ordered by the colonial administration could only be shipped to the Nether-
lands Indies with a NOT certificate, which was only given after the British 
Embassy had given its permission. The Trust, which at the height of the con-
flict callled a temporary halt to the issuing of D-certificates, was only prepared 
to issue these for government goods if the Ministry of the Colonies submitted 
a statement that the goods were destined for the public sector. The overall 
result, compounded by British interference, was extra delays and a less liberal 
policy. A senior civil servant in the Department of Agriculture, Industry, and 
Trade in the Netherlands Indies noted in February 1916 that goods in Holland 
ready for shipment to the colony had been refused a NOT certificate several 
times.38 One such instance concerned a shipment of cement ordered for har-
bour works in Makassar. The argument for refusing to sanction the shipment 
was that cement was also produced in Great Britain. Another concerned the 
pipes for the waterworks of Semarang. The Mayor of Semarang warned that 
without the new pipes contamination of drinking water could not be exclud-
ed.39 The obstruction of shipments of medicines or their ingredients and medi-
cal equipment, which the British Embassy claimed, according to the Dutch not 
always rightfully so, could also be provided (be it against a higher price) by 
36 Pleyte to Loudon, 20-1-1916, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 20-1-1916 U.
37 Note Pleyte, 9-2-1916, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 20-1-1916 T.
38 De Kruyff to Director Department of Agriculture, Industry, and Trade, 17-2-1916, NA, Kol. 
Geheim, Mr. 1916/44x.
39 De Locomotief, 14-9-1916.
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Great Britain attracted special attention.40 So it is no surprise, that in October 
1916, De Locomotief called attention to the novelty that a clinic in Bandung had 
been equipped with an ‘artificial sun lamp’ which, it was said, could be used 
to treat tuberculosis, bone tuberculosis, skin diseases, and rheumatism. It was 
not only the first such lamp in the Netherlands Indies, it was also of German 
make and widely used by the German army to treat neglected wounds; ‘in 
case of extensive festering processes the ultra-violet rays have an anti-bacteri-
cide effect’. The reader could imagine how much trouble it had been to import 
the sun lamp under ‘the present very abnormal circumstances’.41 
To spare himself new embarrassments Pleyte instructed Idenburg that no 
orders for goods to be shipped from Holland should be passed without his 
Ministry being contacted first. The instruction did not go down well in the 
European community in Java; sure as people were that the mills of the gov-
ernment ground exceedingly slowly. De Locomotief pointed out that experience 
had shown that goods ordered through the Ministry of the Colonies took a 
long time to reach Java, even when they were urgently needed. To avoid the 
treadmill of bureaucracy, in the past orders had been placed directly with pri-
vate firms in Holland. This had greatly speeded up delivery. Pleyte’s instruc-
tions would assuredly result in long delays.42
On top of the restrictions on contraband trade came export bans to Holland 
and to the Netherlands Indies instituted in Europe and in Allied colonies. 
In some cases domestic want was the reason. In late 1914 and early 1915 
Australia and British India banned the export of wheat for this reason. As a 
consequence the price of bread rose all over the Archipelago in March 1915. 
Complaints were once again heard in Batavia about loaves of bread becoming 
‘smaller, drabber and more expensive by the day’. The same lament was heard 
in Medan. Loaves of bread there had become smaller and of poorer quality. 
Bengalis on the East Coast of Sumatra, who used to eat bread baked with 
Indian flour and could not afford European bread, had been forced to eat rice 
and dried fish. In Surabaya, army purchases of flour in August were blamed 
for the bad quality and high price of bread.43 
In other instances the ban was motivated by the fear that the goods might 
end with the enemy. An early example was rice. The French colonial authori-
ties in Saigon decided to ban the export of rice to the Netherlands Indies at 
the end of January 1915. Exports to other countries were unimpeded. The 
announcement, an indication that France and Great Britain had stepped up 
40 Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, cited in De Locomotief, 13-9-1916.
41 De Locomotief, 17-10-1916.
42 De Locomotief, 26-1-1916.
43 De Locomotief, 27-8-1914, 19-3-1915, 20-3-1915, 24-3-1915.
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their efforts to bring economic ruin upon Germany, came at an inopportune 
moment, but in the Netherlands Indies this seems to have been the rule rather 
than the exception. The 1915 rice harvest was expected to be late. Rice stocks 
were low. Idenburg and his staff were alerted to the ban by telegrams from rice 
traders. They were perplexed. Batavia had no inkling about the reason why 
Saigon had prohibited the export of rice, nor had the general public. One thing 
was sure: there had been no failure of the harvest in Indochina.
Suspecting that re-export to Germany might be the reason H.J. Lovink, 
head of the Department of Agriculture, Industry, and Trade, suggested to the 
rice traders that they should tell the authorities in Saigon that Batavia would 
guarantee that the rice imported would be used for local consumption only. 
Lovink’s suggestion was no full-proof solution. It was difficult to comply with 
the Allied demand. In the Netherlands Indies there was no institution com-
parable to the NOT which could keep a check on what happened to the rice 
imported. Others pointed out that fear about re-export could not be the rea-
son. In Holland an export ban on rice was in force; in the Netherlands Indies 
a conditional one. They pleaded for an export ban on maize, beans and peas, 
and cassava. The destination of these secondary crops was not always clear, 
and they could only be exported in times of plenty when they did not have to 
serve as a substitute for rice.
Lovink had guessed right. A few days later the French Consul, Fliche, 
explained that Great Britain and France were concerned that rice grown in 
their Asian colonies would end up in Germany via the Netherlands Indies. 
Exports could be resumed when Dutch rice merchants in Indochina could 
produce a certificate issued by the French consulate in Batavia that the rice 
they wanted to buy would not be re-exported from the Netherlands Indies. 
Fliche added that his staff would only issue a certificate if they were presented 
with a guarantee by the colonial administration that the rice bought would be 
consumed in the Netherlands Indies. For a moment it appeared that the ban 
would be lifted before the end of January, but in the middle of February nine 
Dutch merchantmen still lay idle in the port of Saigon, because the export 
of rice still had not been resumed. Rice-traders asked Batavia to institute an 
export ban on Saigon rice.
The solution eventually found was that the colonial government promised 
dispensation on the ban in the export of rice from the Netherlands Indies 
would only to be granted for domestic rice, which could easily be distin-
guished from rice from Indochina by its grain. This decision seemed to do 
the trick. In March 1915 Paris indicated that it had given Saigon permission to 
dispense with the consular certificates. Nothing came of this. The screws were 
really turned as the British colonial authorities started to demand a certificate 
for the export of Rangoon rice. The French authorities in Indochina tightened 
the rules on 1 October 1915. They would only allow the export of rice for 
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which a consular certificate had already been wired by the French consulate 
in Batavia to Saigon. This was tantamount to a complete ban.
The news again came as a shock. Idenburg at once wired Pleyte to ‘obtain 
soonest abrogation exceptional measure’.44 The trepidations of August 1914 
had reappeared. Before the war, between 2 and 3,000 tons of rice had been 
imported annually for Java alone. Emergency purchases of rice were made 
in Thailand. Again the local Dutch civil servants were given the authority to 
fix a maximum rice price. Fearing food shortages, Batavia granted almost no 
dispensation on its own ban to export rice.
The crisis lasted until April 1916 when Saigon agreed to allow exports of 
rice to the Netherlands Indies up to a volume equal to that of 1913. A special 
form had to be filled in by custom officers in the Netherlands Indies and sent 
to the French consulate acknowledging the import of rice from Indochina. 
Imports from Burma could be resumed in July, be it also in restricted quanti-
ties. The government of British India showed itself lenient. First, when the 
estates the East Coast of Sumatra complained that the restrictions would 
endanger their food supply, the region was allowed an extra quotum. Later, in 
October 1916 any restriction on quantities was lifted. There remained one con-
dition. London was adamant that it considered the stock of rice in Holland suf-
ficient and that it would put a stop to the export of Burma rice the minute Java 
rice was shipped from the colony to the motherland.45 The NOT had already 
refused any imports of rice from the Netherlands Indies in June. In 1915 over 
33 million kilograms of rice had still been exported to Holland, but in 1916 
the volume fell to about 10 million kilograms, and in 1917 to just 4 million 
kilograms.46 Saigon stuck to its policy of limiting exports to the Netherlands 
Indies to its pre-war level.
Another target of British bans was the coaling station in Sabang. Coal was 
scarce in the Netherlands Indies. An export ban had been issued in 1915. 
In October 1915 the colonial administration in British India indicated that 
it would only allow the export of Bengal coal to the Netherlands Indies on 
condition that ‘no coals of any kind or origin is furnished [...] to any vessel or 
firm the name of which is specially notified’.47 Though the Sabang Company 
complied with this condition, the export of coal from Bengal to Sabang was 
terminated in January 1916. In an attempt to have the ban lifted, the Sabang 
Company contacted the British consulate in Batavia. The Consul General sug-
gested that the coaling station should make it clear that it was ‘a pure Dutch 
44 Pleyte to Loudon, 6-10-1915, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 6-10-1915 60.
45 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1917-18:1902-3. 
46 Rijst 1919:666; Volksraad 1918:37.
47 Extract from the letter from the Adviser to the Head Administrator, 18-1-1916, NA, Kol. 
Openbaar, Vb. 14-3-1917 8.
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firm, which had no Germans in its employ’. It should likewise promise that 
it would not supply coal to German ships.48 The hint was taken. The Sabang 
Company promised that it would not furnish coal to ships the British govern-
ment did not want it to serve on 24 January. Five days later the ban on Bengal 
coals was lifted.
In Holland the Directors of the Sabang Company had no idea what had 
transpired in Batavia. They were sure that protests at the British legation in 
The Hague, at the India Office in London, and at the British Foreign Office had 
persuaded the British government to lift the ban. They thought that London 
had been sensitive to the argument that British ships bound for Vladivostok 
to deliver weapons and ammunition to the Russian army might be among the 
first ships which could not bunker at Sabang because of a shortage of coal.49 In 
actual fact the January promise in Batavia, made by their agent in Netherlands 
Indies, had caused the British to waver. It was followed by a second pledge 
48 Extract from the letter from the Adviser to the Head Administrator, 18-1-1916, NA, Kol. 
Openbaar, Vb. 14-3-1917 8.
49 Uittreksel notulen van de vergaderingen van commissarissen der Naamloze Vennootschap 
‘Zeehaven en Kolenstation Sabang’, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 1-2-1917 V2.
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in March. The representative of the coaling station in Batavia vowed to the 
British Consul General that his company would ‘decline to fulfil orders to 
bunker any vessel of whatever nationality if so requested by His Majesty’s 
Consul General at Batavia’.50 
The supply of coal for and the bunkering of ships of the Netherlands and 
other neutral countries had been secured. The price was that loading coal by 
German, Austrian, or Turkish ships and on those owned by companies which 
the Allies considered to support the enemy had become impossible. They were 
not only denied Bengal coal, coal mined in the Netherlands Indies were also 
now out of bounds to them.
Pleyte and Van Limburg Stirum were upset in June when they learned 
about the pledge the Sabang coaling station had made. They feared serious 
repercussions if German warships were to call at Sabang.51 The chance that 
this would happen was small, but could not be overlooked completely. The 
last German ship which had entered territorial waters was the Marie. She had 
supplied the German Army in East Africa commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel 
Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck, which was fighting a guerrilla war against South 
African, Belgian, and Portuguese troops. Chased by British warships and 
heavily damaged with parts of the deck shot away and the funnel and masts 
riddled with bullet holes, the Marie entered the port of Tanjung Priok in the 
night of 14 May 1916. The possibility that German raiders out to capture and 
sink Allied warships operated in the vicinity of or even in colonial territorial 
waters could not be excluded, even after the sinking of the Emden. In March 
1917 British warships suddenly increased their patrols of the entrances to the 
Straits of Malacca and all lights which could be used by ships to navigate the 
Straits were extinguished. The Wolf, the former Hansa Line Wachtenfels, which 
had left Kiel in November 1916 had reached the Archipelago. The captain 
carried orders to disrupt British sea traffic by laying mines off Singapore and 
other British ports and to do his best to hamper Allied commerce by raid-
ing and capturing or sinking Allied merchantmen. On board was a seaplane 
which flew over Sydney. A few months later, after the United States had 
joined the war, and in anticipation of this German ships had tried to leave 
the Philippines, the Rotterdamsche Lloyd received information from Osaka 
about another German raider operating in the Archipelago. It proved to be 
false alarm.52
Van Limburg Stirum concluded that the vows had placed the Sabang coal-
50 Uittreksel notulen van de vergaderingen van commissarissen der Naamloze Vennootschap 
‘Zeehaven en Kolenstation Sabang’, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 1-2-1917 V2.
51 Pleyte to Regeringscommissaris b/d NV Zeehaven en Kolenstation Sabang, 1-2-1917, NA, 
Kol. Geheim, Vb. 1-2-1917 V2.
52 Halpern 1994:372-3; De Locomotief, 8-3-1917; Neratja, 22-4-1918, 23-4-1918.
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ing station ‘under the dictatorship’ of the British Consul General. The demands 
of that gentleman had been excessive.53 Van Limburg Stirum expressed his 
‘enormous surprise’ about the fact that the company ‘had apparently only 
been considering its own interests and had given no thought to national hon-
our or its duties as a neutral’.54 Pleyte agreed. The Directors of the Sabang 
Company were unimpressed. They were convinced that their agent had had 
no other choice than to yield to British demands. They complimented them-
selves that pledges had made the bunkering of Dutch vessels with Bengal coal 
possible without interference from any British authority.55
Demanding export bans in the Netherlands Indies as a means of prevent-
ing transit trade became a standard procedure of Great Britain and France. 
Italy joined the van. Batavia had been forced to ban the export of car tyres in 
May 1915 to assure a supply of imports from Italy. A year later, in July 1916, 
Batavia even issued an export ban on ‘instruments for chemical and other 
applied science research of not native origin’.56 In the end, in March 1917, the 
colonial authorities forbade all exports of products which had been imported 
from abroad or goods made from such products. The maximum sentence 
imposed was a three-months’ imprisonment or hard labour, or a fine of one 
hundred guilders. The measure was not well-understood. No explanation had 
been given why. The editor of De Locomotief supposed that the government 
wanted to prevent that in times of international scarcity the commodities were 
re-exported to fetch a higher price abroad. Whatever the reason, he consid-
ered the ban typical of a ‘haughty and silent authority’.57 Exports bans were 
no longer issued. The opposite happened. The exceptions were announced, 
goods which were still allowed to be exported.
Great Britain and France also tightened their control on imports from the 
Netherlands Indies. Early in March 1915, the Dutch commercial community 
in the Netherlands Indies had been shocked by the news that France would 
only allow imports from the Netherlands Indies if a certificate of origin was 
submitted which made it clear that the goods in question did not originate 
from the Central Powers. Another document, a certificate of nationality, to be 
issued by the French consulate in Batavia had to confirm that the companies 
which exported and transported the goods were not owned by Germans or 
Austrians. Nor should Germans or Austrians have majority shares in such 
53 Viethoff to Zeehaven en Kolenstation Sabang, 29-12-1916, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 14-3-1917 
8.
54 Van Limburg Stirum to Pleyte, 26-2-1917, Viethoff to Zeehaven en Kolenstation Sabang, 29-
12-1916, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 14-3-1917 8, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 29-5-1917 K14.
55 Viethoff to Pleyte, 22-1-197, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 1-2-1917 V2. 
56 De Locomotief, 21-7-1916.
57 De Locomotief, 15-3-1917.
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companies. The British ‘Rules of Trading with the Enemy’ also required a 
certificate of origin.
Great Britain and France announced even stricter rules about trading with 
enemy companies in neutral countries in February 1916. Firms in neutral 
countries were warned that they had to sever all ties with enemy companies. 
The following month it became known that the British War Trade Department 
had compiled a statutory list, a blacklist containing the names of firms which 
had not complied. The French and Italians took over the British blacklist. 
Nevertheless, almost all attention and also all the anger in the Netherlands 
Indies centred on that compiled by the British. For the Allied warships in 
Europe and in the Archipelago the black list implied a new task. They were 
no longer only on the look out for enemy agents and contraband, but also for 
cargo originating from or shipped to black-listed firms.
Overnight reports appeared in the press in the Netherlands Indies about 
Dutch companies which had fired German employees because, had he not 
done so, British firms would no longer do business with them. Newspapers 
in Holland and in the Netherlands Indies published the first ‘black list’ at the 
end of March 1916. At the same time the British Consul General left no stone 
unturned to ensure that commercial firms and banks were well acquainted 
with the purport of the Allied economic directives. Beckett himself preferred 
to speak about providing ‘exhaustive explanations’. He provided these ‘with 
pleasure’.58 Beckett promised that local sensitivities would be spared and that 
‘bona fide’ Dutch trade would not be hurt. His words did not make the British 
interference less vexatious. In 1917 the Javasche Bank concluded that the 
black list, on which the companies which had incurred the wrath of France 
and Great Britain were noted had ‘only aroused bitterness, because it was 
generally felt that one was being treated unfairly’.59 Being black-listed meant 
a boycott by Allied firms, who when they traded with black-listed companies 
were liable to be fined, and by Dutch companies which feared that otherwise 
they themselves would suffer the same fate. Dutch shipping companies in 
the Netherlands Indies refused to transport merchandise, suppliers stopped 
delivery of goods, and customers stayed away. If a company did not want to 
run the risk of losing its commercial raison d’être, it had to sever all contacts 
with a black-listed firm. Cable and mail correspondence should also be termi-
nated. At least one Dutch commercial firm, aware that correspondence with 
German firms was not allowed, even inquired in London whether it was still 
permitted to address one last letter to a black-listed company. It wanted to ask 
its former business partner to stop sending letters or telegrams. Were this not 
58 De Locomotief, 15-3-1916.
59 De Indische Gids 1917, II:1430.
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permitted, there was no guarantee that the company no longer received mail 
from the black-listed firm.60
It cannot have come as a surprise that Behn, Meyer and Co. and the Straits 
und Sunda Syndikat were among the first black-listed companies published in 
the Netherlands Indies. Among the ten firms in Batavia which were mentioned 
were also the Société Coloniale Indo-Belge, and three Chinese companies. In 
Medan and Palembang altogether seven firms were blacklisted, in Makassar 
three. In Semarang one company was on the first list. It was the well-known 
firm of Carl Schlieper, active in the Netherlands Indies since 1870, and one of 
the major importers to the colony of machine parts.
The black list was not restricted to fully German- or Austrian-owned com-
panies or companies doing business with them. The same fate befell firms in 
which Germans or Austrians made up one-third of the Board of Directors, or 
held one-third of the share capital issued. One of the consequences was that 
for trade with Great Britain and France a ‘certificate of interest’ to be issued by 
the Allied consuls was required as from September 1916. To obtain the certifi-
cate, a company had to submit a list of its commissioners, directors, managers, 
and senior staff, complete with copies of their birth certificates to prove their 
nationality. 
To contain the damage, Behn, Meyer and Co. and the Straits und Sunda 
Syndikat established their own insurance company, the Javasche Lloyd. They 
did so in conjunction with ‘Chinese friends’. Dutch firms were no longer 
prepared to insure their goods and property (Helfferich 1967:152). The two 
companies also founded an estate product bank.
Companies could be removed from the black list, but the opposite hap-
pened much more frequently. In the course of time, other companies were 
added. Even the newspapers the Java-Bode and the Bataviaasch Handelsblad 
were black-listed. They no longer received Reuter’s telegrams. When mail 
was searched in British ports copies of the Bataviaasch Handelsblad, and prob-
ably also of the Java-Bode, were confiscated. The mail boats were not allowed 
to take them along to Holland. It was reported from The Hague as early as 
August 1916 that neither the Minister of the Colonies nor any private person 
received the Bataviaasch Handelsblad any longer.61 The Ruygrok Company, the 
printer of the Bataviaasch Handelsblad, was also put on the black list. Among the 
other victims of the trade boycott was Erdman and Sielcken, a major exporter 
of Java sugar and active in the Netherlands Indies over fifty years since 1865. 
Like other firms in the Netherlands Indies, it had a German name. Its senior 
60 There was also a Private List B, a so-called grey list. Trading with companies on this list was 
forbidden, but correspondence was still allowed. The British mail boats would not accept such 
correspondence, but the British censor let the letters pass, in theory at least. 
61 De Locomotief, 7-8-1916, 10-10-1916.
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partner, F.A. Warnecke, was a naturalized Dutchman. Of the three junior part-
ners, who were all long-time Resident of Java, two were Germans. The third 
had been deprived of his German nationality. Efforts by the Dutch Envoy in 
London to annul the listing failed. An additional problem, and the reason 
for The Hague to take action, was that Erdman and Sielcken acted as the 
manager of four Dutch-owned mines. Because of the black-listing of Erdman 
and Sielcken, these mines, with no Germans but only Dutchmen, Britons, and 
Swedes among their employees, ran into serious problems. They could no 
longer obtain spare parts for their machinery. Closure threatened, with all the 
consequences this would have for their employees and the local population. 
London was unrelenting. The only solution it was prepared to suggest to the 
Dutch government was that the mines had to find another company to take 
over their management.62
The black list struck terror in the Dutch commercial community in the 
Netherlands Indies. In some instances ‘the mere denunciations of spies’ 
seemed to suffice to be black-listed (Carpentier Alting and De Cock Buning 
1928:69). Commercial firms and estates dismissed their German staff. This was 
repeated at headquarters in Holland. This was not done without some qualms, 
because of uncertainty about how Germany and the German community 
would react. British firms and estates which had not yet fired their German 
employees now did so. They seem to have done so with some reluctance. In 
the notices to British employees, the companies expressed their regret and 
wrote that the reason for the dismissal had nothing to do with performance 
(Helfferich 1948:213). In reaction German-owned firms and estate replaced 
Dutch, British, and French staff with Germans. Not everywhere did peace 
reign. The black-list induced an employee of the French consulate in Surabaya 
to ask the French barbers in town – there were many French barbers in the 
Netherlands Indies – no longer to serve Germans. He, and the Dutch press did 
not fail to notice that he was of German descent, could not stand being with 
‘those awful boches’ in one hairdresser’s salon. Confused the barbers turned to 
the French Consulate General in Batavia, wondering whether they would be 
included on the black-list if they had Germans among their customers.63 The 
only sector which seemingly was not affected was the entertainment industry. 
German male and female light opera singers remained as popular as ever.
Dutch shipping companies refused cargo from black-listed companies. In 
Surabaya the Droogdok Maatschappij, the company that managed the only 
large dry-dock in the Archipelago, refused its services to German vessels 
which were stranded in the Netherlands Indies. As in the case of the Sabang 
62 Loudon to Pleyte 15-9-1916, Directors of the mining companies Redjang Lebong, Ketahoen, 
Simaoe, and Gloemboek to Pleyte, 17-4-1916, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 18-9-1916 K29.
63 Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad, cited in De Locomotief, 16-6-1916.
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coaling-station, the colonial authorities viewed the decision with apprehen-
sion. The decision of the dry-dock company not only gave an indication that 
it was the British who in the final resort determined the running of colonial 
trade and industry, but, as had been feared with respect to Sabang coal, the 
refusal to dock German ships might well be interpreted as a breach of neutral-
ity. Batavia was powerless. The dry-dock company had just recovered from a 
difficult time. Forcing it to accept German ships might result in a boycott and 
a halt to the supply of spare parts and equipment.64 
The black list was grist to the mill of a few rabid Germanophobes. It 
inspired Boon of the Soerabaiasch Handelsblad to suggest that no facility should 
any longer be lent to the German business community in the Netherlands 
Indies. Boon wrote that Germans did not deserve any help. In Belgium the 
‘business scoundrel’, the German, has shown himself to be unworthy of any 
help. In deciding how to act with the prospect of British retaliation and the 
looming loss of the colony, this had to be given priority. To continue to deal 
with the German business community was dangerous.65
Boon formed an exception. Usually the reaction was one of anger, directed 
especially towards the British and less so towards the French, or, failing that, 
of helpless acquiescence. The Dutch government and the Dutch business com-
munity had to stand idly by. Washington, among other things enraged over 
the fact that in the Philippines firms with a German management but with no 
German capital had been blacklisted could threaten with a ban on loans to the 
Allied countries, but Batavia lacked any leverage to make London change its 
mind.66 The only thing the colonial government could do was to continue to 
support black-listed firms whenever possible. After the war Emil Helfferich 
praised the Javasche Bank which had not changed its credit policy for German 
estate companies, even assisting them when possible (Helfferich 1948:302, 
1967:151-2). In an initial reaction De Locomotief wrote that though trade might 
be seriously hurt by the British policy and Dutch feelings were offended, the 
only reaction could be ‘proud resignation’.67 The newspaper saw the calls in 
the British press for ever stricter control of neutral trade as merely proof that 
British newspapers had turned into ‘zealots of commercial jingoism’.68
Everybody was fully aware that the British and French consuls, especially 
the British Consul General, had the final say and that it was on their infor-
mation that London and Paris based their decisions. In Helfferich’s words, 
the British Consul General attained the function of a controller of trade and 
64 Advice General Adviser harbour-works, 7-1-1918, NA, Kol. Geheim, Mr. 1918/42x.
65 Soerabaiasch Handelsblad, cited in De Indische Gids 1917, II:1115.
66 Ferguson 2001:303; De Locomotief, 28-9-1916.
67 De Locomotief, cited in De Indische Gids 1916, II:998.
68 De Locomotief, 29-3-1916.
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export dictator (Helfferich 1921:16). In spite of the feelings of impotence, 
the British effort to hurt German commercial interests in the Netherlands 
Indies did result in a protest. In February 1916 a former banker, Jan Dinger, 
member of the Chamber of Commerce of Batavia and owner of a number of 
sugar estates, placed an appeal in the Batavian newspapers asking people to 
attend a ‘peaceful meeting’ in Batavia to demonstrate against ‘the action of 
foreigners who enjoy the right of being a guest here, of which the purpose is 
preventing our German co-residents to exercise honest and peaceful profes-
sions’.69 Dinger’s initiative was wholeheartedly supported by the pro-German 
Bataviaasch Handelsblad. Its editor, Th. Thomas, used the occasion to lash out 
at the British. The Bataviaasch Handelsblad observed that the consuls increas-
ingly acted as an independent power, as an imperium in imperio. The ‘British 
Consul acts in a way which offends and hurts every patriotic Dutchman’. The 
Bataviaasch Handelsblad urged the government to do something and to protect 
the rights of everybody who lived in the Netherlands Indies. The burning 
question was, where would it end? Tokyo might demand a Dutch firm fire its 
Chinese employees. The Bataviaasch Handelsblad concluded that a little more 
refered to the Dutch government was called for. Great Britain had the right 
to forbid British companies to trade with the enemy, but should not try to 
enforce its will in the Netherlands Indies. Oetoesan Hindia fully concurred.70 
The Bataviaasch Handelsblad suggested prohibiting the export of sugar to Great 
Britain and have British ships which had come to the Netherlands Indies to 
transport sugar leave with empty holds a few weeks later. For some this went 
too far. De Locomotief pointed out that this would cost money, and, being more 
dangerous, might be considered a hostile act by London.71 
In an effort to forestall complications the authorities forbade nationals 
of the belligerents to attend the meeting, which took place on 27 February. 
Sarcastically an inhabitant of Batavia noted in De Locomotief that also Bulgarians, 
Montenegrins, Serbs, and Albanians, were also consequently barred from 
access.72 About one hundred and fifty people, or ‘independent men’ as Dinger 
called them, attended. Dinger told them that the British black-list meant an 
infringement of national dignity. The Dutch should remain master in their 
own house. A letter was sent to Beckett asking him to treat ‘our German co-
residents’ with more clemency, and to take into account the rights of the Dutch 
in their own country.73 Beckett was unrelenting. Though he said that he had 
‘the utmost regard for the feelings and susceptibilities of our good friends the 
69 De Locomotief, 24-2-1915; Bataviaasch Handelsblad, cited in De Indische Gids 1916, I:786.
70 Bataviaasch Handelsblad, cited in De Indische Gids 1916, I:790; Oetoesan Hindia 1-3-1916.
71 De Locomotief, 25-5-1916.
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Dutch’, he explained that it was his duty to provide his government with infor-
mation about people and firms ‘to whom, owing to their enemy nationality, or 
their close connection with enemy interests it is advisable that British subjects 
should not afford any assistance or support by engaging in commercial or 
other transactions with them’.74 Enthusiasm to take a common stand against 
the British measure soon evaporated. A second meeting organized by Dinger 
on 2 April attracted only forty people. It ended in discord, partly because of 
the support the Bataviaasch Handelsblad had given Dinger’s effort.
As had already become evident from the conditions imposed on the 
Sabang coaling station, British consular agents did not stop at reporting to 
London which firms had to be black-listed. They began to interfere directly 
in the business affairs of Dutch companies. In May 1917 the Director of 
the Dutch company H.N. Smalhout and Co. was summoned to the British 
Consulate General in Batavia to give a clarification of the trading activities of 
his firm. Smalhout was sure that the Consul had been alerted by ‘a competi-
tor with very little morality and filthy principles’. Smalhout was subjected to 
what he called ‘a complete interrogation, such as that only a examining judge 
can subject an accused to’. He had not dared to ignore the summons. Had he 
done so his company would have been entered on the black-list and would 
‘no longer receive letters or telegrams, while not a single shipping company 
and above all the Dutch companies accepted goods from black-listed firms’.75 At 
the consulate Smalhout was questioned about thirteen crates of equipment for 
the printing industry, most of German make, which he had taken along as his 
personal luggage and not as freight the previous year. Smalhout was able to 
explain that he possessed a NOT certificate. Not much later, the British deputy 
Consul in Medan alerted the local Planters Committee that its representative 
in Swatow was suspected of ‘consorting with the enemy’ and that this could 
have ‘unpleasant consequences’. To the annoyance of the authorities, the com-
mittee reacted instantly. It concluded that the heart of the problem was the fact 
that Dutch consular agents had been assigned to represent German interests 
in China; which was also a source of strained relationships between China 
and the Netherlands. The Medan Planters Committee asked the Dutch Consul 
General in Hong Kong to allow its representative to resign as Acting Dutch 
Consul in Swatow.76 
74 De Locomotief, 15-3-1916.
75 Smalhout to Attorney-General, 11-5-1917, 6-6-1917, Smalhout to Beckett, 11-5-1917, NA, Kol. 
Geheim, Mr. 1917/111x.
76 1st Government Secretary to Planters-Comité, Planters-Comité to 1st Government Secretary, 
11-9-1917, NA, Kol. Geheim, Mr. 1917/229x; Idenburg to Van Limburg Stirum, 9-12-1918, NA, Kol. 
Geheim, Vb. 9-12-1918 O10.
chapter xiv
Adjusting to economic warfare 
In the first days of the war it had been predicted that Dutch shipping would 
benefit from the disappearance from the seas of German and Austrian freight-
ers. That such ships no longer ventured out was seen as a good opportunity 
for Dutch shipping to expand its business. A neutral flag could also be an 
advantage in other respects. To the indignation of the British press, in Europe 
and in Asia at least one shipping company, a firm in Rotterdam, tried to 
exploit the situation by sending a circular to British trading firms on both con-
tinents in which the message was driven home that because the Netherlands 
was a neutral country, it could still trade with Germany. As an additional 
bonus the circular mentioned that mail carried by Dutch ships was free from 
Allied censorship.
Advertising was not necessary. During the war freight prices rose steeply. 
A combination of factors was at work: the shortage of tonnage caused by 
the disappearance of the German and Austrian mercantile fleets; the dam-
age inflicted to the Allied merchant fleet by German U-boats and mines; the 
requisitioning of part of the Allied merchant fleet for war purposes; and, 
temporarily, the withdrawal of ships from cargo traffic to repatriate pilgrims. 
Shipping lines eager to exploit a world-wide shortage of tonnage were not 
the only reason for rising freight prices. The rising price of coal contributed 
to the inflation, as did higher premiums for insurance against the risk of war. 
Extra costs were likewise incurred by longer sailing times if alternative routes 
had to be sought or if speed was reduced to economize on coal. Yet another 
cost-increasing factor was the shortage of labourers in Allied ports because of 
the war. Neutral freighters often had to wait in French and British ports until 
Allied warships and merchantmen had been taken care of, with all the delays 
and the running up of harbour dues this entailed.
Nevertheless, the Rotterdamsche Lloyd and Nederland, made good use of 
the shortage of tonnage, which turned cargo trade into a very profitable busi-
ness. Between August 94 and January 95, freight prices for colonial wares 
 De Locomotief, 3--94.
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increased by fifty per cent. In that same month Lovink, the Director of the 
Department of Agriculture, Industry, and Trade, noted that ‘some of the trad-
ers do business with hope in their hearts and consider the trade as a lottery 
fraught with plenty of bad luck – another group just throws in the towel and 
dares not undertake anything’.2 Worse was to come. By August 96, freight 
prices were four times as high as at the outbreak of the war. The Nederland 
and Rotterdamsche Lloyd also upset traders by departing from the custom 
of concluding shipping contracts with exporters of colonial wares with the 
freight price being fixed for five months. They reduced this period to two 
months. The change was a serious setback for exporters. They used to buy up 
and trade products at the beginning of the harvest, which started in June and 
ended in October for sugar, shipping the commodities off in portions in the 
subsequent months.
Throughout the whole of the war people in the Netherlands Indies and 
in Holland attacked what they were convinced was selfish policy pursued 
by the Rotterdamsche Lloyd and Nederland. As the two shipping companies 
(and the Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij (KPM, Royal Packet Company)) 
worked in close concert under the aegis of their major shareholder, the 
Nederlandsche Scheepvaart Unie (Netherlands Shipping Union), they were 
accused by their critics, whose numbers swelled as the freight prices soared, of 
acting as a trust. There were even accusations after the war that their ‘freight 
usury’ had caused more damage than many of the measures imposed by the 
belligerents.3 The Nederland and Rotterdamsche Lloyd denied such charges. 
They defended their price policy by pointing out their critics were unaware of 
the great difficulties encountered in maintaining sea traffic between Holland 
and the Netherlands Indies. They also maintained that, compared to non-
Dutch shipping companies their prices were still moderate.4
Criticism by the colonial trading sector was especially harsh. It was claimed 
that the shareholders of the Nederland and Rotterdamsche Lloyd were mak-
ing war profits hand over first at the expense of exporters and producers of 
colonial wares. The main sin for which the companies were attacked was cal-
culating excessive freight prices. Another accusation levied at them was that 
they selected sailing routes which produced the highest profits and that by 
doing so disregarded the interests of colonial trade. The Nederland and the 
Rotterdamsche Lloyd fuelled indignation still further by cancelling contracts 
and raising tariffs unilaterally any time when the circumstances of war forced 
them to change the route of their ships or cancel shipping entirely. It also hap-
2 Lovink to Idenburg, 3--95, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 5-3-95 72.
3 Bataviaasch Handelsblad, 3--97 cited in Koloniale Studiën 97:242; Helfferich 98:480.
4 Report Chamber of Commerce Rotterdam over 95, cited in Koloniale Studiën 97-8:57-
8.
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pened that when for reasons of safety it was decided not to call at Marseille, 
contracts for goods to be shipped to Marseille were annulled, disregarding 
the fact that the exporters concerned had their own contractual obligations 
they had to meet.5 These were isolated incidents but as they cost the exporters 
money, not easily forgotten. No one bothered to point out that British lines in 
Singapore behaved in exactly the same way. 
When shipping opportunities grew increasingly scarce, some critics of the 
Nederland and Rotterdamsche Lloyd even argued that the Dutch govern-
ment should not leave the vital sea links between the Netherlands Indies and 
its overseas markets in the hands of private companies which did not have 
the interests of the colony at heart. Two arguments were especially favoured 
to demonstrate how ‘anti-colonial’ the two companies were. One was that 
they had their head-offices in Holland. The other was that before the war, the 
Nederland and Rotterdamsche Lloyd had worked in close tandem with British 
and German shipping companies in the Batavia Vrachten-Conferentie (Batavia 
Cargo Conference), to regulate cargo and passenger transport between the 
Netherlands Indies and Europe.6
The commercial community in the Netherlands Indies reacted so excessive-
ly because colonial trading houses felt trapped. Their managements believed 
that they had no other choice but to use the services of the Nederland and 
the Rotterdamsche Lloyd; even when an alternative presented itself, which in 
fact was few and far between. The bone of contention was the deferred rabat 
system which had been instituted by the Batavia Cargo Conference in 900. 
Export firms which shipped their cargo exclusively with the Rotterdamsche 
Lloyd and the Nederland were entitled to a discount of ten per cent on the 
freight costs they had paid in a six-months period. The money, which could 
amount to a considerable sum, would be restituted afterwards, but only on 
the condition that during the following six months an exporter would con-
tinue to ship his ware on vessels of the two companies. Opponents took every 
opportunity to drive home that a rabat system had been forbidden by British 
authorities in Singapore and South Africa.
Exporters staged meetings to end what they called the monopoly of the 
shipping companies created by the rabat system as early as March 95. They 
asked the Ministry of the Colonies in The Hague to mediate. Its civil servants 
were well aware that there was not much they could do. They lacked the 
expertise to pass judgement on the arguments advanced by the companies to 
justify their actions. They had to limit themselves to presenting a ‘warm rec-
ommendation’ the companies would take the interests of colonial exporters to 
5 De Locomotief, 6-3-97.
6 Schepenvorderingswet 97:86-7.
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heart.7 Probably Pleyte and his staff would have liked to do more. They were 
not pleased with the policy of the Rotterdamsche Lloyd and the Nederland. 
Pleyte even hinted that if their directors did not take the interests of colonial 
trade into account and continued to force prices up, a time could well arrive 
thoughts would turn to foreign competitors.8 Pleyte’s criticism was shared by 
the Javasche Bank. In its report for 96-97, the bank warned that ultimately 
the selfish attitude of the shipping companies could force exporters to turn to 
rival companies, which in the long run might have disastrous consequences 
for the Dutch lines concerned. The following year, the bank complained about 
the ‘phalanx of the shipping companies’, for which exporters were no match.9 
Resentment swelled to such proportions others speculated that traders would 
turn to Japanese lines after the war had ended because they had become 
so enraged by the war-time policy of the Dutch shipping companies (Van 
Heekeren 99b:40).
In the Netherlands Indies, the commercial community led by the Batavian 
Director of the Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij staged a large protest 
meeting in the middle of 97. Among the persons present were H. de Kruyff, 
the then Head of the Department of Trade and Industry and one of the most 
important civil servants in the colony, and a representative of the Javasche 
Bank. Frustrations spilled out freely. One of those present stated that trade was 
at ‘the mercy’ of the KPM, the company the Nederland and the Rotterdamsche 
Lloyd had jointly established in 89, and of Burns Philp, a Sydney-based 
company and the agent of the Imperial Japanese and United States Mail 
Line.0 A statement read out on behalf of the shipping companies was jeered. 
There were boos when it was argued that the great demand for cargo place 
showed that freight prices were not too high, and that even with existing tar-
iffs there still was a market abroad for colonial products. The promise of the 
Nederland and Rotterdamsche Lloyd that they would foster the interests of 
colonial exports aroused only disbelief.
A new Dutch government had to be sworn in before at last measures were 
taken and the colonial administration enlisted a shipping expert to investigate 
the freight prices demanded by the shipping companies at the end of 98. By 
then war was already over.
The estates in Sumatra began to recruit labour in Java again in early 95. This 
is a pretty good indication that in the first two years of the war export firms 
and producers of colonial wares suffered less than the wave of criticism of 
7 De Locomotief, 2-3-95; Note Department A3, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 5-3-95 72. 
8 Koloniaal verslag 97:xix-xx.
9 De Indische Gids 97, II:428; Koloniale Studiën 98:477.
0 De Indische Gids 97, II:89.
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the Rotterdamsche Lloyd and the Nederland had suggested. Prices of most 
export products of the Netherlands Indies remained high. Many benefited 
from this: the estates, indigenous producers, Chinese and Arab middlemen, 
and the export houses. In 92 the value of the export of the private sector had 
been 533 million guilders, in 95 the figure had risen to 758 million guilders. 
The increase coupled with decreasing imports also worked favourably for the 
colony’s balance of trade.
The export of a number of colonial products exceeded that of previous 
years.2 The most important of these were sugar and tobacco.3 Referring 
to economic performance in 95 it was stated that also industry had not 
performed as badly as had been predicted in the closing months of 94. A 
notable exception had to be made for the batik industry. This cottage indus-
try threatened to disappear and was forced to cede to large-scale industry.4 
Except for the first weeks of the war, import firms also experienced a halcyon 
period. At the outbreak of the war their warehouses had been packed. With 
fresh imports diminishing and rising prices they could sell their stock at a 
good profit. Among the firms which profited was Behn, Meyer and Co. Sales 
of stocks of imported goods was one of the factors which contributed to its 
relatively good performance during the war (Helfferich 967:53). 
The war had a number of positive consequences for the colonial economy. 
As an unexpected bonus the obstacles put in the way of unrestricted export to 
Europe meant that economically the Netherlands Indies was less dependent 
on Holland. A number of products were no longer sold on the commodity 
markets in Holland, but at newly established markets in Batavia. Huge sums 
in commissions and insurance were saved, and, for trade with countries in the 
Pacific, freight costs dropped considerably because goods no longer had to be 
shipped to Europe first. Representatives of foreign trading companies, who 
had bought the colonial products in London or Amsterdam in the past, now 
travelled to the Netherlands Indies to buy their commodities. Tea, sugar, rub-
ber, tobacco, and tin were traded in the Netherlands Indies, and no longer, or 
to a much lesser extent, in Holland. 
Boosting to the qualified optimism was the fact that exporters, and to a 
lesser extent importers, had adjusted themselves to the obstacles they encoun-
tered. New export markets were sought and found: first among them in the 
 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 98-9:206.
2 See for detailed production and export figures before, during and after World War One 
Changing economy 975, 99 and 992. See for an analysis of trends in imports and exports in the 
first three decades of the twentieth century Lindblad 994.
3 Koloniaal verslag 97:223-6.
4 Koloniaal verslag 96:233-4; Report Javasche Bank, cited in De Indische Gids 97, II:432; 
Helfferich 97.
Governor General J.P. graaf van Limburg Stirum as trade mark of an export  
company in Amsterdam (Javasche Courant 96 Trade mark 8088)
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United States, and to a lesser extent in Japan, Australia, and South Africa. The 
report of the Ministry of the Colonies for 96 noted, that 
under the constraint of circumstances trade departed from the old, long-sailed 
ways, looked for and found new markets and freed itself from long existing ties. [...] 
A complete restoration [after the war] of the old links, which mostly passed through 
the mother country, has to be considered impossible, as the realization gradually 
dawns that the Netherlands Indies in many instances can do without that link and 
on its own can and should look after its own interests.5 
The reallocation of the export markets stimulated the Javasche Bank and 
commercial firms to establish offices in the United States and Japan. In The 
Hague the Dutch government reacted by strengthening its consular network 
in the two countries in an effort to stimulate trade even further. Conversely, 
American and Japanese companies opened branches in the Netherlands Indies 
to make the most of new opportunities in foreign trade. Some Dutch firms did 
the same in the United States. The Bank of Holland was set up in San Francisco 
in 97. 
The colonial government and the Javasche Bank supported the shifting of 
the markets for colonial wares to the Netherlands Indies. In the Netherlands 
Indies, Van Limburg Stirum considered the United States to be vital to the 
economic future of the colony, and continued to hold the opinion that this 
would also be true after war had ended (Locher-Scholten 98:65). In The 
Hague Pleyte was determined to promote the idea that more and more of the 
wares produced in the Netherlands Indies were traded in the colony itself. He 
considered such a development would be highly conducive to the growth of 
the colonial economy.6 To stimulate this M. Kolthoff, a former agent of the 
Handelsvereeniging Amsterdam was sent on a four-month trade mission to 
Japan in March 96 to promote the trade of government companies and pri-
vate firms with Japan. Before Kolthoff left for Japan, he organized meetings in 
a number of cities on Java to solicit ‘orders’.
One of the main arguments of those pleading for a greater say by the 
colony in economic matters was that centre of colonial trade had shifted from 
Europe to the Pacific. The United States especially formed a new and valu-
able market for the constantly growing list of articles which were submitted 
to NOT control, and export of which to Holland had to be limited or had to 
stop altogether.7 Exports to the United States grew more than tenfold between 
94 and 97, from 6 to 200 million guilders (Carpentier Alting and De Cock 
Buning 928:66). As in the case of trade with Japan, the newly found economic 
5 Koloniaal verslag 97:xix.
6 Koloniaal verslag 97:xix.
7 Koloniaal verslag 97:xviii, 2-2.
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relationship was lasting and continued after the war. The United States proved 
a profitable outlet for rubber, cassava, copra (in the form of coconut oil), and 
tobacco (from Sumatra, not from Java, where the leaves of the plants grown 
were not fine enough for the American taste). For some products which 
had not been shipped to the United States or only in small quantities before 
the war, such as pepper, tin, and kapok, by 96 the United States already 
accounted for more than half of the exports. This removed some of the causes 
of the worries Pleyte had expressed in September 94 in his letter to Loudon. 
The ‘fledgling trade with the United States’, as it was sometimes referred to, 
formed the main reason why, as Pleyte in his report to the Dutch Parliament 
observed, the colonial economy had not been completely dislocated, and all 
things considered had shown a rather favourable performance. The drop in 
the export of cassava to Europe was made good by an expanding American 
market. On the tin market, the United States had replaced Germany as the 
largest buyer. A remarkable success was also scored by rubber. Forced to take 
action by the problems encountered with shipping their produce to Europe, 
rubber planters had opened up a new market in the United States, which pre-
viously had obtained most of its rubber from Great Britain. In 95 the export 
of estate rubber had swelled almost twofold, increasing from 6,396 to ,307 
tons; doubling again in the case of exports from Java in the following year.8
The prices paid for the major export products were excellent. Among the 
products which fetched higher prices in 95 than they had done before the 
war were tobacco, coffee, and tea. The sugar industry was still booming and 
copra fetched good prices; rubber idem. In short, because of its agricultural 
sector the Netherlands Indies managed to survive the first two years of the 
war remarkably well. The prime beneficiaries were the estates. The shadow 
side was that the consequences for indigenous producers were mixed. Some, 
especially producers of copra, profited from higher prices, but others who 
grew other products or products of a lesser quality than those grown on the 
estates suffered.9 An additional factor was that export crops grown by the 
local population had to take the back seat in the competition for scarce cargo 
space. Exporters gave preference to sought-after, more profitable products, 
the so-called fijne lading (choice cargo). Coupled with the rising prices of daily 
necessities, this meant that the Indonesian population outside Java produc-
ing for the export market suffered a steep decline in purchasing power.20 
Nevertheless, the excellent prospects for tobacco, coffee, and tea stimulated 
their cultivation by indigenous farmers.
8 Koloniaal verslag 96:223-4, 97:23-4.
9 For which export products were grown where by indigenous producers outside Java, see 
Touwen 200:67-84. 
20 Koloniaal verslag 96:225-6.
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The change in the flow of exports highlighted the different economic aspi-
rations of the motherland and the colony. Those cherishing the interests of the 
colony stressed greater independence, even from headquarters in Holland. 
Many Dutch Residents in the Netherlands Indies shared this view. Free trade 
had to replace the monopolies and protectionism, which they suspected the 
leading businessmen in Holland of wanting to maintain. Directors had to 
take the place of agents as heads of the colonial branches of the Dutch trading 
houses, shipping lines, and estate companies (Helfferich 98:482). In August 
97 the Java-Bode wrote that it was a questionable matter to keep the manage-
ment in Holland simply for the reason that Holland was the source of capital. 
Changes were in order. Whenever possible, to give the Netherlands Indies real 
economic resilience jobs should be filled by people living in the colony.2
Commercial circles in Holland and those who earned their living from 
commodity markets there and from the transport of the products traded 
to Holland watched the development with concern. The 96 report of the 
Ministry of the Colonies hinted at the opposition encountered. It noted that 
not everyone realized the implication of 
the economic awakening that has taken place, and the need to adjust to the new 
relations, which [...] after the restoration of normal circumstances, demand that due 
consideration be given to the wishes and the interests of trade and industry in the 
Indies.22 
Opponents had to admit that the new markets in the colony were a success, 
but they expressed their doubts about whether the success would last once 
war had ended. They were convinced the old situation had to be restored as 
soon as possible. They feared that a permanent transfer of commodity mar-
kets, or even worse a transfer of markets like that of tobacco to the United 
States, would be a blow to Holland’s prosperity.23 As had been argued in the 
days of Onze Vloot: too many interests in Holland were at stake, those of the 
shipping companies transporting the wares to Holland; the firms engaged in 
loading, unloading and storage: the Dutch railways: Dutch labourers and so 
on. Another loser might be the NHM, which, because of what had happened 
in the colony in August 94, was not held in high esteem by Pleyte and 
other politicians. The NHM stood a good chance of having to forfeit part of 
its trading activities. Its most vulnerable aspect was its function as the agent 
of the colonial government for goods produced by government companies 
and estates, which had been sold on commodity markets in Europe in the 
past. In November 97 members of the Dutch senate decided that the time 
2 Java-Bode, cited in Koloniale Studiën 97:555.
22 Koloniaal verslag 97:xix.
23 Economisch-Statistische Berichten, -5-98, p. 368.
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had come for the government to sever its ties with the NHM. They preferred 
open competition and championed the establishment of a special body in the 
Netherlands Indies to look after the economic interests of the colony.24
The focus of discussion was the future location of the tin market. Most tin 
was now exported to the United States and in 97 Batavia suggested that the 
market should not be moved back to Amsterdam after the war. Pleyte was 
not unfavourably disposed to this idea. He asked the Rotterdam Chamber of 
Commerce – and not that of Amsterdam, where the interests of colonial busi-
ness firms was far better represented – for advice. The Rotterdam Chamber of 
Commerce endorsed the suggestion, taking the side of those who pleaded for 
a greater independence for the colony. To drive home its advice, the Rotterdam 
Chamber of Commerce observed that moving the tin market to Batavia had 
resulted in a large increase in exports. The economic damage to Holland was 
outweighed by the advantages which had been the result of establishing the 
tin market in Batavia. The advice occasioned a heated debate. It drew vehe-
ment protests from those supporting the economic interests of Holland. De 
Telegraaf called the attitude of the Rotterdam Chamber of Commerce unpat-
riotic.25 It goes without saying, the Amsterdam Chamber of Commerce was 
opposed to the suggestion.
It was a theme that would resurface time and again during the remainder 
of the war. The business community in Holland was a fervent advocate of mar-
kets and bodies regulating trade in the mother country, where the headquar-
ters of the estate companies were located and from where much of the capital 
came. Before 94 company headquarters in Holland had resisted with might 
and main a reallocation of markets, when the matter had come of for the trad-
ing of rubber and tea (Ligthart 923:432). Shifting control to the colony would 
only scare off Dutch people and other Europeans with disposable capital 
from investing. People in the colony wanted to have the commodity markets 
located where the production took place. One of their main arguments was the 
change in export markets. They were convinced this was a development which 
would last, even after the war. People in Holland disagreed. They believed the 
present extraordinary circumstances had to be taken into account. Trade flows 
would resume their pre-war pattern once peace had been restored.
Another heated discussion raged in August 98. In this case the found-
ing of a Vereenigde Javasuiker Producenten-Vereeniging (United Java Sugar 
Producers Associated) in Holland elicited protests in the colony. These very 
much strengthened as the move aborted an initiative taken by Batavia a few 
days earlier to regulate the export of sugar in Java and not in Holland. In the 
24 Handelingen Eerste Kamer 97-8:67.
25 De Telegraaf, cited in De Indische Gids 97, I:692; Report Chamber of Commerce Rotterdam 
over 97, cited in De Indische Gids 98, I:447-8; Gerritzen 97.
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Netherlands Indies the opinion was advanced that even before the outbreak of 
the war the practice of taking decisions about the selling of sugar in Holland 
had been an anomaly. Decisions should be taken in Java, even more so in a 
situation in which many of the buyers were no longer Europeans. Conversely, 
bodies founded in Java to regulate trade in sugar and coffee had failed because 
of opposition from Holland.26 At the end of the war it was maintained that 
such obstructions had occasioned great harm, had paralysed initiative, and 
had shown how ignorant people in Holland were about what transpired in the 
Netherlands Indies. The attitude in Holland was ‘petty and ridiculous’, and 
testified to ‘bragging and vanity’ (Helfferich 98:479).
Alternatives had also to be found for imports. A major impulse for this 
was the severed economic links with Austria-Hungary, and especially with 
Germany, which before the war had been a major, if not the exclusive, source 
of steel and rails, of machinery and spare parts, of cheap consumer goods 
bought by the indigenous population, and of surgical equipment. In statistics 
the volume of trade with Germany was reduced to mere dots. Imports from 
Germany which had still amounted to 22 million guilders in 93 dropped 
almost to zero (Carpentier Alting and De Cock Buning 928:03). Another 
reason was the problems experienced in the trade with Holland and the Allied 
Powers.
The United States, even though its products were considered expensive, 
emerged as a prime source of steel and iron, which Great Britain and France 
supplied only in small quantities or not at all. The United States could also 
supply medical instruments, weapons, and, on a more mundane level, articles 
of clothing and delicacies for the European community. Orders were placed in 
America for locomotives and railway carriages. These were urgently needed. 
Shortages of carriages and locomotives for the transportation of estate prod-
ucts at harvest time to the harbours, the so-called riettreinen (cane trains), had 
already been a problem for years. Fresh orders for rolling stock had been 
placed in Europe before the outbreak of the war, but it had soon become pat-
ently obvious that the goods would not be delivered. American imports of 
other commodities grew in importance. American imports increased from 9 
million guilders in 93 to 62 million guilders in 98 (Carpentier Alting and 
De Cock Buning 928:03). The growing importance of the United States as 
a supplier of imports was reason enough for the Ministry of the Colonies to 
establish a purchasing office in New York, incidentally located in the same 
building as Schenker and Co., the company which had tried to send a cargo of 
weapons to the Netherlands Indies on board Dutch ships. 
The replacement of Europe, including Holland, as a main source of imports 
26 De Taak, cited in De Indische Gids 99, I:08. 
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by the United States provided yet another field in which people saw an oppor-
tunity to reduce the supervision by Holland. The colony should have its own 
purchasing office in the United States. An end had to come to the old system 
in which Batavia had to submit orders first to the Ministry of the Colonies, 
which passed them on to New York. Had this suggestion been implemented, it 
would have meant shifting part of the budgetary responsibilities to the colony. 
Its proponents saw it as a logical step to take in view of the geographical loca-
tion of the United States. It would also speed up matters considerably, as the 
intervention of the Ministry of the Colonies was said to lead to considerable 
delays (Bryan 98).
Japan, itself forced to redirect some of its exports and to establish new 
industries because of the disruption of imports, also figured prominently in 
Indies trade. The disappearance of German trade from the Netherlands Indies 
opened the way for Japanese products and Japanese commerce to make their 
entry on the scene. Japan became a source of cement, coal, sulphur, matches, 
textiles, beer, rice, cheap paper, and even toys. It could supply the Netherlands 
Indies with products of which the supply had almost run out. Among these 
were brass and various chemicals. From a mere 7 million guilders in 93, 
the value of Japanese imports reached a value of 4 million guilders in 98 
(Carpentier Alting and De Cock Buning 928:03). The Japanese were eager 
to exploit such new export opportunities. Japanese business offices and banks 
opened up in the larger cities. Japanese trade delegations started to visit the 
Netherlands Indies.27 It would be a wild exaggeration to say such Japanese 
businessmen were trusted people. At times Dutch people could not make up 
their minds whether the Japanese who visited the Netherlands Indies were 
bona fide businessmen or spies, and whether information should be withheld 
from them or not. Suspicions were aroused if Japanese who visited commer-
cial firms or government offices could not give a proper address or if their 
business cards mentioned a civil servant as their profession and the Japanese 
Consul could not provide any further information.28 A highly embarrass-
ing incident was the shadowing and arrest in Surabaya of four Japanese out 
for a stroll in the spring of 96. The four were members of a large official 
eighty-persons-strong delegation of businessmen, government officials, and 
professors who toured Celebes and Java to celebrate the opening of a Japanese 
shipping-line to the Netherlands Indies, entertained grandly in all cities they 
visited. The Assistent-Resident offered his apologies. This did not satisfy the 
27 Japanese trade delegations were not the only such groups to visit the Netherlands Indies. As 
the Americans had done before them, the Japanese thought that perhaps they could learn some-
thing from the way the Dutch ran their colony. In November 97, eight Japanese civil servants 
stationed in Formosa visited Java to study the colonial administrative and legal systems.
28 Koloniaal verslag 99:259-60; Neratja, 9-9-98.
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four, all of whom it was reported were noblemen. They hastened to their 
Consul to lodge a formal complaint.29 Nevertheless, something good came 
out of the visit. One of its members, Inazo Nitobe, a professor in colonial his-
tory in Tokyo, wrote after he had returned home that the visit had made him 
change his mind. Talks with the Governor General and other senior colonial 
civil servants had convinced Inazo Nitobe that Takekoshi was mistaken when 
he said that the Dutch were in the Netherlands Indies for economic gains 
pure and simple and did nothing to try to improve the fate of the natives. His 
words, the Japan Advertiser concluded, were an attack on those in Japan who 
pleaded for an expansion southwards. Inazo Nitobe’s plea for the expansion of 
trade instead of war did not completely reassure De Locomotief. Inazo Nitobe 
pointed a finger at the Netherlands Indies; Takekoshi raised a fist. Moreover, 
how much effect would his words have in Japan? Could Inazo Nitobe neutral-
ize ‘the untruthful writing’ of Takekoshi?30 
What also made Japan special was that it could provide earthenware, 
peddlers’ wares, and other cheap articles to be sold to the local population. 
Efforts to find new sources of supply in the United States or Europe for such 
goods formerly obtained from Germany and Austria-Hungary, had met with 
failure. Factories in the United States and Europe did not produce for a cheap 
market. The prices of their products were too high for the population of the 
Netherlands Indies to afford. In Japan the situation was different. Factories 
could produce cheaply.
The import of consumer goods from Japan was relatively new. Before 
August 94, the European trading houses in the Netherlands Indies had 
looked down on Japanese products and more often than not had rejected 
requests from Japanese companies to trade their products. After the outbreak 
of the war the attitude of the import firms changed drastically. The same 
companies which had shunted Japanese products in the past now took the 
initiative to interest Japanese factories in the market in the Netherlands Indies. 
Often nothing came of it. The commission Japanese exporters were prepared 
to offer was generally too small to be acceptable to European firms. Trade in 
Japanese products went almost exclusively to Chinese firms, and in some cit-
ies to Japanese shopkeepers, bypassing their Dutch counterparts. 
Unfortunately, such new imports did not always meet expectations. 
Japanese products aroused great disappointment. A much heard complaint 
was that quality was poor. Confronted with such charges, Tokyo instituted an 
official inquiry. American imports also do not seem to have always been up 
to standard. If we may believe contemporary reports, locomotives imported 
29 Oetoesan Hindia, 24-5-96.
30 De Locomotief, 25-8-96, 4-9-96.
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from the United States made a great impression because of their huge size, but 
tended to break down.3 
Imports from the United States and Japan gave some relief, but were not 
varied or in large quantities, enough to bring imports back to their pre-war 
volume. German products, which could no longer be imported, continued to 
be in high demand. When the cargo of the Roon was finally auctioned in early 
98 European, Chinese, and Arab traders jumped at the opportunity and 
outbid each other. Bids were made without even knowing what the contents 
of the crates were. Emil Helfferich recalled how led astray by his eagerness a 
pious Arab merchant ended up with a sausage machine (Helfferich 92:5). 
Scarcity led to acute problems. Since 96 new telephone connections could no 
longer be made because of shortage of telephone wire. Railways were another 
good example. Projects to extend the rail network had to be abandoned, and 
as early as 96 the public railways were experiencing a shortage of wagons 
and locomotives to transport estate products. The reason was that because of 
the war 3,000 wagons and ninety engines which had been ordered in Europe 
had not been delivered.32 Trains began to run at night to cope with the short-
age of rolling stock and the transport of non-perishable goods was temporarily 
stopped. Much to the chagrin of the public, passenger and freight transport 
were combined in an effort to increase efficient use of material. The hope that 
any new rolling stock could be imported evaporated in 97 when the United 
States entered the war and had to upgrade its own railway system to cope 
with the problems the increase in freight traffic posed. Seriously hampered by 
the lack of rolling stock the state railways company at the end of 98 and the 
beginning of 99 contemplated raising the fares in an effort to decrease the 
number of passengers, though it was seriously doubted whether this would 
indeed have had the desired effect. Other measures contemplated were reduc-
ing the number of passenger trains and even running more combined passen-
ger and freight trains. 
Similar problems threw a spanner in the work of mining companies. 
Throughout the war mining operations were hampered by a lack of machin-
ery. An act had to be promulgated to allow for the extension of the prospect-
ing period after which an exploration claim was still valid. Lack of capital and 
even more the dearth of equipment caused considerable delays.
After a long and hard look at the problems experienced, the development of 
an import substitution industry was broached. The efforts gave the colony 
some additional independence from abroad. The army and police also made 
their modest contribution. Alternatives had to be found for the production 
3 De Locomotief, 6-2-97; Nieuwe Noordkust, cited in De Locomotief, 7-4-98.
32 Neratja, 3-2-98.
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of uniforms and the supply of cloth which had been ordered in Holland 
before the war. Measures had already been taken shortly before August 94. 
Expecting that imports could be impeded the army had placed an order for 
shoes at the prison of Yogyakarta. Later, inmates of a prison in Cirebon were 
set to weaving the prison garments, which had once been made in Holland. 
The cotton yarn was imported from Bombay. The uniform of the Armed Police 
was also produced locally. It was not a great success. Batavia had to admit that 
the quality of the new uniforms was far from satisfactory.33 In 96 the army 
also considered the establishment of an arms and ammunition factory in Java. 
After ample thought, the decision was negative. The colonial army was too 
small to provide a viable market. It would be highly questionable if the prod-
ucts of such a factory could compete with arms factories abroad.34
The local metal-working industry profited from the situation. Before the 
outbreak of the war it had mainly been a subsidiary business of agencies of 
foreign engineering-works, located mainly in East Java, but there were a few 
in West Java, to provide the sugar, tea, and rubber estates with their machin-
eries. Confronted with the problems of ordering machinery in Europe and 
hesitant to place orders in Japan and the United States, an increasing number 
of orders went to the local metal-working industry. 
The colonial government also did its bid. In September 95 Idenburg 
installed a special committee for the promotion of the manufacturing industry. 
The step was later described by Batavia as a ‘spontaneous idea’ of Idenburg 
himself.35 The committee was responsible for investigating which goods could 
be produced locally, or more precisely in Java, and how the government could 
assist in this. What Idenburg and other advocates of local industrialization 
envisaged was not just making the Netherlands Indies more independent of 
abroad during the war, they were looking far ahead. Two other reasons for 
them to plead for the encouragement of a manufacturing industry was the 
rapid growth of the population and the need to improve the standard of living 
of the people. Additional sources of income had to be created. To continue to 
rely on agriculture would only result in impoverishment. Consequently, types 
of industry which were still dependent in imports for the input of raw materi-
als were also considered.
When it was founded the committee was hailed as a step in the direction of 
the industrial emancipation of the colony. It had to tackle a subject which was 
close to the heart of many Dutch people in the Netherlands Indies: increasing 
the independence of the Netherlands Indies from Holland. Initial enthusiasm 
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tee for having accomplished almost nothing at all. Van Hinloopen Labberton 
was also highly incensed by the fact that the committee was made up of people 
who never had seen a factory from the inside. The authorities had excluded 
industrialists from the committee for fear that they would advance their own 
interests.36 Lovink thought differently. He wrote that the committee set to 
work seriously and pointed to the some seven brochures published (Lovink 
99:8). This sounds impressive but most had been written by one man, the 
government representative on the committee, J.C. van Reigersberg Versluys. 
He was its only full-time member, and had been especially employed to do 
such a job. All other members of the committee were pillars of society with 
busy jobs, who could not devote much time to the work of the committee. 
Despite such good intentions and sometimes halting efforts the World War 
did not mark the take-off of industry in the Netherlands Indies. Nevertheless, 
a great variety of experiments were tried or suggested. Among the chemicals 
that were produced in the Netherlands Indies for the first time or in much larg-
er quantities than before were sulphuric acid, sodium bisulphite, used in the 
sugar industry, and calcium carbide. Anticipating a serious shortage of iron, 
the prospects for establishing a pig iron foundry were investigated. Research 
into the construction of blast-furnaces passed in review. The vulcanization of 
rubber, and the production of pharmaceutical products, sodium carbonate, 
silk (requiring the planting of mulberry trees), beer, black ink, beeswax, soap, 
castor oil, cement, pigments and the like were broached. Forced by a shortage 
of medicines and bandages the Civilian Medical Service started to experiment 
with the growing of medicinal plants and native fibrous plants, the latter to 
provide bandages. The service was pleased with the results.37 A hay commit-
tee to study what native grasses were best suited as fodder was instituted. 
Another committee studied the possibilities of producing fertilizers. This 
was important because, whether there was a war or not, the growing popula-
tion and the intensification of agriculture would only increase demand (Van 
Reigersberg Versluys 97a:2).
Some were optimistic about the prospects. For a number of new products, 
immediate profits were high. A prolongation of the war would allow such new 
industries enough time to develop sufficient expertise to be able to cope with 
post-war competition. In other cases, the machine industry was one of these, 
doubts prevailed right from the start about the viability. It was expected that 
they would not survive peace-time when pre-war international market forces 
were restored.38
A number of the projects suggested gave rise to heated debates. One was 
36 Volksraad 98:200.
37 Koloniaal verslag 98:24.
38 Koloniaal verslag 97:237-8; Ontwikkeling 97:9. 
XIV Adjusting to economic warfare 397
the production of matches. Enormous effort and a wealth of public discus-
sion went into the question of whether the trees which grew in the colony 
could supply wood with the necessary smoothness and tensile strength for 
the production of matches; and if this were so, whether the new industry 
would be economically sound. In the past experiments had failed. Lack of a 
sufficient supply of the right kind of timber had made the locally produced 
matches far inferior to those imported from Europe. They had also been much 
more expensive than Japanese matches which, though of lower quality, had 
conquered the cheaper segment of the market (see Vervaardigen 98). The 
Hague was even asked to send an expert in the field of match production 
to the Netherlands Indies. By the end of the war no match factory had been 
founded. A similar story can be told about the production of paper. There 
were specific problems, such as the absence of a large quantity of rags, a lack 
of knowledge about the properties of the trees which grew in the colony, and 
the great diversity in trees in a tropical forest, which had made it difficult to 
develop commercial woods. Nevertheless, production did not seem out of the 
question (see Reigersberg Versluys 97b). No concrete steps were taken. At 
the end of the war experts were still quarrelling about the feasibility of a paper 
factory in the colony.
The discussions about the development of an industrial sector in the 
Netherlands Indies were coloured not only by a conflict of interests between 
motherland and colony. An issue of equal importance, though the debate had 
not yet prompted the direct involvement of powerful pressure groups, as that 
on paper did, was the question of what government support, if any, should be 
given to the development of an indigenous industry. The colonial government 
had endorsed recommendations for the development of a big native industry, 
Van Kol had made after his trips to Japan. Batavia had warmed to the idea that 
the management of a native industry would be less expensive than industrial 
projects for which the staff would have had to come from Europe. There was 
many a slip between the tongue and the lip. Concrete steps had been confined 
to assisting those industries which existed already, batik, pottery, leather-
working, rope-making, and indigenous forges (see also Lovink 99:9).
In the colony one of the most enthusiastic advocates of a native large-
scale industry was the socialist Ch.G. Cramer, an engineer employed by 
the Department of Public Works. He wanted government support for the 
establishment of new industries to go primarily – as Van Kol had also sug-
gested – to Indonesian cooperative societies. The government should take the 
lead. It should select branches of industry in which indigenous big business 
could develop. It should also stimulate the establishment of cooperative socie-
ties eligible for financial support and establish model state factories to teach 
Indonesians the trade. Cramer was very outspoken in his preference for the 
development of a native industry. European entrepreneurs should receive 
H.H. van Kol, circa 920 (KITLV 2745)
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financial support from the government in exceptional cases only.
Cramer saw good prospects in the textile sector, in the establishment of 
rice-husking plants, and in the estate sector, especially tea and sugar.39 He was 
highly optimistic about the prospects for a colonial textile industry and fore-
saw that the Netherlands Indies could take over the pre-war role of Holland in 
providing itself with textiles. Unfortunately, the examples Cramer mentioned 
to substantiate his view were not the most convincing. He said that in Cirebon 
there already was ‘a more or less primitive textile company’. He meant the 
local prison. Cramer praised the products made in the prison and argued that 
the prison experience showed that ‘the Javanese quickly understands [the art 
of] weaving with power looms, which requires attentiveness and skill rather 
than effort.’40 To lend extra force to his argument, he pointed out that the 
Director of the Cirebon prison and the inspector of the prison system were 
both ‘textile experts’.4 Cramer did not receive much support from his fellow-
Europeans. They dismissed his ideas as a utopia. They were convinced that for 
some time to come industrialization would still have to depend on initiatives 
from the European community and that native society was not yet ripe for 
such endeavours. Such a view prompted Cramer to blame the government for 
having taken no initiatives to develop native industry in the past.42 
Indië Weerbaar found itself in the spotlight in the discussion about the 
economic independence of the Netherlands Indies. The war had made people 
realize that dependency on imports could be a dangerous liability. Abdoel 
Moeis and Dwidjosewojo and other propagandists of Indië Weerbaar stressed 
that military force was not the only factor on which a country’s defence should 
rest. Economic strength and the improvement of educational opportunities 
were essential elements in the colony’s ability to withstand a foreign threat. 
Van Hinloopen Labberton argued that resilience was far more than a matter 
of soldiers and arms, it embraced economic development and the promotion 
of science. War created some opportunities towards accomplishing this. In 
exchange for Indonesian support for the establishment of native militia, the 
Netherlands Indies was not only to be given a People’s Council; it also was 
granted a technical university.
The appeals for economic development were also voiced by Van Aalst and 
other businessmen in Holland. In contrast to people in the Netherlands Indies, 
they only wanted to go a limited way. They did not pay much attention to the 
implication that the colony should gain a larger degree of economic and politi-
cal independence from Holland. Criticizing this position, Batavia regularly 
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complained that industry in Holland was very hesitant to invest capital in the 
development of industry in the colony or to share its knowledge for this pur-
pose. Nevertheless, one important initiative was taken in Holland. Van Aalst 
was convinced of one thing at least: natives should learn how to grow ‘good 
sugar and good coffee’ and had to develop technical, agricultural, and com-
mercial expertise.43 To contribute to this Van Aalst took the initiative of having 
members of the Dutch business community collect 3 million guilders for the 
establishment of a technical college in the colony. Van Aalst called the college 
a token of the sympathy in Holland for the population of the Netherlands 
Indies.
The good news was announced by Van Aalst during the visit to Holland 
of the Indië Weerbaar deputation. On this occasion he and Abdoel Moeis had 
toasted to each other’s health. Van Aalst had a glass of champagne in his hand, 
Abdoel Moeis a glass of mineral water. The words spoken reflected a particu-
lar contemporary spirit. Van Aalst had said: ‘We want to be brothers to you, 
Mr Abdoel Moeis’. Abdoel Moeis had replied: ‘The Oriental will always grasp 
the fraternal hand, Mr Van Aalst’.44 
Van Aalst’s ‘gift’ did occasion some resentment in Java. Nobody in the 
colony had been consulted in advance. People in Holland had again decided 
what was good for the colony. What they had in mind could well be unreal-
istic and not tally with the real needs of the colony. Expansion of a technical 
middle cadre, of technical schools, might be what was required, not a college 
for engineers. Businessmen in Holland, who were suffering from an attack of 
remorse had to realize that the sudden feeding of a seriously undernourished 
patient who had been neglected for years with toothsome sweets could only 
lead to indigestion and a waste of money.45 The government’s Director for 
Education and Religions, K.F. Creutzberg, agreed. Publicly he praised the idea 
of a technical university as a ‘generous plan of a number of interested persons 
in the Netherlands to make available a substantial sum of money for technical 
education in the Netherlands Indies’.46 Whether he was really pleased was 
a different matter. Still a few months earlier Batavia had rejected the estab-
lishment of a technical college and Creutzberg doubted whether it was wise 
to establish institutions of higher education in the Netherlands Indies. The 
small number of students who graduated each year from Dutch-style second-
ary schools did yet not warrant such a step. These views – illustrative of the 
opinion held by Europeans in the colony that indigenous society was not yet 
ripe for the establishment of institutions of higher education – did not deter 
43 Koloniaal Tijdschrift 97:797.
44 Volksraad 98-9:346.
45 De Indische Gids 97, I:6.
46 Volksraad 98:262.
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others from jumping at the opportunity offered. The inhabitants of Bandung 
took the most decisive action. They formed an Action Committee. In articles in 
the newspapers and in brochures, they launched a campaign to demonstrate 
that Bandung was the most suitable place for the school. Bandung had many 
technical firms within its urban boundaries and was the centre of a plantation 
belt where the estates applied new technology. They also made much of the 
fact that Bandung exuded a European atmosphere. The Javanese educated 
in the city would certainly benefit from this (Rottier 97). In July 920 the 
Indische Technische Hoogeschool opened its doors in Bandung. Among its 




The dangers of war and shipping
Right from the outset British mail checks were a source of embarrassment and 
bitterness to Dutch people in Holland and in the Netherlands Indies (and in 
Suriname and the Netherlands Antilles, as Dutch West Indies mail was also 
checked by the British). In the first months of the war Dutch people were very 
reluctant to use the British mail. They did not want their letters and parcels 
checked by a British censor. They quickly had to rid themselves of this idea 
as British censorship soon became unavoidable. After July 1914, the sending 
of mail on its first or on its final part of the way between Holland and the 
Netherlands Indies through Europe by train, as had previously been done, 
had already become virtually impossible. Passengers and mail could still reach 
Holland and Germany via Italy, but this route stopped being an alternative to 
avoid Allied controls, albeit an equally complicated one because of border 
controls in Europe, after Italy had entered the war. A few persons on their way 
to or from the Netherlands Indies continued to travel via Italy, Switzerland, 
and Germany, but mail between the motherland and the colony had to be 
carried by ships from the ports in Holland to those in the Netherlands Indies 
and vice versa. Such shipments were carefully checked by the British for sedi-
tious pamphlets, letters to and from German and Austrian-Hungarian busi-
ness firms, and articles of trade sent by parcel post to and from Germany and 
Austria-Hungary.1 The stamp ‘opened by censor’ became a familiar feature 
of Dutch mail sent to and from the Netherlands Indies. Had the Italian land 
route remained open, it may not have made much of a difference after fear of 
Germano-Indian incitement in British colonies motivated London to cordon 
off the Netherlands Indies and to check all ships entering and leaving its ter-
ritorial waters carefully. The general public, unaware of the Germano-Indian 
plot, could only wonder why the British acted in this way. The only conclusion 
they could draw was that it had something to do with economic warfare.
In the Netherlands Indies itself, British censorship meant that for a few 
1 Mail to and from Russia had to be sent via Hong Kong and Shanghai along the Siberian 
railway.
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months in 1916 domestic mail to and from a large part of Sumatra was not 
longer delivered using the Dutch sub-post offices in Singapore and Penang as 
a distribution point and was carried only on ships which did not call in there 
(though here the British naval blockade also meant that the measure was not 
particularly efficative) on their regular route. Re-routing proved to be very 
complicated and serious delays were the result. Mail sometimes had to be sent 
via Batavia. In the case of Jambi, avoiding British ports meant that mail from 
Batavia was discharged in Riau, transported by another ship to Pulau Sambu, 
from where it was shipped by yet another steamer which had to make an 
extra stop for this reason to Jambi. In September 1916 the Postal Service in the 
Netherlands Indies announced that ordinary letters and money orders (but 
not registered mail and parcels) could again be sent via the Dutch sub-post 
offices in Penang and Singapore. 
Correspondence between the Minister of the Colonies and the Governor 
General was not exempt from British searches. To put a stop to this, in March 
1916 the Ministry of the Colonies considered having the official letters and 
reports be shipped in a special red, white, and blue postbag. The bags should 
be labelled in such a way that it was clear that they contained government 
mail. In the end the plan was abandoned. Government mail was sent in ordi-
nary postbags on which it was clearly mentioned that they contained govern-
ment documents. The bags were put in the special charge of the captains of the 
mailships. They had to try to see that the bags were not searched by the British 
censor. To give the captains additional status the Ministry of the Colonies 
provided them with a courier pass. For a time it worked. The Ministry was 
satisfied with the results.
Searches caused extra delays. When Dutch ships on their way to the 
Netherlands Indies entered British territorial waters or had no option but to do 
so the postbags and crates were taken off and inspected by the British censor. 
This accomplished, the mail was returned, unless of course the censor refused 
to let it pass. The latter not only included inflammatory pamphlets or mail 
which was supposed to contribute to the economic well being of the Central 
Powers or black-listed firms. Neutral newspapers could also not evade censor-
ship. In 1916 when the Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant published a number of 
letters to the editor critical of an article by Ronald Donald, editor-in-chief of 
the Daily Chronicle, about the British war effort also published by the newspa-
per, the British censor removed that section of the paper which contained the 
letters to the editor from a shipment to the Netherlands Indies.
Because inspection was time-consuming, London changed the system. The 
 Pleyte to Nederland en Rotterdamsche Lloyd, 4--1916, Pleyte to Holland Amerika Lijn, 
NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 4--1916 S4, 8-11-1916 J14.
 De Locomotief, 10-10-1916.
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mail was no longer put back on board, but was forwarded later on another 
ship. Mail for the Netherlands Indies was sent on British ships bound for 
Singapore. The hazard was that the mail could be lost if the ship were torpe-
doed by German U-boats. A notice in a newspaper in the Netherlands Indies 
that mail shipped from Holland on a certain date had been lost was not a 
frequent occurrence but it was certainly not unusual. Initially the mail was 
checked for a second time in Singapore. The second check was discontinued 
after a Dutch protest; a decision which may have been facilitated by the fact 
that expenditure for the censorship of mail and telegrams weighed heavily on 
the budget of the Straits Settlements.4 Nevertheless, it could still take two to 
four months before mail reached its destination.
One of the unintended consequences of this system was that, in spite of 
the risk that British ships might be torpedoed, Dutchmen started to prefer the 
British mail to its Dutch counterpart. The reason was simple. Letters and par-
cels sent by British mail reached their destination much faster. The removal of 
Dutch mail bags from Dutch ships caused considerable delays, and therefore, 
people were never tired of pointing out, money.
British fears that goods might end up in the wrong hands could have 
far-reaching consequences. Early 1917 the management of the Javasche Bank 
suffered a shock. Three shipments of sovereigns with a total value of 100,000 
British pounds had been sent by Dutch mail from Amsterdam. When the 
Dutch ships arrived in Tanjung Priok, there were no sovereigns on board. 
Customs officers in Great Britain had told the ships’ captains that the British 
mail would take care of the transport of the coins to the Netherlands Indies. 
The management of the Javasche Bank wrote to Van Limburg Stirum that it 
considered such treatment to transgress ‘all fairness and justice’.5 It took six 
month for the shipment to reach Batavia. The incident was indicative of the 
growing problems the Javasche Bank encountered in strengthening its stock of 
gold and silver during the war. After 1916, the dispatch of gold and silver from 
Holland to Java became impossible. The Javasche Bank had to rely almost 
completely on the production of domestic mining in the Netherlands Indies. 
Elsewhere in the world, gold and silver was unobtainable. Because of the dis-
ruption of sea traffic, the colony also experienced problems with the circula-
tion of silver and copper coins, which were all minted in Holland. A dearth of 
copper, silver, and nickel prevented the striking of coins in the Netherlands 
Indies itself.6
There was not much that could be done about the searches of cargo and 
mail. ‘We have to bear and forbear, that we have learned’, one author wrote in 
4 Proceedings 1916:C 164.
5 Javasche Bank to Van Limburg Stirum, 0-1-1917, NA, Kol. Geheim, Mr. 1917/8x.
6 Volksraad 1918:11.
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1918 (Van Heekeren 1918:191). Some were not so accommodating and protest-
ed. The business communities in Batavia and Surabaya did so in January 1917. 
The colonial government should do something about the delay of the Dutch 
mail transport. The latest mail that had reached them was from 19 October. De 
Locomotief wrote about mail-ellende, mail misery.7 At that time it was reported 
with a certain frequency in the colonial press that post bags had been removed 
from Dutch ships sailing the Archipelago. To add insult to injury, the mail serv-
ice between motherland and colony had become so irregular that in February 
1917 the telegraph service in the Netherlands Indies extended from five to 
seven months the period in which people could complain about telegrams sent 
which had not reached their destination abroad. The complainants had to sub-
mit a letter from the addressees that they had not received a telegram in order 
to get their money refunded. The mail service to and from Europe had become 
too unreliable to limit the period of a refund to five months. 
The Batavia Chamber of Commerce condemned the searches as contrary 
to the obligations of ‘good neighbourliness’.8 It urged the colonial govern-
ment to do all it could to end the searches. If necessary Batavia should not 
eschew exerting pressure. It could, for instance, stop British mail sent from 
the Netherlands Indies to Singapore. Van Limburg Stirum did nothing of this 
sort. He asked The Hague to protest in London. To demonstrate how serious 
the situation was, in March 1917 Van Limburg Stirum wired to Pleyte that at 
the end of December and in the first days of January British warships had sys-
tematically searched mailbags on board Dutch steamers in inter-Archipelago 
service, had seized mail, and had abstracted registered letters. Observing that 
there was ‘no shadow of right nor any acceptable excuse [for] this proceeding’, 
Van Limburg Stirum asked Pleyte to submit a formal protest.9 Pleyte agreed. 
He wrote to Loudon that a ‘serious protest’ was in order.10
Protests against what less diplomatic persons called a hostile act against 
neutral countries had already been submitted in the past few years. Because 
American mail on Dutch ships including government correspondence, was 
searched and read, the United States had lodged complaints and other neutral 
countries had done the same. The Hague had pointed out the Convention 
Relative à Certaines Restrictions à l’Exercise du Droit de Capture dans la 
Guerre Maritime of 1907 precluded the searching of mail on board neutral 
ships in international waters except, in an actual theatre of war. Great Britain 
had perpetrated a serious infringement of the Freedom of the Sea.11 Within 
7 De Locomotief, -1-1917, -1-1917.
8 De Indische Gids 1917, I:697.
9 Van Limburg Stirum to Pleyte, --1917, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 14--1917 49.
10 Pleyte to Loudon, 14--1917, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 14--1917 49.
11 Loudon to Johnstone, 16-11-1914, De Locomotief, 5--1915
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months after the outbreak of the war The Hague had also been forced to 
protest about the confiscation of mail in British territorial waters. There was 
no way neutral ships could escape sailing these waters. After March 1915 all 
neutral vessels which sailed the Channel had to enter British territorial waters 
(at the roads of The Downs, off Deal, north of Dover) (Verbeke 00:). To 
enforce the measure, depth charges (aimed to lock German submarines and 
other warships stationed in Belgium up in port) had been laid in such a way 
that ships had no other choice. Soon such a measure was no longer necessary. 
The British government simply ordered neutral ships sailing to and from 
Europe to call in at a British port for inspection.
Eventually protests took an almost ritualistic guise. In January 1917 alone, 
the Dutch Envoy in London inquired three times what justification Great 
Britain had to examine mail on Dutch ships in the Archipelago, which had 
often been stopped just outside the territorial waters.1 The protests had 
always been fruitless. London’s reaction was, as one civil servant in the Dutch 
Ministry of the Colonies chose to describe it, ‘laconic’. Sometimes the British 
government waited for months before replying. It persisted in its opinion that 
the British Navy had every right to search neutral ships. Making matters even 
worse London usually also denied the allegation that Dutch ships had been 
searched in Netherlands Indies territorial waters.
In other instances The Hague was informed that ‘enemy goods’ had been 
seized or that seditious pamphlets had been found among the mail which 
aimed to incite ‘His Majesty’s Indian subjects to crime and rebellion’.1 The 
British Foreign Office made it clear that such ‘treasonable matter’ fell ‘into the 
category analogues of contraband’.14 Such arguments – the same Dutch civil 
servant spoke of a ‘fine line of reasoning’ – failed to satisfy the Dutch govern-
ment. Stubbornly The Hague continued to protest, pointing out that mail 
confiscated, including the materials considered dangerous by the British, was 
destined for a Dutch and not a British port. Great Britain should only examine 
post when it reached British India or the Malay Peninsula. It should not do so 
on board of Dutch merchantmen. In spite of the fact that such protests were 
futile the feeling of Dutch politicians was that to remain silent would not do 
if their cause were just. Some Dutch Members of Parliament even criticized 
Loudon for not remonstrating strongly enough.
Allied control of Dutch mail was stepped up even more after the United 
States had entered the war in April 1917 (but had refrained from declaring 
1 Foreign Office to De Marees van Swinderen, 10--1917, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 14--1917 
49.
1 Foreign Office to De Marees van Swinderen, 10--1917, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 14--1917 
49.
14 Note Ministry of the Colonies, 14--1917, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 14--1917 49.
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war on Turkey), and because of Washington’s refusal to be called an ally, for-
mally became one of the Associated and Allied Powers fighting the Central 
Powers (Macmillan 001:17, Oren 007:40-50). The British government feared 
that with the United States in the Allied camp, the Netherlands Indies might 
become even more important as a base for Germano-Indian subversion in 
Asia. Beckett told a Dutch intelligence officer that British Indians from the 
United States and ‘fanatical Germans’ would be drawn to take up residence 
in the Netherlands Indies. This would turn the colony into the centre of the 
Germano-Indian plot.15
Such fears inspired London to decree in the middle of 1917 that Dutch ships 
no longer were allowed to carry ordinary letters and parcel post. Only official 
and commercial correspondence for which special permissions had been 
granted was permitted. Mail had to be sent either by British and, as of August 
1917, by French mail. This meant that mail from the Netherlands Indies first 
had to be sent to Singapore on Dutch ships. There it was transferred to British 
and French ships. Initially the sender in the Netherlands Indies had a choice. 
He or she could write on the envelope whether letters and parcels should be 
send by French or British mail. In February 1918 the system was abolished. 
The mail was sent with whichever French or British ship left port first. The 
only liberty left was that a correspondent could request that mail be sent via 
the United States.
The mail service was also affected by the fact that intensified naval warfare 
made seaborne trade for ships sailing under neutral flags increasingly hazard-
ous. The economic warfare and the war at sea presented neutral fleets with 
special dangers. Ships ran into mines or were hit by torpedoes or by surface 
gunfire from German submarines. From August 1914 to October 1916 the ton-
nage lost in the Dutch merchant fleet amounted to 100,000 tons, one-fifth of 
the total neutral tonnage lost, and half the damage inflicted on the Norwegian 
fleet.16 Passengers travelling between Holland and the Netherlands Indies 
could take out a special insurance to cover the cost during the voyage if they 
were forced to stay in a hotel when the ship they sailed on was damaged and 
had to enter an ‘emergency port’.
A spiral had been set in motion. Restrictions on neutral shipping by one 
side were answered by counter measures by the other, making shipping all the 
more dangerous. The Dutch viewed the escalation with alarm and indigna-
tion. As far as they could see, the efforts of the belligerents to inflict economic 
ruin upon one another would stop at nothing. One author concluded that dur-
ing the war ‘folios of international law became useless paper’. De Locomotief 
15 Report conversation with Beckett on 19 April 1917, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 11-1-1917 A14.
16 New York Journal of Commerce, cited in Schepenvorderingswet 1917:74.
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spoke about ‘the neutrals who are without rights’.17
The first indication of what lay in store had come on 8 August 1914 when 
Germany announced that it would lay mines at the entrance of enemy ports. 
Great Britain reacted by laying mines in the southern part of the North Sea in 
October. On 5 November 1914 London declared the North Sea a war zone, a 
region where mines were placed and neutral ships would be liable to search-
ing. Besides creating a dangerous obstacle course, London tried to force neu-
tral merchantmen to sail the Channel instead of taking the route around the 
northern part of the British Isles (Halpern 1994:49). Neutral ships also had to 
make a detour. They had to sail a narrow strip hugging to the British coast 
between the Straits of Dover and the Farne Islands near Berwick-upon-Tweed, 
just below the Scottish border. At the Farne Islands they had to sail on to 
the lighthouse of Landesnaes, from where they could continue southwards 
or northwards, depending on their destination. Loudon protested that this 
added a thousand sea miles to the voyage between Dover and Dutch ports.18 
The route made it almost impossible to avoid arrest by British warships and a 
search of the cargo.
Germany wanted exactly the opposite. Neutral ships should avoid the 
Channel. They should take the route around Scotland and Ireland. To try to 
force the issue Germany declared the waters around Great Britain and Ireland, 
including the Channel, a war zone on 4 February 1915. Berlin warned that all 
enemy merchantmen in the war zone would ‘be destroyed without it always 
being possible to circumvent the dangers threatening the crew and passen-
gers’.19 The Dutch government was informed about the German step on 1 
February. The letter contained the warning that the German Navy intended 
to make abundant use of sea mines in the area it had declared a war zone.0 
Such mines were not the only danger which threatened Dutch ships. Berlin left 
no doubt that neutral ships would not be immune to attacks, not only were 
there ‘the accidents of naval warfare’, but neutral flags were ‘misused’ by the 
British government.1 The German Navy made an exception for northward-
bound traffic around the Shetland Islands, for the eastern waters of the North 
Sea, and for a strip of thirty miles along the coast of the Netherlands. When 
Loudon asked Johnstone about the German claim that neutral flags were 
being misused, the British Ambassador replied that such a practice was an 
established stratagem. The British Merchant Shipping Act of 1894 allowed for-
eign merchantmen to raise the British flag if they were threatened with being 
17 Van Reigersberg Versluys 1917:; De Locomotief, 16--1915.
18 Loudon to Johnstone, 16-11-1914, De Locomotief, 5--1915.
19 Proclamation, by Pohl, 4--1915, State Papers 1916:101.
0 Oranjeboek, cited in De Locomotief, -9-1916.
1 Proclamation by Pohl, 4--1915, State Papers 1916:101.
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taken as a prize. Great Britain now wanted to adopt a similar means to avoid 
that British ships being taken as a prize or destroyed. Johnstone wrote that 
the Admiralty had not ordered British captains to do so, but would without 
any doubt certainly advise them to hoist a neutral flag to avoid aggression. 
It emerged that at least two British ships had sailed under Dutch colours. 
Loudon was not pleased. Van Aalst blamed Great Britain for the German dec-
laration. Insurance companies reacted by raising war risk premiums. 
The hazard of falling victim to naval warfare forced the management of 
the Rotterdamsche Lloyd and Nederland, and of the Oceaan Shipping Line, 
whose ships only carried freight and no passengers, to keep their newest ships 
in port. The decision provided colonial export circles with one of the first occa-
sions to grumble about the selfish policy of these shipping lines.
 In another respect the Nederland and Rotterdamsche Lloyd also reacted 
quickly to the changing circumstances. A direct shipping link with New York, 
the Java-New York Line, was established at the end 1914. To avoid contraband 
control and searches, which would certainly have taken place if the exist-
ing procedure of transhipping cargo for the United States in Holland had 
been continued, outward-bound merchantmen from the Netherlands Indies 
sailed via South Africa, another new connection. On their return voyage to 
the Netherlands Indies, the ships passed through the Suez Canal. As with 
every other move by the two shipping companies, the opening of the new 
line was harshly criticized in the Netherlands Indies. It was claimed that the 
merchantmen which were used on the new line could have been employed 
to transport products from the Netherlands Indies to Europe. Around the 
same time plans developed to connect the Netherlands Indies with New York 
via the Philippines and the Panama Canal were discarded for the time being. 
Yet another new line, the Java-Pacific Line, was created in December 1915. The 
first ship to take this route, the Arakan, called at Nagasaki and San Francisco 
in early 1916. In both ports her arrival drew plenty of attention from the local 
press and the authorities. Lustre was added by festivities to celebrate the new 
shipping link. In 1918 Idenburg would say in an interview in De Telegraaf 
that the Java-San Francisco Line was one of the few advantages the war had 
brought the Netherlands Indies.4 
The sinking of Dutch ships invariably caused an outcry in Dutch society. It 
also received a fair share of attention in the Malay-language press, in which 
such incidents occasioned calls to support the Dutch government because 
neutrality might be in danger. At times the loss of Dutch ships marked the 
 Johnstone to Loudon, 7--1915, Loudon to Johnstone, 15--1915, De Locomotief, 5--1915; 
interview with Van Aalst in De Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, 19--1915, De Locomotief, 5--1915. 
 De Locomotief, 1-1-1915.
4 See for its text Orgaan der Vereeniging ´Indië Weerbaar´ 1-:1-4.
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start of a mini-propaganda war between Germany and Great Britain. Each 
put the blame on the other. The German government would deny that a 
ship had been torpedoed by a German submarine and would attribute the 
disaster to British mines. The British from their part stressed that no British 
mines had been placed at the spot concerned. Occasionally when Germany 
could not disprove that a torpedo was to blame, Berlin suggested that the 
ship which had been sunk was an enemy ship sailing under Dutch colours. 
In other instances, after a formal Dutch protest and when it could be proved 
that a Dutch ship had been torpedoed in the waters the German Navy had 
reserved for neutral shipping, Berlin paid compensation for the sinking or 
damaging of Dutch ships.
Fear of a stepping-up of the German submarine campaign prompted ship-
ping companies to decide to change the route of their vessels, or keep them 
in harbour. Maritime communications were seriously disrupted. What some 
Dutch people had foretold in August 1914, and had again been speculating 
about in January 1915 when rumours abounded that the Suez Canal was to 
be closed by the British, took on a concrete shape in 1916. To avoid the Suez 
Canal passenger ships of the Nederland and Rotterdamsche Lloyd, which in 
turn maintained a weekly passenger service between motherland and colony, 
began to sail around the Cape of Good Hope. The first ship to do so was 
the Jan Pieterszoon Coen of the Nederland which sailed from Amsterdam on 
1 January 1916. Again people remonstrated that the decision to redirect the 
unprofitable passenger traffic had been inspired by purely selfish motives. 
Throughout 1915 it had been thought likely that the Suez Canal would soon 
become a theatre of war. Ships were only allowed to go through the Canal 
in daylight. Passengers had a full view of British soldiers who were there to 
defend the Canal against Turkish troops. To exacerbate the passengers’ anxi-
ety, sandbags were placed on the bridge to protect the captain, helmsman, and 
pilot against stray bullets. In December 1915 there were additional reasons to 
avoid the Suez Canal. The cause was not, as had been ventured in 1914, the 
closing of the Suez Canal by the British. The main reason given, presented by 
the Rotterdamsche Lloyd and Nederland as the only reason, was that bunker-
ing in the Suez Canal had become too expensive. The operations of German 
and Austrian submarines in the Mediterranean had disrupted the supply of 
coal, with a sharp rise in price as the result. On the top of this was the consid-
eration that in the Mediterranean ships might well have to sail through areas 
full of floating dead bodies of the passengers and crews of torpedoed troop-
ships and merchantmen.
The voyage around the Cape (Van Limburg Stirum on his way to the 
Netherlands Indies was one of those who was forced to take this route) took 
almost fifty days, one-and-a-half to two weeks longer than through the Suez 
Canal route. The detour ineluctably meant extra sailing time. That mail boats 
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and merchantmen, whatever the route they took, sailed at an ‘economic rate’ 
to save coal was another reason for the protracted voyage. The price of coal, 
to cite Abdoel Moeis, made it worth its weight in gold.5 Further delays were 
caused because for safety reasons on many ships – even British ones – avoided 
the Suez Canal, and neutral ships had sometimes to wait for days before they 
could bunker, especially when Allied warships had arrived. The Dutch ship-
ping companies charged their passengers for the supplementary costs for the 
extra meals such delays implied: 5 guilders ‘per day per first class passenger, 
children in proportion’.6
The longer sea voyage created an uproar among civil servants in the 
Netherlands Indies. They were entitled to a European furlough of eight 
months, of which three now had to be spent at sea if they wanted to go home 
to Holland. Another consequence of the decision to re-route the mail boat was 
that mail had to be sent on freighters of the Nederland and Rotterdamsche 
Lloyd which still passed through the Suez Canal. Another option was to put 
it on ships of the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company, which 
departed from Singapore and continued to go through the Canal. Because of 
the uncertainty that arose over the duration of the trip, the dates the mails 
from the Netherlands Indies arrived in Holland were wired to the Netherlands 
Indies, where they were published in the newspapers.
A total discontinuation of the Dutch mail service and passenger traffic 
threatened in February and March 1916 when four Dutch vessels were sunk 
in the North Sea. One was the Tubantia, ‘the largest neutral ship sunk by sub-
marines during the war’ (Halpern 1994:07). She was torpedoed on 16 March. 
The Palembang of the Rotterdamsche Lloyd was sunk two days later. With her 
the furniture for the new drawing-room suite of the palace of the Governor 
General in Buitenzorg and the uniforms and livery of its staff which had 
been specially ordered in Holland by Van Limburg Stirum (as a gesture to 
his successor, Idenburg had had electric light and European-style bathrooms 
installed in the Palace) went to the bottom of the sea; which must have come 
as an extra blow to Van Limburg Stirum as he and his wife detested the way 
the Palace was furnished (Locher-Scholten 1981:59). Apprehension peaked 
when Directors of the Holland-Amerika Line visited Hamburg. Albert Ballin, 
still the Director of the Hamburg-Amerika Linie and a person of influence as 
adviser to the German government, told them that the time was approaching 
when German U-boats would no longer spare neutral shipping in the war 
zone. All ships sailing to and from Great Britain would be liable to attack. The 
news leaked out. The press in the Netherlands Indies carried Ballin’s warning 
5 Neratja, 4-11-1917.
6 De Locomotief, 17-11-1916.
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in large bold type among the war telegrams. The disclaimer that followed was 
almost worse than useless. Crews in Dutch ports refused to sign on. If they 
had already done so, they were reluctant for their ship to put to sea. Ship’s 
officers and engineers adopted the same attitude. At least two steamers bound 
for Great Britain could not sail from Holland. The crew was on board, but the 
officers had not turned up.
For the Nederland and the Rotterdamsche Lloyd Ballin’s words were rea-
son enough to call a temporary halt to all sailings. They delayed the departure 
of their ships from Dutch ports. Captains of passenger ships and freighters 
moored in foreign ports were instructed by wire not to sail until further notice. 
The management of the Rotterdamsche Lloyd and Nederland demanded that 
the Dutch government should take the measures necessary to guarantee safety 
at sea. Newspapers in the Netherlands Indies carried the announcement that it 
was no longer possible to book a passage to Holland. People who had already 
paid the reservation fee could ask their money back. The companies’ attitude 
aroused disquiet in the Netherlands Indies, not least because it upset the plans 
of those who still intended to go to Holland for their leave. De Locomotief car-
ried the news in extra large bold letters. The headline, again in bold letters, 
of the war telegram in Oetoesan Hindia called the decision a dangerous threat 
to the survival of the colony.7 Both companies announced that they contem-
plated keeping their most precious passenger ships in port for the duration of 
the war. Their largest freighters would only sail the safe waters between the 
Netherlands Indies and the United States. The mail service between Holland 
and the Netherlands Indies could be continued by freighters, which would 
carry only a limited number of male passengers, with an urgent reason to 
travel.
The plans of the Nederland and Rotterdamsche Lloyd prompted intense 
consultation with the government. Representatives of the Nederland and 
Rotterdamsche Lloyd pointed out that what Ballin had said seemed to reflect 
the opinion of the political parties in Germany. After all, he was an influential 
adviser to the German Emperor. They told Pleyte that the passing through 
the Channel had become too dangerous to continue the mail and passenger 
services in the usual way. They took good care to mention that both companies 
had already lost more than one million guilders each maintaining the service. 
Mailships could perish. Indubitably when this happened this would be a great 
financial loss. Full insurance against war risk had become unaffordable. There 
were other, even more important considerations had to be taken into account. 
The loss of mailships could threaten the future of the Dutch mail service to 
and from the Netherlands Indies. It would take years before the ships could 
7 Oetoesan Hindia, 4--1916; De Locomotief, 15-4-1916.
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be replaced. The Dutch shipbuilding yards had orders for the next three years, 
which meant that it would take five years before new passenger ships to 
replace the vessels sunk could be launched. The upshot might be that after the 
war German ships, safely anchored in German and neutral ports, would take 
over the passenger traffic between Holland and the Netherlands Indies.
Sailing around the northern tip of Scotland instead of through the Channel 
was an alternative. The representatives of the Nederland and Rotterdamsche 
Lloyd pointed out that its greatest drawback was in contrast to the Channel, 
there would be no other vessels nearby to come to the assistance of ships if and 
when disaster struck. They suggested a passenger service once a month, with 
the mailships under escort by a Dutch warship. If only male passengers were 
to be accepted, this would be enough. Mail and soldiers could be transported 
by freighters. The two companies suggested that the Ministry of the Colonies 
should issue a circular letter informing prospective government passengers 
that under the present circumstances it was irresponsible to take their family 
along. 
The Nederland and Rotterdamsche Lloyd demanded two additional con-
ditions. If accepted, they would shift part of the financial risk onto the gov-
ernment. The first was that the government should bear part of the cost of 
insurance against war risk. The second condition was that the government 
should promise that after the war because of ship losses the Nederland and 
Rotterdamsche Lloyd did not have the requisite number of ships to maintain 
a regular passenger service, the government would not conclude contracts for 
mail and passenger transport with foreign companies. If such a situation were 
to eventuate the Dutch government should bear the financial loss which the 
chartering of passenger ships by the two companies would entail. 
The Nederland and Rotterdamsche Lloyd persisted in their demands, even 
though in a statement published in the Dutch press the German Envoy in The 
Hague denied that Germany would step up its naval warfare. They demanded 
that the Dutch government ask Berlin for a guarantee that the German Navy 
would not attack ships of the Nederland and Rotterdamsche Lloyd. Without 
such a guarantee none of their ships, not even their freighters, would sail. If 
an assurance had been given there would also no longer be any need for an 
armed escort. If sailing could be resumed the Nederland and Rotterdamsche 
Lloyd now suggested a service every three weeks, using only their older pas-
senger ships. These ships should avoid the Channel and take a route around 
Scotland. On part of the trip through the North Sea, as far as north of the 
Dogger Bank, the passenger ships should be escorted by a tugboat, which 
could come to their assistance should an emergency arise.
Pleyte refused to ask Berlin for a guarantee. He was also not prepared to 
explore what would happen after the war, or to issue a warning to the passen-
gers not to take their families with them. The only concession he was prepared 
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to make was to contribute to the war risk insurance, but less than the sum the 
companies had asked for. When the Nederland and the Rotterdamsche Lloyd 
persisted in their demands, at the end of April Pleyte informed their Boards 
of Directors that their attitude had ‘very much disappointed’ him, all the more 
so because freighters – which were making large profits – had resumed sail-
ings. Pleyte was anxious to keep passenger traffic going. He reminded the two 
companies of their contract with the Dutch government and threatened that 
actions could follow. 
Respite came in May 1916. The German U-boat campaign was temporarily 
halted. Berlin wanted to avoid complications with the United States which 
could follow from American ships being sunk or Americans being killed on 
Allied ships which were torpedoed. When this news broke, the mail service 
was resumed, first only once in the three weeks, than once in the two weeks. 
The route taken was that around the Cape of Good Hope. Passenger ships 
departed once every ten days. It was a short reprieve. This time the British 
were the culprit. The end came in September 1916, when the Foreign Office 
in London announced that Allied interests demanded that neutral ships 
would only be provided with British coals if 0 per cent of the tonnage was 
handed over in return. Driving home the message, Great Britain threatened 
that Dutch ships using German coal would be stopped and that the coal 
would be confiscated. In fact, the threat was never put into practice (Van Dorp 
190:11). Nevertheless, Dutch ships could no longer bunker in South Africa 
or in Delagoa Bay. This put an end to trade from Holland and the Netherlands 
Indies with that region. The consequence was that Dutch ships again had to 
pass through the Suez Canal from November 1916; which in a sense was not 
very bad as it saved coal.
Routes and the dangers posed by the war at sea were not the only problems 
hanging over Dutch shipping. Most Dutch seaborne transport was carried on 
Dutch ships. The Allied Powers needed their own freighters for transporting 
their own goods and troops. Lack of tonnage became even more acute because 
in 1915 and 1916 Dutch ships were needed for the transport of food, fertilizers, 
and fodder to Holland. 
Shortage of tonnage demanded that government control over shipping 
was essential. Every sinew had to be strained to prevent Holland having to do 
without essential imports because of a shortage of tonnage. In the course of 
the war, the Dutch government progressively increased its control over Dutch 
shipping. The chartering of Dutch ships to foreign ports was forbidden in 
January 1916. A permit was required for Dutch ships leaving Dutch ports in 
March 1916. The requisitioning of freighters and of cargo space for the ship-
ment of food from the United States and the Netherlands Indies to Holland 
and for the import of good from other countries which were deemed essen-
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tial introduced another factor determining the flow of ships after the middle 
of 1916. In The Hague the Minister of Agriculture, Industry, and Trade, F.E. 
Posthuma, rose to prominence in connection with the sailing of Dutch ships. 
Posthuma, who would earn himself the nickname the ‘big ships requisition-
er’, tried to play down the effects of requisitioning. In January 1917, he told 
Parliament that in the last six months of 1916, only 7 to 8,000 tons had been 
requisitioned monthly from the Nederland and Rotterdamsche Lloyd. The 
drop in tonnage available for colonial trade from between 1. and 1.5 million 
to 895.000 tons, he attributed almost fully to the disappearance of the German 
freight trade, requisitioning of tonnage of freighters of the Dutch-British 
Oceaan Shipping Ccompany by the British government, the longer duration 
of voyages caused by the route around Scotland and the Cape, and delays in 
ports.8 Representatives of the shipping and commercial sector took a dim 
view of his claims. The annual report of the Rotterdamsche Lloyd argued 
that the commandeering of five freighters to transport grain from the United 
States to Holland at the end of 1916 had dislocated shipping. It had robbed 
the Rotterdamsche Lloyd of most of its tonnage for the trade between Holland 
and the Netherlands Indies. The Rotterdamsche Lloyd could employ only one 
ship for this purpose in January and February 1917, the period when most 
colonial crops were exported.9 
Up to the end of 1916 the requisitioning of tonnage had barely attracted 
any attention in the Netherlands Indies. The permits to sail which were 
required in Holland did have their consequences, but these did not affect the 
colony much. The permission could be coupled with a promise by the owner 
that the ship in question should return before a specific date to transport 
food to Holland. It had also obliged the Nederland and Rotterdamsche Lloyd 
to reserve 75 per cent of the cargo hold of freighters and 5 per cent of that 
of passenger ships sailing from the Netherlands Indies to Holland for food 
for Holland. From the point of view of the authorities the weak point of the 
system was that it only affected ships leaving Dutch ports. The authority of 
the Dutch government did not extend to Dutch ships sailing between foreign 
ports or between foreign ports and the Netherlands Indies. This loophole had 
enabled the shipping companies to redirect freighters from non-Dutch ports 
to the Netherlands Indies to alleviate the shortage of tonnage there to as late 
as November 1916.
Anxiety struck in the Netherlands Indies when in the final days of 1916 
news reached the colony that the Dutch government was preparing a gen-
eral ship requisitioning act. De Locomotief predicted a ‘disastrous situation’ 
8 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1916-17:1160; Schepenvorderingswet 1917:9.
9 Petition of Handelsvereeniging te Batavia to Van Limburg Stirum, 4-7-1917, NA, Kol. 
Geheim, Mr. 1917/194x; Voogd 1914:69.
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if the tonnage which was still available were to decrease even more.0 How 
far the new powers of the government in The Hague would reach was not 
yet clear. Some reports suggested that the new act would allow the govern-
ment to requisition 75 per cent of the tonnage, others spoke about 75 per cent 
of the tonnage of freighters and 5 per cent of that of mail boats. The most 
pessimistic view was that the government would demand 100 per cent of the 
tonnage. As always when The Hague took decisions which displeased the 
Dutch colonial community, there was much grumbling about people living 
far away in Holland who were ignorant about the situation in the Netherlands 
Indies but nevertheless took decisions without any effort to consult people in 
the Netherlands Indies in advance and without taking colonial interests into 
account. The Governor General and his advisers also did not know what lay 
in store. They had to wait for news from The Hague. 
Trading associations, chambers of commerce, estate organizations, the 
Nederlandsch-Indisch Landbouwsyndicaat (Netherlands Indies Agricultural 
Syndicate), and representatives of shipping companies appealed to the 
Governor General and to Parliament in The Hague not to decrease the ton-
nage available in the Netherlands Indies even more, and to take the interests of 
colonial trade into consideration. This was to become a standard phrase, and 
the negative consequences of a drop in export for the indigenous population. 
The head-offices of colonial firms in Holland joined the protests. They pointed 
out that the requisitioning of ships was responsible for the drop in exports 
from the Netherlands Indies from about 1.5 million tons in 1915 to 900,000 tons 
in 1916. In a petition to Parliament, they stressed that were requisitioning to 
be continued the trading houses would not be the only ones to suffer. Estates, 
with their hundreds of thousands of labourers, would be forced to dismiss 
part of their workforce. The outcome would be a ‘depression among the native 
population’. It was also noted that the first to suffer would be the native pro-
ducers of colonial wares. They had no storage facilities and sold their product 
immediately after harvest. The appeals were met with stony silence. The only 
reaction was a promise by the Ministry of the Colonies that there was no pros-
pect of the requisition of the total tonnage of the Dutch merchant fleet and that 
a regular shipping between motherland and colony would be maintained. The 
assurance was too vaguely worded to appease the commercial community. It 
was generally considered to be too vague and only resulted in more unease in 
the Netherlands Indies.1 
A Schepenvorderingswet (Ships’ Requisitioning Act) was promulgated in 
February. The act gave Posthuma the authority to requisition all Dutch ocean-
0 De Locomotief, 1-1-1917.
1 Report 1917 Vereeniging van Landbouw en Nijverheid in Djember, cited in De Locomotief, 
16-4-1918; Schepenvorderingswet 1917:14-5, 19.
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going ships to carry imports to Holland, irrespective of the port at which they 
were anchored. Responding to his critics, Posthuma pointed out the extraordi-
nary profits being made by ship-owners who refused to take national interests 
into account. He promised that for the time being mail boats would remain 
exempt from requisition.
The reason that requisitioning of ships created such an uproar in colonial 
commercial and estate circles was not that ships were used to transport food 
to Holland. The need for this was recognized. The fact that, besides grain from 
the United States, Rangoon rice from Burma had to be shipped to Holland was 
difficult to swallow in the Netherlands Indies. There, a businessman wrote, 
‘beautiful Java rice’ was rotting in ports, presumably because there was much 
more money in Burma rice for Dutch rice-mills. The beautiful Java rice lying 
rotting concerned a shipment bought by the British in November 1916. Most of 
it could not be shipped, initially because the British government requisitioned 
part of the tonnage of the ocean freighter destined to transport the rice, and 
thereupon because Batavia refused to extend the export permit.
The Burma rice was a minor detail. What roused indignation was the 
suspicion that the Dutch government had requisitioned Dutch freighters 
for purely financial reasons. People in the Netherlands Indies protested that 
Scandinavian or American vessels could easily have been chartered, but that 
the Dutch government had baulked at the cost. By opting for the cheapest 
solution, The Hague had deprived – robbed was another word used – the 
Netherlands Indies of valuable tonnage.4 A newspaper in Semarang spoke 
about ‘the shipping scandal’. Its editor was enraged by the fact that to save the 
Dutch Treasury money, Posthuma had brought the Netherlands Indies to the 
brink of a crash. The trading houses in the Netherlands Indies would certainly 
have voluntarily collected up the money Posthuma had saved had they known 
in advance that money was the reason. But, ‘this is precisely the dreadfulness, 
the reason for ire in this case, because nobody here knew exactly [...] why 
the Netherlands Indies had been so cruelly abandoned by the motherland, 
was therefore heavily damaged, was so shamefully neglected’.5 Members of 
the Dutch Senate agreed. Van Kol concluded that the Dutch government had 
to share responsibility for the tonnage problem because it had requisitioned 
Dutch freighters at a time when there had still been neutral steamers for char-
ter: ‘The Indies, however, had no voice and the guardian decided over the 
ward and withheld from it ships to which it was entitled’.6
 Schepenvorderingswet 1917:11, 1.
 Schepenvorderingswet 1917:99.
4 Algemeen Handelsblad, cited in De Indische Gids 1917, II:154-5. 
5 De Nieuwe Courant, cited in De Indische Gids 1917, II:1595.
6 Handelingen Eerste Kamer 1917-18:156
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To demonstrate how serious the consequences of requisitioning would be, 
the newly founded Vereeniging voor de Studie van Koloniaal-Maatschappelijke 
Vraagstukken (Society for the Study of Colonial Social Questions) set up an 
inquiry among sixty leading commercial figures in the colony in January 1917. 
They, Emil Helfferich was one of them, were asked to give their opinion about 
the consequences for the colonial export and estate sector, for the indigenous 
producers of export wares, and for the Chinese and Arab middlemen, of the 
requisitioning of freighters.7 One of the conclusions was that the indigenous 
producer for the export market would suffer most. One respondent pointed 
out that one of the reasons for this was that natives lived from hand to mouth 
and did not build up financial reserves.8
In the Netherlands Indies, the requisitioning of ships was seen as yet 
another example of the Cinderella treatment of the colony by policy makers 
in Holland, who were unfamiliar with colonial circumstances. Fears were 
expressed that the feeding of Holland would be given undue preference to 
the detriment of international colonial trade, because people in Holland were 
unacquainted with the needs of the Netherlands Indies. Regular exports 
of colonial wares were vital. The economy of the Netherlands and of the 
Netherlands Indies depended on colonial trade.9 A Member of Parliament in 
Holland, who shared this view, pointed out that Holland had a population of 
6 million people, the Netherlands Indies one of 40 million. Were exports from 
the Netherlands Indies to grind to a halt, ‘want and famine’ in the colony 
would be the inexorable result.40 This was where the real centre of gravity lay 
in the weighing up of the pros and cons which had to be made. Not – as the 
board of the Study Society accused Posthuma to underline his ignorance of 
colonial economic relations – that between a hungry Holland and a few trad-
ing houses in the Netherlands Indies. Many in the colony, first and foremost 
the indigenous population, would face dire poverty if colonial exports came 
to a halt.41
The commercial communities in Batavia and Semarang protested. Their 
members suggested to allow for scope for the continuation of exports from 
the Netherlands Indies, a maximum volume of tonnage that could be requisi-
tioned for the shipping of food to Holland should be fixed.4 Upset ‘interested 
parties in trade and shipping’ met in protest in Batavia at the end of July 1917. 
7 Schepenvorderingswet 1917:. 
8 Schepenvorderingswet 1917:47.
9 Handelsvereeniging te Batavia to Van Limburg Stirum, 4-7-1917, NA, Kol. Geheim, Mr. 
1917/194x.
40 Schepenvorderingswet 1917:5.
41 Schepenvorderingswet 1917:78, 80.
4 Report 1917 Handelsvereeniging te Semarang, cited in De Locomotief, 10-5-1918.
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A six-page petition was drawn up.4 Arguing that ‘Greater Netherlands’ inter-
ests’ should not be sacrificed for those of the motherland, the petition spoke of 
a ‘serious concern about the nearest future’, not only regarding the estates but 
also the colony at large. If the export and production of colonial wares came to 
a halt, native exporters would suffer and hundreds of thousands of labourers 
would lose their income. The result would be a ‘very difficult domestic situa-
tion’. All this meant that the requisitioning of ships in the Netherlands Indies 
could not be left to the tender mercies of Posthuma, who was said to have 
little affinity with colonial affairs. The petitioners deemed it necessary that 
Van Limburg Stirum be consulted in advance. On the same day, the Planters 
Association of Deli and the Association of Rubber Planters at the East Coast of 
Sumatra drew up a petition of a similar purport. They asked for more freight-
ers, absolutely not fewer, to sail to San Francisco.44 Other protests came from 
the boards of trading firms and estate companies located in Holland: 196 in 
total. Later, in June, the Rotterdam Chamber of Commerce sent a deputation 
to Posthuma to convince him of the importance of colonial trade.
Pleyte tried to reassure the business community at the end of August by 
wiring Van Limburg Stirum that for the time being Posthuma did not consider 
the requisitioning of ships in Asian waters.45 Belying these words, The Hague 
demanded freighters to ship rice and coffee to Holland for Dutch soldiers in 
the closing months of 1917. These ships were, in the words of the day, ‘requi-
sitioned by Posthuma’.
To the great frustration of the trading community in the Netherlands 
Indies requisitioned Dutch ships awaiting orders often lay idle in Dutch and 
other ports for a considerable time, for months even. They were not sent from 
Holland to Asia to assist in the export of colonial wares. It was considered a 
clear sign of how little thought was expended on the interests of the colony by 
the decision makers in Holland. In the Netherlands Indies ships also tarried 
in port for a long time. Batavia was given to understand that these could have 
sailed to British India, China, or Japan and back. The fact that this had not hap-
pened was a tremendous shame in view of the ‘emergency in the Netherlands’ 
and the extra financial loss to exporters, who had to spend extra money for 
storage.46 
The Hague and Batavia were not the only culprits to be blamed for the 
delays in the sailing of ships. The British government was a complicating fac-
4 Engels to Van Limburg Stirum, 5-7-1917, NA, Kol. Geheim, Mr. 1917/194x.
44 Deli Plantersvereeniging to Van Limburg Stirum, 4-7-1917, NA, Kol. Geheim, Mr. 
1917/194x.
45 General secretary to NIPA and Aneta, 0-8-1917, NA, Kol. Geheim, Mr. 1917/194x.
46 Handelsvereeniging Soerabaja to Van Limburg Stirum, 5-1-1918, NA, Kol. Geheim, Mr. 
1918/110x.
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tor. In Batavia, the British Consul General made it clear that he had the final 
say in the sailing of merchantmen to Holland. In January 1918, after learning 
about the requisitions the new Consul General, W.N. Dunn, assured the agent 
of the Nederland that he had been authorized by his government to assist 
‘in a manner which will obviate delays’.47 But before he gave his consent, he 
demanded lists of the exporters, of the products shipped, and of the consign-
ees in Holland. He made it plain that only after he had received approval from 
London would ships be allowed to depart for Europe.48
In November 1916 Dutch ships, which could no longer sail around the Cape 
of Good Hope because of bunkering problems, had started to use the Suez 
Canal again. It was a nerve wrecking voyage. One of the ships to do so was 
the Sindoro, which had sailed on  January 1917. In his travel report Abdoel 
Moeis relates how nervous the passengers were when the Sindoro was in the 
Mediterranean Sea. At night passengers left the doors of their cabins open or 
slept with their lifebelt on. Others were afraid to go to their cabins. They tried 
to sleep on deck but could not because it was too cold.
Any idea of a direct shipping link between Holland and the Netherlands 
Indies was abandoned after Berlin, deliberately taking the risk that European 
neutrals including the Netherlands might join the Allied camp, decided to 
resume an all-out submarine war in January 1917. Convinced such economic 
isolation would bring Great Britain to its knees, the German Navy declared 
unrestricted submarine warfare. German submarines would sink all neutral 
merchantmen bound for enemy territory. Sailing to the United States was 
confined to a small ‘free or safe channel’, where neutral merchantmen would 
not be attacked. In the ‘forbidden zone’, the Sperrgebiet, which was compared 
with the no man’s land between trenches by Berlin, all shipping was at risk of 
being torpedoed. One Dutch ferry a day was allowed between Flushing and 
Harwich.49 Dutch ships bound for the United States were now forced to sail 
almost due north through a channel to the Norwegian coast. To the left of this 
lurked German submarines. To the right was an area teeming with German 
and British mines. Having reached the Norwegian coast, ships turned west in 
the direction of the United States. 
No such safe channel was arranged through the Straits of Gibraltar and the 
Mediterranean, effectively closing route through the Suez Canal for the rest of 
the war. At that moment one Dutch ship, the Prinses Juliana, had just reached 
Port Said on her way to Holland. She returned to the Netherlands Indies. 
Passengers were given the choice of sailing back to the Netherlands Indies or 
47 Dunn to Van den Bosch, 0-1-1918, NA, Kol. Geheim, Mr. 1918/59x.
48 Van den Bosch to General Secretariat, 4--1918, NA, Kol. Geheim, Mr. 1918/59x.
49 Halpern 1994:40; De Locomotief, 0-11-1917.
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continuing their journey on a non-Dutch ship at their own risk. Freight was 
unloaded at the ports where it had originally been taken aboard. In retrospect, 
the Dutch Ministry of the Colonies wrote that the announcement presented a 
‘great hindrance to shipping’.50 
The telegram stating that Germany had declared ‘a merciless submarine 
war’ was published in bold type in newspapers in the Netherlands Indies.51 
People there thought that the German measure was primarily directed against 
Dutch shipping.5 Despite the athmosphere of doom and gloom some could 
detect one bright side. Great Britain might allow Dutch ships to sail the 
Atlantic Ocean without obliging them to call in at a British port. When it was 
erroneously reported that London had indeed done so, De Locomotief wrote 
that Great Britain had saved colonial shipping.5 From The Hague the Minister 
of the Colonies sent a telegram to the Governor General issuing a blanket 
prohibition on the sailing of all ships. The Kawi, which was already on her 
way, was forced to remain in Padang. Freight traffic with Europe was tempo-
rarily halted. In the newspapers in the Netherlands Indies it was announced 
that no cargo for Holland would any longer be accepted. The Nederland and 
Rotterdamsche Lloyd also announced that for the time being freighters only 
would sail from Holland to the Netherlands Indies. The route they would take 
was through the Panama Canal. In Holland the head offices of the Nederland 
and the Rotterdamsche Lloyd cancelled all contracts and announced an 
adjustment to passenger and freight prices to cover the extra costs the long-
er sea voyage entailed. Indignation in the commercial community in the 
Netherlands Indies was the result (Cramer 1916-17:410; Hogesteeger 1995:71-
). De Locomotief wrote that the shipping companies could only get away with 
such a breach of contract because exporters were completely dependent on 
them.54
It must also have come as a shock when the Nederland and the 
Rotterdamsche Lloyd announced the discontinuation of passenger service a 
few days later and ordered their agents in the Netherlands Indies to cancel all 
bookings and to refund fares already paid. Within days yet another report was 
published in the newspapers alleging that a system to open a passenger serv-
ice via the United States in which the passengers would have to travel between 
New York and San Francisco by rail was under consideration. Civil servants 
who had resigned in the expectation that they could travel to Holland were 
promised that wherever possible they could take up their former position 
50 Koloniaal verslag 1918:0-4.
51 De Locomotief, --1917.
5 De Locomotief, --1917.
5 De Locomotief, 15--1917.
54 De Locomotief, 6--1917.
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again. All leaves of absence of civil servants who intended to travel to Europe 
were initially deferred. A few weeks, later when the possibility for passenger 
transport via the United States was opened Batavia magnanimously allowed 
its civil servants who, as an announcement of the Governor General phrased 
this, still wanted to spend their leave in Europe ‘despite the serious drawbacks 
which encumbered the journey in the present situation journey’, to take this 
route.55 This was as far as its graciousness extended. It refused to compen-
sate for the extra costs travelling via the United States. Batavia only paid the 
full fare for civil servants and officers who had retired, whose contract had 
expired, or who needed medical treatment in Holland. The fare for the rail 
journey to New York would be paid by the Dutch Consul in San Francisco. 
Some adventurous persons even tried to reach Europe via China and Siberia. 
De Locomotief predicted war. Its editor could understand that Berlin wanted 
to enforce as complete a blockade of Great Britain as London wanted to cut it 
off, but feared that, contrary to the British blockade, its German counterpart 
would only be much more hazardous to neutral ships. When neutral freight-
ers were sunk, the neutral countries might well unite and declare war on the 
Continental Powers. The newspaper also noted that ‘resentment and bitter-
ness [...] knew no bounds’. As on other occasions, when new measures of 
the belligerents hurt at the interests of the Netherlands and its colony, people 
clamoured for war. The editor could not understand this. War with Great 
Britain would mean the end of the Netherlands Indies, war with Germany 
would bring the ‘bloody downfall of the motherland’.56 Nevertheless, all this 
was tinged with admiration. Impressed by the accomplishments of this ‘guer-
rilla war at sea,’ advocates of a strengthening of the colonial fleet adduced 
submarines as a major asset for the defence of the Netherlands Indies (Van 
Heutsz 1917a:19).
Not everyone was brimming with such belligerence. For a moment it 
seemed that the anxiety which had gripped the colony in August 1914 had 
reappeared. There was hunger for news. At the end of March the Bataviaasch 
Nieuwsblad announced that it would publish a morning edition for the dura-
tion of the war.57 Shops prepared for a run which did not materialize on a large 
scale. What did happen was that, calculating that imported goods might rise 
in prices significantly, Chinese traders tried to buy up the stores of European 
shops whose owners, expecting the same, usually refused to sell the bulk of 
their stock. As in other times of heightened political tension, all kinds of sce-
narios and rumours were banded around. After the United States had severed 
diplomatic relations with Germany on  February, one of these had it that the 
55 De Locomotief, 1--1917.
56 De Locomotief, --1917.
57 De Locomotief, 9--1917.
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two countries were at war and that the Netherlands had joined in on the side 
of the United Stated. To prepare for the worst ambulance classes were organ-
ized again. From Banjermasin in Borneo it was reported with some pride that 
women attended shooting practices with revolvers and Mauser rifles.58 
With the prospect of war well and truly in the offing people established 
branches of Onze Vloot and Indië Weerbaar and launched new membership 
drives for the volunteer corps. The army decided to contribute to the uniform 
of the volunteer corps. The handing out of shoes was considered especially 
important. In the past, poor people had not joined up because they had not 
wanted to ‘wear out their only pair of shoes by marching in terrain befouled 
with mud and stumbling over stones’.59 Je Maintiendrai came to the assistance 
of the Medan volunteer corps. Membership of the corps rose to 400 in 1917. 
When, still in 1917, indigenous Indonesians were admitted to the Medan vol-
unteer corps (but only to the legally allowed one-quarter of the total strength) 
membership swelled to 600. At that time it had probably become one of the 
best trained and best equipped corps. In February 1918 the colonial army 
allowed it to use three machine-guns.
Batavia also was goaded into action. The authorities had already found out 
that the Marie, which had entered the port of Tanjung Priok in May 1916, was 
not a German-owned ship but a prize. Nevertheless it had not taken action 
and had not interned her crew as international law required. Now, suddenly, 
the Navy confiscated the vessel and its crew was ordered to disembark, but 
was not interned. De Locomotief reported that they were well looked after by 
the shipping company.60 
The Kawi was the first mail boat which took the route through the Panama 
Canal. She left Padang in Sumatra in the middle of February 1917 and arrived 
in Rotterdam on 5 June. The Kawi had sailed via Japan to San Francisco. 
From there she had taken the Panama Canal to Newsport News near Norfolk, 
Virginia. She remained anchored in Newsport News for seven weeks. After 
a second delay of a week in Halifax, Nova Scotia, in Canada, the base of the 
British North American Naval Squadron and the port the British had decided 
where Europe-bound neutral ships could best be checked on cargo and pas-
sengers, the Kawi finally crossed the Atlantic Ocean. She in total sailed almost 
19,000 English miles, 10,000 more than had she taken the route via the Suez 
Canal (Hogesteeger 1995:7).
The Kawi was also the last passenger ship from the Netherlands Indies to 
pass through the Panama Canal. The all-out submarine war had made sailing 
the Atlantic Ocean too hazardous to risk expensive ships. From March 1917 
58 De Locomotief, 16--1917.
59 De Locomotief, 0--1917.
60 De Locomotief, 15--1917.
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mail boats from the Netherlands Indies sailed only to San Francisco. From San 
Francisco passengers had to travel on to New York by train. There, if lucky, 
they could board a ship to Holland. Passengers from Holland had to travel 
overland from New York to San Francisco. Shipping and the mail connection 
between Holland and the Netherlands Indies had become highly irregular. 
Nobody could any longer have any inkling how long a voyage would take. 
In ports in Holland it became an ‘event’ when a ship from the Netherlands 
Indies put in.
Dutch shipping had become so disrupted by the war at sea being waged by 
the British and the Germans that even the crippled link between motherland 
and colony was presented as an achievement. The report about 1917 given 
by Pleyte to the Dutch Parliament proudly stated that because of this ‘new 
passenger line’, it had been possible to ‘maintain the connection between the 
Netherlands and the Netherlands Indies under the national flag’. The report 
did not mention that not all had run as smoothly as these words indicated. 
Once passengers had arrived in New York or San Francisco, all they could 
do was hope that a ship was available for their onward journey, and that she 
would indeed sail. After they had taken the train to New York, passengers 
who had left Java at the end of May on board the Tjisondari discovered that 
there was no onward connection to Holland. In their distress they founded 
an Association of Stranded Dutch People. In vain they looked for help. They 
turned to the Dutch Consul, who referred them to the British Consul, who 
in turn advised them to contact the Dutch Envoy in London. Recalling how 
in comparable circumstances Dutch shipping had come to the assistance of 
stranded Americans in Europe after the outbreak of the war made no impres-
sion. Most decided that it was best not to try to travel on to Holland but to 
return to Java.
Likewise, only two Dutch passenger ships were available for the onward 
voyage to Java for the 1,500 passengers of the Nieuw-Amsterdam who had 
arrived in New York in February 1918. Each could carry only one hundred 
passengers. Those fortunate enough to travel on reported that the ‘rest of the 
journey was very enjoyable, the weather was good and the food on board was 
excellent’.61 The others had to wait patiently. Some took passage to Singapore 
on American ships, others first boarded a Japanese ship to Hong Kong, where 
they transferred to a British ship bound for Singapore. For many, including 
those travelling in the opposite direction, the long delay meant that they had 
a ‘hard time’ (Van Heekeren 1918:19). Sea travel had become a source of anxi-
ety for passengers and their families. Passengers were not sure when their ship 
would finally arrive. Family and friends were left in the dark for weeks about 
61 De Locomotief, -4-1918.
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where the ship was. They began to worry in earnest when the ship did not 
reach port at the planned date of arrival. Telegrams sent to New York about 
the fate of the ship remained unanswered.
The entry of the United States in the war in April 1917 made travelling even 
more difficult. To prevent German spies or couriers from entering the country, 
immigration rules were tightened. When rumours spread that Germans had 
attempted to smuggle in poison to destroy the American harvest, the exami-
nation of disembarking passengers became only the more stringent. Drinks, 
powders, toothpaste, soap, and medicines were confiscated because German 
poison might be concealed in such goods. Onward passengers had to part 
temporarily with papers and books, which were bundled and forwarded to 
San Francisco or New York.
Except with a special permission in May 1917 ‘natives’ from the Netherlands 
Indies were no longer permitted to enter the country. The American definition 
of natives included Europeans born in the colony, which must have come as 
a shock to many of them. When the Ministry of the Colonies in The Hague 
learned about the strict American immigration rules, it was assailed by fears 
that on their return journey to Java the members of the Indië Weerbaar depu-
tation could well fall victim to the new American immigration policy. The 
American government was contacted to ensure that Rhemrev, Abdoel Moeis, 
and the other members could travel on from New York to San Francisco 
without encountering any problems. Washington consented. For other people 
born in the Netherlands Indies, even when they were civil servants, no excep-
tion was made. Further careful negotiations were pursued before Washington 
finally promised to make an exception in the American immigration rules for 
Dutch civil servants who had not been born in Holland and for first-class pas-
sengers. 
The lengthy reports and letters sent to and fro by mail between Pleyte and 
Van Limburg Stirum had to follow the same time-consuming and precarious 
route. A special courier guarded the mail on the train journey between San 
Francisco and New York. One of the consequences was that the Ministry of the 
Colonies in The Hague was deprived of the information which – for legal and 
bureaucratic reasons – it needed to formulate policy, including the drafting of 
the colonial budget. Batavia had to do without detailed consultation with The 




All circumstances considered, the Netherlands fared reasonably well during 
the first two years of the war. Most pleasing was that the export of agricultural 
produce proved a gold mine. In Holland shipping and agriculture prospered, 
while the ‘OW’er’ or war profiteer made its appearance as an accepted term in 
Dutch language. In the course of 1916 most of the committees which had been 
established at the outbreak of the war to support the destitute were disbanded. 
The stated reason was that unemployment had dropped and was no longer a 
serious problem. In Batavia, the Central Committee for Relief of the Destitute 
in Holland and the Netherlands Indies followed the trend in November. The 
16,000 guilders it still had in hand went to the Red Cross in the Netherlands 
Indies.
In the Netherlands Indies too the overall picture in 1915 and 1916 was 
not as bad as had initially been predicted. Far away from the battlefields, the 
Netherlands Indies remained ‘the most blessed place on God’s earth’ (Van 
Heekeren 1919b:139). The gloomy picture many people in Holland and the 
Netherlands Indies had sketched in August 1914 never eventuated. After the 
outbreak of the war, estates and other companies had fired staff, or had cut 
their salary. Nevertheless, the number of Europeans who had lost their job had 
remained small, and should be counted in the dozens, not in hundreds. In 1915 
and 1916 domestic trade in a number of regions in the Netherlands Indies, but 
not all, recovered from the recession in the closing months in 1914. 
The high prices estate products fetched abroad presented a rosy picture. 
At the Exchange in Batavia, which had partly reopened in April 1915 and had 
become fully operational again in November of the same year, prices had soon 
recovered. In early 1916 it was noted with some satisfaction ‘how unexpect-
edly well the stock market, of course following that in the motherland, had 
overcome the crisis which had looked so threatening.’1 In its report for 1916-
1917 the Javasche Bank remarked that profits were high. With respect to sugar 
1 Report Department of Agriculture, Industry and Trade, cited in De Locomotief, 28-3-1916.
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they were ‘even splendid’.2 The value of exports increased from 614 million 
guilders in 1913 to 854 million guilders in 1916 (Lovink 1919:13). Overlooked 
in the jubilation was that the good performance of the colonial export sector 
could be attributed to one or two products. In Semarang, to give an exam-
ple, the value of exports rose in 1916 by 25.5 million guilders, but the major 
reason for this had been an increase in the export of sugar by 20.75 million 
guilders.3
In view of the excellent performance of the sugar industry, a special sugar 
tax was introduced in the Netherlands Indies in July 1916. The tax never 
became effective. In October Batavia announced that the sugar tax would not 
be levied because the government preferred a general war profit tax. As so 
many other economic and financial decisions the war profit tax triggered off a 
bitter debate in the colony. A war profit tax of 30 per cent was instituted in both 
the Netherlands and the Netherlands Indies. People felt that they were being 
treated unfairly by the mother country. The crux of the matter was that the act 
on war profits promulgated in 1916 in The Hague stipulated that war profits 
of companies which were active in the Netherlands Indies (or in Suriname 
and the Netherlands Antilles) but had their headquarters in Holland would 
be taxed in the mother country. Consequently, the regulation on war profit 
tax in the Netherlands Indies of 1917 exempted such companies from paying 
war profit tax levied in the colony. The war profit tax they paid in Holland 
had to be divided equally between colony and mother country. People in the 
Netherlands Indies argued that such a construction was unfair. The colony 
was entitled to all taxes on war profits made in the Netherlands Indies and not 
just to half of them. By an overwhelming majority, the People’s Council passed 
a motion to this effect.4 
In the closing months of 1916 conditions deteriorated. By 1917 the picture 
had changed completely. In Holland industry was hit by a shortage of coal and 
raw materials, forcing factories to close down. Committees to support the des-
titute once again gained prominence. People took to the streets to demonstrate 
against dearth of food. The reports in the newspapers of the Netherlands 
Indies about the dire economic conditions in Holland were so alarming that 
in February 1917 Van Limburg Stirum asked by wire for confirmation of 
the news carried and he suggested that telegrams to the Netherlands Indies 
should be censored to avoid any unnecessary commotion there. Pleyte issued 
instructions to this effect. He hastened to assure Van Limburg Stirum that 
conditions in Holland were not as bad as they appeared. There had only been 
2 Annual report of the Javasche Bank over 1916-1917, cited in Helfferich 1917.
3 Report 1917 Handelsvereeniging Semarang, cited in De Locomotief, 1-5-1918.
4 Volksraad 1918:523.
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‘insignificant disturbances incited by anarchists’.5
In the Netherlands Indies, the estate sector and the trading companies, and 
not just the Dutch- and German-owned ones, but also their British and French 
counterparts, were not spared the negative consequences of the war. The same 
can be said about native producers, usually hit even harder than the European 
ones. A combination of factors was at work. Trade restrictions imposed by the 
Allied Powers and the NOT played a role as did differential im- and export 
duties imposed in Great Britain and its colonies and possessions to discourage 
neutral trade. The dangers posed by the German submarine war also cannot 
be excluded from the equation. Most important of all, however, and increas-
ingly so, was the lack of tonnage. The number of ships available was no longer 
enough to transport all exports from the Netherlands Indies. Stocks piled up. 
Warehouses in the ports and on the estates could no longer accommodate the 
growing stocks. At the end of 1916, the volume of products which could not be 
shipped was estimated to have reached a value of over 100 million guilders. 
One of the products to suffer was coffee. Initially, coffee had been one of 
the few products which could be imported freely into Holland. Re-exports 
to Germany and Austria-Hungary had guaranteed good prices. The turning 
point came in the middle of 1916 when the NOT restricted the import of the 
coffee ready for shipment to Holland to 30 per cent. No alternative markets 
were found. Prices fell. Robusta coffee, which at the start of 1916 had still 
fetched 100 guilders per picul, at the end of the year fetched no more than 
32.50 guilders per picul. The price of Java coffee displayed a similar pattern. 
As traders had bought large quantities of coffee against a considerably higher 
price, the financial losses were great. Inevitably native producers suffered. 
Though the NOT tried to reserve part of the quotum to what was designated 
native coffee, preference was given to the import of prime class quality coffee. 
In 1916 about half a million picul of the coffee harvest could not be shipped.
The export of tea, mainly produced in West Java, was another victim. At the 
beginning of 1916 the importers of tea in Holland were only allowed to sell to a 
restricted number of firms in Holland. These had all been selected by a special 
tea commission which had been forced upon the tea importers by the NOT 
At the end of the year the tea trade was hurt even more grievously by what 
the Ministry of the Colonies described as ‘orders received from the NOT’. 
Shipping companies were no longer allowed to transport tea to Holland.
The export of sugar began to decline at the end of 1916. The sugar industry 
feared the worst. Leaders of the Suikerbond, the union of those employed on 
sugar estates, told their members in February 1917 that ‘they were on the eve 
5 Pleyte to Van Limburg Stirum, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 12-2-1917 L3.
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of a crisis, so serious as to be only rarely experienced’.6 One of the reasons 
for the decline was that Great Britain began to import Cuban sugar. Cuban 
sugar was more expensive, but fetching Cuban sugar saved Great Britain 
sailing time and thus tonnage. The consequences in the Netherlands Indies 
were all the more serious because sugar had become an object of speculation. 
Because of the excellent price prospects traders, many of them Chinese, had 
bought millions of piculs of the 1917 sugar harvest in advance. They ran into 
grave financial difficulties when prices dropped in January 1917. Bankruptcies 
followed. The larger sugar producers tried to act in concert to prevent a 
further fall of prices. They established a Javasuiker-Vereeniging (Java Sugar 
Association). 129 of the 185 sugar factories joined (Lovink 1919:4). The new 
association could not prevent a further decline, though prices did not drop as 
much as they might have done. The main fly in the ointment was the way in 
which business was done. Because consultation with Holland was necessary, it 
had taken months before the association had been able to take concrete steps. 
Another reason for the failure was the producers who had not joined and were 
not bound by its rules, and even some of those who had done so refused to 
follow the directions issued by the association.
A ‘sugar crisis’ evolved. One-third of the 1917 sugar harvest remained 
unsold.7 The government was forced to build special warehouses in Semarang 
and Surabaya for the storage of sugar. As nobody had ever had any experience 
with the storage of large quantities of sugar over a longer period of time all 
kinds of problems were the result. During the rainy season the high humidity 
in sheds, which were not equipped with the right type of either roof or floor, 
affected the quality of the stored sugar.
A similar story can be told about copra. Trade had already suffered after 
copra had been declared conditionally contraband in April 1915 and the 
NOT had restricted imports in Holland to 10,000 tons a month. To ease the 
consequences, oil factories were built in the Netherlands Indies, but this only 
provided a partial relief. Huge stocks piled up in ports. As in the case of sugar, 
high humidity took its toll. Hordes of hungry beetles devouring the pulp 
caused additional damage.
Tobacco growers and exporters likewise experienced storage problems. In 
the course of 1916 an ‘intolerable situation’ emerged. Because of diminishing 
demand abroad tobacco lost its status as choice cargo. Stocks began to pile up 
because of a lack of shipping opportunities. In January 1917 worried tobacco 
planters who feared an imminent calamity met in Surabaya. In an address to 
Batavia, they pointed out that a production stop would be disastrous. Knowing 
6 De Locomotief, 16-2-1917.
7 Koloniaal verslag 1919:255-6.
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that it was a problem in which the colonial government took a close interest 
the planters scrupulously mentioned the consequences for the local popula-
tion. Hundreds of thousands of Indonesians and hundreds of Europeans 
would be deprived of their means of livelihood. Financial damage would run 
into 80 million guilders, more than half of which had to be borne by the local 
population. In order the convince the government of what was at stake it was 
– as had been done in August 1914 – stressed that unrest would be a likely 
outcome. Subversive elements and revolutionaries would certainly exploit the 
miserable circumstances. Batavia had to come to the rescue to assure contin-
ued production through the advance of loans to the estates and the building of 
warehouses in which to store the crop.8 The planters also pleaded for govern-
ment intervention in the shipping of tropical products. If necessary, freighters 
would have to be requisitioned. Fearing a disaster, Batavia issued an appeal to 
the Javanese small farmers to limit the planting of tobacco as much as possible. 
They should concentrate on the growing of rice, maize and other food crops. 
Doing so would provide them with a smaller, but more stable income. The 
Javanese tobacco planters who had been lured by the good price for tobacco 
in the previous years disregarded the government’s warning.9
At the end of 1916, only one-third of the tobacco harvest had been shipped.10 
It was a disastrous development. The quality of tobacco depreciates rapidly if 
it is stored in a tropical climate for a longer period. To make matters worse: the 
carbon disulphide used to combat diseases could no longer be applied because 
Japan had forbidden its export.
Apart from world-wide lack of tonnage part of the problem was caused by 
a hardening of the attitude of London and Paris engendered by the grow-
ing annoyance in the Allied countries about Dutch policy and the way in 
which The Hague responded to conflicting pressure from Great Britain and 
Germany. The Dutch government had irritated London almost from the first 
day of the war when the refusal to allow armed British freighters to enter 
Dutch ports as innocent vessels had angered British politicians. A further wave 
of indignation was created by Dutch exports to Germany. In 1916 the British 
Foreign Office began to point out that the Netherlands was following a policy 
which benefited Germany and which was ‘anything but friendly’ towards 
Great Britain.11 From that moment on, forced to do so by London, the Dutch 
government professed economic neutrality as well. If potatoes or cheese were 
exported to Germany, an equal amount had to go to Great Britain. At the end 
8 De Indische Gids 1917, II:960-1.
9 Koloniaal verslag 1917:xx; Verslag 1917:1124. 
10 Cramer 1916-17:408; Schepenvorderingswet 1917:44.
11 Cecil to Townley, 24-10-1917, PRO FO 800 195.
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of 1917 Cort van der Linden would state in an interview with an American 
journalist of the United Press Association, that the Netherlands always did its 
best to divide Dutch exports equally among the belligerents.12
This left the problem of transportation, especially after the German Navy 
resumed its all-out submarine war in January 1917. After Berlin’s decision had 
been made public, Dutch ships in Europe fled to whatever port they could. 
For a time Dutch – and other neutral – shipping in the Atlantic came to a 
complete halt. The vacillation of Dutch shipping companies about allowing 
their freighters to sail added to the indignation in Great Britain aroused by 
the Dutch attitude in the war. To Viscount Edgar Algernon Robert Gascoyne 
Cecil of Chelwood, the parliamentary undersecretary for Foreign Affairs and 
British Minister of Blockade, the behaviour of the Dutch government and that 
of the Dutch ship-owners was unforgivable. He was adamant that the German 
submarine campaign should not succeed in preventing neutral merchantmen 
from sailing to Allied ports. To accomplish this, Cecil was in favour of increas-
ing the pressure exerted on neutral countries; taking for granted the chance 
that public opinion in neutral countries might turn against the British.13 He 
counted it a great achievement that Great Britain had been able to persuade 
Norwegian and Danish merchantmen to resume sailing. Dutch and Swedish 
ships should do the same. Dutch merchantmen in British ports, also in Asia 
and Australia, were not allowed to sail home till trade with Great Britain had 
been resumed. Dutch people in the Netherlands Indies had no inkling of 
what was happening when they heard that Dutch ships had been arrested in 
Singapore and Penang. The intensification of the German submarine war pro-
vided one explanation. When the Melchior Treub was ordered not to sail on to 
Singapore but to return to Belawan and when other Dutch freighters were also 
ordered not to leave that port, people speculated that German submarines had 
been sighted near Singapore and that Germany had extended its submarine 
war to Asia. When it dawned on the people that Dutch vessels were forbidden 
to leave Singapore and Penang, people in the Netherlands Indies could only 
relate this to a new export ban on rice or on all foodstuffs which they assumed 
had been instituted by the British colonial authorities. 
The arrests were a clear warning. In Asia the Dutch ships were allowed to 
sail again after some time but London was determined not to lose too much 
neutral tonnage in Europe. Steamers of the northern neutrals were allowed to 
sail from ports in Great Britain only if the destination was an Allied port. Were 
freighters bound for a neutral port, their captains had to promise that after-
wards their ships would carry cargo to an Allied port. Merchantmen could sail 
to a home port if another ship of approximately the same tonnage – in Dutch 
12 De Locomotief, 3-12-1917.
13 Cecil to Townley, 7-11-1917, PRO FO 800 195.
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called ruilschepen (exchange ships) – put to sea to sail to an Allied port.
At the end of February some Dutch freighters finally ventured out. Six of 
them on their way from Falmouth in Cornwall to Holland were torpedoed 
when they entered the Channel. The German government had been prepared 
to allow the ships to sail in safety, but because of a faulty wireless receiver, 
one German U-boat operating in the waters between Great Britain and the 
Netherlands had not received the orders countermanding attacks. To com-
pensate for the loss, at the suggestion of the Dutch government Berlin was 
prepared to open negotiations for the putting of six of the German ships of 
approximately the same value in mothballs in the Netherlands Indies, among 
them the Linden and Gernis, at the disposal of the Netherlands for the dura-
tion of the war. Great Britain and France refused to sanction any such com-
promise. The six German ships remained tied up in the Netherlands Indies 
(Colenbrander 1920:120). 
In early 1917 British politicians seriously considered an outright requi-
sitioning of the Dutch ships anchored in British ports. For the time being, 
such a measure was rejected. The new British Ambassador in The Hague, 
Townley, pointed out to Cecil that confiscation would put an end to trade 
between Holland and Great Britain altogether. He wrote that Great Britain 
would ‘wilfully play Germany’s game by removing a considerable amount 
of neutral tonnage from the seas, whilst we should force Holland to become 
economically dependent upon Germany, whilst nursing a serious grievance 
against us which would make itself felt after the war’.14 The only step of 
this sort London took was to requisition British-owned ships sailing under a 
neutral flag in May. Townley explained the decision to Loudon by pointing 
out that these ships, ‘valuable British property’, were not armed, and were 
‘exposed, without defence, to lawless attacks’ by the German Navy.15 The 
main victim of the requisition was the fleet of the Nederlandsche Stoomvaart-
Maatschappij Oceaan, a Dutch shipping company which had its headquarters 
in Amsterdam. Oceaan, at times also referred to as Ocean, was closely linked 
to the Blue Funnel Line belonging to the British company Alfred Holt and Co. 
A majority of the shares were in British hands. The British step still reduced 
tonnage available in the Netherlands Indies even more drastically. A sugges-
tion by the British government, made after a representative of the Oceaan had 
travelled from Amsterdam to London, that three requisitioned Oceaan ships 
should continue to sail between Java and Great Britain on the condition that 
Dutch colonial authorities would not confiscate them was rejected by The 
Hague. Two other Oceaan freighters had not yet been confiscated. One was 
14 Townley to Cecil, 24-3-1917, PRO FO 800 195.
15 Townley to Loudon, 22-5-1917, State Papers 1917-18, III:465.
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the Dardanus, which lay in the port of Amsterdam. The other was the Tantalus, 
on her way to the Netherlands Indies. After much beating about the bush, The 
Hague agreed to the proposition that Dardanus and Tantalus would not be con-
fiscated providing they were to confine their future sailing to routes between 
Java and the United States, Vladivostok, and other Asian ports. The agree-
ment came too late. The Tantalus had already been seized by British soldiers 
who had boarded her in Hong Kong as ordinary passengers. The Dardanus 
remained at anchor in Amsterdam till the end of the war (De Boer 1997:45-6).
The most grievous Dutch sin in British eyes was the so-called sand and 
gravel question. Bound by international law to allow unrestricted passage 
of innocent merchandise along the Rhine, the Dutch government had given 
Germany permission to ship sand and gravel to Belgium. London was com-
pletely convinced that the sand and gravel were being used for military 
purposes and not for the upkeep and repair of Belgian roads as Berlin, and 
in its wake The Hague, maintained. Impervious to innumerable protests from 
London, the Netherlands refused to call a halt to the transit before concrete 
proof had been presented that the sand and gravel were being used for the 
building of military fortifications.
Cecil took an uncompromising view. In his eyes the Dutch had ‘constantly 
been pro-German in their actions since the outbreak of the war’.16 They should 
be punished for this; this was even more necessary as harsh measures and 
threats appeared to be the only way to force the Dutch government see the 
error of its ways. One of the options Cecil considered was a British occupa-
tion of the Dutch colonies. He wrote to Townley in March 1917 that the Dutch 
attitude was 
the more provoking because, though it may be true that Holland itself might be suc-
cessfully attacked by the Germans, there is no doubt that we could if we chose mop 
up the whole of the Dutch colonies. Java would be indeed an attractive acquisition 
for us from many points of view, and if we were Germany we should no doubt have 
threatened the Dutch long ago that we should use our power in that way.17
Cecil could not utter such a threat through official diplomatic channels. He 
toyed with the idea of using the British press to bring it home to the Dutch 
that if they did not repent the error of their ways their colonies might soon be 
forfeit. Townley was not a friend to the Dutch. On one occasion he confided 
to Cecil, that they were ‘really a very unsympathetic people’. Nevertheless, 
he dissuaded Cecil from pursuing his plan to seize the Netherlands Indies.18 
Townley tried to convince Cecil that the Netherlands was not pro-German and 
16 Cecil to Townley, 5-3-1917, PRO FO 800 195.
17 Cecil to Townley, 5-3-1917, PRO FO 800 195.
18 Townley to Cecil, 15-10-1917, PRO FO 800 195.
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that the grievances which Great Britain nurtured against the Dutch were not 
serious enough to allow for such a drastic step.19 Cecil was unimpressed, but 
for the time being no action was taken. The risk that the Netherlands would 
react by taking the German side was too great. The British General Staff – like 
its German counterpart – was not looking forward to an extension of the front 
and the loss of a neutral source of agricultural products. It viewed the entry of 
the Netherlands into the war on whatever side with ‘grave concern’.20
For the economy of Holland and the Netherlands Indies the entry of the 
United States in the war had serious consequences. In the past it had been 
American protests about the curtailing of neutral shipping which had per-
suaded London and Paris to make some concessions. This countervailing 
power had disappeared. To make matters even worse, after April 1917 the 
United States joined the Allied efforts to accomplish the economic ruin of 
Germany with fervour. In the process of doing so, the American measures hurt 
the Netherlands badly. Washington demanded guarantees that the import of 
American food, fertilizers, and fodder would not facilitate the export of Dutch 
agricultural products to Germany, not even indirectly.
Dutch shipping was curtailed even further by new steps decided upon 
in London, Washington, and Berlin. In the middle of 1917 the Allied block-
ade zone was enlarged, cutting the safe lane from Holland to Norway. The 
measure stirred up an uproar in the Netherlands. It was said to signal the 
ruin of Dutch seaborne trade. Pessimism reigned supreme because in reaction 
Berlin decided to step up its submarine warfare still further and to decrease 
the width of the free zone along the Dutch coast. Sea-traffic became possible 
again when, after a personal appeal by Queen Wilhelmina to King George V, 
Great Britain allowed a certain degree of relaxation.21 What remained after the 
British announcement and the German reaction was a very small and danger-
ous lane through which Dutch and other neutral ships could cautiously make 
their way. For weeks no freighters left Dutch ports. Ships which did sail and 
strayed off course, which could very easily happen because of strong winds 
or adverse tides, ran the risk of striking a mine or when entering the German 
danger zone of being torpedoed.
As the sinking of the Dutch ships sailing from Falmouth indicates, in 
the course of 1917 the voyages of Dutch freighters and passenger ships had 
become dependent not only on the permission of British or American authori-
ties, who decided whether ships were allowed to bunker or to leave port or 
not; German consent was also indispensable. Before ships sailed a Geleitschein, 
19 Townley to Cecil, 24-3-1917, PRO FO 800 195.
20 Townley to Cecil, 24-3-1917, PRO FO 800 195.
21 Townley to Cecil, 18-7-1917, PRO FO 800 195.
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a safe-conduct had to be requested. This, for instance, was provided in July for 
ships transporting food from Argentina to Holland. To prevent Dutch tonnage 
being used for Allied purposes, German authorities demanded proof of inno-
cence of the cargo. When ships sailed from Rotterdam or Amsterdam to the 
United States, a guarantee had to be presented that after the ships had reached 
their destination they would return to Holland, and would not be chartered by 
the Allied Powers. Without a Geleitschein the chances of being torpedoed were 
too great to venture forth.
The new obstacles to Dutch shipping made their presence felt at a moment 
when a real food and fuel crisis hit Holland. Wheat, bread, potatoes, electric-
ity, gas, and petrol had to be rationed. New words were added to the Dutch 
vocabulary. Among these were oorlogsbrood (poor-quality war-bread, made 
up of a combination of wheat, rye, grits, and dried potatoes, which prompted 
some people to say that it made them feel that they had eaten a stone), een-
heidsworst (standard sausage, a word which in Dutch came to denote all that 
was dull and uniform), standaard schoenen (standard shoes, leather had become 
scarce as well), and regeringsvarkens (government pigs, after the rule, also in 
force for other products, that when pork was exported a certain amount had 
to be offered on the domestic market at a moderate price).
Treub and Posthuma had sadly to conclude that Holland was no longer 
mistress in its own house. All that could be done was to try to limit depend-
ency on the Associated and the Central Powers and see to it that none of the 
constituent countries of the two gained the upper hand.22 The United States 
and Great Britain could block the supply of food, cattle fodder and other 
products essential to keeping Holland from starving and from a collapse of its 
economy; but so could Germany. Its government, for instance, could withhold 
coal.
The dire circumstances in Holland provided yet another opportunity to 
lash out at the Nederland and Rotterdamsche Lloyd companies. They were 
accused of not seeing beyond their war profits and of refusing to risk their 
ships. As a newspaper in Sumatra expostulated: in their ‘appalling egoism’ the 
shipping companies ignored national interests. Impeded by their policy, traffic 
had been disrupted between the destitute Dutch people and the colony which 
could help them, and, for instance, could supply the fuel for ‘the oil can of the 
Dutch housewife which has already stood empty in the corner for months’.23
Confronted with such criticism ranks were closed. Business circles in 
Holland stood up for the Nederland and Rotterdamsche Lloyd. In its report 
for 1917, the Rotterdam Chamber of Commerce pointed out that shipping com-
22 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1917-18:2037.
23 Sumatra Post, cited in De Indische Gids 1917, II:1113.
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panies could not be blamed for the lack of tonnage. People in the Netherlands 
Indies did not realize what problems had been occasioned for the Nederland 
and Rotterdamsche Lloyd by the war. Much of the criticism levied at them was 
baseless, even uncalled for.24 Pleyte also came to the defence of the Nederland 
and Rotterdamsche Lloyd. He did so at the end of 1917 when members of the 
Dutch Senate suggested that a state enterprise should take over the transport 
of passengers and cargo between Holland and the Netherlands Indies.25 As 
was so often the case when points regarding the colony came up, the benefits 
change would bring to the indigenous population were presented as the main 
argument. Pleyte could not agree with the suggestion that a state shipping 
company be established. He said that the shipping companies could not 
be blamed and even – though he knew better – that they had never shown 
any reluctance to put their ships to sea.26 Pleyte flew into a passion when he 
was criticized by Van Kol, who had dared to speak about the tyranny of the 
shipping companies: ‘Does Mister Van Kol not know that a war is raging in 
Europe? Or has this great world event completely passed his idealistic mind 
by?’27 
The wretched conditions in Holland decreased the amount of tonnage 
available for Dutch seaborne traffic from the Netherlands Indies. It even lim-
ited the freedom to decide which products could be shipped. Dutch freighters 
had to be sent to the United States to fetch grain, while permission for mer-
chant ships to sail from Holland to the Netherlands Indies, if this were still 
possible at all, was only given in return for a promise that, after arriving at 
their destination, these ships would return to Holland along a route stipulated 
and with a cargo to be determined by the Dutch government.
To add to the predicament of Dutch shipping the amount of tonnage 
available was cut back even further by Washington’s policy. With the excep-
tion of one freighter, none of the ships which had been requisitioned by 
Posthuma to sail to the United States to fetch food was allowed to leave for 
the return voyage in early 1917. The NOT had no part in this. It was strictly a 
government affair with the cargo being consigned to the Dutch government 
(Timmermans 2002:184). Initially no export permits were issued for cargo for 
the Netherlands. Later bunkering coal were refused without the promise of an 
exchange ship. Consequently, in August over sixty ships loaded with food and 
fodder – wheat, flour, oats, barley, maize, linseed-cake, and maize flour – were 
tied up in ports on the eastern seaboard of the United States.
The political or extraordinary hold-up of Dutch ships, as it came to be 
24 Report Chamber of Commerce Rotterdam over 1917, cited in De Indische Gids 1918, I:449.
25 Handelingen Eerste Kamer 1917-18:108.
26 Handelingen Eerste Kamer 1917-18:139.
27 Handelingen Eerste Kamer 1917-18:160.
The Netherlands Indies and the Great War438
called, saddled Washington with some embarrassing problems. Food was rot-
ting away in ships’ holds, causing people in Holland to wonder whether if and 
when the freighters were finally released the cargo would not have become 
too rotten to consume. Crews grew restless. Counterproductively, blocking 
all food transport to Holland would make Holland dependent on Germany, 
an undesired prospect for the Associated Powers. Consequently, in September 
Washington decided on another course. Freighters could obtain fuel on the 
condition that upon completion of their voyage they would return to the 
United States with cargo.28 
For Dutch shipping companies the directives of The Hague and Washington 
were a double bind. They had promised the Dutch government that their 
freighters which sailed from Dutch ports, would return to Holland after 
reaching the Netherlands Indies with the cargo the Dutch government wanted 
them to ship. This made it impossible for them to fulfil American conditions. 
To find a way out, the shipping companies turned to Loudon, to Posthuma, 
and to have plead their case with the other ministers, to Pleyte. They asked 
Loudon to explain to Washington that their ships had already been commit-
ted to the Dutch government.29 Posthuma was appealed to negotiate permis-
sion to allow the freighters to make one extra voyage to the United States 
after they had reached Java, awaiting an agreement between The Hague and 
Washington on Dutch shipping, which it was believed might take a long time 
to be rounded off. The extra voyage would be ‘highly beneficial’ to the export 
of colonial products. To underline their argument Posthuma was told that one 
of the freighters on her way to the Netherlands Indies would carry a cargo of 
fertilizer from Chile, a product which was much needed by the estates in the 
colony, especially, they did not forget to mention, by those growing sugar.30 
Posthuma refused. 
The situation experienced at the outbreak of the war had now returned 
with a vengeance. Merchandise could not be shipped from the Netherlands 
Indies to Holland or other countries; nor could goods be sent to the colony 
from Holland. Although still ninety freighters had reached Holland from 
Java in 1916, in 1917 only five vessels made the trip. Sixteen ships set out 
from Holland to the Netherlands Indies in 1917. The cargo space available for 
exports of the Netherlands Indies to Europe and the East Coast of the United 
States decreased from 455,200 tons in 1916 to 156,500 tons in 1917. In accord-
ance with the redirection of the exports from the Netherlands Indies only ton-
nage destined for the west coast of the United States increased: from 56,000 
28 Nederland to Pleyte, 12-9-1917, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 8-11-1917 70.
29 Nederland to Loudon, 21-9-1917, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 8-11-1917 70. 
30 Nederland to Posthuma, 10-9-1917, 6-10-1917, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 8-11-1917 70.
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tons in 1916 to 136,000 tons in 1917.31
The consequences for the colonial export sector were severe. During 1917 
the export of tobacco from Java, which shipping companies were very reluc-
tant anyway to transport because it was more liable to overheating on board 
ships than tobacco from Sumatra, to Holland amounted to 7,391 tons. In 1916 
exports had been tenfold to 71,992 ton. At the end of 1917 550,000 bales of Java 
tobacco from the 1916 harvest still had not been shipped.32 In November 1917 
De Locomotief observed that the chief of tobacco inspection ‘has been having 
a forced holiday for months’.33 In East Sumatra part of the 1916 harvest – in 
this case 110,830 bales – could not be shipped in 1917. The only compensation 
was that top quality tobacco still fetched an excellent price on the American 
market.34 
In desperation sailing ships were chartered or bought (a practice also 
resorted to in Holland and elsewhere in Europe) to transport Javanese tobacco 
and tea to Europe via the Cape of Good Hope. Such undertakings had the full 
support of KPM which allowed one of its best Captains, E. Meulemans, ‘a nat-
ural captain under sail’ to advance the leave he was entitled to take charge of 
one of the ships.35 As had been realized in advance, such sailing ships setting 
out on what De Locomotief called an ‘old-fashioned voyage’ were just as vul-
nerable to attacks as steamers.36 The voyage of the Albertine Beatrice on which 
Meulemans sailed with a majority Chinese crew, began ill-omened. Having 
left Tanjung Priok, she collided with a pilot boat in the port of Surabaya. The 
pilot boat sustained heavy damage. Nevertheless, her sailing on 4 February 
1917 was a festive occasion. Guests were invited on board, where they could 
listen to speeches about the history of Dutch sailing and drink their fill of 
champagne. Naturally, the national anthem was struck up. The trip of the 
Albertine Beatrice ended in disaster. She was torpedoed in European waters. 
Another of the sailing ships sustained heavy damage and made it only as far 
as Durban. Because of what had happened to the Albertine Beatrice, her own-
ers did not want to run the risk of having her continue her journey. For the 
same reason the captain of the third sailing ship, the John Davis, was ordered 
to remain in Gibraltar and not to sail on.
The export of other colonial wares showed a similar pattern. In 1917 
only 61,000 kg of Java tea was shipped to the Netherlands, compared to 
31 Report Chamber of Commerce Rotterdam over 1917, cited in De Indische Gids 1918, I:449; 
Carpentier Alting and De Cock Buning 1928:66.
32 Koloniaal verslag 1918:217-8.
33 De Locomotief, 6-11-1917.
34 Koloniaal verslag 1918:21-2.
35 De Locomotief, 9-1-1917.
36 De Locomotief, 9-1-1917.
The Netherlands Indies and the Great War440
almost fifteen million kilogrammes in 1916, by which time it had already 
been impossible to export the whole harvest. To make prospects worse, the 
Russian market, good for about three million killogrammes, was eclipsed after 
the Russian Revolution. Initially Australia seemed to provide an alternative 
market, though there was sharp competition from tea from British India and 
Ceylon, which could no longer be shipped to Great Britain because of lack 
of tonnage, and likewise had to find a new outlet in Australia. Hopes were 
dashed when Australia instituted an import ban on foreign tea in June. Before 
this happened there had already been complaints in Australia about the poor 
quality of Java tea. 
Not all was gloom and doom. Tin, rubber, pepper, and gambir still fetched 
high prices throughout most of 1917, as did tin. The export of tea from 
Sumatra increased to about four million killogrammes. Exporting tea to the 
United States, where, De Locomotief noted, tea was still virtually unknown, was 
also explored in the beginning of 1917.37 It promised to be a new, but modest 
market, as Americans were only ‘moderate tea-consumers’.38
As had happened in August 1914 the Javasche Bank stepped in. The bank 
financed the new storage facilities that it was essential to build for the colonial 
products which could no longer be exported. Once again the bank had to 
shoulder the burden of providing credit to companies, which needed capital 
to keep their estates running because they could not sell their produce. Care 
was taken to emphasize that the Javasche Bank acted as it did because the 
bank considered it ‘of paramount importance for the economic life in the 
Netherlands Indies that work in the export crops is continued with the least 
possible disturbance’.39 
Imports also suffered, including those from Holland, which in 1914 had 
still amounted to 150 million guilders, or one-third of the total value of 
imports to the Netherlands Indies.40 In view of the shortages which had arisen 
in medicines, draperies, certain European foodstuffs, and other goods in the 
Netherlands Indies and the interruption in commercial sea traffic as early as 
May 1917 the Ministry of the Colonies had decided to charter a mail boat, the 
Tabanan, from the Rotterdamsche Lloyd. It was proposed the Tabanan make 
an emergency voyage to Java via the Panama Canal. Another argument for 
chartering the Tabanan was the acute shortage of men in the colonial army. 
The Navy, incidentally, had the opposite problem. The disruption of sea traffic 
had caused an over-abundance of sailors, who could not be repatriated. These 
could be taken home on the return journey. More trivial considerations also 
37 De Locomotief, 16-2-1917.
38 Schepenvorderingswet 1917:140.
39 Koloniaal verslag 1918:159-60.
40 Report NHM over 1917, cited in De Indische Gids 1918, II:1136.
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played a role. With some indignation it was observed that soldiers and non-
commissioned officers in the colonial army who were waiting for transport to 
the Netherlands Indies did get their pay, but passed their days in idleness.
The cost of chartering the Tabanan was estimated at 500,000 guilders. 
The Ministry of the Colonies considered this a considerable sum, but the 
civil servants had made their calculations. Products bought by the Ministry 
were stockpiling and renting storage facilities did not come cheap. In view 
of the uncertainties which plagued neutral shipping, the management of 
the Rotterdamsche Lloyd stipulated that the passengers should acquiesce in 
advance to simpler meals than those usually served on mail boats. Passengers 
also had to promise not to protest about rationing if harbour authorities in 
ports at which the Tabanan was to call limited the supply of provisions.41
The question remained how Great Britain, because it was so adamant that 
no German products should leave Europe, would react. The mediation of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was sought. Loudon was asked to sound out 
whether the British government would be prepared to allow the Tabanan to 
sail without stopping her for examination. To impress Loudon of the urgency 
of the voyage, Pleyte explained that for months it had been impossible to ship 
people and goods to the Netherlands Indies. The natural outcome had been 
a whole host of problems, but even more alarmingly under certain circum-
stances could well form a threat to the safety of the colony.42 On the advice of 
Loudon, the Ministry of the Colonies also contacted Van Aalst to solicit him to 
plead the case with the British Envoy.
The sailing of the Tabanan was scheduled to take place at the end of June 
1917. The plan was abandoned when a warship, the Zeeland, set out for a 
voyage to the Netherlands Indies via the Panama Canal. It was a drop in the 
ocean. In November 1917 almost 10,000 m3 and 10,000 tons of government 
goods were stored in Holland awaiting shipment to the Netherlands Indies.43 
Pleyte told Parliament that the ‘impediments of circumstances’ increasingly 
burdened the Netherlands Indies. He said that he had no idea how the coloni-
al government came by some of the goods which were so urgently needed.44
The Netherlands was dealt an additional blow in October 1917. As commercial 
circles had realized in 1914 when they had established their estate committees 
in Java and Sumatra, the cable link between Holland and the Netherlands 
Indies was a vulnerable weak spot. Even the Dutch government reluctantly 
had to admit this. In June 1915 the Dutch Staatscourant (Gazette) called atten-
41 Rotterdamsche Lloyd to Pleyte, 16-5-1917, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 16-5-17 C7.
42 Pleyte to Loudon, 4-5-1917 NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 4-5-1917 N6.
43 Note 8th department NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 19-4-1918 1.
44 De Locomotief, 14-11-1914.
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tion to the fact that wires could be rejected or mutilated by the British censor. 
Great Britain from its part had made no secret of the fact that it controlled 
Dutch telegraphic communication with the rest of the world and that it could 
use access to the cable as political leverage. London stressed that the Dutch use 
of British cables was not a right. It was an act of grace. 
The implicit threat was disquieting, but a way out seemed to present itself. 
Direct wireless communication appeared to be the solution. Radio links would 
also put an end to the embarrassment of British censorship, which impeded 
communication, not simply by setting limitations on the text of telegrams, 
but perhaps even more aggravatingly because the delays it caused. Telegrams 
might reach their destination only after eight to twelve days (Lovink 1919:24). 
Till 1916 the distance between Holland and the Netherlands Indies had been 
too great to allow for wireless communication. To overcome the problem of 
geographical distance and create a wireless connection a variety of solutions 
had been proposed. These ranged from a radio link via the United States to 
the use of mail boats as intermediate stations. In April 1916 there was a glim-
mer of hope when a wireless message from the large German Telefunken 
transmission complex in Nauen was received in Honolulu, some 9,000 miles 
away. This was not all. In Sabang, transmissions from the Canadian Marconi 
radio station on Cornwallis Island and from Nauen were also received. The 
latter consisted of war news and of messages to the German Governor of East 
Africa and to the German Consul in Ispahan. It was a break-through. One 
month earlier De Locomotief had still dismissed a report that the radio station 
in Sabang had intercepted messages from Nauen as an ‘April Fools Day-like’ 
prank. Somewhat prophetically De Locomotief had added that were the report 
true, such long-distance communication would be of incalculable value to the 
government and to commerce.45
Experimental transmissions from Nauen to Java were started in secret. A 
receiver, a gift from the Gesellschaft für drahtlose Telegraphie (Telefunken), 
was built on a hill near Bandung at the beginning of 1917. The effort required 
to build the station and its hundred-metres mast was enormous. Horses had 
to be used to transport staff, workers, and material to the station. The tests 
were successful. At the end of March, a few days before the United States 
entered the war, Van Limburg Stirum cabled Pleyte in cipher via Manila 
and Washington that seven messages, in total 3,400 words, had been flaw-
lessly received. Pleyte was pleased. A way had been found to transmit secret 
messages to Java without having to depend on the goodwill of Washington. 
Nevertheless, he wrote to Van Limburg Stirum, he intended to use the new 
opportunity to maintain radio communication with Java only in the event of 
45 De Locomotief, 3-3-1916.
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an emergency.46 Pleyte was a little bit worried that the British would find out. 
They might be alerted by the frequent use of the codeword ‘Webster’ announc-
ing the messages sent to Java. They could also, but this escaped the attention 
of the Dutch authorities, easily find out about the Dutch plans to establish a 
wireless link between Holland and Java by reading the newspapers and by fol-
lowing Dutch parliamentary debates (though for obvious reasons the Dutch 
government refused to provide detailed information).
At this moment Le Roy reappeared on the scene. He contacted the Ministry 
of the Colonies and suggested that Pleyte should allow him to start negotia-
tions with Telefunken to see whether that company was prepared to build a 
100 kW transmission station in Java, making two-way wireless traffic possible. 
Authorization was quickly given. Le Roy was informed that the equipment 
for such a station could be shipped to Java on board the Zeeland. Within days 
an agreement was reached. Telefunken was more than willing to help out the 
Netherlands. It promised that private and official messages to Java could be 
transmitted at all times from the Nauen station. There was one small catch. A 
German naval officer suggested that in return the Dutch government might 
allow that ‘insignificant’ messages be sent occasionally to Germans in the 
Netherlands Indies.47 In May the necessary equipment to build a provisional 
100 kW radio installation offered for free by Telefunken was transported 
to Holland. Two Dutchmen were selected to take charge of the building of 
the radio station. One of them was Karel Moens, an engineer employed by 
Telefunken. They and the equipment were taken to Java on the Zeeland, which 
also had a new engine on board for the only submarine operating in the 
Archipelago in June. The Zeeland had an ill-fated voyage. In the United States 
some of her crew – sixty-three people in total – deserted. The equipment 
reached Java, but was stored for eight months, before the building of a radio 
station at Cililin near Bandung finally commenced. The delay was caused by 
a difference of opinion in the Netherlands Indies about what would be the 
actual use of the Telefunken radio installation. 
The plan bristled with pitfalls. The Dutch Minister of Transport and 
Communications called attention to the fact that a link between Nauen and 
Bandung could re-institute German communication with the Netherlands 
Indies, which would heighten the chance of British reprisals. Nevertheless, 
he realized that Telefunken was the only choice. The Netherlands just did not 
have the expertise to build a radio station powerful enough to bridge the dis-
tance between Holland and the Netherlands Indies. Assistance in building a 
more powerful station from the British Marconi Wireless Telegraph Company 
was not likely to be forthcoming. The aim of having a direct wireless link with 
46 Pleyte to Van Limburg Stirum, 16-5-1917, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 15-5-1917 C7.
47 Report Dubois, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 30-4-1917 L6. 
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the colony was to become independent of British cables, and decrease vulner-
ability to British sanctions.
The importance of a wireless link was brought home a few months later 
after the British government had began to suspect that neutrals were misus-
ing the British cable network. The main culprit was Sweden. The Times of 9 
September reported that Sweden had ‘repeatedly placed her diplomatic cable 
facilities at home and abroad at Germany’s disposal’ and that the Germans 
had made use of this to direct their submarine campaign. The Times concluded 
that cable communications was the ‘one aspect of our “blockade” which has 
been insufficiently considered’. The newspaper complained that the policy 
of allowing neutral countries to use British cables had been ‘conducted more 
with an eye to neutral susceptibilities than with an eye to preventing goods 
from reaching the enemy’.
The Associated Powers had a mighty weapon to strike at the neutrals. After 
the United States had entered the war, all cable lines were in the hands of the 
enemies of the Central Powers. In Europe the cables of the neutral states ran 
to Great Britain. In Asia Singapore formed a relay station for messages to and 
from the Netherlands Indies. France and the United States also controlled 
cable accesses to the Netherlands Indies. In short, as The Times concluded: the 
Associated Powers were ‘the absolute masters of the cable communications of 
Germany, of her allies, and of all the near-by neutral States [...]’. 
Great Britain was to use this power against the Netherlands. On 12 October, 
Pleyte wired Van Limburg Stirum that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had 
learned that the British intended to refuse all Dutch commercial telegraph 
communications. Batavia should prepare for the possibility that official cables 
might also be rejected or delayed.48 Whether The Hague was fully aware of the 
irritation Dutch conduct in their dealings with the belligerents had created in 
London is doubtful. At the end of June when Van Limburg Stirum had asked 
Pleyte whether Reuter’s reports about a serious difference of opinion between 
Great Britain and the Netherlands were true, the reply by wire had been brief: 
‘all humbug’.49 This was wishful thinking. The Netherlands had squandered 
almost all the sympathy it had in London. To punish the Dutch government 
for allowing the transit of sand and gravel, and to force the Netherlands to 
put an end to such transports, the British government decided to refuse to 
permit the transmission the non-official wires – especially the commercial 
ones, private wires would at times still be allowed – between Holland and 
the rest of the world, including the Netherlands Indies. As explanation of its 
decision, London pointed out that the use of British cables by the Dutch was a 
48 Pleyte to Van Limburg Stirum, 12-10-1917, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 12-10-1917 G12.
49 Van Limburg Stirum to Pleyte,26-6-1917, 29-6-1917, Pleyte to Van Limburg Stirum, 29-6-1917, 
NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 2-7-1917 G9.
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favour, not a right. This favour had been withdrawn.50 The Britsche Telegram 
Onderbreking (BTO, British Telegram Interruption) or, to give it another 
designation, the telegram blockade was a fact. Loudon called the blockade 
‘a measure which seriously threatens economic life in the Netherlands and 
its colonies’. In his view the sanction was out of all proportion to the issue at 
stake: the transit of sand and gravel.51 Pleyte was forced to conclude that the 
matter was ‘very serious’.52
In Holland and the Netherlands Indies – where the advertisement ‘send 
your telegrams “Via Eastern’’’ continued to appear in the newspapers – only 
citizens of the Associated Powers could still send messages along the British 
lines. An exception was made for Japanese companies in the Netherlands 
Indies. In the past these had been reluctant to sever their business rela-
tions with German firms and, for instance in Medan, had resisted pressure 
by the British Consul to stop trading with German firms.53 After protests 
lodged with the Japanese and British government, Japanese businessmen 
were allowed to send and receive telegrams, but only with prior permission 
of the British Consulate General. Another possibility open to them was to send 
their telegrams by mail to Singapore from where they were forwarded by 
cable. Likewise, telegrams addressed to them were transported by post from 
Singapore to the Netherlands Indies.
London had not forgotten its own British interests. The telegraph station 
in Singapore was allowed to relay wires, even those from Dutch firms, which 
served Associated interests. These could concern the export of foodstuffs 
or the transmission of money from the Netherlands Indies to Great Britain. 
The exceptions hurt Dutch economic interests even more and added to the 
anger with which the blockade had been greeted. Exacerbating the feeling 
of isolation telegraph communications with the United States also collapsed. 
This effectively blocked the only way out for the business community in the 
Netherlands Indies to circumvent the British blockade. Immediately after 
the BTO had taken effect, companies had turned to the Exchange in New 
York instead of that in London for their financial information.54 The disrup-
tion of communications with the United States was seen as additional proof 
that London had acted in an extremely underhand way and used the ban to 
promote British commercial interests, to the detriment of American ones as 
well. In mid-December regulations were tightened even more stringently. 
Commercial telegrams to and from Great Britain were only accepted if these 
50 Townley to Cecil,15-10-1917, PRO FO 800 195.
51 De Locomotief, 3-11-1917.
52 Koloniaal verslag 1918:205-6.
53 De Locomotief, 7-6-1916.
54 Indische Financier, cited in De Indische Gids 1918, I:626; Lovink 1919:30-1.
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concerned commercial transactions concluded in the past, not any new under-
takings. The message from London was that further transactions could be 
arranged by mail.55
Townley called the telegraph blockade a masterstroke. He wrote that it 
would have been hard ‘to find anything that could have hurt the Dutch sus-
ceptibilities, for which please read pockets, more than the suspension of the 
commercial cable facilities’.56 The only flaw Townley saw was that he had been 
away from The Hague when the decision had been taken. Had it been up to 
him, he would have waited a couple of days before communicating London’s 
decision to Loudon. The extra time would have allowed him to contact Van 
Aalst in order to have the latter put pressure on the Dutch government.57 
Less pleased was the British Secretary of State for India, Edwin Montagu. He 
had been kept in the dark about the notes exchanged between the Dutch and 
British governments on the sand and gravel issue, and had to learn about the 
crisis from the newspapers. Piqued that he had been passed over and believ-
ing that in view of the relations between India and the Netherlands Indies he 
had a right to be informed, he wrote a sarcastic letter to the Foreign Office 
explaining that it was impossible for his staff to do their job if they had to rely 
‘not on the cooperation of my colleagues in the Government, but on a careful 
reading of the newspapers’.58
Generally the blockade was received with great wrath. The business com-
munities in Holland and in the Netherlands Indies drew up a variety of peti-
tions to impress upon the government the vital importance to Dutch interna-
tional trade of cable communications. For the first time during the war public 
opinion turned against Great Britain. The atmosphere in Holland reminded an 
Irishman of the days of the Boer War. Friends and acquaintances cold-shoul-
dered him.59 The coldness was fleeting. As Townley noted, the torpedoing of a 
number of Dutch fishing boats by German submarines around the same time 
steered public opinion away from Germany again.60
The blockade stimulated a rush of renewed pleas to establish a wireless 
link. Because of the experiments in Germany, the Netherlands Indies was 
almost ready. All that was lacking was a station in Holland. Money should 
not prove to be the stumbling block. As a Member of Parliament remarked: 
the financial damage caused by the cable blockade was certainly much greater 
55 De Locomotief, 17-12-1917.
56 Townley to Cecil, 29-10-1917, PRO FO 800 195.
57 Townley to Cecil, 29-10-1917, PRO FO 800 195.
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59 Townley to Cecil, 28-11-1917, PRO FO 800 195.
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than the cost of the most expensive radio station.61
Public opinion about whether The Hague was to be blamed or not was very 
divided. Some praised the Dutch government for the ‘fair’ neutrality of the 
Netherlands, and for avoiding war with Germany by sticking to international 
conventions in the sand and gravel dispute. Others saw matters differently. 
They argued that the Dutch government should have steered away from a 
conflict with London.
The telegram interruption fuelled the fears that the Netherlands could no 
longer keep out of the war. Especially for those who had always argued that 
in 1914 the Netherlands had only managed to stay neutral because of Great 
Britain’s benevolence, the cutting of the cable communication was a sign that 
an appeal could no longer be made to British generosity. This could spell the 
end of the Netherlands Indies. They and others with them were sure that 
Japan, the United States and Great Britain, either during the war or when 
peace had restored would have no qualms about sacrificing the Netherlands 
Indies in making an adjustment in their power relations in the Pacific. The 
Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad wrote that the Netherlands Indies was completely at 
the mercy of these three ‘itchy-fingered’ powers. If the Netherlands entered 
into conflict with one or more of them in these ‘extremely confused times’ the 
colony would certainly be lost.62 Kaoem Moeda, the Sarekat Islam newspaper in 
Bandung, also ventured to say that the ‘teasings’ on the part of Great Britain 
cast a pall of gloom over the future of Holland and the Netherlands Indies. 
Were the Netherlands forced to cut its relations with Germany, Berlin should 
realize that this had not been done out of hatred for ‘Germania’.63 To some, 
and rumours with this purport also circulated elsewhere in Asia, it appeared 
as if the Netherlands and Great Britain were teetering on the brink of war. In 
Padang the Captain of the Chinese had some difficulty in persuading anxious 
Chinese merchants not to leave for the Straits Settlements.64 Elsewhere, in 
a place which was described as an isolated post rife with rumours, ‘native 
youths of good family’ wanted to learn English as they were convinced that 
Great Britain would occupy the Netherlands Indies.65
Among the persons who feared serious repercussions was Boon of the 
Soerabaiasch Handelsblad. He wrote that the only salvation for the colony would 
be a defensive pact with Great Britain. A rift with London would usher in ‘a 
disastrous time such as perhaps only a few nations have experienced in this 
61 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1917-18:1430.
62 Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad, cited in De Indische Gids 1918, I:484-5.
63 Kaoem Moeda, 15-10-1917, IPO 42/1917.
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war’.66 Boon went as far as accusing the Dutch government of collaboration 
with Germany. The colonial authorities reacted furiously. They accused Boon 
of libel and brought action against him. Once again it was a court case full of 
sound and fury, signifying nothing. The judge dismissed the claim. Boon’s 
words had also infuriated some of his readers, who wrote a letter to the edi-
tor. To let the world know that what Boon had argued did not imply that all 
Dutchmen considered the British sanction a justified reaction to a wrongful 
position assumed by the Dutch government the letter was written in English. 
The indignant readers stressed that Dutch people should support their gov-
ernment in times of trouble and not attack it. They urged subscribers to cancel 
their subscriptions (which eighty persons did). Advertisers were exhorted to 
withdraw their advertisements. The attack was partly personal. It was sug-
gested that Boon was inspired by his own frustration about the fact that he had 
never reached the rank to which he had aspired in the army and had remained 
a ritmeester, a cavalry captain, before he had resigned from the army and had 
become editor of the Soerabaiasch Handelsblad in April 1915.67
The cable blockade struck at the heart of the Dutch commercial community. 
Trade immediately slowed down when telegrams from Holland and more 
urgently from the major commercial centres in the world, containing orders or 
listing market prices on commodity markets were not forthcoming. A few tel-
egrams – one congratulating the Escompto Bank with its sixtieth anniversary 
– did come through, but these remained exceptions, and usually concerned 
British orders for sugar. The Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad observed that commercial 
life in the colony had come to a standstill: ‘The Indies is in a state of resigna-
tion. Trade strolls with its hands in its pockets – nothing to do – wait, no wire 
messages, no telegraphic transactions, no business’.68
The sale of export products, already affected by the shortage of tonnage, 
plunged steeply, if it did not grind to a temporary halt. Among the trade hit 
was rubber. Rubber prices on the London market had fallen shortly before the 
telegram ban. Coupled with the isolation from the outside world this meant 
that rubber fetched such a low price that initially there were almost no trans-
actions at all.
Individuals who were dependent for their income on the transmission of 
telegraphic transfers found themselves in financial difficulties. Among them 
was the son of the Susuhunan of Surakarta who lived in Lausanne with his 
family. Not knowing what was going on, he tried to contact his father by wire, 
but to no avail. Thereupon he turned to the Ministry of the Colonies in The 
Hague. It promised to help him, though the staff decided to wait a couple of 
66 Soerabaiasch Handelsblad, cited in De Locomotief, 1-11-1917.
67 De Indische Gids 1918, I:347.
68 Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad, cited in De Indische Gids 1918, I:487.
XVI  Gloomy prospects 449
weeks before contacting the colonial authorities. After all, the money might 
just have been delayed.69
On 15 November 1917 the Dutch government called a temporary halt to the 
transit of sand and gravel. The inevitable upshot was a conflict with Germany. 
Berlin used the Dutch step to present The Hague with fresh demands. To 
remain in grace the Netherlands had to allow the restoration of the traffic of 
merchandise on the railway between Antwerp and Mönchengladbach, part of 
which ran through Dutch territory. Germany promised that the line would not 
be used for the transport of war materials or troops, but The Hague refused 
to listen. The reason was that Berlin had made no exception for foodstuffs (in 
Parliament Loudon even spoke of army victuals). Because food was contra-
band, the Netherlands could not permit its transit. The food might be used to 
feed German troops fighting on the Belgian front.
At the end of November London allowed the sending of private telegrams, 
but it was February 1918 before Great Britain lifted the telegram blockade 
completely. New problems soon emerged. On 13 March the telegraph office in 
San Francisco announced it no longer accepted private Dutch telegrams with 
trifling messages. The cables were overloaded. 
Though London had promised not to obstruct official communications 
from the Dutch government, a number of wires exchanged between Pleyte 
and Van Limburg Stirum were not transmitted during the blockade. Official 
telegrams, and as it turned out in December commercial telegrams as well, 
could soon be sent again via the American route, but here the complications 
also reared their ugly head. For weeks it was impossible to send ciphers 
because of new rules instituted by the United States in the Philippines at the 
end of October. After the Dutch Envoy in Washington had asked the American 
government to reconsider the ban at the end of January 1918 ciphers were once 
more accepted. If we may believe the Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad, the disruption of 
telegram traffic between The Hague and Batavia immediately resulted in iner-
tia in the colonial administration, as Van Limburg Stirum was supposed to be 
hesitant to act without approval from The Hague. The Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad 
called Van Limburg Stirum’s inertia a lost opportunity. The telegram blockade 
could have given the Netherlands Indies its own independent government 
had Van Limburg Stirum acted resolutely. Freedom of action had to remain 
a ‘golden fantasy’.70 Its criticism was rather wide of the mark. In reality the 
cable blockade confirmed Van Limburg Stirum in his opinion that people in 
the colony should be allowed a greater say in the decision-making process. 
The Netherlands Indies could no longer be treated as a mere branch establish-
69 J. Leyh to the Ministry of the Colonies, 3-1-1918, Pleyte to Leyh, 7-1-1918, NA, Kol. Openbaar, 
Vb. 5-1-1918 17. 
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ment, not the economic sector.71 For others the absence of the possibility to 
consult Holland, or the long time it took to consult was a reason to plead for 
the greater economic and political autonomy of the colony.
Loudon took up the matter of government wires with the British Envoy 
in The Hague, who promised an investigation in Singapore. Initially this had 
little effect. In January 1918, Van Limburg Stirum felt obliged to inquire in The 
Hague whether Pleyte had ‘reasonable certainty’ that if he resent his wires 
‘at the cost of perhaps three hundred pounds’, the messages would come 
through.72
In judging the situation in the Netherlands Indies and Holland respective-
ly, Pleyte and Van Limburg Stirum had become dependent on the telegrams 
of Reuter, ANETA, and NIPA. This was not always plain sailing. NIPA had 
been one of the victims of the telegram ban. It had been ANETA, not NIPA 
which had spread the news on 23 October that London had cut telegraph 
communications. The blockade – and the disruption of the mail service – only 
made Spijkman’s task more difficult. At the end of 1917 he complained that the 
circumstances had greatly favoured his rival ANETA, which acted as Reuter’s 
agent. Many NIPA telegrams had not reached Batavia, and those which had, 
had been held up in London for days. Reuter’s telegrams about the same 
event, which Spijkman claimed had been wired later, appeared in the colonial 
press days earlier than those of NIPA.73 Spijkman posed that this hold a real 
danger to the Netherlands. As an example he mentioned reports by Reuter 
and ANETA about strikes in Holland, which could be ‘neutralized’ only days 
later by NIPA telegrams. After the blockade had been ended, news telegrams 
about what was happening in Europe again reached the Netherlands Indies, 
but in a diminishing numbers, and in some instances highly mutilated. At 
times no Reuter telegrams were received in Java at all. A headline in Neratja in 
February 1918 read ‘censorship’ when it reported about one such occasion.
Pleyte and Idenburg were pretty much in the same boat. As late as May 
1918, Pleyte complained in the Dutch senate about the extraordinary difficul-
ties encountered in consulting with Van Limburg Stirum. It had caused ‘some 
lacunae’. Pleyte explained that telegrams did arrive, but that there was no 
certainty that they had not been mutilated. He had received the most recent 
mail from the colony a fortnight ago. It dated from eight months previously.74 
In view of this, after it had discussed Pleyte’s policy in April the House had 
concluded that there was no reason for either praise or criticism. Because of 
crippled communications, Pleyte was not well informed about the situation 
71 Volksraad 1918:2.
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in the Netherlands Indies. It was also no use asking questions. The minister 
would not have been able to answer them.75
Because of the complications about the transit of sand and gravel, people in 
the Netherlands Indies as well, started to fear that a war with Germany was 
imminent. The prospect became even more likely after Germany had launched 
an offensive on the Western front on 21 March 1918. A belligerent German 
press underlined the importance of the Antwerp-Mönchengladbach railway to 
the battle now raging and stressed that Holland could not avoid war for ever. 
Holland prepared for a German invasion. The Dutch government got some 
freedom of manoeuvring when the Associated Powers informed The Hague 
at the end of April that war between Holland and Germany was not what they 
wanted (Snapper 2002:299). Berlin also did not want war and backed down the 
following month. The German government was prepared to limit the quantity 
of sand and gravel to be transported to a volume well below a Dutch estimate 
of what was required for the maintenance of Belgian roads. Berlin also prom-
ised not to carry foodstuffs on the Mönchengladbach-Antwerp railway. Transit 
trade of sand and gravel was resumed at the end of May.
The agreement with Berlin created fresh problems with London. On 15 
June 1918 The Times wrote that it was clear as far as the British were con-
cerned that the agreement formed a German success. It might be true that 
only innocent goods were transported – ‘which is a very large assumption’, 
but the transports would in any case ‘greatly relieve the strain on the German 
railways further south’ which ran to the front. These railways could now be 
reserved for the transport of troops and war materials. The conclusion of 
The Times was as plain as a pike-staff. At a decisive moment in the war the 
Dutch government ‘had rendered their neighbours a very timely service and 
improved the German position in the matter of rapid communications with an 
important part of the Western front’. The British government also remained 
highly suspicious. Repeatedly it asked The Hague for detailed information 
about the goods transported. Cecil told the House of Commons in the middle 
of 1918 that the Dutch replies were unsatisfactory.76
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The references in the discussions about tonnage and shipping to the conse-
quences for the indigenous population had not been picked out of thin air. By 
1917 the reassuring expressions of solidarity at the outbreak of the Great War 
had been replaced by vocal attacks on Dutch rule. The Chinese had remained 
susceptible to nationalist impulses from China, while among the indigenous 
population the anti-Dutch undercurrent had remained as strong as ever. If 
anything, the Turkish participation in the war had contributed to a revival of 
Islam. 
It had become almost instantly painfully obvious that the internal foe had 
not suddenly abandoned its resistance to the expansion of Dutch rule because 
of feelings of commiseration that the Netherlands was being threatened by 
war. In Celebes, from where, as Michielsen had requested, Dutch troops 
had been withdrawn for the defence of Java shortly after July 1914, all kinds 
of rumours began to circulate about the Dutch leaving the island. Unrest 
increased when dissatisfied local leaders became convinced that ham-struck 
by the war the colonial army could not spare sufficient troops to keep the 
region under control. The same conclusion was drawn in West Seram.
What happened in Sumatra in 1916 made the very greatest impression. In 
August anti-Dutch violence erupted in Jambi and spread to Palembang.1 In 
Tapanuli people also took up arms. In Jambi resistance was fortified by stories 
about impending Turkish military support and the recognition of the insur-
rection by Istanbul (Locher-Scholten 1994:297-9). In desperation the colonial 
authorities sent one of the leaders of the Sarekat Islam, Goenawan, who, as 
had not passed unnoticed, on a tour to Jambi in early 1916 had been greeted 
with ‘great respect’, to Sumatra to calm the population.2 Armed disturbances 
1 Whether it was an act to get even with Batavia or not is not clear but initialy the newspaper 
Sumatra Post refused to publish the statements about the military campaign in Jambi issued by 
government. The stated reason was that by issuing these statements Batavia broke its own ban 
on the reporting by the press of movements of Dutch troops and warships in the Archipelago (De 
Locomotief, 4-10-1916). 
2 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1917-18:1498.
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of a lesser magnitude, in 1916 and again later took place in Flores, in South 
and East Borneo, in South Celebes, and on the Tanimbar and Babar Islands. 
The Dutch senate concluded that such events lent an even more dangerous 
edge in view of the Great War. The consequence was that throughout the war 
army and Navy in the colony had to be deployed to enforce Dutch rule, divert-
ing ships and troops from what were two of the main headaches confronting 
Batavia and The Hague: the guarding of strict neutrality and the defence 
against a foreign enemy.
The uprising in Jambi especially came as a shock. Reports in the colonial 
and international press about the insurrection induced the new Governor 
General, Van Limburg Stirum, to plead for a curtailment of the freedom of 
the press and of the right of assembly. He did so because the disturbances 
had done the price of shares on the Exchange no good. Van Limburg Stirum 
feared that news about such events would discourage foreign investments. 
Imperatively, outside the colony people should not be encouraged to think 
that the colonial authorities were unable to maintain law and order.4 For the 
wider Dutch community, and Mrs Van Limburg Stirum did her best to stimu-
late this, the Jambi rebellion was a reason to start collecting money to send 
cigars and cigarettes, titbits, and ‘good books’ to the troops in Jambi to cheer 
the soldiers up.5 
The developments in Sumatra played into the hands of critics of the leni-
ency shown to political organizations which had begun to emerge in the years 
just previous to the war. With a few exceptions, the white community in the 
Netherlands Indies and the press which served it were quick to put most – if not 
all – of the blame on the Sarekat Islam. In extension of this they condemned the 
moderate approach to nationalism favoured by Hazeu, Rinkes, and Idenburg. 
They had allowed the Sarekat Islam to come into existence and to flourish. The 
colonial government and those politicians in The Hague who were convinced 
that the Sarekat Islam had a role to play in the gradual emancipation of the 
Indonesian population argued differently. They put every effort in stressing 
that when local Sarekat Islam branches were involved in disturbances – as 
they were – this had been the work of outsiders. Such politicians were greatly 
relieved when reports indicated that this indeed was the case.6 In their eyes 
the disturbances had another discomforting implication. They indicated that in 
any case outside Java, the colonial administration had failed to accomplish the 
instigation of the benevolent rule in which so many Dutch politicians sincerely 
believed. They saw such rule as essential. The cry ‘Remember the Philippines’ 
 Handelingen Eerste Kamer 1917-18:269.
4 Note Ministry of the Colonies, 2-2-1917, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 14-6-1919 26.
5 De Locomotief, 14-11-1916.
6 Handelingen Eerste Kamer 1917-18:494, Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1917-18:1498.
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had passed into history, but the idea behind it was still very much alive. A 
benevolent colonial policy should suffice to convince the population, especially 
its leaders, that Dutch rule was the best, and that its replacement by that of 
another ruler would only be a change for the worse. Some were more cynical.
An on-the-spot investigation into the causes of popular discontent was set 
in motion. The task was assigned to one of the members of the Council of the 
Indies, J.H. Liefrinck, in October 1916. First and foremost he had to investigate 
what had really happened in Jambi and Palembang, but as it was feared that 
a more general malaise was at work Liefrinck had to extend his inquiries to 
Besuki in East Java, Bali, Lombok, Timor, the Minahasa, and Borneo.
Reports by Liefrinck, Snouck Hurgronje and others put the blame on the 
excessive diligence of the Dutch civil service outside Java. Its officials were 
said to have been overzealous and been deficient in the necessary tact and 
expertise. They had put too much pressure on the population in their efforts to 
achieve reforms and open up their territories to the blessings of civilization; a 
zeal which as one critic put it, manifested itself especially in the ‘construction 
of many, preferably motor roads’.7 Pleyte concluded that in their ‘desire to 
introduce radical reforms and some improvement of the backward situations 
within a short span of time’, the civil servants had lacked ‘tact, consideration, 
and moderation’. They had not realized that they had made ‘excessive heavy 
demands on the means and energy of the population’.8 The civil servants 
themselves felt that they had been made scapegoats. They claimed that they 
had tried to convince Batavia of the fatal consequences government policy 
might have, but that their warnings had been ignored. They averred that they 
had even been punished for such criticism of government policy.
In Java a new party had taken over the role of the Indische Partij and 
its successor Insulinde as the mouthpiece of radicalism. Just before Tjipto 
Mangoenkoesoemo had returned to Java, a new political organization had 
been born which would exert great influence in the nationalist movement, 
turning it into a more leftist direction and providing it with a Marxist jargon. 
Social democrats living in the Netherlands Indies had organized themselves. 
They had also begun to look for ways to reach the indigenous population.
One of the options by which they might accomplish this was Insulinde. 
Insulinde confessed to being a socialist organization. As a result, the Semarang 
congress had accepted a motion to translate socialist literature in Malay. 
Members started to address each other as comrade. Insulinde’s leaders were 
sure that cooperation with the social democrats was a fait accompli. In May 
7 De Indische Gids 1918:84.
8 Handelingen Eerste Kamer 1917-18:469.
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1914 De Expres had published a poem by one of its readers hailing Douwes 
Dekker for accomplishing this:
Kameraden, wilde loten Comrades, free spirits
Schaart U onder onze vlag Rally to our banner
Het verbond is thans gesloten The covenant is now sealed
Kome wat er komen mag Come what may
Het verbond met de SDAP The covenant with the SDAP
Danken wij aan onz’ DD For which we have to thank our DD
Onze Tjip, en Soewardi Our Tjip, and Soewardi
Dat zij leve ‘onze Drie’. Long may the three of them live.9
Douwes Dekker may have done much but he was not the most suitable person 
to reach an understanding with the Dutch social democrats. His own attacks 
on socialism in the past were in part to blame, whereas social democrats in 
Holland found it hard to deal with the radical way in which Douwes Dekker 
and some of his political associates expressed themselves. Social democrats 
had been highly critical of the decision to exile Douwes Dekker and had used 
this to castigate colonial relations, but shrank away from the suggestions 
made by Douwes Dekker and others that violence might be necessary as a 
means to an end. In spite of the stress on the one Indiër race, some people 
were convinced the Indische Partij and Insulinde remained unequivocally 
Indo-European organizations, representing a group many of whose members 
looked down upon the Indonesian population and were only prepared to fight 
for their own narrow interests. 
Its main antagonist in Holland was Van Kol. Van Kol – the ‘anti-revolution-
ary imperialist’, De Expres called him – condemned the rash words spoken by 
members of the Indische Partij. He was convinced that they dreamt of a vio-
lent revolution. In the press he called attention to the fact that members of the 
Indische Partij had imported fire-arms, and during a visit to Java had jokingly 
told him that they had done so to hunt pigs, but that one day perhaps they 
might shoot ‘other game’.10 He repeatedly argued that the Indonesians, among 
them, he thought, the leaders of the Sarekat Islam, did not trust the Indische 
Partij. Van Kol characterized the majority of the members of the Indische Partij 
as Indo-Europeans of a certain class. Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo, whom Van 
Kol called ‘a noble man [...] whose intellectual development I highly esteem’, 
would do better to dedicate himself to the cause of the Sarekat Islam, which 
was supported by the Javanese intellectuals and commercial middle class.11 
Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo did not take kindly to Van Kol’s words. In his turn, 
9 De Expres, 14-5-1914.
10 Soerabaiasch Handelsblad, 1-9-191. 
11 De Locomotief, 2-12-191.
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he accused Van Kol of spouting ideas which resembled those of an ‘arch 
reactionary’. Substituting the word proletariat for Van Kol’s qualification ‘of a 
certain class ‘, Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo expressed surprise about the fact that 
somebody who professed to be a social democrat could oppose a proletarian 
organization like the Indische Partij and plead in favour of one supported by 
the middle class.12
Feelings among the Dutch social democrats living in Java were at the best 
mixed. At first there was an idea that whatever its faults Insulinde was still 
a valuable vehicle to disseminate socialist ideals to a wider audience. One of 
the persons who nurtured this view was H.J.F.M. Sneevliet. who had arrived 
in Java in 191. Attorney-General Uhlenbeck concluded in 1918 that since his 
arrival, ‘this young man’ – he was not yet thirty at that moment – ‘considered 
himself called and entitled to act as a demagogue on the basis of a few half-
understood doctrines, in a country which was totally alien to him, with a 
population whose needs he could not have probed in the short time of his stay 
here, whose language he hardly understood and spoke’.1 
Sneevliet was not impressed by Insulinde. He reported home in February 
1914 that Insulinde (at that moment still in disarray because of the banish-
ment of the Indische Partij leaders) was a weak party, incapable of even 
organizing a proper congress.14 Sneevliet saw a more promising prospect 
in the Vereeniging van Spoor- en Tramwegpersoneel in Nederlandsch-Indië 
(VSTP, Union of Rail and Tramway Personnel in the Netherlands Indies). The 
VSTP was small, but Sneevliet was very optimistic that he could change this. 
One of the advantages of the VSTP was that like Insulinde it was open to 
Indonesians. An Indonesian, Moehammad Joesoef, a clerk with a Semarang 
Railway Company, had become a member of the board as early as October 
191. A second prominent Indonesian socialist, Semaoen, a railway clerk at the 
station in Surabaya, came on the board in March 1915. Sneevliet was appoint-
ed editor of the VSTP periodical De Volharding (Perseverance). Moehammad 
Joesoef edited the Malay version, Si Tetap.
Sneevliet was also prominently present when the Vereeniging van 
Sociaal-Democraten in Nederlandsch-Indië (Union of Social Democrats in 
the Netherlands Indies) the ‘future Indian battalion of the International’, as 
it was expectantly called, was founded on 9 May 1914.15 After a meal and 
the singing of lines (adapted) from The Internationale like the ‘Sterft gij oude 
vormen en gedachten!’ (Die ye old forms and thoughts!) and ‘Broeders, laat 
12 De Indiër 1-44:7-40.
1 Demand in appeal of the public prosecution, 27--1918, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 14-6-1919 
26.
14 Sneevliet to Wibaut, 17-2-1914 (Tichelman 1985:171-4).
15 De Expres, 16-5-1914.
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ons de kazerne slopen’ (Brothers let us demolish the barracks), those present 
discussed the relationship with Insulinde and the Sarekat Islam. The Sarekat 
Islam could count on plenty of sympathy. The opinions about Insulinde 
were not so felicitous. Some accused Insulinde of inciting racial hatred and 
encouraging a race struggle. Such a policy diverted attention from a correct 
analysis of colonial society and disregarded the basic tenets of a class struggle. 
Others saw in an Indo-European bourgeoisie the enemy of ‘rising Javanism’. 
Nevertheless, observing that many Indo-Europeans belonged to the prole-
tariat cooperation was not entirely precluded.16
De Expres published the report of the inaugural meeting of the Indische 
Sociaal-Democratische Vereeniging (ISDV, Indies Social Democratic Union), 
as it was soon re-christened. It was the only time that its readers, used to 
excessive praise of Douwes Dekker in the pages of De Expres, read less flattery 
words about their hero in their favourite newspaper. The criticism of Insulinde 
and the not very complimentary remarks made about Douwes Dekker had 
not been expurgated. ISDV members had said that Douwes Dekker was not a 
social democrat at all. He was a nationalist-anarchist.
The uneasy partnership between Insulinde and the ISDV would not last 
long. Their leaders had completely different political ideals. Sneevliet admired 
Douwes Dekker’s courage and his disregard for racial differences, but the 
glorification of Douwes Dekker and the veneration with which ‘DéDéisme’ 
was presented offended him. Leaving personal considerations aside, Sneevliet 
rejected almost all the points propagated by Douwes Dekker to improve the 
lot of the poor Indo-Europeans. Only about one matter Sneevliet had not yet 
made up his mind. This was the right of landownership for Indo-Europeans. A 
final evaluation depended on the assessment of the factors required to accom-
plish a socialist revolution in the colony. If indeed an industrial proletariat 
was an essential prerequisite for the realization of a socialist society, Sneevliet 
could accept and even welcome an increase in the number of landless, poor 
Javanese, if this were the result of allowing Indo-Europeans to own land.17
Another reason why relations were strained was that the leaders of the 
ISDV and Insulinde both looked to the Sarekat Islam (and also to the VSTP) to 
expand their support among the population and foster their Indonesian activ-
ists. In the ISDV Moehammad Joesoef, Semaoen and other future communists 
were literally indispensable to the translation of the ISDV message to the mass-
es. Most Dutch socialists, many of them teachers at European schools, had 
little or no command of Malay or Javanese. In Insulinde it was a small group 
of militant Indonesians from Surakarta operating at the fringe of the Sarekat 
Islam branch of that city who embarked on a radical nationalist course.
16 Sneevliet to Wibaut, 26-5-1914 (Tichelman 1985:181-2).
17 Sneevliet to Wibaut, 17-2-1914 (Tichelman 1985:171-5).
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Insulinde also contributed its own efforts towards reaching out to the 
indigenous population. In August 1914, the Insulinde branch of Semarang had 
launched De Goentoer, The Thunder. It appeared twice a month. It was edited 
by Darnakoesoemo, one of the Javanese board members of Insulinde, former 
corrector of De Expres, and a close friend of Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo. Articles 
were published in Dutch and Malay. De Goentoer was in a sense the continua-
tion of De Expres. Troubled by financial difficulties, a drop in subscribers and 
advertisements, the ‘Knocker-up of Insulinde, the Scourge of Evil’, as De 
Expres describes in the last issue, had ceased publication at the end of July 
1914. In the same issue Darnakoesoemo announced the birth of De Goentoer: 
‘In the cradle at the side of the bier lies the baby, De Goentoer. The dark bright 
eyes look around terrified, the cry is a sign of the longing for mother’s milk. 
Alas the breast has dried up! The milk supplier asks cash on the nail, think 
about that comrades!’18
In this race to win the hearts and minds of the population, Tjipto 
Mangoenkoesoemo was assigned a significant role. The sea voyage and the 
return to his fatherland in August 1914 had done Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo 
good. He made a speedy recovery. Idenburg had not expected this. As far as he 
was concerned, a return to health was a reason to worry. Idenburg was afraid 
that when people were confronted with a healthy Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo 
they might not understand the real reason for the decision to revoke his 
banishment. They might interpret the permission he had given Tjipto 
Mangoenkoesoemo to return a sign of weakness on his, Idenburg’s, part.19 
Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo had first taken up residence in Semarang, the 
centre of Insulinde activities. Before the end of the year he moved to Surakarta, 
where he lived with Kebo Panatas. Together with a small number of radical 
Javanese journalists Kebo Panatas had founded the Inlandsche Journalisten 
Bond (IJB, Native Journalists’ Union) in December 191. They had done so at 
the office of the local branch of the Sarekat Islam. President of the union was 
Marco Kartodikromo, born in Cepu in Central Java around 1890. Mas Marco, 
as he was usually called, was editor of Sarotomo, published by the Surakarta 
Sarekat Islam, and appearing twice a week. The colonial authorities consid-
ered Mas Marco ‘extremely dangerous’.20
The goal of the IJB was to establish a fund to pay for legal aid for members 
who were prosecuted by the authorities and for the financial support of their 
families if journalists ended up in jail. Such financial guarantees were one of the 
reasons why the union’s leaders stressed that journalists should not hesitate to 
speak out. Courage became their password. The IJB motto reflected this: Berani 
18 De Expres, 1-7-1914.
19 Kindermann to Rinkes, 4-1-1915, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 6-1-1916 1.
20 De Expres, 8-1-1914, citing Soerabaiasch Handelsblad. 
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karena benar, takoet karena salah, Courageous because of right, afraid because of 
wrong. The nationalist were right and had nothing to fear, the Dutch were in 
the wrong and because of this were afraid. In February 1914 the IJB launched 
Doenia Bergerak (The World on the Move), a bi-weekly. Doenia Bergerak wanted 
to become ‘the trumpet of the truly suppressed and deceived’.
The founding of the IJB and the publication of Doenia Bergerak was hailed 
in Insulinde circles. ‘Do not slumber’, De Expres had exhorted its readers, ‘we 
are now in the period of Doenia Bergerak says the Native Journalists’ Union. 
Rise, Indiërs and close ranks and join together, because unity gives strength.’21 
De Indiër wrote that the IJB had Sarekat Islam leaders as its organizers and ‘IP 
tendencies in its expressions’.22 Sarotomo and Doenia Bergerak had no formal link 
with Insulinde, but both were printed on the presses of De Expres in Bandung. 
De Goentoer, Sarotomo, and Doenia Bergerak were militant in tone. They 
could not count on any sympathy in government circles. Rinkes called them 
scurrilous rags and disqualified their editors as a ‘pathetic scolding club’. 
21 De Expres, 16-2-1914.
22 De Indiër 1-2.
Mas Marco Kartodikromo and his wife in better days (KITLV 4451)
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Nevertheless, in the same breath Rinkes had to admit that they were widely 
read by the ‘pious but backward’ community of Central Java and by ‘semi-
intellectuals’, that is Indonesians employed in the lower ranks in government 
enterprises and the bureaucracy.2 
The content of the three papers worried the colonial authorities. Batavia 
feared that it could set people in Central Java against Dutch rule. The authori-
ties ignored that the persons behind De Goentoer, Sarotomo, and Doenia Bergerak 
expressed their ideals in radical words and fierce sounding slogans, but 
beneath this brimstone were truly concerned about the plight of the Javanese; 
those half-humans, as the nationalist leaders liked to call them.24
Restoring the dignity of their fellow-countrymen meant more to them than 
political and economic emancipation or a better education. A moral awaken-
ing – the renaissance Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo had referred to when he left 
Holland – also had to be achieved. The Javanese should cast off their servile 
attitude and their gestures of submission in front of superiors. Social abuses 
had to be combated. Darnakoesoemo, for instance, and for such campaigns the 
Sarekat Islam had set the tone in Java, was chairman of the Madjoe Kamoeljan 
(Progress of Honour) founded to fight prostitution in March 1915. When he 
learned of a girl of about fifteen years of age, who was lured by a Briton to 
become his housekeeper by the promise of a high salary, he visited the girl in 
the company of the female treasurer of Madjoe Kamoeljan to urge her not to 
accept the offer. The girl was told that her future was bleak, all the more so 
because her prospective employer was British. It was well known that might 
there be a child, how much the British despised half-castes. She would end 
up in the kampong, where she would be treated with disdain because of her 
past.25
Much of what people like Darnakoesoemo strove for did actually cor-
respond to the stated intentions of the colonial administration to elevate the 
Indonesian population. Their main fault was that they rejected the guidance by 
the authorities. They defied established etiquette and in their writings paid no 
heed to the limitations set by the authorities. This earned them a reputation of 
being ill-mannered at best and subversive at worst. Upset by their words, the 
colonial authorities ordered action to be taken against the inflammatory arti-
cles written by them. These were plentiful. The authorities were at their wit’s 
end. It was a hopeless task to take legal action against all the articles which 
were considered seditious. The problem was compounded because many of 
2 Rinkes to General Secretary, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 17-9-1915 46.
24 A similar notion was presented outside Java. In Pewarta Deli, for instance, it was noted 
that the native was sliding down to the status of a buffalo, an ox, a monkey and other animals 
(Koloniaal Tijdschrift 1917:96).
25 De Expres, 14-7-1914.
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the contested articles were written in such a way that a court could never pin 
down a charge on the author. Mas Marco, Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo, Darna-
koesoemo and other authors of malicious articles also were not the sort of men 
to be discouraged by a jail sentence or banishment to remote places. On the 
contrary, they would wilfully exploit every attempt to prosecute them to draw 
public attention to their cause. The only way to stop them was to close down 
their printing-works or to impose direct censorship. Since 1906, when the 
press law had been reviewed, this sort of intervention had become impossible, 
but action had to be taken. If not, the authors would only become increasingly 
audacious and in the end their writings could not but have a baleful effect on 
the mind of the population.26
Batavia blamed Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo for this upsurge in radicalism in 
the vernacular press.27 Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo did indeed enthusiastically 
support the union of native journalists. He became a contributor to Doenia 
Bergerak and came out in support of Mas Marco when an investigation against 
the latter was started in January 1915. One of Mas Marco’s sins was that he 
had used Soewardi’s slogan Rawé-rawé rantas malang malang poetoeng. Another 
was that he refused to disclose the name of the authors of a number of letters 
to the editor which had appeared in Doenia Bergerak in July and August 1914, 
to which the authorities had taken offence; among them one entitled ‘Oh, 
Javanese are very stupid’, written by M. Juist (M. Right).
What Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo wrote about Mas Marco’s prosecution 
occasioned his first collision with the colonial authorities since his return. 
Rinkes even went as far as to conclude that Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo had 
gone mad and might need psychiatric treatment.28 The bone of contention was 
a pamphlet – Pressdelict – written in January 1915 in support of Mas Marco and 
Darnakoesoemo, who also had to stand trial around the same time. Written 
in Malay and Javanese it ended with the sentence ‘The members of the judici-
ary will confront our brothers Marco, Darnakoesoemo or Diponegara, even 
though they will find themselves in troubled waters with the IJB’.29 These 
words were considered shocking. Reading them the head of the Insulinde 
printing-works in Bandung went to the Assistent-Resident of the city to inquire 
whether publishing the pamphlet would still be within the confines of law. He 
also asked the authorities’ opinion about another pamphlet ‘Justitie ngamoeg’, 
Justice runs amok, written by one Mintarogo, which, he disclosed, was a pseu-
donym used by Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo.0 ‘Why’, it began, ‘is action taken 
26 André de la Porte to Idenburg, 0--1915, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 17-9-1915 46.
27 Note Rinkes, 7-6-1915, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 17-9-1915 46.
28 Rinkes to Idenburg, 1-2-1915, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 6-1-1916 1.
29 NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 6-1-1916 1.
0 Janssen to Idenburg, 20-2-1915, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 6-1-1916 1.
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against the article in Pressdelict by brother Tjip. The piece is unimportant. [...]. 
In point of fact, the brother in question is completely debilitated [a reference 
to the medical report of Dr Winkler] and prefers to eat saté or soto on the 
aloen-aloen [the town-square].’ Other parts of the text fell more alarming on 
Dutch ears: ‘Rawe rantas, malang malang poetoeng I cry in chorus with Tjip en 
Soewardi. We want to declare war on all those people, who do not join forces 
[with us] in our country, and woe to them who dare to take up arms against 
us.’ ‘If’, it ended, ‘my brothers and fellow-countrymen would just show them-
selves to be “daring”, if we have the “right”, then the power of the Javanese 
will return and a Kingdom of Majapait will rise again.’1
Sneevliet and the ISDV were not behind-hand in springing to the defence 
of Mas Marco. The ISDV and Insulinde staged a joint public meeting in 
Semarang to protest about the sentence of two years’ imprisonment the 
prosecution had demanded on 7 July 1915. The speakers included Tjipto 
Mangoenkoesoemo (who later attacked Tjokroaminoto for not joining in the 
protests), Sneevliet, and Mas Marco himself. Mas Marco stressed the familiar 
theme: ‘as long as you, people of the Netherlands Indies, do not have courage, 
you will always certainly be trampled on and be said to be quarter human 
beings’. The Dutch public was shocked; not only by the fierce speeches of 
Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo and Sneevliet, but also because of the prominent 
presence of ‘a Marxist like Mr Sneevliet’ who was set on exploiting the harsh-
ness of the public prosecutor to propagate his own revolutionary ideas.2
The protest meeting did not achieve much. The following day Mas Marco 
was sentenced to nine-months’ imprisonment. He appealed. The sentence was 
reduced to seven months in October. A Committee for the Freedom of the 
Press, constituted in August and supported by the ISDV, Insulinde, the IJB, 
and the VSTP, gave Mas Marco’s wife financial support. After Mas Marco had 
been sentenced, Sarotomo mentioned between brackets in its colophon that 
Mas Marco was in the boei, the jail of Semarang; maybe the initiation of the 
habit of radical papers of the Netherlands Indies of mentioning a special type 
of staff member: the editor in jail (Soebagijo 1981:5).
The authorities’ anger had repercussions on Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo’s 
personal life. When he had moved to Surakarta, Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo 
had hoped to resume his practice as a ‘private native doctor’, as he chose 
to call himself. The local Islamic press had welcomed the prospect. At last 
there would be a doctor in town who would take care of poor patients. 
Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo had a hard time. Because of his reputation he 
did not attract many moneyed patients. He tried in vain to become the per-
1 NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 6-1-1916 1.
2 De Nieuwe Soerabaia Courant, cited in Baars and Sneevliet 1991:54; Oetoesan Hindia, 1-4-1916.
 Sarotomo, cited in De Locomotief, 18-12-1914.
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sonal physician of the Mangkunegara, one of the two rulers in Surakarta in 
February 1915. Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo stood no chance, not least because 
the Resident, S.P. Sollewijn Gelpke, refused to write a recommendation. Tjipto 
Mangoenkoesoemo had never made a secret of the fact that he did not 
care a fig for Javanese noble titles and steadfastly refused to use his own 
title of Mas. The prime minister of the Mangkunegara disqualified Tjipto 
Mangoenkoesoemo as somebody ‘who did not like the Javanese’.4 The fol-
lowing month Sollewijn Gelpke again refused to help Tjipto who had asked 
Idenburg to appoint him to the medical staff to combat an outbreak of plague 
in Surakarta. Sollewijn Gelpke would not hear a word of it. He wrote to 
Idenburg that Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo was an arrogant, conceited person 
and did not enjoy a good name among the Javanese notables in Surakarta, 
who valued good manners. Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo could be given a job 
as a plague doctor, but not in Surakarta.5 On hearing that his request had 
been turned down Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo angrily returned his decoration. 
‘Poor Javanese’, the newspaper Djawa Tengah commented, contrasting Tjipto 
Mangoenkoesoemo’s willingness to combat the plague, even if it had to be 
without pay, with the egoism of Dutch doctors.6
Another person to suffer was Soewardi. Mr. J.H. Abendanon, an influential 
former colonial civil servant, informed Pleyte in March 1915 that Soewardi’s 
wife was expecting a baby and that she was apprehensive about having a 
delivery in Europe far away from her relatives.7 Batavia was unrelenting. Two 
months earlier Idenburg had asked the opinion of his advisers about allowing 
Soewardi, who had made no radical remarks for almost a year, to return to 
Java. On the advice of Rinkes, who was sure that Soewardi had not changed 
his political views, and the Council of the Indies Idenburg decided against 
clemency. Mas Marco and Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo had already caused 
enough trouble. Idenburg wired Pleyte that Soewardi would only be allowed 
to return to the Netherlands Indies if he took up residence in Bangka and ‘if 
he himself requests this in writing’.8 Pleyte was prepared to pay a third class 
ticket if Soewardi agreed to the conditions. Soewardi refused. He wanted to 
return to the Netherlands Indies only if he were allowed to take up residence 
in Java. The refusal to allow him back was the end of Soewardi in his role as 
a quiet exile. He castigated Indië Weerbaar as Dutch imperialist propaganda, 
4 Sollewijn Gelpke to Idenburg, 26-2-1915, Rinkes to Idenburg, 15-10-1915, note about Tjipto, 
NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 17-9-1915 46, Vb. 26-1-1916 2. 
5 Tjipto to Idenburg, 1-4-1915, Sollewijn Gelpke to Idenburg, 6-4-1915, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 
12-10-1915 1.
6 Djawa Tengah, cited in Koloniaal Tijdschrift 1917:404.
7 Abendanon to Pleyte, 9--1915, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 16-1-1916 1.
8 Idenburg to Pleyte, -9-1915, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 6-1-1916 1.
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and contributed articles to Het Volk, De Groene, De Nieuwe Amsterdammer and 
other leftist periodicals in Holland. 
Afterwards Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo tried to convince the colonial author-
ities that they had only themselves to blame for the turn his life had taken by 
refusing him the opportunity to practise as a plague doctor. He explained to 
Van Limburg Stirum that it had forced him to take up journalism to find an 
additional source of income.9 Admittedly Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo did not 
exactly make a fortune as a journalist. One of the problems was that he, as 
Darnakoesoemo observed in a letter to Sneevliet, was ‘a champion of his peo-
ple’, but definitely not a businessman.40 At the end of September 1915, when 
Mas Marco had to enter the ‘journalists’ hotel’, as the prison was ironically 
known, and Darnakoesoemo moved to Semarang to become the book-keeper 
of the VSTP, Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo took over leadership of the financially 
not very viable weekly Goentoer Bergerak (Thunder on the Move). Published 
partly in Dutch and partly in Malay Goentoer Bergerak had appeared for the first 
time in February 1915 after the merger of De Goentoer and Doenia Bergerak.
From its inception Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo had played a key role in 
Goentoer Bergerak. In the first issue, using the pen-name Djajabaja – a Javanese 
king supposed to have prophesied the coming of a Just King who would replace 
Dutch rule – he had outlined its editorial policy. Goentoer Bergerak would fol-
low ‘the old IP orientation, guided by the spirit of DD’.41 These were no idle 
words. In one of the next issues Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo proposed extenuat-
ing circumstances for the assassination of Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo: ‘it has 
been a political murder and in us oppressed it strikes a cord of sympathy when 
we think about this’.42 As editor-in-chief Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo decided to 
rename Goentoer Bergerak Modjopait. In revealing this he made no secret of the 
fact that he wanted the initially bi-lingual Modjopait to be a Malay De Expres. 
His wishes were fulfilled. People were quick to liken Modjopait, defending the 
interests of Javanese and Indo-Europeans alike, to the former De Expres. To 
the additional dismay of the authorities in the first issue he announced that 
Modjopait’s aim was to strive for an independent Netherlands Indies, free of for-
eign tyranny. In the eyes of the authorities, Modjopait qualified as a dangerous 
periodical, through which the ‘well-known agitator’ Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo 
could conduct a vicious Insulinde and Indische Partij campaign.4
After Mas Marco had served half his sentence, in February 1916 Idenburg 
9 Tjipto to Van Limburg Stirum, 19-7-1916, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 22-11-1916 6.
40 Darnakoesoemo to Sneevliet, 16-9-1915 (Tichelman 1985:274).
41 Note about Tjipto, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 26-1-1916 2.
42 Note about Tjipto, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 26-1-1916 2.
4 Attorney-General to Idenburg, 5-10-1915, Assistent-Resident Surabaya to Resident Surabaya, 
12-4-1916, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 14-6-1919 26, Vb. 1-8-1916 15.
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ordered his release from prison. The difference between the sentences pro-
nounced against Mas Marco and Darnakoesoemo and against Dutchmen 
prosecuted for a similar offence had become too blatant. In a comparable court 
case in October a Dutch officer had been sentenced to one day’s military deten-
tion. After he had appealed he was acquitted in December.44 
A few months after his release Mas Marco went to Holland. He was 
impressed by the political freedom in Holland and by the activities of radi-
cal Dutch socialists. In The Hague he discussed the publication of a political 
journal in Malay with Soewardi. To avoid censorship it should be printed in 
Holland. High printing costs and the uncertainties of sea traffic prevented 
the realization of the plan. Instead, Mas Marco had a pamphlet printed in 
Holland: No 1 November 1916, Boekoe Sebaran jang pertama oleh Mas Marco (The 
first brochure by Mas Marco). A glance at the first page left no doubt about 
Mas Marco’s intentions. It stated that to prevent people contemplating rising 
against Dutch rule in increasing numbers (it were the days of the troubles in 
Jambi and other parts of Sumatra), the colonial government should acquiesce 
in the requests made by the Javanese. On other pages the word pemberontakan, 
rebellion, figured prominently.
Mas Marco stayed in Holland for five months. His intention had been to 
stay longer but he decided to leave earlier. The winter cold had made him ill.45 
Upon his return in Java in February 1917, Mas Marco took over leadership of 
Pantjaran Warta (News Broadcast), a Sarekat Islam newspaper published in 
Batavia, from Goenawan, who did not feel physically fit enough to continue 
as editor-in-chief. For months Pantjaran Warta had earned itself the displeas-
ure of the authorities for its attacks on the colonial government and its civil 
servants.46 Mas Marco continued along this line. In Holland he had made no 
secret of the fact that he sympathized with the Jambi rebels and that a rebel-
lion might be the right way to react to injustice and ill-treatment.47 Back in Java 
Mas Marco called for action with renewed vigour. He told his readers that his 
time in Holland had fortified him in his conviction that courage was a pre-
requisite for success.48 To bring home his ideas, Mas Marco started a series of 
articles in Pantjaran Warta entitled ‘Sama rasa sama rata’ (Fraternity and equal-
ity) published from 14 to 19 February. Soewardi, who, as Mas Marco wrote, 
‘lived in distressing circumstances’ in Holland, was held up as an example. 
By exemplifying Soewardi, Mas Marco wanted to impress upon his readers 
44 Idenburg to Pleyte, 27-1-1916, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 1-4-1916 26.
45 De Indische Gids 1917, I:520.
46 Van Vuuren to Lulofs, 7-9-1916, Hazeu to Van Limburg Stirum, 15-10-1916, NA, Kol. 
Openbaar, Vb. 14-6-1919 26.
47 Sinar Djawa, cited in Koloniaal Tijdschrift 1917:544. 
48 Pantjaran Warta, 1-2-1917, cited in De Indische Gids 1917, II:1080.
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that sacrifices were essential on the road to emancipation. People who were 
afraid of ‘convict labour, hunger, defamation, and death’ would never attain 
their ideals.49
Mas Marco clearly did not believe that the Dutch government would grant 
the indigenous population status equal to that of the Europeans of its own free 
will: ‘Brothers [...] the Government does not want this because it is afraid that 
then we the children of the Indies could no longer be extorted’.50 He hinted 
that Indonesians would rise in rebellion if the demands for emancipation 
were not met: ‘Government, we ask for equal rights! We the children of the 
country are dissatisfied. Agree to our request and avert a general uprising in 
the Indies, our fatherland!’51 Mas Marco stressed, and he could hardly have 
done otherwise in the hope of escaping prosecution, that his words should 
be seen as a warning. He valued good relations with the ‘elder brother’, but 
if emancipation did not come, other ways would have to be resorted to reach 
this ideal.
Dutch people were shocked. They wanted the blood of this ‘notorious 
native loudmouth’, this ‘demagogue in the worst sense of the word’, whose 
short stay in Holland had turned his head. What he had written was worse 
than the ‘Marxist bombast of Tjipto and Sneevliet’. Freedom of the press was 
one thing, allowing boorish improprieties of juveniles and loutish protests 
against the authorities by ‘so-called intellectuals’ was another.52
The public prosecutor of Batavia, Ch.Ph. du Cloux, decided to act. Mas 
Marco was taken into preventive custody on 21 February 1917. He was 
charged with sowing hatred and inciting the population to change or bring 
down the colonial government. Within days pamphlets in Malay and in Arab 
script were discovered, in which ‘friends of Mas Marco’ urged the members 
of the Sarekat Islam to rise on the first day of the Fasting Month against ‘the 
unjust government, which had assailed Mas Marco who had only spoken the 
truth – and how well he had done so! – by putting him in jail’.5 On the initia-
tive of Insulinde, a committee was founded, the Sedyo Tama Fund, to support 
Mas Marco, his family, and ‘others who will suffer in their struggle for the 
own people’.54
One side effect of Mas Marco’s arrest was a change in the prison system. 
When they were interrogated, European prisoners were transported from the 
49 Pantjaran Warta, cited in De Indische Gids 1917, II:1079.
50 Pantjaran Warta, cited in De Indische Gids 1917, I:79.
51 Pantjaran Warta, cited in De Indische Gids 1917, II:1080.
52 De Preanger-bode, Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad, Bataviaasch Handelsblad, and Sumatra Post, cited in 
De Indische Gids 1917, II:959, 1079-80, 1219, 1529.
5 Hazeu to Van Limburg Stirum, 21--1917, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 8-11-1917 6.
54 De Roo de la Faille to Van Limburg Stirum, 5-4-1917, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 8-11-1917 6.
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prison to the courts by carriage. Indonesian prisoners were handcuffed and 
forced to walk escorted by a native policeman. Mas Marco felt humiliated 
by this treatment and protested. Du Cloux and Uhlenbeck had not given the 
way Mas Marco was treated a second thought. Handcuffing was standard 
procedure for native prisoners to prevent them trying to make their escape in 
the busy streets of Batavia. They had never heard a prisoner complain before. 
Nevertheless, swayed by Mas Marco’s protest, Uhlenbeck instructed Du Cloux 
to discontinue this custom, but only in certain cases. Natives accused of offences 
against the press code and those who had to stand trial with European accom-
plices should in future be transported by carriage.55 Du Cloux had to consent, 
but suggested that ordinary thieves and robbers should remain handcuffed. 
An exception might be made for ‘prominent natives [...] and civilized and more 
educated natives, and all women’.56 While making these concessions Du Cloux 
defended the old custom. He wrote to Uhlenbeck that it was common knowl-
edge that native police officers were ‘lazy, indolent, and corrupt, furthermore 
brazen and arrogant towards their inferiors and equals, and submissive and 
servile towards those who because of their previous post or previous social 
position, even though they were prisoners, were still seen by their guards as 
superiors, which explains why those guards in most instances would not act 
if such prisoners were to walk away during the transport’. Du Cloux gave the 
impression that Mas Marco had been done a great honour. Guards should be 
seen as escorts of honour to prisoners of high status. To explain this Du Cloux 
related how one important prisoner had ‘strolled at his ease’ from prison to 
the courthouse with the native police officer three steps behind him, carrying 
a dinner pail in one hand and in the other a bunch of bananas.
This time Mas Marco was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment. The pre-
text of legal equality was abandoned. Later a representative of the colonial 
administration would state that the heavy sentence had nothing to do with 
class justice. Mas Marco simply had to be punished much more severely than 
Dutch journalists.57 After Mas Marco appealed, the sentence was reduced to 
one year. By now he had become so popular that a Chinese firm in Kudus 
announced that it would sell cigarettes with the brand name Marco.58 While 
serving his sentence in the civilian and military prison in Batavia, Mas Marco 
was not allowed to write for newspapers. He used his time to write Student 
Hidjo (Green Student) and other novels (Kartodikromo 2000:ix).
Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo and Mas Marco were both avowed opponents of 
55 Uhlenbeck to Du Cloux, 20-6-1917, Uhlenbeck to Van Limburg Stirum, 17-7-1917, NA, Kol. 
Openbaar, Vb. 8-11-1917 6.
56 Du Cloux to Uhlenbeck, 7-7-1917, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 8-11-1917 6.
57 Volksraad 1918:47.
58 Pantjaran Warta, 6-7-1917, IPO 27/1917.
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Indië Weerbaar. Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo even had to deny the rumour that he 
would organize a protest meeting on 1 August 1916. Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo 
of whom it was said at that time that he would again be banned to a far-away 
island, was too ill to do anything.59 Mas Marco appealed to the readers of 
Pantjaran Warta to disobey the law and become conscientious objectors if a 
militia were to be created at the expense of the Javanese. He made this point 
crystal clear in a poem, ‘Comité Indië Weerbaar’, published in Pantjaran Warta, 
in which he observed that Indonesians refused to be used as soldiers by those 
who sucked their blood: 
Children of the Indies beware of the savages
Because they are robbers of our vast lands
Children of the Indies rely on God the Almighty
The cheat cheats you.
Children of the Indies beat them within an inch of their lives
If necessary kill them
Courage that is our weapon
To live and to die truly.60
The same issue contained a drawing by the cartoonist of the Dutch monthly 
De Wapens Neder (Lay Down Your Arms) who Mas Marco had met in Holland. 
It showed a well-fed, fat Dutchman who held a skinny Javanese to the ground 
in a virtual stranglehold, exclaiming: ‘O Lord! Please have this damned native 
defend my precious Insulinde!’61
The attacks by Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo and Mas Marco were indicative 
of the fact that inadvertently the Indië Weerbaar drive had created a new and 
more intense debate about Dutch rule. Indonesian protagonists and oppo-
nents of Indië Weerbaar alike used a native militia as political leverage to win 
political reforms. As usual Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo had been among the first 
who had seen the opportunity. Shortly after the outbreak of the war, De Indiër 
had carried an article written by Madjapaïtatma, who was almost certainly 
Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo. Madjapaïtatma observed the war showed that in 
the West conflicts could only be solved by violence. It was a malicious delight 
to ‘rejoice in the debâcle of that most superior of all races: the white one’, but 
the readers should realize that the war could be used to force the oppressor 
into making concessions. Aware of their helplessness, the Dutch would real-
ize that they had to appease the Indiërs by making allowances. The time had 
come to resist.62
59 De Locomotief, 18-8-1916.
60 Pantjaran Warta, 14-2-1917. 
61 Pantjaran Warta, cited in De Indische Gids 1917, II:1080.
62 De Indiër 1-4:204.
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In efforts to gain political concessions, good use was made of the fear the 
Japanese threat had elicited among the Dutch. Abdoel Moeis, for instance, 
capitalized on such trepidations during the dinner in the Zoological Gardens 
in Amsterdam when he spoke about a Foreign Power which threatened to 
become increasingly popular in the Netherlands Indies.6 In an effort to dem-
onstrate that a militia should be financed by those who had a vested interests 
in the Netherlands Indies remaining Dutch: the Dutch government and the 
rich, not the small people Dwidjosewojo said that ordinary people did not 
mind whether the foreign ruler was the Netherlands or Japan.
They tried to exploit Dutch fears just at a moment when Dutch people 
really became apprehensive about the consequences of a struggle for hegem-
ony in the Pacific Ocean. Some were ready to accept the possibility that what 
they considered to be a contest between the white and yellow races would 
start with an invasion of the Netherlands Indies. Among the more prominent 
persons who held this view was the new naval commander, J.A.M. Bron, who 
had succeeded Pinke in 1916.64 Others dreaded a situation in which the Allied 
Powers would sacrifice the Netherlands Indies to their own interests and 
Japan would have a free hand. The British would be too busy fighting a war 
in Europe. The United States would not dare to enter into a war which would 
give Tokyo the excuse to invade either the west coast of the United States or 
the Philippines.65
 Opponents of Indië Weerbaar especially succeeded in touching a raw 
Dutch nerve. Dutch people felt it very difficult to swallow, after Tjipto 
Mangoenkoesoemo had resumed his political activities, what he said about 
Dutch fears of Japan. Hazeu noted that he did so with a certain degree of pleas-
ure.66 The cry ‘banzai’ could be read in issues of De Voorpost (The Advanced 
Position), a weekly started by Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo in December 1915 as 
the Dutch-language equivalent of Modjopait. When Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo 
ventured to suggest that Batavia would not dare to act against Insulinde if 
Insulinde had the support of Tokyo, this provoked howls of outrage in the 
Dutch community. De Locomotief called Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo’s remark 
below the belt. Other Dutch-language newspapers speculated about the likeli-
hood of Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo’s arrest. Indignation reached a peak when 
Modjopait wrote in the middle of 1916 that Insulinde would accept Japanese as 
members. Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo ventured to speculate how strong eight 
to ten thousand Japanese members would be making Insulinde. The PID was 
goaded into action, searching assiduously for information about the relation-
6 De Indische Gids 1917, I:802.
64 Bron to Van Limburg Stirum, 15-5-1917, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. -5-1918 O4.
65 Note retired officer P. van der Haas, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 8-12-1916 ????. 
66 Advice Hazeu 21-8-1916, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 22-11-1916 6. 
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ship between Insulinde and Japanese living in the Netherlands Indies. In 
Muurling’s eyes De Voorpost was ‘unquestionably revolutionary’. It showed the 
same tendencies as the Indische Partij. What was written in De Voorpost cou-
pled with the ‘prophet’s mantle of the former Indische Partij’ which Insulinde 
now wore warranted the surveillance of Insulinde by the PID.67 The distrust 
of Insulinde, strengthened by the information about Douwes Dekker’s exploits 
in Japan transformed Insulinde into a dangerous party. It also was an extra 
reason to distrust Minami, the editor of Pertimbangan. After his arrest, a police 
investigation revealed Minami’s contacts with Insulinde members. All was a 
hoax, which happened at a rather unfortunate moment, just when renewed 
speculations about an alliance between Germany and Japan began to be ban-
died about. Only one Japanese in Batavia had asked whether he could join 
Insulinde. There had been no objections. Britons, Germans, Frenchmen and 
other foreigners were also welcome if they supported the policy of Insulinde.68 
Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo and other party leaders had deliberately spread the 
word about the prospective Japanese members to tease the PID and to irritate 
the Dutch community.
Mas Marco also made good use of the spectre of a Japanese threat to the 
Netherlands Indies: 
I think that the Government knows very well, that we natives, children of the Indies, 
will reach out our hands to the Japanese as gesture of fraternization. [...] Would the 
government be strong enough to ward off the [combined] force of the danger that 
is already present domestically and the one that threatens from abroad?69
Japan was more than a bogeyman to frighten the Dutch government into 
concessions. Japan was also a symbol to Indonesians. It may even be that, 
in contrast to the many public statements to the contrary, some Indonesians 
would have actually preferred Japanese rule over that of the Dutch. In the 
past, al-Imam, which was published in Singapore between 1906 and 1908, had 
already in some of its articles expressed the hope that Japan might liberate 
the Javanese (Laffan 2006:12). Such hopes probably had not disappeared. In 
1917 the Malay-Chinese newspaper Perniagaan wondered whether those who 
favoured a change in overlordship were really convinced that Japan would 
honour their aspirations, and under such circumstances what the fate of ‘the 
Chinese and other races’ would be.70
As a modern nation ranking among the world Powers, Japan provided an 
alternative to the option of assimilation to Western culture. Some Javanese 
67 Volksraad 1918:288.
68 De Locomotief, 7-6-1916, 10-6-1916.
69 Pantjaran Warta, cited in De Indische Gids 1917, I:794.
70 Perniagaan, 7-7-1917, IPO 27/1917. 
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– the Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant called them discontented natives – con-
templated sending their children to Japan for their education.71 Hearing about 
such plans radical Muslims prayed that these children would succeed and 
become examples for their fellow-countrymen in their struggle to gain their 
rights as human beings.72 Even leaving aside the consequences of the war, 
going to Japanese schools made good sense. Japan was much closer by than 
Holland. Education in Japan was cheaper. As in the case of Arab children who 
went to school in Turkey, the matter was blown up out of proportion. Figures 
of over a hundred children who wanted to go to Japan to study were men-
tioned. Probably not many more than five actually went. Certainly a certain 
degree of alarm was felt. Dutch people nurtured some apprehension that the 
discontent the desire for schooling in Japan reflected could provide Japan 
with the pretext to intervene and invade the Netherlands Indies to liberate its 
population.7
In the eyes of Indonesian nationalists, the reports about boys leaving for 
Japan provided an excellent occasion to attack the lack of educational facilities 
for the indigenous population. Soewardi said that it may come as an unpleas-
ant surprise to the Dutchmen to learn about such cases, but they should realize 
that parents wanted to send their children to Japan because of the very limited 
educational opportunities on offer in the Netherlands Indies. As long as the 
Dutch tried to keep Indonesians ‘quiet by ethical promises and bureaucratic 
intentions without any visible deeds and tangible results’, it was in the inter-
ests of Indonesians to send their children to schools in Japan.74
In the second half of 1916 and the beginning of 1917, opposition to Indië 
Weerbaar became increasingly articulate. The founding of the Indië Weerbaar 
committees formed a kind of fault line. Nationalists were forced to make up 
their minds. Illustrative of this choice is how Moehammad Joesoef, a future 
leader of the Indonesian left, reacted. As chairman of the Semarang branch of 
the Sarekat Islam he had become a member of the local Indië Weerbaar com-
mittee. He was forced to resign after a meeting of the Semarang Sarekat Islam 
had spoken out against the movement.75 Other leaders of the Sarekat Islam and 
Boedi Oetomo, but not all of them, continued to support the Indië Weerbaar 
ideas. Sometimes they turned the meetings of these organizations into mani-
festations of loyalty. Audiences stood to attention when the Dutch national 
anthem was sung and cheered speakers who praised the achievements of 
Dutch rule. On other occasions, praise was greeted with hoots. Opposition to a 
71 Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, cited in De Indische Gids 1918, I:48.
72 Islam Bergerak, 20-5-1917.
7 Indische Gids 1917, II:1110; Koloniaal Tijdschrift 1917:1089-90.
74 Indische Gids 1917, II:1110.
75 De Locomotief, 12-8-1916, 14-8-1916.
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militia was growing. Proponents who observed that, if anything, the ordinary 
people who were anti-militia began to waver.76 Branches which had initially 
spoken out in favour now turned against. This happened not only in Java, but 
also in Sumatra, where the Sinar Sumatra (Ray of Sumatra) and the Chinese-
Malay newspaper Andalas now proved extremely hostile. Anti-Indië Weerbaar 
pamphlets were distributed, some of which were in Malay, and at times confis-
cated by the authorities. The word conscript was translated as soldadoe paksaan, 
coerced soldier. Militia members would be oempan meriam, cannon fodder. A 
much used argument was that soldiers were supposed to defend house and 
homeland; but did the Javanese have a house and homeland of their own? 
The trend was unmistakable. ISDV members did their best to stir opposition. 
Sneevliet made the slogan geen man en geen cent (no man and no penny) for 
defence purposes a popular one. Another prominent ISDV leader who put his 
oar in was A. Baars, an engineer from the Technical University of Delft, who 
had found work as a teacher at the Koningin Emmaschool, a technical high 
school in Surabaya. Baars was one of the few Dutch ISDV members fluent in 
Malay. De Locomotief reported on 28 August that ‘Mr Baars especially distin-
guished himself by going around the kampongs, advising non cooperation’.
On 1 August 1916, when the pro-Indië Weerbaar movement climaxed, 
a protest meeting was held in Semarang in the theatre (and not in the City 
Gardens; its board had refused to host the meeting). The protest meeting 
was organized by local leaders of the Sarekat Islam, Insulinde, and the ISDV; 
perhaps the reason why Insulinde and the Semarang branch of the ISDV were 
described at that time in De Locomotief as ‘the anti-Netherlands groups’.77 
The leftist Sarekat Islam newspaper, Sinar Djawa, estimated that the protest 
meeting was attended by 4,000 people. Most were Javanese.78 De Locomotief, 
writing that about ,000 people had been present, was impressed. Never had 
the theatre been so chock-full. De Locomotief was also a little awed. Most of 
those attending were natives, who were certainly not drawn from ‘intellectual 
circles’.79 Posters were distributed by Ch. Razoux Kühr, one of the nestors of 
the Indo-European and nationalist press. It showed a column of Indonesians 
being drilled by Van Hinloopen Labberton. Sneevliet was one of the speakers. 
Initially the Resident had forbidden the meeting. His colleague in Surabaya 
had done the same. In Semarang, the Resident finally capitulated when J.J.E. 
Teeuwen of Insulinde and others told him that if he persisted trouble might 
be in store. There was a great chance that the opponents of a militia would 
attend the pro-Indië Weerbaar manifestation in town. Even though allowed to 
76 See, for instance, Dwidjo Soemarto in Neratja, 18-9-1918.
77 De Locomotief, 6-9-1916.
78 Sinar Djawa, cited in Koloniaal Tijdschrift 1917:100. 
79 De Locomotief, 1-8-1916.
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go ahead, the freedom of the meeting was strictly curbed. The organizers had 
had to submit an anti-Indië Weerbaar resolution to the authorities in advance 
for approval. When they read out another one at the meeting – mentioning 
colonial capitalist interest as the main motivation for the Indië Weerbaar 
movement and speaking about the population being without rights and politi-
cally kept under tutelage – they were called to order. The organizers had to 
settle with the original resolution, which merely stated that the founding of a 
militia should be decided upon by an elected parliament in the Netherlands 
Indies. In Surabaya protesters, not allowed to have their own meeting, had 
succeeded in putting leaflets on the chairs and tables in the City Park where 
the pro-Indië Weerbaar meeting was to take place. The leaflets with the texts 
‘Against Indië Weerbaar’ and ‘Demand debate!’ were removed by the police 
before the meeting opened. 
The report to Parliament by Pleyte about 1916 noted that the campaign 
for a militia had unintentionally contributed to ‘the growth of the slumber-
ing political life’.80 The editor of De Locomotief agreed. Though he absolutely 
could not bring himself to agree with the anti-Indië Weerbaar manifestations 
– Stokvis called these politically dirty and inferior and seemingly blamed a 
number of Europeans and Indo-Europeans for this – he wrote that 1 August 
had been a ‘beautiful day’. For the first time a political issue had been raised 
in the Netherlands Indies in which Europeans and Indonesian groups showed 
an almost general interest. It also, pleased him that Indonesians had made 
their own judgement, based on their own interests.81
The Semarang meeting was an unequivocal indication that leaders had 
emerged who would give substance to an Anti-Weerbaarheids movement. 
They rejected a militia out of hand, at least as long as political and social 
emancipation had not been attained, or, as some stressed, as long as compul-
sory education had not yet become a fact. Fuelling the doubts about a native 
militia was the fact that also outside the Dutch community defeatism about 
the outcome of a war which might have to be fought ran riot. In July 1917 
Oetoesan Hindia wrote that it was useless to defend the Netherlands Indies 
against Japan. Better it was to promote the spiritual and material development 
of the Netherlands Indies. The best course would be to pray to God that one 
might be spared an invasion.’82
Among all non-European population groups, the militia debate was a 
means to call attention to the discrimination their members experienced. 
Opposition to a militia among the Chinese was widespread. They had been 
conspicuously absent at Indië Weerbaar manifestations. The government did 
80 Koloniaal verslag 1917:1.
81 De Locomotief, 1-9-1916.
82 Oetoesan Hindia, 28-7-1917, cited in De Indische Gids 1918, I:225.
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not intend to include Foreign Orientals in a militia but this did not prevent 
Chinese-Malay newspapers and Chinese organizations rejecting conscrip-
tion with a passion. They seized upon the militia debate to bring home their 
demands for emancipation. Why should they become cannon-fodder as long 
as the colonial government treated Chinese as Foreign Orientals, as long as 
nothing had been done to make the Chinese feel that the Netherlands Indies 
was their home?8 Or, as one of them put this in an article in the Soerabaiasch 
Handelsblad why should the Chinese care about the defence of the Netherlands 
Indies when they were clearly treated as foreigners and not as Indonesians. The 
government viewed them as Foreign Orientals. It discriminated against them 
in many ways including the field of education. The schools open to Chinese 
were few and of a lower quality than the elementary schools for Europeans. 
Worse, other foreigners, including the Japanese, ‘who are not on a higher level 
in civilization than the average Chinese’, were treated better. Almost all Dutch-
language newspapers contained offensive remarks about Chinese. In a nutshell 
the message was the Chinese could not feel any love for the Netherlands Indies 
as their homeland. Supporting Indië Weerbaar meant treason against their real 
homeland, China.84 Dutch officials tried to neutralize such voices by pointing 
out that Chinese should be aware that they would be much worse off under 
Japanese rule. Reaction was prompt. The Chinese suffered from legal discrimi-
nation and the lack of educational opportunities.85 It did not take long for those 
Chinese who had acquired European status to realize that a militia might well 
imply, as it indeed did, that their sons would be called up for military service.
One of the specific objections the Chinese raised was equally relevant to 
many Javanese, at least to the devout Muslims among them. In a letter to De 
Locomotief it was explained that conscription posed insurmountable problems 
for the Chinese community. The wives of Chinese conscripts could not join 
their husbands in the barracks. Inescapable part of an unyielding patriarchal 
society for them to live on their own was out of the question. Another prob-
lem adduced was that Chinese did not pray in a church or mosque. They did 
so at home in front of a family altar. This made compulsory military service 
even more problematic. In short: the militia was ‘a terrible blow to Chinese 
prosperity’.86
In the Arab community there was likewise much opposition to compulsory 
military service. At protest meetings rejection was coupled with demands that 
the immigration rules be relaxed. Yet another group which used the discus-
sion about a native militia to protest about discrimination was the Ambonese. 
8 Warna Warta, cited in Koloniaal Tijdschrift 1917:160.
84 Soerabaiasch Handelsblad, cited in De Locomotief, 7-9-1916.
85 Warna Warta, cited in Koloniaal Tijdschrift 1917:11.
86 De Locomotief, 19-11-1917.
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Their major complaint was that in the army they were treated as inferiors to 
Europeans. Spokesmen in the Ambonese community despised the idea that 
only when the very existence of the Netherlands Indies was in danger was 
assistance asked of people who had not even been considered to be human 
beings in the past.87 
87 De Voorpost, cited in Koloniaal Tijdschrift 1917, I:112.
Abdoel Moeis, circa 1916 (KITLV 7814)
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In Java the Indië Weerbaar movement became a serious bone of contention 
within the Sarekat Islam. It split the party into two camps, if indeed it did 
not threaten to break it up completely. Dissenting voices reached a crescendo 
when the Indië Weerbaar deputation visited Holland. In Surakarta, the local 
Sarekat Islam branch sent a wire to the Queen, stating that Abdoel Moeis did 
not have the support of the native population or that of the Sarekat Islam.88 
In Semarang a massive protest meeting organized by both the Sarekat Islam 
and Insulinde and attended by two thousand people demanded that a rep-
resentative body be formed first before the constitution of a militia could be 
contemplated. In Batavia speakers at a Sarekat Islam meeting warned that a 
native militia might well turn against the Dutch.89 In the same city Goenawan, 
an avowed opponent of Indië Weerbaar, sent a telegram to Soewardi in The 
Hague, who forwarded it to the Dutch socialist leader, P.J. Troelstra. It claimed 
that 90 per cent of the Sarekat Islam supporters did not give a damn about a 
militia.90 
Singled out for attack was Abdoel Moeis. He would suffer greatly for his 
participation in the deputation. In Sinar Djawa and its successor, Sinar Hindia, 
he was castigated for his role in Indië Weerbaar and for the alleged anti-
Chinese speeches he had made in Europe. From then on, relations between 
Abdoel Moeis and the radical nationalist left would only deteriorate. His 
moderate, independent views constantly drew the scorn of the left wing of 
the Sarekat Islam. In the political struggle Abdoel Moeis had to fight with 
radical ISDV and Sarekat Islam leaders he could count on the support of the 
non-Javanese members among the Sarekat Islam leaders and in Java on that 
of a still large section in the Islamic community who could not stomach ISDV 
propaganda. Some of them presented Abdoel Moeis’s trip to Europe as a great 
contribution to the nationalist cause. Abdoel Moeis’s achievement had been to 
inform the public in Holland about the miserable fate of the indigenous people 
in the colony. What Abdoel Moeis had said about the Chinese did not bother 
such people. He had merely put their thoughts into words.
Abdoel Moeis became an easy prey after his return from Holland when he 
resigned his position as editor-in chief in Kaoem Moeda to become editor-in-
chief of the daily Neratja (Balance), in which he would strike back at his ISDV 
critics in September 1917. Neratja was founded, Spijkman had played a role in 
this, with the financial support of the colonial administration. The formal rea-
son for the support given Neratja was that Batavia needed a Malay-language 
newspaper if only to allow the government to keep track of what its inhabit-
ants thought. Pantjaran Warta had run into financial troubles and was tottering 
88 De Locomotief, 12-2-1917.
89 Koloniaal Tijdschrift 1917:29, 1109.
90 Indische Gids 1917, I:799, II:1080. 
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on its last legs.91 It were good intentions, weren’t it that as early as January 
191 Rinkes had suggested to Idenburg that were a Malay version of De Expres 
to be published, it might be worthwhile considering support for ‘good native 
papers’.92 As its name indicates Neratja wanted to present a balanced view of 
developments in the Netherlands Indies. To make matters worse for Abdoel 
Moeis he also became an editor of Inlandsche Stemmen (Native Voices), a few 
months later baptized Indische Stemmen, a weekly dedicated to ‘the associa-
tion idea’, of which the purpose was to provide Europeans who were ‘well-
disposed towards the natives’ with information about developments in the 
indigenous society.9 Contrary to what his critics said, Abdoel Moeis had not 
forfeited his nationalist views. Neratja remained critical of colonial conditions. 
Abdoel Moeis was in favour of association and gradual emancipation. This 
ideal was likewise expressed in the name of the firm which printed Neratja: 
Evolutie. 
The attacks on Abdoel Moeis formed part of the efforts of the ISDV to expand 
its influence. Leftist Indonesians took control of the VSTP. They also made 
considerable headway in the Sarekat Islam. In Central and East Java especially 
the influence of the ISDV in the Sarekat Islam and among the indigenous 
population at large was growing fast. The social democrats had succeeded in 
forming a strong leftist faction in the Sarekat Islam. This success had largely 
been because of a number of prominent Indonesian members of the ISDV: 
Semaoen, Moehammad Joesoef (Deputy Chairman of the Semarang Sarekat 
Islam branch), Alimin (who had been raised by Hazeu), and Darsono. The 
advance to prominence of ISDV members who had also succeeded in taking 
control of the VSTP, in the Sarekat Islam was grist to the mill of those plead-
ing for resolute action against a radical vernacular press and against inflam-
matory speeches. The Resident of Surabaya went as far as to suggest that the 
enrolment of Indonesians in secondary schools should be restricted. Too many 
teachers were Dutch social democrats.94 The ISDV also gained some influ-
ence in the Chinese community, but this received much less attention in the 
reports and comments on the actions of the ISDV than its efforts to win over 
the Javanese.
To step up propaganda amongst the population, the ISDV founded an 
organization especially for Javanese in April 1917. The initiative was taken 
by Baars. The movement founded was the Inlandsche Sociaal-Democratische 
91 Volksraad 1918:550.
92 Rinkes to Idenburg, 16-1-191 (Bescheiden ‘Indische Partij’ 191:159).
9 De Locomotief, 6-11-1917.
94 Creutzberg to Van Limburg Stirum, 24-11-1916, Hazeu to Van Limburg Stirum, 2--1917, 
NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 14-6-1919 26.
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Vereeniging Hindia Bergerak (Native Social Democrat Union Hindia Bergerak). 
Sometime later the organization was rechristened Sama Rata Hindia Bergerak 
(Equality in the Indies [Nationalist] Movement). It had about two hundred 
members.95 President was Darsoeki. Darnakoesoemo (who also had been edi-
tor of Pertimbangan) was one of the board members. The first issue of its week-
ly, Soeara Merdika, the Voice of Freedom, was published in Semarang at the end 
of April 1917. Among its editors were Semaoen and Baars. The Perhimpoenan 
Kaoem Boeroeh dan Tani (PKBT, Labourers’ and Farmers’ Union), was also 
said to be a ‘native ISDV’. Most of its leaders were members of the ISDV.96
One of the consequences of the growing influence of the ISDV in the 
Sarekat Islam and the VSTP was the worsening relationship between Tjipto 
Mangoenkoesoemo and Sneevliet. One reason for the deterioration was that 
international socialist ideals and Insulinde’s nationalism were out of kilter 
with each other. Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo stressed that in the Netherlands 
Indies nationalism was more important than the attainment of socialist ide-
als. Sneevliet wanted to run before he could walk. Nationalism and a grad-
ual evolution was what the Netherlands Indies needed. His flirtation with 
Japanese support aggravated the divide. The sarcasm and teasing tone with 
which Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo played on the Dutch fear of Japan com-
pletely passed Sneevliet. To Sneevliet, who had also fallen to the hoax about 
Japanese membership of Insulinde, any praise of Japan was an abhorrence. 
When rumours circulated about groups in Japan which claimed Java and 
Sumatra as a reward for Japan’s involvement in the war in May 1916, the ISDV 
put a number of questions to the central board of Insulinde. One concerned 
information about Douwes Dekker’s trip to Japan and China. The Insulinde 
leaders likewise had to explain what they thought about the slogan ‘Asia 
for the Asians’, a possible Germano-Japanese coalition, and the threat Japan 
posed to the Netherlands Indies. When Sneevliet failed to get a satisfactory 
reply, he attacked Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo and Douwes Dekker for their 
sympathy for Japan, the imperialist enemy. Referring to Douwes Dekker’s 
role in the Germano-Indian plot, at its annual meeting in June 1916 Sneevliet 
also succeeded in having the ISDV accept a motion ending any cooperation 
with Insulinde at its annual meeting. The motion was received with ‘lively 
applause’ and carried unanimously.
The Insulinde leaders denied any knowledge of Douwes Dekker’s exploits. 
In their turn they attacked Sneevliet’s denunciations of Douwes Dekker, the 
Indische Partij, and Insulinde and countered by asking whether the ISDV sup-
ported the statement of the Dutch social democrat, W.H. Vliegen, asserting 
95 Annual report ISDV, cited in Neratja 16-5-1918. In total the ISDV was said to have 740 mem-
bers.
96 Assistent-Resident Kudus to Resident Semarang, 25-8-1919 (Sarekat Islam 1975:182).
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that were the Netherlands to become involved in the war it would have to side 
with the Allies, if only not to lose the Netherlands Indies.97 
On its side, Insulinde indicated that it would only be prepared to cooper-
ate with the ISDV if Sneevliet (and the chairman of the VSTP, H.W. Dekker) 
resigned as members.98 The writing was on the wall. After the ISDV motion 
Insulinde announced in De Voorpost that it had ended all cooperation with the 
ISDV.99 The two parties still fielded a joint candidate for the election to fill a 
vacancy in the municipal council of Semarang in August 1916, but after this 
they grew only further apart. In August 1917 Insulinde once more declared it 
had broken with the ISDV. Its leaders accused ‘a few’ ISDV members, namely 
Sneevliet and his associates, of trying to drive a wedge between the Indo-
Europeans and the indigenous population and of sowing discord within and 
between organizations.100 De Indiër, a new Insulinde daily newspaper which 
had replaced De Voorpost, deplored the uncompromising criticism with which 
the ISDV greeted ‘the nationalism which we have taken as the motor of our 
movement’.101 Later, in March 1918, during the annual Insulinde congress 
where the stage was brightened up by life-sized portraits of Douwes Dekker 
and Diponegoro, Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo, who by now styled himself the 
most irreconcilable enemy of Sneevliet complained about the destructive criti-
cism uttered by ‘a certain group of fellow-citizens, who pretend all the time 
they have a monopoly on wisdom’.102 With ‘sweet but cunning’ words these 
‘political adventurers’ had come in as guests, had enjoyed the hospitality of 
Insulinde, but after a while had begun to try to sow discord.10
In Holland Soewardi took the side of his long-time friend and of Insulinde. 
In favour of continuing the cooperation with the ISDV, he put the blame for 
the rift on a small faction in the ISDV, which ‘bluntly loathes the nationalism 
of the Indiërs and because of this fiercely fights the members of Insulinde’. 
The main culprit was the ‘Marxist Sneevliet’. Soewardi’s conclusion was that 
because of ‘his fierce fight against our nationalism’ Sneevliet had done ‘a great 
deal to discredit the whole socialist movement’.104 Others used the national-
ist argument to explain why they sought cooperation with Insulinde and not 
with ISDV. Among them were leaders of a newly established Chinese labour 
organization in Semarang, the Tiong Hoa Ieng Giap Hwe.105 
97 De Locomotief, 7-6-1916.
98 De Locomotief, 20-5-1916.
99 De Locomotief, 21-6-1916.
100 Tichelman 1985:60; De Indische Gids 1918, I:.
101 De Indische Gids 1918, I:4; Volksraad 1918:288.
102 De Locomotief, 1-4-1918.
10 De Locomotief, 1-4-1918.
104 De Indische Gids 1917, II:1221.
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The position of Sneevliet and his close political friends was not uncon-
tested even in the ISDV. The opposition was led by R.A. Schotman and 
other members of the Batavian branch. They wanted the ISDV to follow a 
more moderate course. Eschewing militancy they stressed evolution and 
the parliamentary way of tackling matters. What the Dutch government 
was doing in the colony was not all wrong. Schotman and his friends, much 
more akin to the rest of the Dutch community in the colony than Sneevliet 
and Baars were, were convinced Indonesian society was not yet ripe for 
radical action or independence. The ‘naive and by inclination quickly inflam-
mable population’ should be taught discipline and had to be shown how to 
organize themselves.106 Sneevliet’s mistake was that he did not differentiate 
between the conditions in Holland and those in the Netherlands Indies. He 
treated the people of the Netherlands Indies ‘as if they had already reached 
the same level as most peoples in Europe in political and economic respect’. 
The great majority of them were still peasants. They were not yet ripe for 
real social-democratic propaganda, which a proletariat was. Industrialization 
had to proceed before a strategy like that advocated by Sneevliet could be 
implemented.107 A suggestion by Baars that the Indonesians be given univer-
sal suffrage did not go down well with them either.108 Schotman had a low 
opinion of Indonesians. At most they could manage a warung. Were they to 
become independent their leader would become ‘a tyrant, such as Holland 
has never known and never again will know’ (Tichelman 1985:517). He and 
his friends also feared that the agitation by Sneevliet and Baars might in the 
end only result in another country taking over. Such a new overlord would 
behave in such a way that Dutch rule would seem to have been ‘mere child’s 
play’ (Tichelman 1985:54).
The ideological differences came to a head at the fourth general meeting 
of the ISDV held in Surabaya in May 1917. It was attended by a little over 
twenty members and about an equal number of Indonesians. The content of 
Het Vrije Woord (The Free Word), the organ of the ISDV established in October 
1915 and edited by Sneevliet, Baars, and D.J.A. Westerveld, was one of the 
issues. The Batavian branch protested about the way in which Het Vrije Woord 
made propaganda for ‘a sectarian school of thought in the International’.109 
Schotman blamed Sneevliet’s continued exhortion of European dogmas in a 
colonial society without having provided the most elementary social demo-
cratic schooling for the fact that the ISDV had remained such a small group 
(Tichelman 1985:516). A breach had become unavoidable. The tone at times 
106 De Indische Gids 1917, II:107.
107 De Indische Gids 1917, II: 122.
108 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1918-19:2079; Tichelman 1985: 662.
109 De Indische Gids 1917, II:1217.
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was harsh. Schotman said that Sneevliet suffered from ‘auto-sadism’; later at 
the request of an angry Sneevliet toned this down to zelfpijniging, self-torment, 
that is denigrating himself as a Dutchmen, as a totok. Baars was a ‘revolution-
ary romanticist’. Another ISDV radical, J.C. Stam (or Aroen), was daverend 
krankzinnig (completely and utterly mad). Mas Marco was a fantast (dreamer) 
(Tichelman 1985:517, 520, 54-5).
The war had exacerbated the conflict among the socialists. Sneevliet and 
his friends were avowed opponents of the support the socialist parties, includ-
ing the Sociaal-Democratische Arbeiderspartij gave their government during 
the war. They wanted to continue to fight colonialism and capitalism, prefer-
ably in fact to intensify the struggle (Baars and Sneevliet 1991:100-1).
The moderate members – ten in total – parted company with the ISDV on 
1 September 1917. The following week they formed the Department of the 
SDAP in the Netherlands Indies. Ch.G. Cramer was appointed chairman. He 
averred that the SDAP in the Netherlands Indies was prepared for an ‘endur-
ing struggle by a resolute, well-organized mass’. It detested the anarchistic 
action of which it accused the ISDV, which would only result in ‘disturbances 
and slaughter, by which the people’s movement will be seriously harmed and 
which will set the movement back for years’. A revolution had to wait till a 
‘well-educated, excellently organized working class was ready to take over 
the government from the ruling class’.110 These were fine words but they did 
not butter any parsnips. Cramer and his political friends were apparently 
among those leftist Dutchmen whose contacts with ordinary Indonesians 
were minimal. Tjokroaminoto at least asked them to show that they were pre-
pared to assist in organizing the masses and ‘to descent down from their high 
position to [join] the mass, the people’.111 The breach was later singled out by 
Idenburg as the moment from which the ISDV and the influence it exerted on 
the Sarekat Islam had gone from bad to worse.112 
The ISDV propaganda did not fail to leave its mark. Some newspapers began 
to be replete with socialist jargon. One of these was Sinar Djawa. In October 
1917 it came under the control of the ISDV. Alimin, Semaoen, and Moehammad 
Joesoef took on the job of unpaid editors and announced that Sinar Djawa 
was of ‘a radical persuasion’.11 In April 1918 their friend, Darsono, started a 
campaign against the ‘money devils’ in Sinar Djawa in April 1918. His articles 
made a great impression. The pejorative ‘money devils’ was soon copied by 
others. Darsono stressed that once the money devils had disappeared, an 
110 Volksraad 1918-19:210.
111 Volksraad 1918-19:544.
112 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1918-19:2079.
11 Press report Rinkes, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 17-9-1915 46; De Locomotief, 26-11-1917.
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‘equitable government (pemerintah sama rasa sama rata)’ would be achieved. 
He gave his words an extra dimension by adding that such a government was 
what had been called the coming of the Just King in ancient prophecies.114 
Though Attorney-General Uhlenbeck rated the articles by Darsono ‘boyish’ 
and ‘inexperienced’, and therefore not worth a prosecution, he still considered 
it necessary to keep a weather eye on Sinar Djawa.115 Other Indonesian nation-
alists and their press began to attack the ‘capitalists’. At times they included 
the Chinese in their assessment.
Socialist ideas and socialist jargon spread in broad layers of the national-
ist movement, never again to lose their popularity. Tjokroaminoto blamed 
capitalism for the war in Europe.116 The nineteenth-century Javanese rebel 
and hero Diponegoro was introduced to readers of Oetoesan Hindia as an 
anti-capitalist.117 In another issue the commemoration of the martyrdom of 
Muhammad’s grandsons, Husein and Hasan, was taken up to demonstrate 
that the price of the advancement of Islam and the protection of the people 
against oppression was ‘a flood of blood’. ‘Life... or death! should become 
the banners of the leaders of the People.’118 Muhammad, it had already been 
stated at the first national congress of the Sarekat Islam in June 1916, was 
‘the father of Socialism and the pioneer of democracy’. He was the ‘Socialist 
par excellence’.119 Villagers in Cilacap were told that sama rata was the aim of 
Islam.120 In Islam Bergerak contributors did their utmost to explain that the 
ideals of social democracy, social justice, and sama rasa sama rata had been an 
integral part of Islam since the time of Muhammad. In its pages it was stressed 
that a proper interpretation of Islam and the courage to resist the whims of 
an arbitrary government were essential to instil in the kromo, the people, in 
order they might recover their dignity and become full human beings. Islam 
demanded that an unjust government be opposed.121 ‘Si Rakjat’ (The People) 
pointed out that China and Russia had shown what the fate of an oppressive 
regime which sided with the capitalists and was insensitive to the suffering 
of the people could be.122 Illustrative of the mood among some Javanese was 
the plan to publish a bi-weekly in Purbalingga named Anti Willekeur, Anti-
Arbitrariness.12 
114 Sinar Djawa, 4-4-1918, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 14-6-1919 26. 
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Suppression became a catchword to explain all evil. In August 1918 
Uhlenbeck observed that suppression was invariably mentioned in the native 
press in the evaluations of events, whether this was relevant or not. The trend 
was reason enough for him to urge a closer supervision of this press, and to 
advise the colonial government not to hesitate to take legal action.124
Echoing what had happened to Douwes Dekker a few years earlier 
Sneevliet and Baars had become an example to all groups demanding radical 
change. They had earned themselves a reputation as unselfish champions of 
the oppressed. In a Chinese newspaper Sneevliet was compared to Sun Yat 
Sen. A parallel was drawn between the Netherlands Indies and the overthrow 
of the Emperor by social democrats in China. The author wrote that Sneevliet 
had shown both natives and the Chinese how to force white people to respect 
them as human beings and finally to realize that they too were members of 
humankind.125
Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo and Insulinde were less successful. Using slo-
gans such as Rawé-rawé rantas malang malang poetoeng, Berani karena benar 
takoet karena salah (maybe the most popular of them all and also adopted as 
its motto by the Chinese/Malay newspaper Djawa Tengah), Semoea boeat satoe, 
satoe boeat semoea (All for one, one for all), and Sama rasa dan sama rata, Tjipto 
Mangoenkoesoemo had tried to expand his influence. Incontrovertibly he 
did succeed in winning a following, especially in Surakarta and surround-
ing areas. Elsewhere he and Insulinde lost out to the ISDV. As early as 
February 1915, Rinkes concluded that the Indische Party or Insulinde was no 
longer very lakoe, very popular.126 In August 1916 Hazeu stated that Tjipto 
Mangoenkoesoemo had become isolated. Other nationalists had surpassed 
him.127 In spite of his political demise, Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo continued to 
be widely revered as a person who had made great personal sacrifices for his 
people. Only very conservative groups thought otherwise.128
The apparent success of the ISDV propaganda, for contemporaries, as well 
as for later generations, has clouded the importance of people like Douwes 
Dekker and Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo to the development of radical national-
ism. The irritation and anxiety they had caused seemed to have been forgot-
ten. They were not held responsible for what was considered a turn to the left 
in the nationalist movement. Still viewing moderate nationalism as the way 
in which a gradual emancipation of the population could be accomplished 
124 Circular letter Uhlenbeck, 26-8-1918, NA, Kol. Geheim, Mr. 1918/71x.
125 Tjhoen Tjhoei, cited in De Locomotief, 4-6-1918.
126 Rinkes to Idenburg, 1-2-1915, 15-10-1915, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 6-1-1916 1, Vb. 26-1-1916 
2.
127 Advice Hazeu, 21-8-1916, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 22-11-1916 6.
128 Advice Hazeu, 21-8-1916, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 22-11-1916 6.
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and prepared to put up with the occasional ‘excesses’, Batavia and The 
Hague acted as stern fathers who were prepared to forgive their sons much. 
Van Limburg Stirum appointed Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo a member of the 
People’s Council. Soewardi was allowed to return to Java as early as August 
1917, but because of the disruption of sea traffic had been forced to remain in 
Holland. Van Limburg Stirum revoked the decision to intern Douwes Dekker 
in Timor in July 1918. Douwes Dekker returned to Java at once. Even before 
the end of the month he had travelled on to Semarang. Here at the end of July 
he met Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo for the first time in years. The reunion was 
‘touching’.129
In the Netherlands Indies there was not much opposition to Douwes 
Dekker’s return. The reason for this, and maybe such considerations had also 
inspired Pleyte and Van Limburg Stirum, was the hope that he could act as a 
counterpoise to ISDV propaganda. Suddenly editors of the Dutch-language 
newspapers concluded that what Insulinde and Douwes Dekker were striv-
ing for, independence of the Netherlands Indies, was a moderate course. It 
was greatly to be preferred to what Sneevliet and his comrades wanted to 
accomplish.10 After all, the European community was also steering for greater 
independence from Holland. 
129 Neratja, 1-8-1918.




The end of Dutch international  
shipping and trade
In the course of 1917 people in the Netherlands Indies became increasingly 
alarmed about what the future would bring. ‘Imagine’, the Director of the 
Colonial Civil Service had posed in January 1917 
what will happen when all imports and exports come to a halt because of the iso-
lation from the outside world, [...] the repercussions for the centres of trade and 
industry, the population compelled to stay alive by planting all available land with 
foodcrops only, the almost complete unemployment of the European and Chinese 
populations, and the increasing multitude of Natives who no longer make a liv-
ing from handicrafts, precisely the so-called intellectuals whose influence on the 
population is great.1 
He gloomily predicted that Java would survive only for a few months. The col-
lapse would be accelerated by social unrest. The same scenario was envisaged 
for the north of Sumatra. Isolated and deprived of rice from Java, the estate 
region could not hold its own for long.
Though the possibility that the Netherlands would be drawn into the Great 
War was on everybody’s mind at the beginning of 1918, it would not need 
war to bring about the ruination of the colony. The disappearance of foreign 
markets and the disruption of sea transport could achieve the same miserable 
outcome. The Jember Association of Agriculture and Industry noted that 1918 
had ‘started so sombrely that – it could be said – it can bring no disappoint-
ments’. A report about the sugar industry for 1917 predicted that if the war 
did not end soon ‘unprecedented misery’ would be in store.
Others calculated the financial consequences of a collapse of the agricul-
tural export market. Huge amounts of money would be withheld from colo-
1 Quoted in Bron to Van Limburg Stirum, 15-5-1917, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. -5-1918 O4.
 Report 1917 Vereeniging van Landbouw en Nijverheid te Djember, cited in De Locomotief, 
16-4-1918.
 De Locomotief, 5-6-1918.
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nial society if wages and taxes could not be paid by the estates, or had to be 
expended without being compensated by income. Sixty-five million guilders 
were paid out in wages in the sugar industry each year.4 Annual expenditure 
for wages in coffee, tea, and tobacco amounted to 4 million guilders (Cramer 
1917:407-8). The only bright side was that ‘neither education of children nor 
position [to keep up] nor fashion’ would make it extra difficult for the indig-
enous population to make ends meet if they became unemployed or had to 
cope with a drop in income.5
The entry into the war of the United States had added to the gloom. It 
meant that the alternative trading links established by the commercial world 
in the Netherlands Indies to compensate for dwindling trade with Europe 
came under threat. The consequences could be severe. The United States and 
Japan were the only remaining export partners of any significance. Not tak-
ing sugar into account, the United States was good for more that half of the 
market of the Netherlands Indies. Almost the entire rubber export went to the 
United States.
In early 1918 the capital tied up in stocks of colonial products stored in 
the Netherlands Indies because they could not be shipped had reached an 
4 Regeering 1919:10, citing a report by C. Lulofs and L. van Vuuren about the food situation in 
the Netherlands Indies; Bezwaren 1919:67.
5 Sumatra Post, cited in De Indische Gids 1918, I:49.
The KPM freighter Van Cloon (Rinkes, Van Zalinge en Roevers 195:107)
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estimated value of 87 million guilders.6 In the rare cases that goods could 
be shipped transport costs had risen to unprecedented heights. Freight costs 
to the United States tripled. In 1918 for some products they exceeded market 
price. For a picul of copra bringing in about ten guilders (in 191 this had 
been seventeen guilders) the freight price was forty-four guilders.7 Most of 
the goods stockpiling were perishable. With this in mind the unrealistic sug-
gestion was made in Holland to ship them all to there. In the more temperate 
climate, decay would proceed more slowly. The Allied Powers might object, 
but the NOT, it was hoped, could play a decisive role in making the British and 
American governments change their minds.
Until the end of 1917 the American hinderance of Dutch shipping had 
been confined to transatlantic shipping. Sea traffic between the Netherlands 
Indies and the United States had been left unhindered. In January 1918 this 
changed. A KPM freighter of the Java-Pacific Line, the Van Cloon, was given 
only enough coal to sail to Java on the condition that she would return to San 
Francisco with cargo for the United States. On hearing the news, the KPM 
management forebode shipping to the United States. The complete isolation 
of Holland and the Netherlands Indies loomed. One author concluded that 
the Dutch flag had as good as disappeared from the seas. The ‘free seas’ had 
become ‘the most blocked territory on God’s earth’s surface’ (Van Heekeren 
1918:191). Worse was to come. Desperate to free their own merchant fleets 
for the shipping of American troops and equipment to the front in France, 
the Associated Powers tried to force neutral countries to hire out tonnage. 
They wanted the Netherlands to surrender its merchant fleet for charter with 
the exception of the tonnage needed for colonial trade and for the transport 
of food and fodder to Holland which they would graciously allow in return. 
Indications were strong that draconic sanctions would be in store if the Dutch 
government did not comply. In that case all Dutch ships in Allied ports might 
be impounded.8
The Hague could hardly refuse. Various people remarked in 1918 that 
the Netherlands was caught between three fires: the Associated Powers, the 
Central Powers, and hunger.9 Wheat was needed to avert a famine in Holland. 
A ‘basis of agreement’ was reached in London on 18 January 1918. Under this, 
Holland would receive 400,000 tons of food. In return, the Associated Powers 
were promised the use of 500,000 tonnage for a period of ninety days. This left 
about 50,000 tons for the transport of colonial wares to non-European ports, 
and about 00,000 tons for the transport of food to Holland and for shipping 
6 Handelingen Eerste Kamer 1917-18:156.
7 Handelingen Eerste Kamer 1917-18:157.
8 Morning Post, 8-1-1917, cited in De Locomotief, 9-5-1918.
9 Handelingen Eerste Kamer 1917-18:194, Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1917-18:045.
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between the Netherlands and the Netherlands Indies.10
In the end, when the Dutch government inquired whether the Associated 
Powers would allow an initial shipment of 100,000 tons of wheat to Holland 
before the final agreement had been signed, the Asssociated Powers had no 
objections. The condition was that simultaneously the total amount of Dutch 
tonnage that had been promised by the Dutch government in January would 
be placed at their disposal. Initially Washington demanded that freighters 
would have to sail from Holland to the United States to fetch the wheat. Later 
Washington permitted that three Dutch merchantmen already in the United 
States could transport the wheat to Holland. Simultaneously three Dutch 
ships had to sail from Holland to the United States. Germany would not 
object. The only sticking point for Berlin was the increase of Dutch tonnage in 
American ports and so it demanded that in exchange for every ship that left 
a Dutch port for the United States, a ship of comparable tonnage should sail 
from the United States to Holland. In Holland desperation had so threatened 
to engulf the country, that the German position was considered a friendly 
gesture by Berlin.
Just when everything seemed to have been arranged, a new condition was 
imposed by the Associated Powers and caused additional delay. Initially the 
Dutch government had been given the assurance that the chartered Dutch 
ships would not have to sail the ‘danger zone’; the area where German subma-
rines were active. Before any ship could sail, the hawk Cecil on behalf of the 
Associated Governments informed The Hague that no exception with regard 
to the danger zone would be made for the Dutch ships they wanted to employ. 
The Dutch government had considered the non-sailing of the danger zone a 
matter of principle. The Hague reacted by stating that the new condition was 
of a ‘very onerous nature’. In a final and desperate attempt to find a way out, 
The Hague inquired with Germany whether it could deliver 100,000 tons of 
wheat within two months. The answer was no. The Dutch government was 
informed that Germany’s ally, Austria, was suffering a severe food shortage 
and that any surplus food it might have had to be sent there. 
Forced by what Loudon called the stress in Holland and the Netherlands 
Indies the Dutch government had to accept that the Dutch ships chartered by 
the Associated Powers would have to sail the danger zone.11 It posed some 
counter-conditions: the Dutch ships would remain unarmed; they would trans-
port no soldiers or war materials; and crews would be free to decide whether 
to sign on or not. The Hague realized that these conditions were unacceptable, 
but it had to avoid any chance that Germany could accuse the Netherlands of 
10 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1917-18, II:1081; Colenbrander 190:18.
11 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1917-18:016, 04.
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a serious breach of neutrality which allowing Dutch ships to transport soldiers 
and arms to the front would imply (Timmermans 00:190). 
In explaining Dutch policy in Holland, Loudon took great pains to avoid 
any impression that the interests of Holland and not those of the Netherlands 
Indies had been decisive in bowing to the Allied Powers’ demands. He 
explained in Parliament that it was the duty of the government to assure 
that the Dutch fleet would ‘not be banned from the seas, especially from the 
Eastern seas, to ensure that for as long as possible that we are not completely 
cut off from our Colonies’.1 Loudon added that the alternative, requisition, 
would mean that ‘our ships will not be Dutch ships, our colonial trade will 
disappear, our colonial commercial interest will become totally dependent on 
the good will of the Associated Governments’.1 The crisis in Holland and in 
the Netherlands Indies had become so acute that the interests of motherland 
and colony could no longer be reconciled. Loudon’s words had been intended 
to soothe sentiments in the colony, but they really stired up opposition in 
Holland. Troelstra had the impression that in yielding to Associated demands 
the government first and formost had had colonial interests at heart. He could 
not agree. Troelstra said that it should not be forgotten that ‘our interest lies 
in the colonies, but that our heart beats here, that the colonies are important 
to our wealth, [but that] our history, our soul lie where we live, on the estuary 
of the Rhine’.14 These words did not go down well with Loudon. He riposted 
that the future of the Netherlands was to a high degree dependent on the way 
the Dutch fulfilled their colonial task: ‘Exactly in the hour of tribulation we 
have to show millions of Dutch subjects in the colonies that our policy is not 
tainted by self-interest, that our and their ideals are one, that the loosening of 
the historical tie would cut us to the quick, that we are prepared to make a 
sacrifice to maintain it’.15
The Associated Powers, suspecting that the Dutch government was drag-
ging out on negotiations only because Dutch shipowners did not want to risk 
their precious freighters, announced that they had rejected the Dutch condi-
tions. They acted accordingly. On 0 March the United States, Great Britain, 
France, and Italy requisitioned all the Dutch ships in their ports. In one blow 
the Dutch merchant fleet had lost a total tonnage of almost 700,000 tons.16 At 
least one Indonesian crew of an impounded ship showed that they sided with 
the Dutch. When the Rochussen was seized ‘the native crew which was lined 
up suddenly without any order being given to that effect, on their own initia-
1 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1917-18:04.
1 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1917-18:04.
14 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1917-18:049.
15 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1917-18:08.
16 Economisch-Statistische Berichten 4-4-1918, p. 44-5. 
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tive squatted and made the sembah as final homage to our tricolour, while it 
was lowered’.17
Loudon learned about the Allied Powers’ step in the evening of the fol-
lowing day; Van Limburg Stirum only on 8 March. To justify the requisition 
London explained that the Associated Powers had exercised their right of 
angary. The Dutch objected that this right of belligerents to confiscate neutral 
vessels for their own use when they were hard-pressed for shipping facilities 
was an obsolete, obscure relic of international law, which the United States 
and Great Britain had not recognized in the past.18
In Asia, Dutch freighters in British and American colonial ports had been 
refused permission to put to sea as early as 8 March. At that moment twenty 
Dutch ships were anchored in Singapore alone. Other Dutch freighters were 
stuck in Rangoon, Manila, Hong Kong, Colombo, Bombay, and Brisbane. 
The price of rice in the Netherlands Indies had risen immediately. When the 
actual seizure became a fact, prices of shares dropped in Holland and the 
Netherlands Indies. From Semarang it was reported that there were ‘panic-
17 De Locomotief, -4-1918.
18 De Boer 1997:44-5; Economisch-Statistische Berichten 16-1-1918, p. 46.
The KPM passengership Melchior Treub (Rinkes, Van Zalinge en Roevers 195:109)
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stricken quotations’ on the local exchange.19 Most heavily affected were sugar, 
shipping, and industry. Some prices of stocks dropped to their 1914 level.
Indignation in the Netherlands Indies was great. Bijl de Vroe wrote in his 
diary that the whole of the Netherlands Indies was in turmoil: 
they are wretches n.b. the peoples who claim to fight for the right of the small 
nations! [...] Still people here remained rather calm about the affair, resigning them-
selves to what appears inevitable. For the export crops which will miss even more 
of the necessary tonnage prospects look grim’ (Bijl de Vroe 1980:140).
In a telegram to the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs the Batavia Chamber 
of Commerce also noted that ‘Batavia [was] seething with indignation and 
disgust’.0 Such feelings were shared in Holland. Queen Wilhelmina spoke of 
robbery of ships (Timmermans 00:177). Senator J.Th. Cremer lamented that 
the merchant fleet in the Netherland Indies ‘which is one of the most beautiful 
fleets in the East and the life-blood of our Archipelago, has been subjected to 
the indignity of confiscation’.1 He was especially shocked by the confisca-
tion of the Melchior Treub, which sailed the route Medan-Singapore-Batavia-
Semarang-Surabaya. Cremer called the Melchior Treub the ‘most beautiful of 
our passengerships out there’. Her passengers were transported by steam-
launches to an adjacent Dutch island from where a Dutch ship transported 
them to Batavia.
National pride was hurt most. The requisitioning was less galling than it 
seemed. From the outset, it was clear that profitable times might be in store 
for the shipping companies. Their ships could sail and the Associated Powers 
offered the owners fair compensation. In view of the freight prices offered 
by the Associated Powers and the high compensation paid for ships that were 
lost, it was in retrospect indeed concluded that the requisitioning was ‘the 
largest fixture ever recorded in the annals of shipping’ (Van Dorp 190:16).
The confiscation of the merchant vessels – the words theft and robbery 
tended to be used by Dutch and Indonesian residents alike in the Netherlands 
Indies – ushered in a new period of anxiety. In the Netherlands Indies the 
fleet was put on the alert. The sailing times of freighters under Dutch flag 
became a state secret. On  April newspapers were forbidden to report on ship 
movements. To ensure that the editors complied, the regulation dating from 
the Russo-Japanese War was reinstated. The anouncement aggravated the 
nervous mood prevailing in the Dutch community, already upset by reports 
19 De Locomotief, 6-4-1918.
0 De Locomotief, -4-1918.
1 Handelingen Eerste Kamer 1917-18:190.
 Handelingen Eerste Kamer 1917-18:190.
 Economisch-Statistische Berichten, 7--1918, p. 75.
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about the dire food situation in Holland, the German offensive launched on 
the Western front on 1 March, and the sand and gravel conflict. People began 
to fear that the Netherlands might no longer be able to escape being dragged 
into the war. From Surabaya it was reported that these were ‘days of enor-
mous tension’ in which there was no room for ‘drinking-table or tango-dinner 
Patriotism’.4 After the United States had entered the war, one of the conclu-
sions drawn was that the American presence in the Philippines no longer 
formed any protection against a Japanese advance. In the mind of some the 
requisitioning of the Dutch ships turned the United States into a real enemy. 
Speculation was rife that one of the first hostile steps the United States, said 
to lust after the annexation of the Central American islands, might take would 
be the occupation of Curaçao to give Washington a Caribbean base to act if 
ever Venezuela and its oil reserves were lost to the United States. De Standaard 
concluded that as a Colonial Power the Netherlands found itself ‘in a very 
threatened position’. Meek acquiescence was the only course of action open. 
One false move in Holland would have repercussions in the Netherlands 
Indies, and vice versa.5
The tenseness of the situation and the possibility of a clash with the Allied 
Powers did not escape the Indonesian population. In July Neratja commented 
that the Dutch government was really in trouble. Neratja made this remark 
after it had become known that a lieutenant in the colonial army had been 
put on the black list. Neratja was sure that London would place the colonial 
government on the black list if the soldier in question was not cashiered from 
the army.6
Pressure likewise mounted because the confiscation of the Dutch ships 
gave rise to the fear that Great Britain might try to seize the German and 
Austrian merchantmen stranded in the Netherlands Indies. What should 
be done? There had been no request from the German Consul General, but 
Commander Bron of the colonial Navy decided that two freighters should be 
moved to a safer location: the Anhalt away from Telukbetung and the Wismar 
away from Banyuwangi. The merchantmen anchored in Sabang, Emmahaven, 
Tanjung Priok, Cilacap, and Surabaya were or, in the case of Emmahaven soon 
would be, protected by artillery. The four German ships in the roadsteads of 
Makassar also had a relatively safe anchorage. Other ships were too small 
to be employed for ocean-going trade, or, as in Ambon, could be and were 
moved from the roadstead to the safety of an enclosed bay. The plan was 
to sail the Anhalt to the Bay of Bantam and the Wismar to the roadstead of 
Pasuruan, voyages of respectively thirteen and twenty-two hours. From there 
4 De Locomotief, -5-1918.
5 De Standaard, cited in De Indische Gids 1918, I:71.
6 Neratja, 18-7-1918.
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it would take only a few hours under way to reach Tanjung Priok or Surabaya 
if war were to threaten. It was not plain sailing. There were two problems. A 
minor one was that the hulls of the Anhalt and Wismar had not been careened 
for four years and were covered with barnacles. There was a good chance they 
would have to be towed. A more serious problem was that the two German 
freighters would have to traverse international waters. Van Limburg Stirum 
was against granting protection by Dutch warships outside territorial waters, 
and did not disallow the possibility that the Anhalt especially, which had to 
sail some ten miles through international waters, might be intercepted by a 
British or a Japanese cruiser. Though Bron had estimated the risk low, Van 
Limburg Stirum decided that the dangers were too great.7
Assurances by the Associated Powers that no more ships were to be con-
fiscated and that bunkering would be allowed in their ports failed to win the 
trust of either the shipping companies or the Dutch authorities. In Holland and 
the Netherlands Indies Dutch ships simply did not venture out to Associated 
ports. For the crews a period of boredom lay in store. As people were aware of 
what this might portend initiatives were taken to entertain them. In Surabaya 
a society was formed, De Nederlandsche Handelsvloot, The Dutch Merchant 
Fleet, to ensure that the spirit among the European officers remained high. 
One of the events organized was a dinner in the local theatre. It lasted from 
11:0 in the evening till 7:00 in the morning. The three hundred guests ate, 
sang, recited, danced, and drank toasts. A local newspaper reported that it 
was ‘a smashing do’.8
Some of the resulting gaps in shipping in the Netherlands Indies were 
filled by Chinese traders. They chartered small steamers in Singapore to sail 
between there and Jambi. Such initiatives were just a drop in the ocean. In most 
ports warehouses, if this was not already the case, were crammed to capacity, 
forcing some of the companies which owned them to announce they would 
no longer accept additional goods for storage. In Belawan, near Medan, this 
even affected imports, including rice. In Padang copra was stored in houses 
all over the town, even a cinema was pressed into service. The townspeople 
suffered. The stench became unbearable and innumerable small, black copra 
beetles invaded their houses. Nothing could be done to prevent the practice. 
Copra fell outside the scope of the Nuisance Act.9 
In the Netherlands Indies, the decision not to sail to an Associated port 
resulted in fresh complications with the British. Van Limburg Stirum had 
discussed the fact that goods transported by KPM freighters to Sumatra were 
7 Bron to Van Limburg Stirum, 8-4-1918, 1st Government Secretary to Bron, -4-1918, NA, 
Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 9-1-1918 7.
8 Nieuwe Soerabaia Courant, cited in De Locomotief, 16-4-1918. 
9 De Locomotief, 18-5-1918.
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forwarded by non-Dutch freighters to Singapore and ports in the Malay 
Peninsula with the KPM management. At his suggestion, the KPM decided 
to ask for a guarantee from its clients affirming that the cargo KPM ships 
transported from Java to ports near Singapore would not have a British or 
American port as its final destination. In this way the company hoped to 
protect its future interests and to prevent making it too easy for foreign com-
petitors to exploit the ‘forced unemployment’ of its ships. Without hesitating 
a second, the British Consul General, Dunn, called the KPM to account. He 
suspected that the KPM had taken this step in retaliation for the requisition-
ing of KPM freighters. Consequently, Dunn left no doubt that the guarantee 
requested by the KPM was a ‘most serious’ matter; important enough for him 
to have informed London about it. Ominously he told one of KPM repre-
sentatives that the KPM was playing for too high stakes. Retaliatory measures 
might lead to a declaration of war and were the prerogative of governments. 
Private individuals should never take such steps.0 Batavia drew in its horns 
and accused the KPM of having acted foolishly. The KPM should have made 
it clear that its only objective had been to combat unfair competition. The 
company should have explained that it was impossible to prevent a direct 
cargo trade from the Netherlands Indies by foreign freighters, but that it was 
in no way to assist competitors by shipping cargo from Java to other ports in 
the Archipelago, from where it might be easier for a non-Dutch freighter to 
transport the goods abroad.1
This was not the only clash between the KPM and Dunn. Initially the local 
management of the KPM believed that refusing to sail to British ports would 
lead to the release of some of its freighters. It was able to entertain such hopes 
because the requisitioning of Dutch ships had not had the result the British 
had hoped for. Crews could not be forced to sail. In both American and British 
ports it was almost impossible to replace the Dutch officers by experienced 
American or British counterparts. Finding competent British or American cap-
tains, navigation officers, and engineers to replace their Dutch counterparts 
proved more difficult than had been expected. The result was that in Asia as 
well requisitioned Dutch freighters remained idle, moored in ports, decreas-
ing and not increasing the tonnage available to the British in Asia. Trade in 
Burma and the Straits Settlements suffered. In Australia exporters complained 
about the inconvenience the requisitioning had caused.
The KPM racked its brains about how to exploit the situation. In February 
the colonial authorities in British India had forced the KPM to conclude a 
contract in which the latter promised to deploy a number of its freighters for 
0 Koning to Van Limburg Stirum, 5-4-1918, NA, Kol. Geheim, Mr. 1918/161x.
1 Hulshoff Pol to President Director KPM, -4-1918, NA, Kol. Geheim, Mr. 1918/161x.
 De Locomotief, 4-6-1918.
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the transport of coal between ports in British India. As compensation these 
ships were allowed to take on board a fixed amount of Burma rice – in total 
400,000 tons – on their return journey to the Netherlands Indies. The KPM 
had assented after consulting the Nederland and Rotterdamsche Lloyd, and 
after it had received the assurance that none of the ships of the three compa-
nies would be requisitioned; a clause, the Dutch never tired of pointing out, 
the British had violated in March when they seized possession of the Dutch 
freighters in their ports.
By keeping its steamers in port, the KPM gambled that a moment would 
come when the British would be so desperate for extra tonnage to transport 
coal from British India or rice from Burma that they would release the requi-
sitioned Dutch ships in an effort to enlist the service of Dutch freighters held 
back in the Archipelago. Van Limburg Stirum let it be known he did not share 
this opinion. Nevertheless, he gave the plan the benefit of the doubt; warning 
that might he be forced to order freighters to Rangoon to fetch rice, the stub-
born attitude of the KPM could have dire consequences for the company.
At the end of April Dunn inquired on what date sailing to British India 
would be resumed. A representative of the KPM explained to him that to 
execute the contract between the KPM and the government of British India, 
six freighters were needed. Dunn was also told that thirteen ships of the KPM, 
Rotterdamsche Lloyd, and Nederland had been requisitioned, which left the 
shipping companies with insufficient tonnage to fulfil even the contracts con-
cluded with the government and exporters in the Netherlands Indies. Dunn 
appeared impressed. He promised to inquire by wire in London how the 
British government imagined that the KPM could honour the contract. The 
following day Dunn demanded a specification of the tonnage needed to fulfil 
the obligation of the three companies to the Dutch government, to exporters, 
and to the government of British India. Dunn suggested that if these figures 
showed that there was a shortage of tonnage, the British government would 
certainly release some of the requisitioned freighters. The KPM refused to 
provide the information. It was not prepared to go so far in its efforts to get 
its ships back.4 
In early May headquarters in Holland realized that the KPM management 
in Java was cherishing false hopes and that shipping to British India and the 
Straits Settlements had to be resumed to avoid ‘unpleasant reprisals’ on the 
part of the British.5 Shipping seemed safe. London and Washington had 
given the assurance – by now on paper – that no more Dutch vessels would 
 Van Limburg Stirum to Pleyte, 17-5-1918, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 1-9-1918 S8.
4 Koning to Van Limburg Stirum, 5-4-1918, 7-4-1918 , NA, Kol. Geheim, Mr. 1918/166x.
5 Pleyte to Van Limburg Stirum, 6-5-1918, Koning to General Secretary, 10-5-1918, NA, Kol. 
Geheim, Vb. 6-5-1918 Q4, NA, Kol. Geheim, Mr. 1918/161x.
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be requisitioned. The condition was that nowhere, also not in the territory of 
the Netherlands Indies, would there be any transport of German, Austrian, or 
Turkish goods and passengers, or of cargo of black-listed firms.6
The first Dutch steamers left for British ports in Asia on 15 May. The colo-
nial government, responsible for the regulation of Dutch sea traffic in the 
Netherlands Indies, allowed ships to sail on the principle, as Pleyte put this, 
that ‘they can get from us all what we still have to give, providing that we can 
also get those articles which we so badly need’.7 Grudgingly the trade with 
British India and the Straits Settlements was resumed. The Dutch shipping 
companies explained that there were ‘practical reasons’ for taking this step, 
but that they still considered the requisitioning of their ships a breach of con-
tract.8 Two days later the ban on the reporting on the movement of merchant 
vessels was lifted.
By that time some of the ships seized had already been released. A few had 
been allowed to sail within a few days of their having been requisitioned. One 
of them was the Melchior Treub which, as a passenger ship and not a freighter, 
was not of great value to the Associated Powers in Asia. The last vessels confis-
cated in Asian waters were handed back in June. Optimistically Dutch people 
assumed that the importance of colonial wares for the world market was the 
reason for this act of grace
For the passenger transport between Holland and the Netherlands Indies the 
seizure of Dutch ships had no consequences. Simply because passenger traffic 
had come to a standstill. As a consequence the shortage of trained personnel in 
the private and public sector, already palpable at the outbreak of the war in the 
Netherlands Indies, had become more acute. The civil service, for which even 
under normal circumstances it was difficult to interest suitable candidates in 
Holland, was understaffed. There was also a shortage of professionals, school-
teachers, and trained technical staff. The recruitment of doctors was out of the 
question. All over Europe they had been mobilized.
The other side of the coin was that Europeans could no longer send their 
sons to Holland for higher education. Both factors combined to push people to 
take initiatives to improve the educational system in the Netherlands Indies. 
As late as 1915 the colonial administration had still rejected plans to establish 
technical secondary schools in the Netherlands Indies. In 1917 Batavia was 
forced to revise its position. Various projects, most serious among them water 
management schemes to increase food production, had been delayed because 
of a shortage of skilled technicians. In 1918 a special engineering course was 
6 Koloniaal verslag 1919:47-8; De Locomotief, 7-5-1918, 14-5-1918.
7 Handelingen Eerste Kamer 1917-18:568.
8 De Locomotief, 11-5-1918.
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set up in Batavia for students who had completed their secondary education 
but could not travel to Delft to study at the Technical University. The break-
down in the shipping link between colony and motherland also brought a 
certain emancipation in its wake. European and Chinese children who could 
not travel to Europe for higher education were allowed to follow classes at 
the NIAS medical training college, initially intended only for indigenous stu-
dents. 
The army experienced problems similar to those of the civil service. Most 
crucially the army was short of officers who had been trained in Holland. 
Indirectly the civil service also suffered. Forced by circumstances, in 1915 
Batavia had taken the much criticized decision of having eight army officers 
fill some of the vacancies in the civil service outside Java, paying them 150 
guilders on top of their military pay. Army command refused to supply any 
more officers for the civil service in 1917.
The modest size of the army had already been a cause for concern at the 
outbreak of the war. This had been qualified as ‘downright alarming’ in 1915.9 
The shortage of European soldiers had risen to ,478 on a supposed strength of 
11,960, or 0 per cent, at the end of June 1917. To make matters worse: almost 
one-fifth of the some 8,000 Europeans serving in the army was for one reason 
or another not available for active service. Sixty-three per cent of the European 
soldiers suffered from a venereal disease. (For the whole army including the 
Indonesian soldiers the percentage was 0 per cent.)40 As in 1914 part of the 
answer to diminish the shortage was sought in stepping up the recruitment of 
indigenous soldiers in the Archipelago and in easing the rules for promotion. 
The shortage of European soldiers was also the reason why such a haste was 
made with the creation of a European militia, which it was calculated would 
soon be 10,000 men strong.41 
Officers in the colonial army could no longer be sent to Holland for supple-
mentary training. Special courses had to be organized in Java; in this respect 
again giving the colony some degree of independence. Though delayed by the 
cable troubles which made consultation with The Hague a difficult and time-
consuming process, plans to establish a Higher Military Academy and a Cadet 
Training bore fruit in 1918.
The manpower problem was compounded by a lack of munitions, arma-
ments, and other military paraphernalia the colonial army needed, shortages 
9 Note Department 8, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 19-4-1918 1.
40 The percentage had increased over the years. One explanation advanced was the introduc-
tion of the Decency Act of 1911 in the Netherlands Indies. It had meant an end to the medical 
examination of prostitutes and (because of this) to an increase in the number of prostitutes in the 
Netherlands Indies (De Locomotief, 6-6-1916).
41 Volksraad 1918:577.
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which had been felt almost right from the outbreak of the war; and which 
would have been felt almost as badly had a regular shipping been maintained 
because the army in Holland did not fare much better. A circular issued by 
the Indië Weerbaar movement in May 1917 noted: ‘In times like these, now 
that we live constantly in danger [...] it has to be realized that we are unable 
to make one gun, not one machine-gun, not one torpedo, not one aircraft’.4 
What the circular did not mention was that the commander of the colonial 
army had given the order in December 1916 to start as soon as possible train-
ing in the digging of trenches ‘in a way the modern war demands this’.4 On 
9 April 1918, Bijl de Vroe wrote down with dismay in his diary that in the 
almost four years of war no economic and military precautionary measures 
had been taken: ‘The army still consists in all of about 5,000 man as good as 
without munitions, artillery, dressings, aeroplanes and so forth. Nothing is in 
order’ (Bijl de Vroe 1980:140). Pistols, field-glasses, cloth to make uniforms, 
and horses (for which Australia was a main source of supply) can be added 
to his list of items the army was in need of. An export ban on horses had been 
instituted as early as March 1915. The lack of horses forced the cancellation of 
annual cavalry manoeuvres in 1918. 
The shipment of goods from Holland had also grounded to a halt. The 
value of imports from Holland dropped from 14 million guilders in 1914 and 
48 million guilders in 1917 to 11 million guilders in 1918. Not even govern-
ment goods could be shipped. In mid-February 1918 the man-of-war Hertog 
Hendrik had set out on a voyage to the Netherlands Indies through the Panama 
Canal to replace the Tromp, which had sailed to Holland in August 1917. The 
Hertog Hendrik carried the equipment for a 400 kW radio installation on board. 
Her total cargo amounted to 0 m; a fraction of the 10,000 m; of government 
goods that had been piling up. The Minister of the Navy had informed Pleyte 
that a limited number of goods could be transported on the Hertog Hendrik 
‘which would be impossible to ship on a private steamer because of the origin 
of those goods’.44 The Hertog Hendrik made it as far as the Faroer Islands. There 
she ran into a heavy storm and sustained engine damage. The Hertog Hendrik 
had to be towed to Bergen in Norway, from where she returned to Holland.
To relieve the shortage of military and civilian personnel, and of urgently 
needed goods in the Netherlands Indies, an emergency plan was devel-
oped. The idea was to have a convoy protected by two warships sail to the 
Netherlands Indies in June. During the whole journey, the convoy should 
remain independent of any goodwill or services from the side the Associated 
Powers. This meant that it had to sail the route around the Cape of Good 
4 De Indische Gids 1917, II:1186-7.
4 De Locomotief, 11-1-1916.
44 Rambonnet to Pleyte, -1-1918, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 9-1-1918 P1.
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Hope and that it had to take along its own coal. The Ships’ Requisition Act 
was amended to allow requisitioning for the purpose of sending ships to the 
Netherlands Indies. Initially the Dutch government may have had something 
grander in mind. There was talk of a large convoy of merchantmen. Soon 
the intelligence dawned that the convoy could only be a small one. Because 
coal was scarce, it would have been out of the question to arrange a larger 
convoy. Dutch industry could not sustain a large drain on its resources, espe-
cially not in a time when the import of coal from Germany and Great Britain 
had stopped. Additional limits on the size of the convoy were set by the fact 
that coaling from colliers on the high seas, as it had been during the Russo-
Japanese War, was still a difficult undertaking.
On the return voyage the convoy could bring colonial products which 
Holland badly needed. Posthuma reminded ‘the consumers’ in Holland that 
the ‘fat problem’ which had arisen could only be solved with fats from the 
Netherlands Indies.45 Naturally, national prestige was also at stake. Civil serv-
ants in the Ministry of the Colonies were afraid that it would only make an 
unfavourable impression on the population of the Netherlands Indies if the 
motherland found itself unable to maintain communication with its colonies, 
even though it was not at war.46
Opinion in Holland about the convoy vacillated between extreme caution 
and stubborn intent to restore the sea link with the Netherlands Indies. Some 
pointed out the possibility that warships of the Associated Powers might 
want to search the convoy. One member of the Lower House feared that such 
an incident would ‘simply be war’.47 Others were furious at the hesitation 
shown. They stressed that the Netherlands should not abandon the right to 
send Dutch ships wherever it wanted. Representing this view, a Member of 
Parliament said that Dutch shipping had been crippled because the Dutch 
ships had always needed something from other countries. Was such help 
– coal – not needed then the interference by a third country would amount to 
a grave injustice: ‘We abide therefore by the proper view, when we try to find 
the way to the Netherlands Indies under our own steam’.48
Plans had to be adjusted. Repairs to the Hertog Hendrik, one of the two war-
ships which was to protect the convoy, took longer than expected. The boiler 
of another warship, the Gelderland, exploded. To prevent the number of sea-
worthy Dutch ships in the fleet shrinking to an unacceptable level, a passenger 
ship, the Tabanan, was transformed into an auxiliary cruiser.
By far the greatest delay was caused by the Associated Powers. Initially the 
45 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1917-18:649.
46 Note Department 8, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 19-4-1918 1.
47 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1917-18:649.
48 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1917-18:650.
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Dutch government does not seem to have given much thought to British objec-
tions. In the middle of May Loudon assured Parliament that he did not expect 
problems with London.49 If he was sincere, Loudon had completely misjudged 
the situation. British opposition was vehement. In 1909 the British government 
had consented to a right of convoy, but only on the condition that the captain 
of the accompanying warships could present cargo manifests and that should 
doubts arise about the accuracy of the manifests, the merchantmen in the 
convoy could be searched. Some civil servants in the Ministry of the Colonies 
believed that such an eventuality could be avoided if the Netherlands sent out 
warships, not merchantmen. They proposed to charter a mailship and have 
her sail under a naval ensign. The crew was to enter the voluntary landstorm, 
home guard, for the duration of the voyage.50 Other civil servants in the 
Ministry considered such a decoy a folly. They warned Pleyte that the ‘comedy 
of transformation’ would not deter the British, or for that matter the Germans, 
who, they pointed out, did not shun from violating every tenet of international 
law when their interests demanded them to do so.51
London’s reaction was prompt and unequivocal. The British Foreign 
Secretary, A.J. Balfour, lost no time in instructing the British Ambassador 
in The Hague to impress upon the Dutch government that Great Britain ‘of 
course’ did not recognize a ‘right of convoy’. British warships would exercise 
‘the belligerent right of visit and search’.5 The Dutch government tried to pre-
vent the perpetrating of such an act and the loss of face such a search would 
have implied. The Dutch Envoy in London, R. de Marees van Swinderen, 
was asked to explain to the British government that the voyage was purely 
a government undertaking and was in no way intended to circumvent the 
Associated blockade. Van Swinderen wrote to Balfour that the purpose of the 
convoy was to relieve military men and to send out civil servants with their 
families. Dutch officials would supervise the loading of goods. They would 
also ensure that only passengers to whom the Associated Powers could have 
no objections sailed. No private correspondence would be allowed on board, 
nor would ordinary mail be sent along. The government goods transported 
would all have a certificate of origin. The British could inspect the certificates 
before the convoy set sail.5
This was not the reply Balfour had been waiting for. He had expected a 
49 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1917-18:649.
50 Note Department 8, 1--1918, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 19-4-1918 1.
51 Addendum to note of Department 8, 1--1918, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 19-4-1918 1.
5 Balfour to Townley, 5-4-1918, Balfour to De Marees van Swinderen, 7-6-1918, State Papers 
1917-18, III:5, 59.
5 De Marees van Swinderen to Balfour, 9-4-1918, Balfour to Townley, 7-6-1918, State Papers 
1917-18, III:54, 540. 
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prompt reaction to the message Townley had conveyed. The ‘friendly warning’ 
Townley had presented to Loudon on his behalf, which had been in a ‘courte-
ous form suited to such a communication to a friendly neutral Government’, 
had been ignored.54 To Balfour’s ‘considerable surprise’ the Dutch Minister of 
the Navy, Rambonnet, had made matters worse by blazoning abroad that the 
commander of the convoy would not tolerate a search of the merchantmen. An 
admonition was in order. It was conveyed in ‘the most formal manner’. Balfour 
refused to let pass what he considered a Dutch demand that Great Britain abdi-
cated ‘her belligerent right to stop contraband trade by the regulated exercise of 
naval force, and, in the middle of a great war, abandon the Allied blockade’.55
Balfour made it perfectly plain that he was of the opinion that the Dutch 
government had blundered. An ‘international complication of the utmost 
gravity’ could be the result.56 He had Lord Cecil inquire of Van Swinderen why 
the protection by warships was needed. The escort of a warship was ‘hardly 
capable of explanation’, except if the convoyed vessels were ‘to be protected in 
some transaction which the belligerents do not recognize as legitimate’.57 The 
conclusion was that the Dutch authorities might in ‘good faith’ have expected 
that the guarantees as conveyed by Van Swinderen would suffice, but the 
course taken by The Hague, was ‘lacking both in courtesy and in prudence’.58 
The Netherlands should be under ‘no misapprehension’ that the British Navy 
would not exercise its rights. Nevertheless, the British government wanted 
to ‘maintain their relations with the Netherlands Government on the most 
amicable footing’. They were prepared ‘to go out of their way in order to save 
the susceptibilities which the Dutch official announcement was calculated 
to arouse’, but only ‘to prevent the action of the Netherlands Government 
from definitely creating a situation gravely imperilling the friendly relations 
between the two countries’.59
London would allow the convoy to sail undisturbed, providing that The 
Hague did not take this as a precedent. There were a number of conditions. 
A list of names of passengers, all of whom had to be government officials, 
had to be handed over, as had full particulars of the cargo. The Dutch gov-
ernment had to guarantee that none of the goods shipped were wholly or in 
54 Balfour to De Marees van Swinderen, 7-6-1918, State Papers 1917-18, III:59.
55 Balfour to De Marees van Swinderen, 7-6-1918, State Papers 1917-18, III:540.
56 Memorandum recording confidential statement Lord R. Cecil to Dutch Envoy, State Papers 
1917-18, III:541.
57 Memorandum recording confidential statement Lord R. Cecil to Dutch Envoy, State Papers 
1917-18, III:541.
58 Memorandum recording confidential statement Lord R. Cecil to Dutch Envoy, State Papers 
1917-18, III:541.
59 Memorandum recording confidential statement Lord R. Cecil to Dutch Envoy, State Papers 
1917-18, III:541.
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part of enemy origin. The escorting warships should not transport civilian 
passengers or civilian goods. They could carry only articles for the colonial 
army and Navy, a list of which had to be submitted for examination. Finally, 
‘no mails, correspondence, private papers, printed matter, or parcels [were] to 
be carried by any ship in the convoy (except official dispatches of the Dutch 
Government)’.60 The Hague accepted, trying to save as much face as possible. 
Van Swinderen wrote to Balfour that the British conditions were almost identi-
cal to what the Dutch government had asked him to convey from the outset. 
Information about passengers and cargo would be sent to ‘all foreign lega-
tions, as the Netherlands Government wished to avoid any possible impres-
sion that anything is being concealed’.61 
Impeded by what Cort van der Linden described as objections by the 
British government to the transport of ‘a small part of the cargo’ and other 
points of ‘minor importance’ which had to be investigated, sailing was delayed 
still further.6 There were even rumours that a British squadron had taken up 
position just outside Dutch territorial waters to await the convoy. In actual 
fact the objections raised by the British were far from trivial. There was the 
usual dispute over chemical dyes. British suspicion also thwarted the plans to 
build a more powerful radio station in Java. Equipment for a Telefunken 400 
kW installation had been loaded on the Hertog Hendrik. Much to the dismay 
of Pleyte it never left port. Together with other government goods, the radio 
equipment had to be unloaded. Pleyte wired in cipher to Van Limburg Stirum 
60 Statement of conditions handed to De Marees van Swinderen, 7-6-1918, State Papers 1917-18, 
III:54-.
61 De Marees van Swinderen to Balfour, 15-6-1918, State Papers 1917-18, III:54.
6 Handelingen 1917-18, Aanhangsel: 51, 57.
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via Washington that the ‘circumstances’ under which the Hertog Hendrik had 
to sail made its shipment impossible.6 Disillusioned by the delay, Rambonnet 
resigned. He did so shortly before a new Dutch cabinet was to be formed. 
Nevertheless, his ‘firm’ attitude reaped Rambonnet much applause.
To underline the national importance of the voyage, the commander of the 
convoy and the captain of the auxiliary cruiser, the Tabanan, were received in 
audience by Queen Wilhelmina. Thereupon the Noordam, with 1,00 passen-
gers, the Hertog Hendrik, and the Tabanan set out for the Netherlands Indies on 
5 July 1918. Taking part in the convoy was a freighter of the Netherlands, the 
Bengkalis, from which coal had to be transhipped at a number of points along 
the route of the voyage which took the ships around Scotland and the Cape of 
Good Hope. Great Britain did not allow coaling in South Africa. Among the 
passengers were fifty army officers and 155 non-commissioned officers and 
their families. They and the other passengers did not have a very pleasant trip. 
The Noordam was not suitable for the voyage to the Netherlands Indies as she 
had been built to sail the Atlantic Ocean. Because of the high temperatures on 
board caused by lack of ventilation ten babies died during the passage (De 
Haas 00:175). 
The arrival of the convoy was announced in the press in the Netherlands 
Indies when the Sabang radio station succeeded in contacting the Hertog 
Hendrik. At that moment the convoy was still seven days’ sailing away. A 
warship was sent out to welcome the convoy. On board was the journal-
ist Berretty, keen to report on the last leg of the voyage. The convoy finally 
reached Tanjung Priok on 7 September 1918. The arrival had been intended 
to be a big occasion. Van Limburg Stirum boarded a ship to meet the convoy 
on the last miles of its trip. To the disappointment of the Governor General, 
the occasion did not turn into a grand ceremony. His adjutant, Bijl de Vroe, 
agreed: ‘It was a failed entrance. The Allied Powers again refused to permit the 
convoy to return without being inspected. Fine freedom of the seas.’ (Bijl de 
Vroe 1980:16-.) This meant that the Tabanan and Noordam were constrained 
to remain in the Netherlands Indies till the end of the war. After the war the 
Noordam was to provide the first opportunity to sail to Holland for the many 
people in the Netherlands Indies waiting to return to the mother country.
Export prospects alarmingly in 1918. When there was a choice between buy-
ing colonial wares from the Netherlands Indies or from British and French 
colonies, the Associated Powers gave preference to the latter. Trade with the 
United States slackened. For almost all imports, the United States had intro-
duced a licensing system before shipment. Because the telegraphic communi-
6 Pleyte to Van Limburg Stirum, 11-7-1918, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 11-7-1918 L6.
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cation between the Netherlands Indies and the United States was poor, a great 
deal of time had elapsed before consent to import reached the Netherlands 
Indies (Idenburg en De Graeff 190:91). The value of exports to the United 
States dropped from 00 to 111 million guilders in 1918 (Carpentier Alting and 
De Cock Buning 198:10). 
The fate of the export of colonial wares during 1918 presented a sorry pic-
ture. The market for tapioca (a cassava product) almost disappeared when the 
United States, which had been a valuable expanding market for this product 
in recent years, instituted a full import ban in April. Coffee suffered greatly 
after Washington demanded a licence for its import in May. As a result, the 
export of coffee from Java dropped from 1,400 tons in 1917 to 5,400 tons in 
1918.64 In the same month the United States banned the import of tobacco. 
Consequently the export of tobacco from the East Coast of Sumatra declined 
even further: from 0.75 million kilos in 1916, via 4.75 million kilos in 1917, 
to .5 million kilos in 1918. From Java there was almost no export at all.65 In 
May a licensing system for rubber was also instituted. The impression made 
by the ban in the Netherlands Indies was great. Rubber was considered to be 
one of the products of which the export would surely continue unobstructed 
because of the great demand abroad. The export of cocoa in 1918 was half of 
what it had been in 1917. The culprit was an American import ban brought in 
August. In July Washington demanded a licence for the import of tea. Batavia 
tried to support local tea producers by banning the import of tea. The Chinese 
business community protested. The ban hit the import of tea from China and 
Japan the most. In retrospect it had to be admitted that the import ban in the 
Netherlands Indies had made no difference.66
It was the same story with sugar. In 1917 people still cherished the hope 
that in view of high demand abroad, American and British freighters would 
certainly continue to call in Java to fetch sugar. It was not to be. In early 1918 
the Washington Post observed that Java sugar had become ‘as useless to the 
world as unmined gold, because no nation can spare the ships to carry it’.67 
‘Sugar circles in Amsterdam’ were sure that a debâcle was in the making.68 The 
price of sugar which in May 1917, when the crisis began, had still been 1 guil-
ders per picul, dropped to 5.50 guilders in July 1918. Afraid of being saddled 
up with large stocks, producers sold sugar at a great loss.69 The realization that 
64 Koloniaal verslag 1919:5-4.
65 Koloniaal verslag 1919:61-, 57-8.
66 Koloniaal verslag 1919:57-8.
67 NA, Kol., Vb. -4-1918 89.
68 De Locomotief, 6-5-1918.
69 Report of the Javasche Bank over 1917-18, cited in Koloniale Studiën 1918:474, 477; Koloniaal 
verslag 1919:55-6.
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this erstwhile major export earner, the ‘motor’ of trade as it was called, was 
caught up in a crisis brought home to Europeans and non-Europeans alike 
the inexorably growing seriousness of the situation. In April 1918 the Sarekat 
Islam concluded that the whole population was suffering. The consequences 
would be grave if the government did not act quickly.70
Plans again had to be thrashed out to come to the rescue of estates which 
had run into financial problems. The situation appeared more alarming than 
it had been in August 1914. With the falling away of markets, the collapse of 
the estate sector loomed. Continued operation would mean an accumulation 
of debts. Closure would imply the annihilation of capital, and many were sure, 
domestic disturbances. In 1914 people had expected the disruption of export 
trade not to last long. In 1918 nobody had an inkling of how long the import 
restrictions and bans abroad would be in operation (Helfferich 191:18-9). In 
the previous year, some plantations had only been able to continue to function 
thanks to soft loans provided by the Javasche Bank; the ‘most powerful moral 
back-up of agriculture and products trade’ as the institution was lauded in 
1918.71 Other estates, which had made huge profits from the sale of colonial 
wares in the first years of the war, still had enough financial reserves to cope 
with the crisis that emerged in 1917, but if the war were not to end soon – it 
was feared – a catastrophe was just waiting to happen. For their working capi-
tal an increasing number of estates would become dependent on the Javasche 
Bank, which could not come to their assistance forever. The annual report of 
the Ministry of the Colonies stated in retrospect that ‘[t]he situation threatened 
to become fatal in the second half of 1918’. Elsewhere in the same section, the 
phrases ‘a desperate situation’ and the Netherlands Indies having escaped a 
‘serious disaster’ were used.7
This time the Javasche Bank did not intend to lend money directly to the 
plantations. It opted instead for a special institution that would be responsi-
ble for managing the bank’s aid to the estate industry. A Cultuur-Hulpbank 
(Estate Relief Bank) was instituted in the middle of September. From the Estate 
Relief Bank estates could borrow money on their produce against production 
costs and at a moderate rate of interest. The Javasche Bank would provide 
most of the money needed. The colonial government would act as guarantor 
for the repayment of the loans. The Estate Relief Bank was also envisaged as 
a mechanism to prevent a steep decline in export prices. Estates were only 
eligible to borrow if they promised not to sell their produce below a minimum 
price. Praiseworthy though it was, the rescue operation did not bring instant 
relief. Some estates had to be closed, or because ‘times were not good’ had to 
70 De Locomotief, 5-4-1918.
71 Bataviaasch Handelsblad, cited in De Indische Gids 1918, II:176.
7 Koloniaal verslag 1919:01-
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refuse demands for a cost-of-living allowance, at most willing to supply their 
labour force with cheap rice. 
The only export market which did not suffer was that in Japan. Japan 
had not issued import restrictions or bans and Japanese companies deployed 
enough freighters to keep trade going. Japan even opened new shipping lines 
between Japan and the Netherlands Indies and between the Netherlands Indies 
and Calcutta. The only time the apple-cart seemed upset was in August 1918 
after Japanese forces had landed in Siberia. It was feared that Japanese trading 
companies would stop buying produce from the Netherlands Indies because 
all Japanese freighters would be needed to transport troops to Vladivostok for 
the Japanese war effort against Russia in Siberia.
In the course of the war various non-food products had become scarce. 
Iron, steel, concrete, and coal were among the more important items. The 
import of coal to Java had dropped from 44,09 tons in 1916 to 94,716 
tons in 1917.7 One of the consequences was that the Dutch squadron in the 
Archipelago had stopped using Cardiff coal in order to ‘maintain an adequate 
war stock’. The Navy stoked with domestic and Japanese coal. Cardiff coal 
was held in reserve.74 The government impressed on foresters in Java that 
‘every pile metre produced above the normal amount does its part in reliev-
ing the fuel need’.75 Relief was also provided by the intensification of domestic 
coal production in South and East Borneo. This had the additional advantage 
that it ‘was a Godsend to the population of a large part of the region’.76
The import of iron had dried up completely. This meant that plans to 
replace obsolete ships employed by the colonial government with new ones 
could not be implemented. The building of wooden ships (as was done in 
Europe and in British India) was considered. It did not prove a viable alter-
native. Besides the fact that there were doubts about whether shipyards in 
the Netherlands Indies had the capacity to build larger wooden ships, the 
expertise had disappeared. Lack of know-how was compounded by the fact 
that iron was not available in sufficient quantities for the machines and boil-
ers required.77 Iron had become so scarce that in the draft colonial budget of 
1919 money was set aside to send an engineer to Australia. He was to study 
whether the wooden pipes used there, could also be used in the waterworks in 
the Netherlands Indies. An export ban for products like barbed wire and nails 
had been instituted as early as 1916. In 1918 there was even a shortage of oil 
can. Oil companies published advertisements in the newspapers stating that if 
7 Koloniaal verslag 1919:6-.
74 Koloniaal verslag 1918:5-4.
75 Circular Wehlburg 6--1917, NA, Kol. Geheim, Mr. 1917/9x.
76 Koloniaal verslag 1918:7-8.
77 De Locomotief, -6-1918; De Indische Gids 1919, I:11; Koloniale Studiën 1918:104.
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the old cans were not returned no oil would be supplied.78 
With the exception of so-called ‘European writing and printing-paper’, 
paper was still available from Japan, but as the war staggered on this had 
become highly expensive. This included the price of newsprint. Scarcity had 
threatened from the outbreak of the war and had forced printers to increase 
their prices sharply. Consequently, Dutch-language and vernacular newspa-
pers and periodicals had to put up subscription rates; a measure sometimes 
described as a ‘high cost allowance’. Some publications closed never to re-
open, in an exceptional case as happened with the De Noordkust (The North 
Coast) published in Cirebon, because the editor’s health was failing and the 
high price of paper made it impossible to employ a replacement; and weeklies 
only appeared only once a fortnight. Some editors had to resign and take on 
a job that offered them a better income. The severe consequences for the ver-
nacular press prompted Abdoel Moeis to plead in the People’s Council for the 
establishment of a paper industry in the Netherlands Indies. Mentioning the 
Dutch paper producer Van Gelder by name he accused those who maintained 
that a paper industry was not viable of having their own particular reasons for 
saying so.79 Other Indonesians worried about the high price of paper, slates, 
slate pencils, penholders, writing pens, and pencils. That these school neces-
sities could no longer be bought at an affordable price formed ‘an obstacle in 
the way of progress of the natives’.80
The government and private firms were both equally plagued by the short-
age of paper. Private firms had started to economize on the use of paper as 
early as the end of 1916. In 1917 the colonial government urged its officials to 
be thrifty with paper. Army Command followed suit in May 1918. It suggested 
that instead of using envelopes, sheets of paper could be folded up, and the 
address written on the back. Even the planned first national census had to be 
postponed because of lack of paper.81 
In early 1918 the economic problems the war caused in the Netherlands and 
in the Netherlands Indies prompted representatives of the business commu-
nity in Holland to plead for central control of colonial foreign trade. Exports 
should be banned except if special permission had been given. One major rea-
son for advancing this idea was that a section of international trade had begun 
to resemble barter. Imports to Holland were only possible in return for prom-
ises to supply the Associated Powers and Germany with specific goods, loans, 
or tonnage. Those in favour of the centralization of colonial trade stressed that 
78 Neratja, 8--1918; De Locomotief, -6-1918.
79 Volksraad 1918:99.
80 Neratja, 8-1-1918.
81 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1917-18:144.
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the motherland and colony were one, and that the Netherlands Indies had 
to assist in alleviating the misery experienced in Holland. The Netherlands 
Indies had much to offer in this respect. Wheat for Holland might be obtained 
in exchange for rubber or sugar from the Netherlands Indies. Another reason 
to stress the unity between motherland and colony was that politicians and 
businessmen in the Netherlands believed that the Netherlands Indies should 
also shoulder its share in the raising of money for loans the belligerents 
wanted to conclude and which could hardly be refused. Such credit had to be 
financed by banks and by the shipping and trading companies. It was only fair 
that colonial companies should share part of the burden.
Some of the arguments advanced to convince the decision makers in Java 
that centralization of colonial foreign trade was necessary were impeccable. 
By giving priority to the export of products urgently needed abroad, Batavia 
would be in the position to demand a supply of goods urgently needed in 
the colony such as iron and rice. An additional bonus, and according to some 
the most important reason to intervene, was that by supervising foreign trade 
the colonial government could control the shipment of goods and ensure a 
fair allocation of scarce tonnage. By taking control Batavia would be able to 
prevent companies with special influence or connections thrusting themselves 
forward. As with almost all debates about what economic measures should be 
taken the fate of the indigenous population entered the picture. Control would 
allow Batavia to assure the shipment of colonial wares specifically produced 
by them.8
The idea of regulating colonial foreign trade appealed to Pleyte. Within 
days of the proposal being suggested to him, he sent a telegram to Van 
Limburg Stirum in which he mentioned three reasons in favour of the cen-
tralization of colonial foreign trade. The first was that it would thwart efforts, 
especially in the United States, to wrest a lower price for colonial products. 
He mentioned this point because his staff shared the suspicion of the Dutch 
business community that traders in the United States were trying to take 
advantage of the circumstances to buy colonial wares for a low price with the 
intention of re-exporting them to Europe for a higher price. Secondly, it would 
enable the colonial government to assure the import of essential goods. His 
staff had suggested that sugar could be used to guarantee the import of rice 
from British India. The third reason was the ‘threatening danger’ of the credit 
demanded by Foreign Powers.8
Van Limburg Stirum was not eager to comply. The topic again brought to 
the fore the distrust felt in the Netherlands Indies for suggestions emanating 
8 Economisch-Statistische Berichten, 1-5-1918, p. 66-7; Handelingen Eerste Kamer 1917-18:69.
8 N.U.M. to Pleyte 4--1918, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 14--1918 59; Pleyte to Van Limburg 
Stirum, 14--1918 in Economisch-Statistische Berichten, 15-5-1918, p. 415.
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from Holland. The plea for central control was seen as an effort on the part 
of the commercial community in Holland to regain some of the control it had 
lost over the running of the colonial economy.84 Van Limburg Stirum replied 
that he lacked the staff with the necessary expertise to execute a licence sys-
tem. In the back of his mind lurked a fear of retaliation from abroad and the 
imposition of additional export obstacles and he was afraid that for products 
such as tin and rubber a loss of markets to foreign competitors would be the 
outcome. In contrast to the people in Holland, Van Limburg Stirum advanced 
the fate of the indigenous population as an argument against export restric-
tions. He foresaw that export bans on copra, tapioca, tea, kapok, and pepper 
would have adverse consequences for them. The colonial government lacked 
the funds to buy up their produce.
This was not all. In view of the large amounts of foreign capital invested 
in the colony, and the unremitting efforts to attract even more (that is money 
from Europe and the United States to block Japanese investments), Van 
Limburg Stirum considered it ‘very risky’ to abandon the colony’s open door 
policy.85 In short, the interests of the Netherlands Indies demanded freedom 
of foreign trade. Seemingly unaware that the colony was expected to share 
some of Holland’s burdens, Van Limburg Stirum was not impressed by the 
reasons put forward by Pleyte. He wired Pleyte that he had consulted lead-
ing figures in the commercial community in the Netherlands Indies and that 
he had learned of no indications that their customers abroad had exploited 
the situation to demand lower prices or that governments demanded special 
credit. In no way should anything comparable to the NOT be created in the 
Netherlands Indies. Were centralization to be inevitable this should take the 
form of a special government bureau, not of a private organization like the 
NOT.86 Van Limburg Stirum and his advisers made one concession. They were 
prepared to contribute to the credit demanded from Holland but this should 
only happen on a voluntary basis and on the condition that ‘the present free-
dom of trade’ was maintained.87
When export prices continued to plummet, Van Limburg Stirum and his 
advisers changed their minds. In April and May the export of a number of 
products was forbidden. Among these were tin, timber, tobacco, sugar, tea, 
coffee, pepper, copra, petroleum, kapok, and quinine, to mention the most 
84 See the discussion between H.H.A. van Gybland Oosterhoff, J.T. Cremer en H. Colijn in 
Economisch-Statistische Berichten 1918:66-9, 415-8, 44-4, 466-7, 500-1.
85 Van Limburg Stirum to Pleyte, 0--1918 (Handelingen 1917-18, Aanhangsel: 196); De Kat 
Angelino to Van Limburg Stirum, 7--1918, NA, Kol. Geheim, Mr. 1918/99x.
86 Van Limburg Stirum to Pleyte, --1918 in Economisch-Statistische Berichten, 15-5-1918, p. 
415.
87 Van Limburg Stirum to Pleyte, --1918 in Economisch-Statistische Berichten, 15-5-1918, p. 
415.
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important ones. Later other products such as rubber were added to the list. 
In an attempt to forestall sanctions abroad, Batavia announced its new policy 
in newspapers in the Straits Settlements and in British India. Batavia tried to 
argue that the government of the Netherlands Indies had been forced to act as 
it did because of export bans abroad and conditions which were impossible to 
meet imposed on exports. As example, the agreement between the KPM and 
the government of British India was mentioned. The Netherlands Indies was 
no longer able to honour the arrangement (and hence could no longer import 
Burma rice) after the requisitioning of Dutch freighters.88
Export permits would be granted, but only when essential commodities 
were imported in exchange. A firm, as did happen, which wanted to export 
kapok to the United States was only allowed to do so on the promise that it 
import iron and steel of equal value. In this case the condition was difficult to 
meet. Washington had instituted an export ban for iron and steel.
Now it was the turn of the business community in Holland to be angry. 
Two hundred trading companies impressed upon Pleyte that the Netherlands 
Indies needed free trade, not export restrictions. It was pointed out that even 
firms which were engaged in both import and export lacked the necessary 
expertise and contacts to fulfil the conditions set. This made the exchange of 
commodities demanded by the government a graver financial risk. The only 
result of the regulation would be that export would come to a complete stand-
still. Adding to the discontent was the conviction that decisions about colonial 
trade had to be taken in Holland, where the headquarters of the Dutch estate 
companies were located, and from where most of their capital came, not in 
Java. De Telegraaf even blamed Van Limburg Stirum for having declared eco-
nomic war on the Associate Powers, offending the United States especially by 
prohibiting the export of a number of products the Americans needed in great 
quantities for their war efforts.89
The commercial world in Java also reacted sceptically. The only advan-
tage some saw in the licensing system was that government supervision of 
colonial export might curtail what they considered the power of the shipping 
companies and lower freight prices. The Netherlands Indies was in too weak 
a position to lift restrictions on imports imposed by the belligerents. Foreign 
suppliers would simply not deliver, which meant that colonial exports would 
be hurt even more. In a petition to Van Limburg Stirum, the Trade Association 
of Semarang dismissed the licensing system as ‘absolutely impracticable’.90
In practice the licensing system was applied with leniency. One of the 
reasons for this was probably fear. The Dutch government shrank from 
88 Economisch-Statistische Berichten, 15-5-1918, p. 47.
89 De Telegraaf, cited in De Indische Gids 1918, I:70.
90 De Locomotief, 10-5-1918, 5-6-1918; De Indische Gids 1918, II:169.
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the consequences a ban especially on petroleum, the only real means of 
putting pressure on the Associated Powers the Netherlands had, could have 
(Helfferich 191:19). At the end of May Van Limburg Stirum reported to Pleyte 
that licences for exports to the United States, France, Hong Kong, and the 
Straits Settlements were freely being handed out, and that trade with Japan 
had encountered no difficulties. Only with respect to Australia was the licence 
system in force.91 The sentence in the report of the Ministry of the Colonies for 
1918 that in October the export of rubber was forbidden ‘except when permis-
sion had been obtained in advance, which was never refused’ was pregnant 
with significance.9 Nevertheless, in retrospect it could not be denied that the 
system had caused ‘unavoidable impediment’ to exports.9 Partly this could be 
attributed to procedure. The Department of Agriculture, Trade and Industry, 
which had to issue the permits, did not inform the applicants about its deci-
sions. When an export permit was granted it informed the Custom House, 
which in turn had to contact the company concerned.94 
In spite of all its trials and tribulations, the licensing system bore one 
result: it gave Van Limburg Stirum the leverage to force the sugar producers 
to act in concert. In June, Batavia faced as it was with the plummeting of the 
price of sugar decided to intervene in the sugar trade. Where the Java Sugar 
Association had failed to make producers act in concert and headquarters in 
Holland could not agree on what course should be followed, Van Limburg 
Stirum succeeded in bringing about the almost impossible. He called together 
a ‘sugar meeting’ attended by planters and exporters and forced them to 
cooperate to prevent a further drop in price at the end of July. Export permits 
would only be granted by a Regeerings Commissie van Advies voor de Suiker 
(Government Committee of Advice on Sugar) founded on 0 July 1918. The 
committee only issued a permit when sugar was sold above a certain price 
(7.5 guilders per picul), thus preventing sales at extremely low prices, even 
below the cost of production as had been happened. Another condition was 
that the firm or estate in question would be prepared to enter an Association 
of Java Sugar Producers and Exporters. One conclusion was, that Holland 
had only become a complicating factor in international economic relations. 
The Netherlands Indies had to look after itself.95 The committee was a great 
success. It accomplished ‘a complete turn around in the situation’.96 Aided by 
a returning demand, and by the news that the Continental Powers had sug-
91 Handelingen Eerste Kamer 1917-18:568.
9 Koloniaal verslag 1919:50. 
9 Koloniaal verslag 1919:49-50 
94 De Locomotief, -6-1918.
95 Bataviasch Handelsblad, 1-9-1918, cited in Koloniale Studiën 1918:71.
96 Koloniaal verslag 1919:55-6.
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gested an armistice in early October, prices recovered. In October the price of 
sugar reached 1 guilders per picul.
Much to the displeasure of the Governor-General and the Minister of the 
Colonies the Advisory Committee on Sugar and the Association of Java Sugar 
Producers and Exporters were dissolved at the end of October. The headquar-
ters of the sugar companies in Holland, united in the Bond van Eigenaren in 
Nederlandsch-Indische Suikerondernemingen (BENISO, Union of Owners of 
Netherlands Indies’ Sugar Estates), which had been founded in November 
1917 at the height of the sugar crisis, rejected any government interference 
in the sugar trade (Taselaar 1998:106). The headquarters also refused to allow 
their estates in Java any freedom of action. To counter the steps taken in 
Batavia, the sugar companies in Holland founded their own organization to 
regulate trade, the Vereenigde Java Suiker Producenten (United Java Sugar 
Producers Association), in August 1918. When he left the Netherlands Indies 
in July 198, Emil Helfferich was still complaining about the negative conse-
quences of this and similar organizations in Holland for the spirit of enterprise 
in the estate sector in the Netherlands Indies (Taselaar 1998:1-). 
Nevertheless, producers had been made to see the benefit of cooperation 
and ‘voluntary was continued, what had been established by pressure from 
the government’.97 Batavia and the business community in the Netherlands 
Indies had discovered the proper instrument to regulate trade and fix prices. 
A Rubber Producers Association, with a special branch in Medan, and a 
Coffee Producers Association were established in November. A Tea Producers 
Association and a Cocoa Producers Association were not far behind.
97 Koloniaal verslag 1919:55-6.
chapter xix
Rice and sugar
To Dutch people who had travelled on the Noordam it appeared as if the conse-
quences of the Great War had almost passed by the Netherlands Indies. People 
in the Netherlands Indies thought differently. They were aware that they were 
better off than the people in Europe, but as a woman wrote to De Locomotief 
in March 1917 ‘is it not beginning to become alarming expensive. The price of 
everything is rising: food, clothing, building materials (and as a consequence 
more expensive rents) and earnings remain the same’.1
War had made life only more expensive for all population groups. Duurte, 
dearness, was on everybody’s mind. Europeans complained about high prices 
and grumbled because they had to forego with luxuries like Eau-de-Cologne 
and some of the foodstuffs and drinks which pleased their palate most. 
Initially there had been substitutes. Europeans could buy ‘Edammer’ cheese 
and ‘Rheinwein’ from Australia and ‘Bordeaux wines’ from California. They 
could eat delicatessen products imported from the United States and drink 
beer from Japan, which people by now had started to appreciate. Maintaining 
eating and drinking habits only became a problem in the later years of the war, 
when imports from Australia, an important source of ham, flour, cheese, and 
butter, and from the United States were disrupted.
The Netherlands Indies were not completely dependent on imports, a 
modest effort was made to set up an import substitution industry. Beer was 
produced locally. In Java jenever distilleries were established; in Sumatra cigar 
factories. Erdman and Sielcken experimented with the production of marga-
rine from coconut oil. Another novelty was the First Medan Tea Factory, a 
Chinese initiative, where tea was blended and packed. A Dutch rusk factory 
and a vermicelli factory were opened. A special treat was guaranteed when 
a company succeeded in producing Haagse hopjes (coffee-flavoured butter-
scotch sweats). Such efforts were a drop in the ocean. Their European bias 
irritated nationalist leaders. In February 1918, when a chocolate and cacao fac-
1 De Locomotief, 14-3-1917.
 De Locomotief, 14-1-1915; Koloniaal verslag 1919:61-; Helfferich 191:14. 
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tory commenced production, Neratja wondered when finally a factory which 
catered for the needs of Indonesians would be built. The same newspaper 
reacted differently when Australia issued a ban on the export of butter and 
cheese. This time Neratja expressed the hope that the ban would be a stimulus 
to start the production of these products in the Netherlands Indies.3 
Europeans began to worry that because of a shortage of wheat soon bread 
could no longer be baked. Once again it was observed that loaves of bread had 
become smaller.4 Fortunately, in Bandung an experiment to make ‘flour’ suit-
able for the production of bread from cassava was successful. For some time 
the army had already been trying to develop such a product, but in vain. Now 
someone had succeeded. A local reporter noted that mixed with real flour, the 
bread, biscuits, and cakes made from it were rather tasty.5 Others disagreed. 
There were plenty of complaints about its taste when the tapioca flour bread 
reached the shops. Earlier, in the middle of 1917, experiments to grow wheat 
in the Archipelago had been successful.
The relief afforded by all such experiments and initiatives was pretty 
small. In early 1918 the price of butter rose by 50 per cent within two months 
after Australia had imposed an export ban. The shortage that followed forced 
the colonial Navy to institute ‘butterless days’. No butter was served if there 
was jam, meat, or sardines on the table.6 The price of bread and tinned milk 
had doubled since 1914. That of other foodstuffs had also mounted: ‘Who’, 
an angry speaker in Ambon demanded, ‘remembers what the inside of a tin 
of sardines looks like?’7 The prices of medicines, clothing, and textiles fol-
lowed exactly the same pattern. Shoes, those markers of European status and 
of modernity, had become too expensive to buy for people with a modest 
income.8 Rents had risen. In some instances they had doubled by 1917.
The time was ripe for the European community to complain. In De Locomotief 
a reader from Blitar indignantly asked why the colonial government did not 
intervene? When matters affected ‘the brown brother,’ Batavia was quick 
to act. If the daily lives of the Europeans were put under pressure, and if 
the colonial government was confronted with the might of the large import 
companies, Batavia hesitated to take appropriate action. He posed that it was 
the ‘pur-sang’ Europeans who were hurt most. They could not do without 
European foodstuffs, or, we may conclude from the way he went on, their 
drinks (a bottle of Dutch gin had become four to five times more expensive). 
3 Neratja, 18--1918, 13-3-1918.
4 De Locomotief, 1-5-1918.
5 De Preangerbode, cited in De Locomotief, 8-4-1918.
6 Nieuwe Soerabaia Courant, cited in De Locomotief, 3-6-1918.
7 De Locomotief, 1-5-1918, 5-5-1918.
8 De Locomotief, 1-4-1918, 13-4-1918.
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The reader angrily suggested that everybody should become a teetotaller. 
This would teach the import companies not to stock their warehouses full of 
jenever in expectation of higher prices.9
Indonesians did not lay behind in lamentations. As early as May 1916, in a 
fierce editorial Oetoesan Hindia had observed that since the outbreak of the war 
not only had prices of imported goods risen steeply but it was the same story 
for products made and grown in Java. Oetoesan Hindia urged the government 
to act against the ‘capitalists’, the leeches, who were making money hand over 
fist from huge war profits and who were responsible for the rise in the price 
of domestic products. Batavia had to wake up to just how serious the situation 
was. If they could not buy enough food, the Javanese might not support the 
Dutch if the Japanese invaded the island.10 People’s welfare was hard hit. In 
February 1917, a contributor to Islam Bergerak put the consequences of the war 
on a par with other disasters such as the plague, floods, and earthquakes.11 A 
few months later Oetoesan Hindia wrote that natives did not worry about the 
telegraphic blockade. For them there was only one question: mati atau roti, 
dead or bread.
Indicative of the growing poverty outside Java was the drop in government 
income from commutation of statute labour outside Java. It fell from 63,11 
guilders in 1914 to 191,500 guilders in 1918.1 The increasing profits at gov-
ernment pawnshops mirrored the steep economic decline of the indigenous 
population of Java. Receipts increased from 10 million guilders in 1914, to 1 
million guilders in 1916 and 14 million guilders in 1917.13 
Prickled into action by the duurte, a variety of European and Indonesian 
organizations staged meetings to protest about the consequent high cost of 
living, in 1917 and early 1918. They asked the government to intervene and 
to fix prices. If we may believe a statement by the central board of the Sarekat 
Islam of March 1918, almost all its branches had organized protest meetings, 
which had drawn hundreds, thousands, and even tens of thousand people.14 
On the principles the organizations were all agreed. The difference lay in 
the way the message should be conveyed. The ISDV and the Sarekat Islam 
wanted to present demands directly to the government. Boedi Oetomo and 
other more moderate organizations did not want to go further than to draw 
up urgent requests. Usually the resolutions accepted at such protest meetings 
were brought to the attention of Van Limburg Stirum by wire. A reader of 
9 De Locomotief, 17-4-1918.
10 Oetoesan Hindia, 9-5-1916.
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Oetoesan Hindia protested about this practice. It was a waste and a shameful 
fashion, a mania, at a time when entrenchments were being propagated from 
all sides. Each word cost 10 cents. Some telegrams held hundreds even over 
a thousand words. This was typical capitalist behaviour. It would be better to 
send a registered letter to the Governor General. The editors of Oetoesan Hindia 
begged to disagree. They claimed that it was a well-known fact that Batavia 
paid attention only to telegrams, registered letters got short shrift.15
To compensate for the higher cost of living, European firms, the NHM in 
the forefront, had already increased the salaries of their European staff by add-
ing a special allowance in 1916. At first no more than a few per cent, the allow-
ance could rise as high as 15 per cent at the beginning of 1917. Some compa-
nies restricted this to Europeans who earned less than 500 guilders per month. 
Other companies gave their European staff an allowance depending on the 
composition of their family. Sometimes Indonesian and Chinese employees 
and labourers were also compensated, but often, not always – Internatio was 
one of the exceptions – at a lesser rate than the European staff. Neratja reacted 
15 Oetoesan Hindia, 3-4-1918.
A sugar cane estate in Java (Van Gent, Penard and Rinkes  
193: Photo 173)
XIX  Rice and sugar 519
indignantly. Indonesians also worked hard and could not be treated as ‘mere 
natives’.16 The labour force usually had to do without. They were precisely 
the people leaders of the Sarekat Islam sagely pointed out without whom the 
estate owners would not have been able to grow rich.
Judging from a report in Djawa Tengah, which urged its readers to demand 
a similar measure from Chinese employers, Chinese firms did not follow 
suit, at least not immediately.17 Among those Chinese who did not pay their 
employees compensation, or perhaps not enough, were Chinese owners of 
sugar estates. The trade union of people employed in the sugar industry in 
Java and Madura, De Suikerbond (Sugar Union) called for action.18 Initially 
Batavia had also refused to pay a cost-of-living supplement, a duurtetoeslag, 
a word which was to enter the Malay vocabulary. The colonial government 
admitted that life had become expensive, but refused to follow the example 
of the private sector. A cost-of-living supplement would cost too much. Van 
Limburg Stirum’s staff had calculated that it would require expenditure of 
8.7 million guilders annually. This calculation did not yet take into account a 
similar allowance for the soldiers in the colonial army.
Van Limburg Stirum tried to convince the civil servants that in the 
Netherlands Indies people had ‘more reason for gratitude than for com-
plaint’.19 They should not demand a special allowance. People in Holland 
were far worse off. The colonial government could not ‘neutralize every con-
sequence of war for civil servants’.0 As an additional argument, in the closing 
months of 1917 Batavia pointed out that it was no great burden for private 
firms to pay a cost-of-living supplement. They could well afford it. They 
only had few Europeans with a permanent appointment and in ‘the present 
circumstances’ they were doing ‘good, many even very good business’.1 The 
state was in a different position. It was suffering the financial consequences 
of the war, had to cope with an ever increasing expenditure, and had a much 
larger number of people with a permanent appointment.
The VSTP which had made a cost-of-living allowance a centre piece of 
agitation since January 1917, dismissed Batavia’s decision as a gross neglect 
of the interests of the civil servants. It did so at the end of the year in an 
appeal to other unions of public servants to make a united stand to force a fair 
cost-of-living supplement out of the government. Earlier attempts to make a 
16 Neratja, 10-4-1918.
17 Djawa Tengah, cited in Koloniaal Tijdschrift 1917:687.
18 De Locomotief, 19--1917.
19 Van Limburg Stirum to Pleyte, 17-1-1917, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 31-1-1917 A15.
0 Van Limburg Stirum to Pleyte, 17-1-1917, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 31-1-1917 A15.
1 Circular, cited in De Locomotief, 5-11-1917.
 De Locomotief, 7-1-1917.
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common stand had failed. This time the VSTP appeal was successful. Twelve 
trade unions and other organizations met in Yogyakarta on  February 1918. 
They claimed to have 17,464 members.3 A telegram was sent to the Parliament 
in The Hague to ask for support. Among its signatories were Dwidjosewojo 
of Boedi Oetomo and Sneevliet of the ISDV. The telegram had at least one 
unexpected result. It made members of Parliament aware that Great Britain 
had ended its wire blockade.
The government gave in in April 1918. Batavia announced that it would 
compensate civil servants and soldiers who earned less than 315 guilders per 
month for the high cost-of-living. It was a progressive allowance. Those with a 
salary of less than 50 guilders received an increase of 0 per cent; those earning 
between 00 and 315 guilders 5 per cent. It was calculated that these allow-
ances would cost the government 7.5 million guilders annually.
The compensation was immediately attacked as being too low. Throughout 
1918 trade unions and other organizations continued to plead with the People’s 
Council, in petitions and in letters, for higher wages. To show that the govern-
ment measures were inadequate some argued that the cost of living had risen 
by 30 per cent.4 To illustrate the desperate living conditions of Indonesian 
civil servants, Malay newspapers published surveys of how much money 
ordinary Indonesian civil servants had to spend on daily necessities and how 
inadequate their salaries were. The discrepancy between low pay and high 
expenditure was also presented as a reason – besides the rigid labour relations 
and the marks of homage superiors still demanded from their underlings – 
why, as Europeans did not fail to notice, fewer and fewer Indonesians entered 
the civil service. It was also claimed that only uneducated civil servants were 
forced to remain in government employment because they could find no job 
elsewhere.5
Critics also stigmatized the compensation as inadequate. One of the rea-
sons for them to argue in such a vein was that a cost-of-living allowance 
was only given to those who had a permanent appointment; not the people, 
some pointed out, who needed it most.6 Initially even retired people were 
excluded, but this mistake was redressed at the end of October 1918. Widows 
and orphans, many struggling with a very small pension, did not receive 
an allowance either. Batavia said that it had forgotten to include them.7 Yet 
another point of criticism was that the compensation did not take into account 
regional differences in the cost of living. One of the complaints claimed that 
3 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1917-18:1493.
4 Volksraad 1918:135.
5 Neratja, -11-1918.
6 De Locomotief, 5-4-1918.
7 Volksraad 1918:06.
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life in Ambon was much more expensive than in Java. A teacher in Ambon 
who earned 300 guilders was still reduced to poverty and had experienced 
great difficulty in making ends meet. Consequently the local branch of the 
Nederlandsch-Indisch Onderwijzers Genootschap (NIOG, Netherlands Indies’ 
Teachers’ Association) asked for a special cost of living allowance of 5 per 
cent for salaries below 600 guilders. Those who earned less than 100 guilders 
should get even more.8
The criticism failed to make an impression on Batavia. The representa-
tive of the government for general affairs in the People’s Council, the lawyer 
D. Talma, explained that it never had been the intention to compensate in full 
for the rise in the price level. It would be unfair were only civil servants to be 
fully compensated and the rest of the population still continued to suffer from 
the high prices.9
Another specific point of complaint was rent. There was a housing shortage 
in almost all the larger cities. Housing had not kept pace with the increasing 
number of Europeans who had come to the colony before the war. It had also 
not been able to accommodate the growing number of employees on mod-
est pay. During the war rents rose steeply, one reason lay the blame at the 
door of Arabs and Chinese especially, often the owners of houses rented by 
Europeans, even in the richer neighbourhoods. Relaxing the restrictions on 
residence of the Chinese and Arab population had also contributed its mite. 
Rich Chinese and Arabs took up residence in the quarters of town where the 
Europeans lived.
Projects to build cheaper houses had been started or were planned by 
municipalities and public companies before 1914. During the war such plans 
were still contemplated by Insulinde, the Sarekat Islam, and the NIOG. 
Suggestions that civil servants be given a special rent-allowance could be 
heard as early as January 1915. In the course of the war matters only became 
worse. In view of this, government services gave their employees a special 
supplement to cover rising rents, or paid them as travel allowance, to give 
them the opportunity to rent a cheaper house outside the city. In Surabaya, 
said to be a city where rents were especially high, civil servants who earned 
less than 60 guilders a month received a rent allowance of 5 guilders. Javanese 
assistant-teachers were excluded from the rent allowance. They complained 
bitterly about this; the more so because Batavia intended to deny them the 
rises in salary it gave to the better-educated ordinary teachers.30
Housing and rent affected people of all population groups, but the pro-
tests against rising rents focused on the problems it created for Europeans. 
8 De Locomotief, 10-4-1918, 17-4-1918, 7-5-1918, 5-6-1918.
9 Volksraad 1918:557.
30 Oetoesan Hindia, 4-5-1918, 9-8-1918.
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At times the issue drove Europeans and Indonesians apart. The Sarekat Islam 
withdrew as co-organizer of a well-organized protest meeting held at the City 
Gardens of Surabaya on 30 April 1918, attended by over 5,000 people. It did 
so after a conflict with the NIOG, an exclusive European organization, about 
what the aim of the meeting should be. The NIOG leaders wanted to highlight 
high rents. The representatives of the Sarekat Islam protested that rent was 
mainly a problem affecting the European population. Food prices and hunger 
should take centre stage.31
Measures were taken in June 1918. The first step was an ordinance which 
protected house-owners against eviction by the owner of the land on which 
their houses were built. An ‘ordinance against the unreasonable forcing up of 
rents’ was issued a few days later. It pegged the rent level at that of 1 January 
1916. Higher house rents were allowed only when local rent commissions 
gave permission. The Sarekat Islam organized information meetings to assist 
Indonesians tenants. The stated aim was to prevent that people were evicted 
or were tricked into paying a higher rent than that allowed.
Though hailed as a welcome step the rent ordinance did not bear full fruit. 
Not everywhere was it easy to appoint a rent commission. In Cirebon, in an 
effort to guarantee impartiality, the municipal council looked for somebody as 
a chairman who was neither a tenant nor a landlord. As most Europeans in the 
city rented their houses from Arabs or Chinese, such a person was difficult to 
find.3 In Semarang the mayor was reluctant to institute a rent commission. In 
his opinion rents had not increased too sharply. Ways were also found to cir-
cumvent the ordinance. From Batavia it was reported that Arabs did precisely 
this by upgrading the value of the furniture in the houses they rented out. Yet 
other owners tried to evict their tenants under the pretext that they needed the 
house for themselves to live in.
The adverse circumstances forced the colonial government to announce, as 
leaders of the Sarekat Islam and others in Java and West Sumatra had already 
asked, that it would be lenient with the collection of tax.33 As in 1914 Dutch 
colonial civil servants also hastened to urge the population to be thrifty. 
Leaders of the nationalist movement made similar appeals. The central board 
of Boedi Oetomo issued a manifesto, in Javanese and in Latin script, about the 
shortage of food and clothing amid ever-rising prices in May 1918. It urged 
the people to be careful how they spent their money. They should avoid all 
extravagant activities and purchases. The measures taken by the government 
to guard the welfare of everybody had to be obeyed to the letter. They should 
31 Oetoesan Hindia, 7-4-1918, 9-4-1918, -5-1918. 
3 De Locomotief, 19-6-1918.
33 Oetoesan Hindia, 18-5-1918.
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not be misunderstood. It was the duty of all who read the manifesto, the state-
ment ended, to explain the message to others, especially to those who could 
not read.34 Within the devout Islamic community, similar pleas were coupled 
at times with admonitions not to spend money on watching traditional per-
formances of dance, gamelan, wayang, and other un-Islamic activities.35 
The dilemma was that food and clothing had gone up in price, and the 
economic consequences of the war had made it more difficult to find employ-
ment. A picul of rice which had cost 6 guilders in 1916 cost 11 guilders in 
February 1918, in Batavia as much as 1. Cassava had become more expensive. 
The price of eggs and chickens had doubled since the outbreak of the war. 
That of fresh fish had tripled. Kain had become twice as costly.36 Equally bur-
densome was that the price of petroleum used in lamps had mounted. It was 
claimed that some Indonesians could no longer afford to light their houses at 
night because of this.37 On top of this, the tariffs on public transport had gone 
up. Decreasing purchasing power also affected the demand for luxury goods, 
which had still been bought by the indigenous population in the past. Among 
these were the better quality draperies, household utensils, and tinned food. 
More than under normal circumstances, people who were trying to cope with 
adverse circumstances pawned their possessions; not only bracelets, rings, 
necklaces, and other items of jewellery but also clothes. There were some who 
maintained that matters were even worse. People had become too poor. They 
had nothing left to pawn.38
The consequence of rising prices for domestic retail trade were twofold. 
Increased unemployment in the estate sector and diminishing purchasing 
power in various regions – Semarang, Pasuruan, Kediri, Malang, Yogyakarta, 
Surakarta were examples – forced many warung, small shops, to close down. 
Elsewhere people who had been forced out of a job or had experienced a 
drop in income had undertaken new economic activities. In West Java and in 
Madiun and Pacitan an increase in petty trade and in the number of food stalls 
was noticeable.39 In Madiun these activities were initiatives taken by women 
who had formerly worked in the batik industry.
Especially hard hit were indigenous producers of export wares. The 
decreasing markets abroad for coffee, tea, rubber, copra, and forest products, 
and the necessity to keep local selling-prices low to compensate for high 
34 Oetoesan Hindia, 13-5-1918.
35 Oetoesan Hindia, 18-5-1918, 1-8-1918.
36 Schepenvorderingswet 1917:59; Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1918-19:065; Soerabaiasch Handelsblad, 
cited in De Indische Gids 1918, II:889; Koloniaal verslag 1919:61-; De Locomotief, 1-5-1918.
37 Neratja, 31-1-1918.
38 Neratja, 15-8-1918.
39 Koloniaal verslag 1919:65-6; Oetoesan Hindia, 30-10-1918.
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freight prices, had taken their toll. The consequences were glaringly visible. 
People in Tapanuli neglected their coffee plants. In Jambi, also hit by a decreas-
ing market for rattan, the price for rubber grown by the population more than 
halved in the last three months of 1917. Rubber trees went untapped.40 From 
Bali it was reported that the customary sight of women carrying the coffee 
harvest down from the hills had become rare. In this case the NOT directives 
were blamed. Pleas by the Dutch government to the NOT to reconsider fell on 
deaf ears.41
In North Celebes, a major copra-producing area, people were confronted 
with a lack of shipping opportunities, exacerbated by a low copra price. The 
situation looked alarming. There was little planting of rice, and with the dis-
appearance of the copra market, no money to buy it.4 As a representative 
from the Minahassa in the People’s Council said: ‘As in Java and many other 
places in Insulinde, the economic conditions of the native population in the 
Minahassa are deteriorating fast, very fast’.43 
There were only a few products which still did well – pepper was one 
40 De Locomotief, 1-1-1917; Koloniaal verslag 1919:55-6, 59-60; Locher-Scholten 1994:96.
41 Koloniaal verslag 1917:17-8.
4 Schepenvorderingswet 1917:49; Koloniaal verslag 1918:31-.
43 Volksraad 1918:06.
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of them, pinang another – from which local producers in Aceh, Lampung, 
Bangka, West Borneo profited greatly. In the Riau Archipelago export of peo-
ple’s rubber increased considerably.44
In Java one of the sources of concern was the native tea producers. 1918 was 
a bad year for them. It was estimated that their income dropped to a quarter 
of what they had earned in normal times.45 In April some tea factories in West 
Java which used to buy their tea leaves stopped production. Other factories 
still accepted leaves from the population, but only when these were of top 
quality, while the price they offered was almost not a paying proposition. 
Driven into a corner by economic circumstances, indigenous producers had 
to sell their land. A report about one such case in West Java claimed that the 
owner received between 50 and 75 guilders per bau (7096.5 m). Before the 
war the equivalent price had been between 400 and 500 guilders.
In April 1918 the colonial government decided to act. Batavia hired a tea 
factory in Cicurug, a region where indigenous production was high and fac-
tories had stopped buying leaves from the Indonesian producers. To defend 
the step Batavia pointed out that the local population could not do without 
its income from tea, and that if the government were not to act as a wholesale 
buyer, gardens would be neglected.46 Though in reaction to the government 
move, neighbouring tea factories increased the price they were prepared to 
pay to indigenous producers for their tea leaves, the government intervention 
had only a modest effect. A few months later Neratja observed that Indonesian 
producers of tea who had once been rich had been forced to become labour-
ers on the land they had once owned. Neratja contrasted their fate with that of 
the European owners of the sugar estates which had recovered with the help 
of government assistance. In one and the same breath Neratja complained that 
sugar now had become too expensive. Poor people could no longer afford it.47
In Java the consequences of the war for the population at large had been 
somewhat hidden by the export of sugar which had continued unhampered 
for such a long time. Nevertheless, income had not kept pace with rising 
prices, and admittedly the number of Javanese and others employed in the 
sugar industry was small. There were about 51,000 people with a permanent 
appointment, about 600,000 in seasonal appointment (Carpentier Alting and 
De Cock Buning 198:98). Those Javanese, and they were the majority, who 
only produced just enough rice for their own consumption, were badly 
stricken by the mounting prices, the more so when they had no secondary 
crops to sell. 
44 Koloniaal verslag 1919:63-4.
45 Koloniaal verslag 1919:51-; De Locomotief, 1-4-1918.
46 Volksraad 1918:59.
47 Neratja, 5-11-1918, 6-11-1918.
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Europeans and their press seemed to have had little regard for the fate of 
the indigenous population. How the economic consequences of war affected 
them scarcely ever rated a mention in the European-language press. When it 
did the discontinuation of the haj was often used to demonstrate that it was 
not necessary to worry too much about a drop in the purchasing power of 
the population. Some Europeans completely ignored the consequences of the 
war for the indigenous society. In 1917 the President of the Javasche Bank 
still maintained that the situation of the population was very favourable. He 
claimed that native prosperity was permanently entrenched and would not 
be affected by the war. The following year he made the same observation.48 
Others used the familiar colonial argument reiterating that natives were used 
to bad times: 
Do not assume Reader that kromo can eat rice as he pleases throughout the year. He 
is not acquainted with such a luxury, he has never been acquainted with it. There 
are, even in the most favourable circumstances, always a few months in the year 
when he does not eat any rice at all. Then he eats secondary crops namely tuberous 
plants and root vegetables, like sweet potatoes, tubers, maize, peas, and the like. 
Then he seems equally happy and contented, at least he does not grumble and 
complain.49
The Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij was more realistic. About 1916 
it noted that because of the rising prices of foodstuffs and imports life had 
become more expensive for the population and that as a consequence pros-
perity was declining.50 The same can be said of the Bataviaasch Handelsblad. It 
concluded in early 1918 that conditions for the few thousand members of the 
European community were better than those for the people in Holland, but 
that millions of Indonesians were really suffering.51 A reader of De Locomotief 
made a similar observation. At the end of December 1917 he wrote that bad 
times had arrived for many families. How would the population for whom 
many essential goods had become too expensive to buy react? It ‘would be all 
too sad’ if food were to be among these items.5
The Malay-language press generally sketched a gloomier picture. Its journal-
ists claimed that the high price of food had forced people to cut down meals 
to only once or twice a day; that some could no longer afford any rice and 
had turned to maize, when this was available, and cassava; and that side 
48 De Indische Gids 1917:143; Eenige n.d.:9. 
49 De Locomotief, 6-11-1917.
50 Verslag 1917:113.
51 Bataviaasch Handelsblad, cited in De Indische Gids 1918, I:747.
5 De Locomotief, -1-1917.
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dishes were skipped. Oetoesan Hindia concluded that the Netherlands Indies 
had entered a ‘season in which everything was expensive’.53 In another issue 
Oetoesan Hindia wrote that it was the Takdir Toehan, the Divine Decree of 
the Lord, that almost all over Java people were confronted with hunger and 
expensive foodstuffs.54 Leaders of the nationalist movement made the same 
observation. They stressed – at times overstressed – the misery war had 
brought upon the ordinary people. Tjokroaminoto pointed out that all goods, 
especially those which were counted among the necessities of life for the 
population, had become expensive.55 He spoke about ‘the poverty which had 
become chronic and the economic breakdown of a very large part of the native 
population in Java’.56
The blame for the alleged decrease in rice consumption again went to the 
Chinese. They were accused of hoarding and were consequently called capi-
talists and egoists.57 At various places members of the Sarekat Islam went into 
the countryside to investigate how bad circumstances were and to advise the 
farmers on how to cope. In Jombang they were pleased with the result: almost 
no farmer any longer sold his rice to ‘the leech alias the middleman of the 
Chinese race’.58 Sometimes there were rather ugly incidents. In Leuwiliang 
Javanese women looted the shop of a Chinese because he refused to lower the 
price of the rice he sold.59 
The colonial administration denied that the situation was as alarming as 
the nationalist press and leaders depicted.60 Nevertheless, how a continued 
supply of rice could be assured had remained one of its top priorities; espe-
cially, as a Dutch man wrote, ‘because of the spirit of the population’ (Van 
Heekeren 1919b:139). Javanese agreed. During a meeting in Surabaya in April 
1918, when a member of the Minahassa Union drew attention to the high price 
of butter he was jeered: ‘Rice, rice! We do not need butter! The stomach of a 
son of the soil demands rice!’61
In spite of restrictions and obstacles, the import of rice had only increased 
in the course of the war: from 443,307 tons in 1913 to 741,576 tons in 1917. In 
53 Oetoesan Hindia, 0-8-1918, 1-8-1918.
54 Oetoesan Hindia, 8-5-1918.
55 Volksraad 1918-19:550.
56 Volksraad 1918-19:543.
57 Significantly, one of the few press reports about the arrests tells of an indigenous Indonesian 
apprehended at the Batavia railway station of Meester Cornelis for carrying thirty kilos of rice 
(Neratja 31-1-1918). Chinese on their part organized relief actions for regions where a famine 
threatened.
58 Oetoesan Hindia, 8-5-1918.
59 Neratja, 31-1-1918, --1918, 1--1918.
60 Volksraad 1918:38.
61 Oetoesan Hindia, -5-1918.
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Java it had even doubled (Lulofs 1919:7). The entry into the war of Siam on the 
side of the Associated Powers in 1917 created an additional reason for people 
to ponder about cutting off of imports. All rice-producing regions in Southeast 
Asia had entered the Associated camp, and thus, as it was said, would follow 
economic directions from London. The ‘Entente circle’ around the Netherlands 
Indies had been closed.6
The colonial authorities began to worry in earnest when Burma instituted 
a ban on the export of rice in October 1917. More expensive rice had to be 
bought in Siam, and this was reflected in an increase in rice prices on the 
domestic market. High prices affected not only the city dwellers. Other vic-
tims were the many farmers who could hardly make ends meet, or who were 
in the habit of selling their crop before harvest for a low price because of dire 
financial circumstances. Nevertheless, Batavia still refused to fix a maximum 
price for rice on the domestic market. It considered this would not be in the 
interests of the population.63 What was done was to instruct the civil servants 
in Java to make an inventory of the food supplies and to prepare for the day 
rice could no longer be imported in the Netherlands Indies. 
To keep the food situation under control, the export of rice from Palembang 
and Sumatra’s West Coast to other parts of the Archipelago was forbidden 
on New Year’s Eve of 1917. Bans for other regions and for maize and cassava 
products followed. The contract between the KPM and the colonial govern-
ment of British India in February gave some relief. It also permitted the KPM 
to strike back at its critics. Pointing out in an influential economic magazine 
that it asked a low freight price for the shipping of rice, importers and traders 
were blamed for the high prices of rice in the Netherlands Indies.64 Private 
organizations also tried to do their bit. Early March 1918, when rice imports 
from Burma had once more become possible, Insulinde, the Indische Bond, the 
SDAP, and a number of other European organizations announced that they 
had succeeded in buying rice in Rangoon and that they would sell this rice at 
a low price.65
The seizure of Dutch ships quashed all optimism there still might have 
been. In some places, like Manado, people panicked when they realized that 
the requisitioning had put a halt to the import of rice.66 The crisis that threat-
ened laid the colonial government open to attacks that it had failed to act with 
competence and resolution. Action should have already been taken in the 
wake of August 1914, when it had become clear how vulnerable the colony 
6 Bataviaasch Handelsblad, cited in De Indische Gids 1918, I:80.
63 Volksraad 1918:330.
64 De Indische Financier, cited in De Indische Gids 1918, II:874.
65 Neratja, 7-3-1918.
66 Volksraad 1918:07.
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would be if rice imports were to fall away.67
To prevent a sky-rocketing of prices, the colonial government instituted 
a maximum price for rice and wheat on the very day news of the seizure of 
Dutch freighters reached the Netherlands Indies; this time showing no hesita-
tion about doing so. A week later the stock of tinned milk was confiscated in 
Batavia and other cities to assure the supply to hospitals, children, and the 
sick. The decision to confiscate milk had been taken in a panic. Within days, 
the measure was abrogated when it was realized that there was still a supply 
large enough to last for five months.
To be able to enforce a maximum ceiling price of rice, Batavia earmarked 
special funds to allow central and regional authorities to buy up rice through 
the intermediary of village heads. Oetoesan Hindia endorsed the government 
policy. It appealed to farmers to sell their rice to the government, and not to 
the (Chinese) capitalists, who, the newspaper claimed, were the reason why 
food was so expensive.68 As an additional precaution, legislation to combat the 
forcing-up of prices was tightened.
Impressed by the seriousness of the situation, Van Limburg Stirum called 
together an emergency meeting with the Residents in Java in early April. He 
revealed that without imports the annual shortage of rice would amount 
to 400,000 tons for Java and Madura, and 300,000 tons for the rest of the 
Netherlands Indies. There was still some stock, which meant that shortage in 
1918 would be 550,000 tons if rice could no longer be imported. The situation 
looked ‘very alarming’.69 The general public was told a different story. It was 
assured that not all was as bad as it looked. There were still sufficient stocks 
of food.
Leaders of the nationalist movement were also concerned. Abdoel Moeis 
wrote in Neratja that the season of famine was just around the corner.70 After a 
meeting with representatives of local boards, the central board of the Sarekat 
Islam concluded that with the requisitioning of the Dutch freighters it ‘abso-
lutely no longer had any faith that rice could still be obtained from abroad as 
it used to be’.71 The Sarekat Islam suggested that the government should be 
given a monopoly in the rice trade. It should buy up rice stocks and the crop 
in the fields, and sell the rice to the population at an affordable price. Batavia 
refused to acquiesce in this. It feared that such a drastic step would create too 
much unrest; a prospect it was not willing and probably would not be able 
to handle. The suggestion was also said to be impracticable. Most Javanese 
67 De Taak and De Locomotief, cited in De Indische Gids 1918, II:1003.
68 Oetoesan Hindia, 1-6-1918.
69 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1918-19:077.
70 Neratja, 4-4-1918.
71 Neratja, 30-3-1918.
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farmers were small peasants who harvested only a small amount of rice, just 
sufficient for their own family. If the government were to buy up their rice, it 
would almost immediately have to be resold to them.7
As with almost every measure taken by the colonial administration, the fix-
ing of a maximum price met with criticism. Some considered intervention in 
the free market an infringement of personal freedom.73 Others were sure that 
price control would not work. The small retailers from whom the poor bought 
their rice would ignore it. Larger traders would simply sell second-grade rice 
as a more expensive variety.74 Yet others claimed that because of the maximum 
ceiling price traders would be hesitant to buy rice from the Javanese peasants. 
Even worse, a fixed price would deprive the small farmer of the opportunity 
to make a nice profit at last. European traders with their lawyers and connec-
tions could continue to make war profits; the Javanese peasant had nobody to 
defend his interests.75
Things did indeed go wrong. Batavia had to admit that enforcing a maxi-
mum price was ‘a matter that was completely new’ and that it had ‘no experi-
ence whatsoever’ in this field.76 In Batavia the price fixed was lower than the 
existing market price, which put the retail traders in a difficult position. The 
price was even lower than the market price outside Batavia. Traders bought 
rice in Batavia and sold it for a higher price outside the city. To make such a 
trade impossible, the transport of rice from one regency to another was forbid-
den. Even in Batavia itself it was difficult to enforce the maximum price. State 
companies and the army bought up rice at a higher price. This had been done, 
it was explained, because of the ‘extraordinary circumstances’.77 Traders also 
ignored the price limit set. One of the reasons for them to do so was that they 
themselves had bought rice at a price higher than which they were allowed to 
sell. If rice was not sold openly at a higher price, one of the tricks to circumvent 
the maximum price indeed was to sell cheaper rice as a more expensive vari-
ety. In other cases local authorities acted too hastily. In Semarang the munici-
pality sold rice at a price lower than that on the market. It turned out to be a 
fiasco. There was no shortage of rice in the town, while people considered the 
rice offered to be too poor a quality for the price asked.78 
The main goal Batavia set itself was to increase the production of rice 
and other food crops. Van Limburg Stirum personally impressed upon the 
7 De Locomotief, -4-1918, 6-4-1918; Volksraad 1918:58.
73 De Locomotief, 13-4-1918.
74 De Locomotief, 17-4-1918.
75 De Locomotief, 10-5-1918.
76 Volksraad 1918:330.
77 De Indische Gids 1919, II:883.
78 De Locomotief, 16-5-1918.
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Residents of Java that they had to convince their staffs of the utmost impor-
tance of food production. All other interests had to bow before this.79 Javanese 
farmers were advised not to grow tobacco or other export products which no 
longer yielded a profit. They should concentrate on the planting of food crops. 
Rewards were held out to Javanese civil servants who really flung themselves 
into increasing food production.
In their effort to circumvent the imminent food crisis the authorities also 
tried to change the diet of the Indonesian population. If all else failed, sub-
stitute staples would have to do the trick. A campaign was started to have 
people eat less rice and more cassava (which they liked less than maize). 
Civil servants outside Java were informed that if the local population was not 
yet familiar with cassava as a staple, Batavia was more than happy to send a 
trial packet.80 The sooner people changed their eating habits the better. The 
Director of Agriculture wrote to the Residents in Java that care had to be taken 
to see that people should not start eating alternative foodstuffs only after rice 
had become unavailable. Rice was a product that could be stored for a long 
time. Its major substitute, dried cassava roots, could not. After a while dried 
cassava roots tended to ‘disintegrate into powder’.81 It can be deduced from 
the words of his successor that it was hoped that cooking instructions would 
help. He had come to Java on the Noordam and was of the opinion that there 
was no reason to complain in the Netherlands Indies. War bread in Holland 
tasted more like putty than real bread. With this in mind, he tried to convince 
the People’s Council that there was nothing wrong people ate cassava or maize 
in times of shortage of rice, providing that ‘there is enough food and they learn 
to prepare it in a tasty way’.8 
There was no lack of suggestions. A reader of the Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad 
wrote that sago formed a good alternative to rice. In Java ‘Ambonese soldiers 
could teach the population how to eat the eat sago’.83 Others were dubious. 
Sago was a blessing as well as a curse. It was a curse because it was easy to 
produce and had made those who had sago as their staple lazy and lacking in 
initiative. Consequently, people living in sago-producing regions could not be 
counted upon to increase their harvest. They could not be tempted by money 
to work extra hours. Perhaps, a solution would be to involve prisoners in the 
production.84
The suggestions that eating habits be changed did not have much effect as 
79 De Locomotief, 5-4-1918.
80 De Locomotief, 16-4-1918, -5-1918; Oetoesan Hindia, 3-5-1918.
81 De Locomotief, -5-1918.
8 De Indische Gids 1919, II:881.
83 Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad, cited in De Locomotief, 5-4-1918.
84 De Locomotief, 30-5-1918.
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long as the necessity to do so was not clearly felt. In the cities people refused to 
part with their rice. With ‘some amazement’ it was also observed that Chinese 
in Sumatra refused to eat maize instead of rice.85
At times the appeals completely misfired. In Surakarta where the food 
situation looked particularly alarming in the hinterland, the Sunan issued 
a proclamation drafted by the Dutch Resident. Rich and poor were asked to 
have only one meal a day (in the evening) with rice, maize, or cassava and eat 
other foodstuffs at other meal times. The statement was read at markets and 
the Resident’s request was also brought to the attention of the workers on the 
estates in view of the ‘present, extremely abnormal times’.86
To issue such an appeal was not a prudent step, especially not at a time 
when Javanese rulers, civil servants, and notables had become an object of crit-
icism in nationalist circles, and not only there. Even Dutch-language newspa-
pers made fun of the ‘fatherly proclamation’. De Locomotief suggested that the 
rulers should also address their advisors, the Dutch authorities. They should 
ensure that such Dutchmen and their servants and pets no longer ate rice, 
bread, or potatoes. They should also stop consuming large quantities of bis-
cuits, macaroni, vermicelli, or other rich people’s foods. It was these Dutchmen 
who could afford a slimming, not the ordinary Javanese. They were already 
undernourished because of the present difficult circumstances. To ensure 
that Europeans heeded the food restrictions, they should be weighed once a 
month. After a few months, if their well-fed corporations did not shrunk, this 
was proof of the fact they still had a hidden supply of food.87
Part of the Malay-language press seized upon the proclamation to attack 
the Javanese rulers. Intentionally or not, the proclamation was sometimes pre-
sented as an order to eat only one meal a day. It was also subtly insinuated that 
the police would enforce the order. Malay newspapers used the proclamation 
to point out how much the Javanese suffered from taxation and other demands 
imposed on them by the colonial government. The blame for their tribulations 
was set squarely on the shoulders of the own rulers and civil servants who 
condoned and shared in this.88 The weekly Medan Boediman explained that 
once upon a time the rulers had cared for their people. They had supported 
them in bad times with goods and prayers. This was no longer the case: ‘the 
rulers do not care about the people and consequently the people do not care 
about the rulers’.89 Instead of handing over land to their subjects to be planted 
with food crops as they should, the rulers of Yogyakarta and Surakarta had 
85 Nieuwe Financier en Kapitaal, cited in De Indische Gids 1919, I:377; Bezwaren 1919:670. 
86 De Locomotief, -5-1918.
87 De Locomotief, 10-5-1918.
88 Islam Bergerak, 0-5-1918.
89 Medan Boediman, 30-10-1918.
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rented out land to the capitalists for their estates. Because they blocked any 
improvement in the lot of the people in other ways as well, it would be best 
if the rulers were pensioned off. It was a view which was also voiced in the 
Sarekat Islam. Oetoesan Hindia attacked the Regents Association for remaining 
silent at a time when the people suffered.90 Even worse, by pretending that 
all was well and by not informing others about shortages of food, it was the 
Javanese civil servants who were to blame if the people were starving. Dutch 
civil servants acted differently. The Resident of Kediri was cited as an example. 
He had admitted to representatives of the Sarekat Islam that there was a short-
age of food in his territory.91
The phrase about rulers who cooperated with the capitalists was one of the 
ways in which the growing hatred towards the European estates manifested 
itself. Discussions in early 1918 about stepping up the production of rice 
focused on the need to reduce the acreage planted by the sugar factories. Such 
a solution had already been suggested as early as August 1914. Speculating 
then about a blockade of the ports of Java, Oetoesan Hindia had suggested that 
Idenburg should prepare for such an eventuality by ordering the estates to 
grow food crops.9 The idea resurfaced in public debate in 1918. The sugges-
tion that estates be turned into sawah was highly controversial. Because of this, 
the food situation was a topic which, as was observed, was written and spoken 
about almost more than the war itself.93 ‘The people cannot live from sugar’, 
became a popular expressions, also in the Dutch-language press.
The reputation of the sugar estates was bad. The Javanese and progressive 
Europeans put the way in which estates hired land from the population and 
arranged the irrigation of their fields to the detriment of local farmers on a 
par with outright exploitation. It was common knowledge that the war had 
brought the sugar estates great profits; profits in which the population did 
not share. In order not to alienate the more moderate members and those who 
propagated the growth of Indonesian trade and industry, during its second 
national congress in October 1917 the Sarekat Islam announced a battle against 
what was called kapitalisme jang berdosa, sinful capitalism, by which in the first 
place the sugar estates were meant.94 Abdoel Moeis described the sugar indus-
try as the ‘goldmine of the big capitalists’.95 For the Malay press the estates 
formed an easy butt of propaganda. Oetoesan Hindia called the estate owners 
90 Oetoesan Hindia, 8-5-1918.
91 Oetoesan Hindia, -4-1918.
9 Oetoesan Hindia, 11-8-1914, 19-8-1914, 1-8-1914.
93 De Indische Gids 1919:743.
94 Sarekat-Islam Congres 1919a:83, 1919b:78.
95 Volksraad 1918:98.
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the cruellest people on earth.96 Djawa Tengah blamed the expanding acreage of 
the sugar estates for the fact that the population had to eat expensive imported 
rice.97 In Oetoesan Hindia it was argued a few months later that this sort of rice 
not only cost over the odds, the quality was also nothing to write home about. 
The rice was said to be extremely poor, to have lost most of its vitamin value 
because it was too old, making it a health hazard, and when cooked exuded a 
nasty smell.98 The way in which the sugar industry was castigated even in the 
People’s Council shocked the public in Holland. The words used did in a sense 
backfire. Not all criticism was taken seriously, people were suspicious that it 
was inspired by a general desire to lash out against the ‘big capitalists’.99
Even an organization so loyal to Dutch rule as the Regents Association 
criticized the way the estates operated. At its meeting in November 1914, 
after the association had testified to its loyalty, attention had been drawn to 
the unrest created by the sugar estates. The warning had not been without 
reason. It was by no means a rare occurrence for angry villagers to set fire to 
sugar-cane fields or for labour unrest to erupt. Some estates even reserved a 
special sum of money to buy off potential trouble-makers. The estates were 
not unaffected by the mood of the population. By the autumn of 1916 the anxi-
ety of August 1913 when European newspapers speculated about the prospect 
of a St Bartholomew’s Night reared its ugly head again. The President of the 
General Syndicate of Sugar Producers informed the government that, on the 
basis of information gathered by its informers, he was sure that a violent attack 
on Europeans was planned in Central and East Java. The object was nothing 
less than ‘a general massacre’. On behalf of the sugar estates, he asked Batavia 
to provide the European employees with extra weapons and ammunition. 
Batavia refused as it wanted to avoid a panic. No Europeans were murdered 
at that time. The only variation in the general pattern to be observed was an 
increase in visits to the mosque.100
Undeniably unrest had reappeared in the countryside in its pre-war inten-
sity. As in the past, members of the Sarekat Islam intimidated or boycotted 
outsiders, including the Chinese. A ‘social democrat and member of the SI’ 
wrote in October 1918 in Oetoesan Hindia that the people ‘felt so oppressed, so 
bled white, so humiliated, so discriminated against, so unprotected, so irritated, 
so enraged’, that they no longer cared a straw for the law and had started ‘to 
96 Oetoesan Hindia, 4-4-1918.
97 Nieuwe Soerabaia Courant, cited in De Locomotief, -4-1918; Djawa Tengah, cited in Koloniaal 
Tijdschrift 1917:1111.
98 Oetoesan Hindia, 0-8-1918.
99 Handelingen Eerste Kamer 1918-19:461.
100 Note by v.d. H.v.O. [Van der Houven van Oordt], -11-1916, Resident Rembang to Van 
Limburg Stirum, 6-11-1916, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 6-7-1917 ???.
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burn the forest, to burn sugar cane, to murder Europeans, to steal, etc.’.101 It 
was the ‘season of fire’ and of thefts and strikes on estates. Many were the 
instances of the burning of crops in the field and in sheds. Figures presented 
were horrendous. In 1917 the total number of sugar-cane fires had been 900. 
In 1918 1,36 fires were lit between January and the end of August.10 One 
sugar-cane estate had been struck by 75 cane fires in eight months.103 Theft 
of sugar cane, sometimes committed by large gangs of Javanese operating in 
broad daylight, showed a similar upward trend. One estate claimed that of 
some of its field 35 to 50 per cent of the crop had been stolen. The damage was 
estimated at 88,000 guilders.104 Railways sleepers, rails, and parts of the lorries 
of sugar trains were also stolen.
Elsewhere people stole tobacco from the estates and set fire to tobacco 
sheds. Organized theft of cassava from the fields was also rampant. One estate 
was reported to have had ,600,000 cassava plants, representing a value of 
00,000 guilders, stolen. At times groups of people took away tens of thou-
sands of plants at night. Sometimes, as happened in Blitar, they even ventured 
this in broad daylight. Kediri, which had a reputation as being a ‘difficult 
region’, suffered especially badly. Such thefts had started here in December 
1917. Some Dutchmen blamed the local Sarekat Islam. They accused its lead-
ers of having hinted that should people be unable to buy cheap food, they 
could always steal cassava. Extra guards did not help. Troops had to be sent 
to Kediri to guard the cassava planted on estates.105 
Managers began to complain that estates might be forced to close if thefts 
continued on such a large scale.106 Leftist Europeans and the leftist and mod-
erate nationalists blamed hunger, high food prices, capitalism, and economic 
exploitation for the increase in thefts of agricultural produce and for the fires 
on sugar and other estates. Indubitably another reason for the thefts was the 
money thieves could make from selling sugar cane and cassava. Hatred of the 
sugar estates was also said to lurk in the background. In the People’s Council 
Tjokroaminoto pointed out that cane-fields were supplied with water in abun-
dance. While cane flourished rice withered in adjacent fields because of lack 
of water. He said that cane was burnt because of anger about such injustice or 
in an attempt to obtain water for the rice fields.107 
Perhaps not surprisingly many Europeans had other ideas. They blamed 
the colonial government for its failure to maintain law and order. In the 
101 Oetoesan Hindia, -10-1918.
10 Volksraad 1918-19:5.
103 Oetoesan Hindia, 0-8-1918.
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Soerabaiasch Handelsblad Boon 
went as far as to suggest that if 
the Dutch authorities could no 
longer protect the estates, other 
countries with large invest-
ments in the plantation sector 
should be invited to intervene.108 
Europeans interpreted what 
was happening as an increased 
threat to their person and goods. 
They pointed to the many bur-
glaries of houses of European 
staff on estates, and to the occa-
sional murder of Europeans. On 
plantations which had run into 
financial difficulties, staff were 
sometimes attacked by coolies 
who had not been paid. Again 
wild stories ran riot recounting 
threats to life and property. The 
European community demand-
ed a strengthening of the police 
force, especially in Central Java 
and the Eastern Salient of East 
Java. Estate employees armed 
themselves with a pistol when 
they went out into the fields. Their companies once more turned to the gov-
ernment for extra protection. Such appeals were greeted with some malicious 
delight in Oetoesan Hindia. The rich who had so far only profited from the war, 
had now begun snivelling to their father to ask for protection.109
To be fair, estates also took their own precautions. Private security guards 
had there also been in the past. In 1896 the colonial government had given 
them the power to arrest people, but only on the land of the estate itself. 
By 1918 such bodies were considered to be ineffective. The Vorstenlandsche 
Landbouwvereeniging (Agricultural Association of the Principalities) founded 
a cultuurpolitie, estate police, or cultuurbrigades, estate brigades in October 1918. 
Neratja claimed that the aim was to act upon villagers who had enough of 
the way the estates operated and burnt and destroyed crops and property. It 
was estimated that each estate needed a brigade of about thirty guards. Local 
108 Soerabajaasch Handelsblad, -11-1918, cited in Volksraad 1918-19:07.
109 Oetoesan Hindia, 3-10-1918, 17-10-1918, 6-10-1918.
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colonial civil servants supported the initiative. The guards should be Javanese, 
but as they might be on friendly terms with local villagers, each unit should be 
commanded by three or four policemen from North Sulawesi or Ambon.110 At 
the end of the same month, during a meeting in the Concordia Club in Malang, 
the Java Sugar Association suggested that European staff on the estates should 
always go around armed with a Browning and a revolver (which most already 
did). In order to be able to hit the mark, they also had to learn to shoot well. It 
was no use waiting till the government acted. That might be too late. ‘Before 
that time you might already be dead and buried, and your family reduced to 
extreme misery. No rot! Act! Self Help!’ Malay newspapers copied the report 
about Dutch fears and brave words.111
Shivers of alarm spread through the Sugar Union. Its board sent out a 
circular. To convince the government of the necessity of additional security 
measures, the members were asked to report all the information they had 
about violent incidents. The Sugar Union was especially interested in attacks 
on employees ‘whether or not committed under a certain provocation’, thefts 
of produce from the fields, and ‘incidents of laxness or unwillingness on the 
part of the police’. ‘Blatantly deliberate rudeness to Europeans’, and acts of 
instigation by natives and Europeans should also be reported. The informa-
tion was needed to prove that 
in the interior respect for the authorities is declining, that the native no longer 
spares the life and property of Europeans, that there are incontrovertible indica-
tions of a definite rebellious spirit among the population and of an increase in 
explosions, in magnitude as well as in number.
No less important was the need to convince the government that ‘orally and 
in writing the population is incited to commit acts of violence’. The circular 
advised the members to act ‘dispassionately’. Restraint was necessary in view 
of the ‘irritability of the population which unarguably does have its natural 
causes, but which, because of the systematic, artificial feeding by demagogues 
represents a very large danger to the employees’. In short, the population ‘suf-
fered from severe overstrain’. Only the government had the power to ‘cure’ 
this.11 In the magazine of the union the ‘(criminal) slackness’ of the colonial 
administration was blamed for the circumstances that had arisen. South Africa 
was held out as an example. There ‘no Kaffir will dare to walk on the pave-
ment’. In Java, a Javanese would rather collide with a European than step 
aside.113 
110 Neratja, 19-10-1918; Volksraad 1918-19:8.
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As uncultivated land in Java was scarce, there was no other option but to turn 
for an increase in food production to the estates. As early as 1916, building on 
earlier experiments, the colonial government had taken steps to develop an 
irrigation system which would allow for better irrigation of the fields planted 
by the Javanese farmers, without damaging the growing of sugar cane. It had 
tried to convince the estates companies to build large water reservoirs on their 
land which would allow the land planted with food crops to be irrigated dur-
ing daytime, and not only, as was the practice, at night. Because the estates 
had to bear the costs, the reaction had been negative. Now the time had come 
to contemplate more drastic measures. The estates could provide the land for 
additional rice fields should food production have to be stepped up. The food 
situation appeared so alarming in early 1918, Van Limburg Stirum seriously 
contemplated using the option to force sugar and tobacco estates to reserve 
one-quarter of their acreage for the production of rice. It was borne in mind 
that other estates might have to follow. Indigenous producers of export crops 
should be left untouched as long as possible. Should circumstances require that 
land of indigenous producers of export crops had to be planted with rice, the 
measure should be confined to those crops which no longer yielded a profit.
The scheme to reserve part of the land of the sugar estates for the produc-
tion of food won the wholehearted support of the nationalist movement. 
During meetings of Boedi Oetomo and Sarekat Islam motions with this intent 
were carried, loudly applauded by those present. The Sarekat Islam wanted 
to go further than Van Limburg Stirum did. In April 1918 the Sarekat Islam 
presented Van Limburg Stirum by wire with a motion carried at a meeting of 
its central board with local branches and with representatives of the ISDV and 
Insulinde. The Governor General was asked to convert half of the sugar acre-
age into rice fields. This was presented as a minimum requirement. The meet-
ing had only taken the food situation in Java into account. The rice shortages 
elsewhere – which the Sarekat Islam leaders said they were not in a position to 
calculate – might well imply that a larger acreage would have to be reserved 
for food production. The meeting did not confine itself to demands to do with 
the sugar industry. The land of tobacco, tea and coffee estates producing for 
the foreign market should also be turned into rice fields. The government 
should take the responsibility for the rice production on these additional 
fields, or should give financial assistance to the ‘people’ to plant them. In 
no way should the estates themselves be allowed to arrange the planting of 
food crops on their land, and profit from this at the expense of the Javanese 
farmers.
The scheme was opposed by the owners in Holland, who had united them-
selves in the BENISO. According to the BENISO reduction would disrupt the 
industry and would vitiate the expansion, which had cost so much effort and 
XIX  Rice and sugar 539
money to attain in previous years.114 The BENISO and those who agreed with 
the union stressed that the volume of extra rice produced – usually putting 
forward much lower figures than those mentioned in the estimate of the 
government – bore no relation to the financial consequences for the industry, 
and, a point such people never failed to mention, the Javanese labour force. To 
demonstrate the wickedness of the scheme it was also suggested that a reduc-
tion in production could well lead to the mass slaughter of the buffaloes used 
for the transportation of sugar.115
Dutch colonial civil servants also were not without reservations. They had 
calculated that a reduction by one-fifth would mean a loss in wages of 11.5 
million guilders. The additional rice planted might bring in six million guil-
ders for the Javanese.116 They also had started to realize that having labourers 
return to their villages would not solve all problems, as had been suggested it 
would do in the past. Even Javanese needed money; if only to buy clothes and 
household utensils. How much money the redundant labourers would need 
and to what extent fellow-villagers would support them when they returned 
to their village remained an ideological issue, an argument to be used when 
it suited a person’s own position. In 1918 leaders of the Sarekat Islam argued 
that the estate labourers could well be embraced by the village community. 
The following year it was the communists in Dutch Parliament who echoed 
the same sentiment.
When Pleyte informed him that the ‘general feeling’ in Holland was that 
only in an extreme emergency should sugar fields be turned into rice fields, 
Van Limburg Stirum changed his mind.117 On 9 April 1918, he told a deputa-
tion of the Sarekat Islam that for the time being it was not necessary to issue a 
directive forcing the sugar estates to plant part of their acreage with rice. The 
deputation had come to try to convince Van Limburg Stirum of the urgency of 
the food situation. Van Limburg Stirum assured them that they did not have 
to worry. Rice imports had been resumed. No famine loomed. There was only 
a shortage of food.
Tjokroaminoto did not agree. A statement issued by the Sarekat Islam in 
March 1918 had claimed that Indonesians were suffering from lack of food 
and had been forced to eat inferior food (such as gadung, a kind of yam) which 
endangered their health and was in fact only fit for animals. It was claimed 
that in some places, Indonesians had died of starvation.118 At the meeting 
114 Economisch-Statistische Berichten, 4-4-1918, p. 343.
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Tjokroaminoto presented Van Limburg Stirum with proof. He showed him 
pictures of starving people in one especially hard-hit area: Trenggalek in the 
south-west corner of East Java; a region which by now had become the symbol 
for the Sarekat Islam of the suffering of the ordinary Javanese and of what 
might be in store if the food situation deteriorated any further. Tjokroaminoto 
explained that these were photos of people who were best situated, people 
who could still walk to a relief centre established by Sarekat Islam members 
and a number of Chinese. Oetoesan Hindia reported that on seeing the photos 
Van Limburg Stirum’s face had become grave. Tjokroaminoto also told Van 
Limburg Stirum that the Sarekat Islam not only blamed the war for the food 
crisis, the ‘capitalists’, hoarding food, were equally culpable. The govern-
ment should interfere and take the distribution and trade in rice into its own 
hands.119
What had happened during the meeting was part of a recurrent phenom-
enon. Spokesmen of the colonial administration downplayed the effects of 
the war on the living conditions of the Indonesian population. They also 
denied that hunger had struck on a unprecedented scale. At most they were 
prepared to speak about food shortages, or the threat of these in the near 
future. Nationalist leaders told a different story. They talked about famine and 
highlighted the miserable conditions of the population. Members of the ISDV 
and the Socialists in the Netherlands Indies shared their view. In the People’s 
Council Cramer observed that ‘[h]unger uprisings are not rare and are often 
counted among the most vicious ones!’10 
No directive about a decrease in the sugar acreage was issued, but Van 
Limburg Stirum had created the impression that when forced to choose 
between sugar and rice, he would opt for the latter. He also had made no 
secret of the fact that when circumstances necessitated this he would give pref-
erence to the irrigation of rice fields above those of sugar cane. This was much 
to the dismay of the Sugar Syndicate which protested about such an idea to 
Van Limburg Stirum and Pleyte.11
Van Limburg Stirum had not completely discarded the idea of a reduction 
in sugar production. He and his staff pondered about the possibility that, even 
if ships were available for transport, bad harvests in the rest of Asia could put 
an end to the import of rice. Another thought that haunted them was that 
after the war the Allied Powers would reserve all surplus rice in their colonies 
and in Siam to feed people in Europe.1 The sugar companies were made 
119 Oetoesan Hindia, 4-5-1918, 13-5-1918, 14-5-1918, 15-5-1918. 
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to understand that the government would welcome a reduction in acreage. 
Management was asked to consider such a step. The Javasche Bank exerted 
extra pressure. The bank pointed to the difficulties experienced in exporting 
sugar and indicated that it might be less forthcoming with loans to estates 
which did not reduce their sugar-cane fields.13
In some cases such gentle pressure was unnecessary. The poor export 
prospects did the government’s work for it. Sugar and tobacco estates reduced 
their acreage and started to grow rice. The sugar estates did so by 15 per cent 
on the average (Carpentier Alting and De Cock Buning 198:70). As had been 
predicted during the discussions about a forced limitation of their fields, 
they often only let go of their less productive fields.14 The reduction in sugar 
production was welcomed by members of the Sarekat Islam. For them it 
was proof that their agitation had worked. It was even claimed that the local 
population had revived and had become prosperous.15 In Sumatra the rub-
ber estates were ordered by their head offices to reduced production by one-
third. No labourer was sacked because the managements of these estates were 
anxious to avert lack of manpower when peace had been restored and exports 
could resume their normal course. Surplus capital and labour were employed 
to improve drainage, and to build or improve factory buildings, warehouses 
and living-quarters.
The panic seemed to have subsided at the end of May 1918. Batavia con-
cluded that the danger of a food shortage in Java had been averted. Large 
quantities of rice had been imported. In spite of temporary export bans abroad 
and in spite of the requisitioning of Dutch ships, Batavia had succeeded in 
importing even more rice than in the same period in 1917. A small amount of 
rice, 13,00 picul, taken from the government stock of imported rice, had even 
been sent to Suriname, to alleviate the food shortage over there.
Outside Java, the food situation had also remained under control. Never-
theless, additional measures had to be taken in Sumatra because private 
estates and mines had not heeded the earlier suggestion to build up a stock 
of food sufficient to last a couple of months. East Sumatra was an exception, 
but in Lampung, Biliton, and Bangka stocks were small. Estates and mining 
companies asking for rice from Java were urged to take measures to cut down 
on the consumption of rice. The Biliton Company complied by forbidding the 
feeding of rice to pigs and poultry and by restricting the production of rice 
wine. It also decided to employ between 5 and 10 per cent of its labour force 
in the growing of maize and cassava instead of in tin-mining. Another 500 of 
13 Economisch-Statistische Berichten, 4-4-1918, p. 343.
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its Chinese labourers were employed in dry-rice cultivation.16 In Biliton the 
results were disappointing, but in Bangka the rice harvest of 1918 was one-
and-a-half time larger that in the previous year.17
 
16 Distribution report 5 (5- April 1918), NA, Kol. Geheim, Mr. 1918/144x.
17 Koloniaal verslag 1919:63-6.
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Restlessness
The problems experienced by the estates all fitted into a broader pattern. 
Deteriorating living conditions had again made crime a cause of concern, 
as it had been in 1914. In the Volksraad the Director of Justice complained 
that prisons were full because of the war.1 One of the Dutch members, 
J. Schmutzer, spoke about verwildering, lawlessness, in certain parts of Java. 
In some regions of the Archipelago – Java (especially Kediri), Sumatra’s West 
Coast, Palembang, and Borneo – crime increased to a greater or lesser extent in 
1918. The colonial government attributed this at least in part to worsening eco-
nomic conditions. Crime was also said to have become rampant in Celebes. In 
this case the authorities did not blame deteriorating economic conditions, but 
‘the quarrelsome and rapacious nature of the population, [...] its gaming fever, 
its scattered pattern of residence and its reckless carelessness, and to round it 
off the lack of sense of responsibility of its heads’.4 On Bangka special meas-
ures had to be taken to prevent an increase in crimes committed by Chinese 
labourers, who could not be sent home because of a lack of shipping. In Java 
it was observed that more beggars had appeared in the street. A correspondent 
of Neratja in Surakarta spoke about a ‘rain of beggars’. Walking around town 
for one hour he had counted fifty of them.
Coinciding with this general turbulence the Sarekat Islam had taken a 
more radical direction. Comparing the atmosphere at successive national 
conferences of the Sarekat Islam, the Ministry of the Colonies referred to 
what had happened in 1917 as remarkable. In 191 the general mood had 
still been in favour of cooperation with the government. In October 1917 the 
tone had been ‘more intemperate, from time to time on the rude side [...] and 
there appeared to be very little room for appreciation of the intentions of 
1 Volksraad 1918-19:00.
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the government’.7 Criticism had become ‘often one-sided destructive, rarely 
constructive’.8 In line with this, after he had become Minister of the Colonies 
in September 1918 Idenburg observed in Parliament that even the editorials 
in Oetoesan Hindia had become unequivocally inflammatory.9 Senior colonial 
civil servants spoke about ‘nihilistic’ tendencies.10 A similar trend, though less 
general and less radical, was observed in the Boedi Oetomo. At its meetings 
capitalism was identified as the enemy.11 In its newspaper, Darmo Kondo, that 
is in its Javanese not in its Malay edition, readers who were not familiar with 
Latin script were instructed in the principles of Socialism.1
What Dutch people thought had happened was expressed in the People’s 
Council by one of them, Z. Stokvis. Stokvis deplored the fact that the leaders 
of the Sarekat Islam should come 
under the influence of a few persons [...] who with a dogma cultivated in Europe, 
with all the obstinacy of zealots want to force the leadership in a direction which 
they consider the only one which leads to the only goal acknowledged by them as 
right and desirable, irrespective of the circumstances here. 
Stokvis clearly could not stand ‘young men who only recently had left school 
and with a curious facility for assimilation and an even more curious memory 
gave speeches about the most difficult subjects which required long study’.1 
Idenburg concluded that through 
the press, through the propaganda meetings, where leaders of the ISDV spoke, 
the public which reads newspapers and that part of the population organized in 
associations (not only in the SI) have gradually learned to denote he complex of 
political, social, and economic factors, which in the course of time has affected the 
indigenous population and brought it to its present position as capitalism.
They had ‘learned to see this as one big, all-dominating power, as if it were an 
enormous, many-armed monster’.14
The turn matters had taken in the Sarekat Islam was a great personal 
disappointment to Idenburg, who in the early years of its existence had been 
fiercely criticized for the leniency he had shown towards the association. In 
April 1919 he recalled with fondness how, when he had left for Holland, a 
Sarekat Islam deputation had seen him off at Tanjung Priok. Idenburg told the 
7 Koloniaal verslag 1919:1-.
8 Koloniaal verslag 1919:-4.
9 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1918-19:080.
10 Volksraad 1918-19:44.
11 Koloniaal verslag 1919:7-8.
1 Bataviaasch Handelsblad, cited in De Indische Gids 1917, II:1.
1 Volksraad 1918-19:17.
14 Koloniaal verslag 1919:-4.
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Dutch Parliament that at that time the Sarekat Islam and Boedi Oetomo were 
still ‘completely loyal’. There had been ‘excesses’, but these had not been sup-
ported by the chief Sarekat Islam leaders. They had testified of their loyalty in 
the ‘most unambiguous’ way.1
Colonial civil servants were especially piqued that the population did 
not value the good intentions of the government. As early as February 191, 
Rinkes had had to admit that his visits all over Java had made him real-
ize that because of Douwes Dekker and the Indische Partij ‘even the most 
sedate persons, sometimes without being aware of this’, expressed ideas and 
misconceptions about what he called the good measures taken by the govern-
ment. Such ideas had become an idée fixe and were difficult to erase.1
A case in point, which contributed hugely to the unruly mood among the 
population, was the measures taken to combat the plague. These measures 
interfered deeply in the lives of Javanese and crystallized into a focus of pas-
sionate opposition. A protest meeting in Yogyakarta in May 1918 attracted an 
audience of ,000 persons. De Locomotief saw this as proof of how deeply the 
matter touched the ‘otherwise calm native from Djokja’.17 There was a vari-
ety of complaints. Some were minor. The regulation that houses had to have 
single plaited bamboo walls instead of double plaited ones caused villagers 
to fear that break-ins would become easier. This worry was exacerbated by 
the idea that in the evening, when the lamps were lit, potential thieves could 
easily select valuable possessions in advance. Others blamed the single walls 
for their having caught a cold. One or two unfortunate people fell victim to 
compatriots who posed as housing inspectors and threatened to draw up 
unfavourable reports if no money were handed over to them. More important 
were religious objections to the compulsory puncture of the spleen of corpses, 
the indignation raised by the medical examination of females by male doctors, 
and the anger about the ban on burying a deceased before a doctor had estab-
lished the cause of death, which disregarded the Islamic rule that a corpse had 
to be buried on the day death occurs. Such sentiments were whipped up at 
times by local religious leaders. Occasionally they found expression in attacks 
specifically on plague doctors and their staff and on civil servants who tried to 
impose government regulations, and more generally in ‘plague riots’.
A point stressed by leftist, nationalist Muslims was the financial burden 
the housing improvement scheme implied. Houses constructed in accordance 
with government regulations, which, as it was said at times had to be ‘com-
pletely rat free’, cost 10 guilders, and according to some Indonesian sources, 
stressing how much the common people – the bangsa kromo – suffered from 
1 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1918-19:079.
1 Rinkes to Idenburg, 1--191, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. -1-191 1.
17 De Locomotief, 8--1918.
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the scheme, even more than 00 guilders. This was three to five times as much 
as the costs of the construction of the houses in the past.18 The government 
provided loans which had to be repaid in four years, but during the war it 
was claimed that the rising prices of daily necessities and of building materials 
made the monthly instalments too high. Assurances issued by Batavia that, in 
view of the economically averse times the government would be lenient in col-
lecting the advances, made little impression.19 A great deal of fuss was made 
of people who had ran in financial trouble because of such loans and whose 
houses had to be auctioned.0 Referring to the fact that once a week improved 
houses were inspected, during which time the occupants had to empty and 
clean their houses to prevent rats being able to take refuge behind cupboards 
and other furniture, Steeds Lijder (Eternal Sufferer) wrote that for Javanese 
all the housing improvement not only meant that houses and yards looked 
clean. It also meant that houses looked empty because possessions had to be 
pawned or sold. Steeds Lijder concluded that fear of the plague had evapo-
rated but that it had been superseded by the prospect of hunger or at best a 
want of food.1
During the closing months of the war grievances about the ill-fated efforts 
to combat an epidemic of cholera were added to the flow of these complaints. 
The measures taken created a storm of protest in Batavia and Surabaya in 
August 1918. Families of sufferers were moved to barracks. Here males and 
females had to sleep in the same dormitory. Meals had to be eaten with the 
hand. It was stressed indignantly that such treatment resembled life in prison. 
To make the comparison even more fitting, people had to keep quiet after six 
o’clock in the evening. The rules set by the authorities for the way the dead 
had to be buried in this case again added to the indignation. One point in ques-
tion was that when a person died in the barracks, only people who had been 
vaccinated were allowed in to attend the burial. One positive side was that 
Indonesians became so afraid of what could happen to them and their families 
that they by the thousands volunteered to be vaccinated. Nevertheless, the 
vaccinations led to grumbling. People complained that the places where this 
was done were inadequate, that the treatment was rough, and that the rules of 
decency for Muslim women were not observed. Racial discrimination raised 
its ugly head. It was observed that white people were not subjected to such 
humiliations and that they also were not forced to enter the barracks.
18 De Locomotief, -4-191; Islam Bergerak, 0--1917.
19 Oetoesan Hindia, 18--1918.
0 Islam Bergerak, 1--1917, 0--1917; Van Reigersberg Versluys 1917:17.
1 Islam Bergerak, 1-8-1918.
 Oetoesan Hindia 1-7-1918, 9-8-1918, 10-8-1918, 1-8-1918, 1-8-1918, 0-8-1918, 1-8-1918, -
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If this was not enough, a world-wide epidemic of Spanish influenza 
reached a climax in the Netherlands Indies in November 1918. The Spanish 
influenza truly made the second half of 1918 ‘the season of illness (and the 
season of expensive foodstuffs)’.4 Even coffins became scarce and expensive. 
Muslims were not bothered by this, but the Eurasians, Christian Indonesians, 
and Chinese were. This penjakit baroe or ‘new disease’ had made its appear-
ance in the middle of 1917. Eventually it would cost the lives over 1 million 
people in the Netherlands Indies. A less moderate estimate spoke of a death 
toll of  million. The enormous dimensions of the epidemic threw a spanner 
in economic life. Land remained untilled, schools and offices had to close. The 
disease gave the Sarekat Islam a new nom de plume. Its leaders began to refer 
to it as the S(panish) I(nfluenza); an epidemic that could seriously weaken the 
colonial system. 
The Spanish influenza affected all population groups. Neratja called it the 
sama rasa sama rata illness.7 Europeans living in the colony were disturbed by 
the thought that the Spanish influenza did not bypass the army and police, (even 
the commander-in-chief of the army was not immune). This significantly weak-
ened the operational force of the army and police at a time when unrest among 
the Indonesian population had mounted. Nevertheless, the Spanish influenza 
struck especially at the native society, taking a large toll among people whose 
health conditions were poor and who, unlike Europeans, could not count on an 
adequate medical service. The epidemic provided yet another opportunity to 
remonstrate about how subordinated and neglected the Indonesian population 
was. It was pointed out that poor people could not afford to remain in bed for 
as long a time to recover as others could. Oetoesan Hindia also observed that few 
European doctors were prepared to make house-calls in Javanese neighbour-
hoods.8 The epidemic even provided an opportunity to lash out at the hous-
ing improvement programme. Neratja published a plea that houses without 
a masonry wall should again be allowed to have double windows and attics. 
Such adaptations would mean that influenza would not endanger the health of 
the population even more by their having to be in a draught.9
Developments in Europe had resounding echoes in the colony. When news 
about the February Revolution in Russia reached Java on 18 March 1917, 
 In the Malay Peninsula the Spanish influenza was also called the Russian disease (The 
Singapore Free Press, cited in Neratja, 19-10-1918).
4 Oetoesan Hindia, 0-8-1918; Neratja, -1-1918.
 Information of the Burgerlijke Geneeskundige Dienst, cited in Neratja, 1-1-1919.
 Neratja, -1-1918.
7 Neratja, 0--1919.
8 Oetoesan Hindia, 1-11-1918.
9 Neratja, 8-11-1918.
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Sneevliet had been jubilant. He immediately had put pen to paper and had 
written an article, ‘Zegepraal’ (Victory). It was published in De Indiër the fol-
lowing day. In his enthusiasm Sneevliet had chosen De Indiër and not Het Vrije 
Woord because he did not want to delay publication for six days. That it was 
an Insulinde newspaper did not matter. De Indiër was, as ‘oppositional, nation-
alist paper’, the only Dutch-language newspaper that he considered eligible 
to publish his article. It was his only choice. Because he lacked the necessary 
skill to write the article in Malay, he depended on a Dutch-language news-
paper which all, with the exception of De Indiër, were against him. De Indiër, 
moreover, was read by the ‘followers of Douwes Dekker therefore in a politi-
cal sense the dissatisfied’ (Baars and Sneevliet 1991:9-7). Darnakoesoemo, 
still a loyal Insulinde leader, made a Malay translation. It was published in 
Pertimbangan. Cautiously Darnakoesoema had added a postscript: the article 
did not aim to set the population against the government (Baars and Sneevliet 
1991:1).
In ‘Zegepraal’ Sneevliet applauded the deposing of the Czar, and won-
dered whether this would also mean revolution in Germany and Austria. 
Sneevliet had a message for ‘the people that endure and suffer’ and who since 
Diponegoro had had no leaders who ‘galvanized the masses into action to take 
their destiny in their own hands’. The Russian Revolution held a lesson for 
them: ‘The Russian people had also endured oppression for centuries, were 
poor and for the greater part illiterate as you are’. Sneevliet ended by stating 
that the Javanese would certainly attain what the Russian people had accom-
plished: Victory (Tichelman 198:44-7).
Sneevliet was not the only one who had made the obvious link. Others had 
done the same. Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo had presented the Russian Revolution 
as proof of what the fate would be of a government which expected its subjects 
to bear everything, however much they were bleed white and exploited.0 In 
Semarang and Surabaya the ISDV and Insulinde had asked permission for joint 
meetings to discuss the developments in Russia (Baars and Sneevliet 1991:xxv). 
In both cities permission was refused. The authorities too were alarmed by 
Sneevliet’s reaction to the dethronement of the Czar. In Semarang the organ-
izers appealed to the Attorney-General. He refused to intercede. He explained 
that the reports about the revolution in Russia were still too incomplete to serve 
as a basis for ‘an objective historical discussion’.1
Public indignation centred on Sneevliet. ‘Zegepraal’ created an uproar, 
assiduously fanned up by the Dutch-language press. Retribution was quick in 
coming. In April 1917 Sneevliet was sacked by his employer, the Semarangsche 
Handelsvereeniging (Semarang Trade Society) though he himself maintained 
0 Warna Warta, cited in Koloniaal Tijdschrift 1917:99.
1 De Locomotief, --1917.
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that he had resigned of his own free will. Sneevliet was also prosecuted. The 
outcome was a victory for Sneevliet. The Court of Justice in Semarang ruled 
that ‘Zegepraal’ had been no more than a sharp attack on colonial conditions 
and had not incited feelings of hatred against the government. The ver-
dict greatly disappointed the Attorney-General. G.W. Uhlenbeck called it an 
example of racial justice. He was sure that were a non-European to have been 
charged with the same offence, a heavy sentence would have ensued. Heavy 
sentencing of ‘insignificant’ Indonesians, whose articles were only an imita-
tion of the words of Sneevliet and his European political friends, and letting 
Sneevliet go free could not but give the impression that judges did decide dif-
ferently when a European stood trial. It was best to avoid such an impression 
in such turbulent times as these. Uhlenbeck appealed at the High Court in 
Batavia. The High Court ruled that the Semarang court had rightly acquitted 
Sneevliet and in March 1918 threw the case out of court.
It was easier to act against Baars, a civil servant. Batavia seized upon a 
request by Baars to have his temporary assignment as a teacher transformed 
into a permanent appointment in August 1917. Baars had been warned that he 
risked his job if he continued with his agitation against Dutch rule. The imme-
diate cause of government wrath was an article by Baars about education in 
the Netherlands Indies which had been published in Het Vrije Woord in March 
1917. The contents had piqued his highest superior, the Director of Education 
and Religion, who took the initiative to issue the warning. K.F. Creutzberg 
had been especially offended by one sentence in which it was postulated that 
Dutch rule formed the greatest obstacle to the development of the Netherlands 
Indies. In Creutzberg’s eyes such an observation was the strongest stand any-
one could take against legal authority. He was all in favour of strong measures. 
He detected growing opposition to the Indië Weerbaar campaign and feared 
a confrontation between the colonial authorities and dissatisfied Indonesians. 
In his mind violent oppression could only be avoided if the European com-
munity and most Indonesians remained loyal to Dutch rule. Referring to a 
similar measure in British India, as early as November 191, he had written, 
that the time might be fast approaching when a ban would have to be issued 
that forbade civil servants to engage in anti-government activities. In The 
Hague Pleyte agreed with Creutzberg. He singled out the same sentence as 
Creutzberg had done as his main argument to defend the action taken against 
Baars in Parliament. Pleyte called the warning a standje, a friendly rebuke.4
 Appeal 7--1918; Van Limburg Stirum to Pleyte, 0-4-1918, 9--1918, NA, Kol. Openbaar, 
Vb. 14--1919 , Vb. 17--1918 .
 Creutzberg to Van Limburg Stirum, 4-11-191, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 14--1919 .
4 Director Department of Education and Religion to Van Limburg Stirum 8--1917, NA, Kol. 
Openbaar, Vb. 0-4-1918 8; Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1917-18:109.
ISDV leader A. Baars, circa 1917 (KITLV 14)
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A chance to suit the action to the word presented itself the following month. 
The occasion was a debate between Baars and Abdoel Moeis in the Indonesian 
club, Panti Harsojo, in Surabaya on 1 September 1917. The core issue was 
the familiar question which had dogged the Indië Weerbaar discussions from 
the start: would a different foreign ruler be a change for the worse? It is not 
clear what Baars’s exact words at the meeting were. The Dutch-language press 
reported that speaking of the insurrections in Sumatra, Baars had said that 
there was no government more boesoek, more rotten, than that of the Dutch in 
the Netherlands Indies. Baars denied this. He had wanted to counter Abdoel 
Moeis’s argument in favour of Indië Weerbaar that the population would be 
worse off under the rule of another power, and had only stated, first in Dutch 
and then again in Malay, that it was not a foregone conclusion that the rule of 
other powers would be more rotten than that of the Dutch . Claiming to base 
itself on reports of officials present Batavia turned a deaf ear to Baars’s expla-
nation. Baars had to be fired. His command of Malay made him an especially 
dangerous person in the eyes of the colonial authorities. As the banishment 
of Douwes Dekker and his friends had patently shown, the language used 
in communicating political ideas mattered very much to them. In The Hague 
when a Member of Parliament pointed out that Dutch people were allowed 
to write that they thought the British or American colonial system was better, 
Pleyte reacted by stating they should not venture such opinions in ‘native 
company’ and in ‘ugly Malay words’.7
Baars was granted ‘an honourable discharge’ at the end of October 1917. 
Creutzberg objected to the qualification.8 The Department of Education 
and Religion was instructed to reclaim the money Baars had received for his 
journey from Holland to Java and for the tropical outfit he had had to buy at 
that time. A socialist member of Dutch Parliament observed that for a ‘boy 
without means’ the sum, ,000 guilders, was a large amount of money.9 Later 
the court acquitted Baars. The judge ruled that Malay had no word for ‘bad’ 
that was less strong than boesoek and that to convict somebody for using such 
a word would leave little over of the freedom of speech. Baars’s acquittal was 
no reason for the government to re-instate him as a teacher. His agitation had 
convinced Van Limburg Stirum and his advisers most adamantly not to do so. 
Talma explained in the People’s Council that a judge used the penal code as the 
 Secret report Political Intelligence Service, -10-1917; Creutzberg to Van Limburg Stirum, 
18-10-1917, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 0-4-1918 8.
 De Locomotief, 10-1-1917, 1-1-1917.
7 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1917-18:11.
8 Creutzberg to Van Limburg Stirum, 18-10-1917, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 0-4-1918 8.
9 Besluit Gouverneur-Generaal, -10-1917, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 0-4-1918 8; Handelingen 
Tweede Kamer 1917-18:1441.
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yardstick to determine what was still permissible and what not. A government 
had to bear in mind other considerations. It demanded a ‘minimum of reserve 
in its civil servants in their political behaviour’. Baars had disregarded this, 
‘however low the minimum had been set’. Batavia could not tolerate propa-
ganda among the population aimed at bringing the government down.40
Set virtually beyond the pale by the government, their fate enhanced the 
status of Sneevliet and Baars among their Indonesian supporters. In Islam 
Bergerak it was pointed out that some Indonesian nationalists professed their 
love of their nation with no more than just a pen and some speeches. They 
refused to fraternize with the common, poor people. Sneevliet and Baars were 
different. They did not ‘love a nation’ nor did they care for nationality. They 
‘loved the oppressed human being’ and suffered personally for this.41
Sneevliet was given a great welcome when he returned from Batavia to 
Semarang after his trial at the High Court on  April 1918. The blijde incomste, 
the joyful entrance, the headline of De Locomotief read the following day. Sinar 
Djawa claimed that ,000 members of the Semarang Sarekat Islam and 00 sol-
diers had come to the railway station to welcome him. A police report spoke 
about ,000 Sarekat Islam members and 0 European soldiers. Neratja put the 
crowd at ,000. Van Limburg Stirum steered a middle course in a telegram to 
Pleyte:  to 4,000 natives and some European soldiers. When the ‘once-a-day’ 
from Batavia arrived in the early evening, the crowd shouted its acclamation 
and cheered. Among them was Mas Marco, who had become one of the editors 
of Sinar Djawa after his release. The mood was clearly anti-Dutch. Observing 
the ‘impudent’ way in which the assembled Indonesians treated Europeans, 
the Resident of Semarang, who happened to be on the same train, did not dare 
to leave his carriage.4 De Locomotief reported that Sneevliet ‘surrounded by 
many private soldiers and crowded around by thousands of small natives, 
who often cheered loudly’, was lifted onto their shoulders and carried across 
the platform to the exit.4 European soldiers waved red banners and shouted 
‘Long Live Sneevliet! Long Live Sneevliet!’
From the railway station Sneevliet and his supporters marched in pro-
cession into town.44 Skirmishes followed. The chief of police of Semarang, 
C.A. Ruempol, was hit on the head when he tried to disperse the crowd. The 
police had to use clubs and called for the assistance of the fire brigade, which 
dispersed the crowd with spurts of water. Van Limburg Stirum had to admit 
that the police was taken by surprise. Its officers were unable to calm the 
40 Volksraad 1918:, 19, .
41 Islam Bergerak, 1--1918.
4 Neratja, 9-4-1918; De Indische Gids 1918, I:718.
4 De Locomotief, -4-1918.
44 Handelingen 1917-18, Aanhangsel: 7.
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demonstrators down. After reinforcements had arrived, the authorities asked 
Sneevliet to disband the demonstration. Sneevliet complied. He climbed up a 
lamp-post and thanked ‘the brothers and sisters’ who had come to celebrate 
his ‘victory’. He concluded his brief speech with the words ‘Long live the SI, 
long live the fraternity, the Indies will be independent’.4 Sinar Djawa warned 
the government and the money devils that the demonstration was a clear indi-
cation that Sneevliet was loved by the people. If the government saw him as an 
enemy, this meant that ‘we all from the bottom of our hearts HATE HATE the 
government and the capitalists, who never cease to oppress us’.4
A similar scene evolved the following day when Semaoen, chairman of the 
Semarang branch of the Sarekat Islam, returned to town. Again a large crowd 
– according to police estimates ,000 men strong – assembled at the railway 
station in the early evening. It was a manifestation of solidarity. There was no 
specific reason to demonstrate. In view of what had happened the previous 
day, the police allowed only Europeans and members of the Semarang Sarekat 
Islam board to enter the station. The authorities gave the Sarekat Islam leaders 
to understand that the police would not allow ‘shouting along the road, there-
fore the disturbance of public order and the hindering of traffic’.47 The warn-
ing went unheeded. Again the assistance of the fire brigade had to be called 
in. It was reported that telling blows were dealt out by the police. Among 
those who made good use of his baton was the Superintendent of Police, who 
kept his end up. Disquieted about the ‘troublesome spirit among a part of the 
native population’, a public viewing of the film ‘Rasputin’ in the town square 
was forbidden after one showing the following day.48
In 1918 Semarang had definitely acquired fame as a revolutionary city. In 
view of this, the authorities had decided to station a special officer of the PID in 
Semarang as early as the beginning of 1917. The decision had been taken that 
Semarang needed the presence of such a person more than Surabaya, the only 
other city which then had already a local PID official. Semarang was politically 
much more stormy.49 The city’s fame had reached such heights that in May 
1918 the Native Pawnshop Union decided to make Semarang the venue of its 
meeting. The chairman explained that in Semarang ‘the actions of the prole-
tariat were most strongly visible’.0 In Semarang and its hinterland Semaoen 
could also count on a large, loyal, and militant following. One cogent example 
of this took place in December 1917 at the commencement of a mass meeting 
4 De Locomotief, -4-1918.
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in the City Gardens of Semarang. According to a report in De Locomotief, it was 
attended by ,000 members and a few thousand other people. When Semaoen 
was summoned by the Assistent-Resident to discuss the removal of protest 
signs, the rumour spread that he had been arrested. Reaction was immediate 
and among the crowd there was talk about launching a riot and that blood 
would flow if Semaoen had indeed be apprehended.1
The events are indicative of the fact that, since the latter part of 1917, dis-
content with Dutch rule had manifested itself in an increasingly militant way. 
The ISDV and the Sarekat Islam both actively sought to organize labourers 
and farmers, including those in the sugar-producing areas. Strikes, which 
were a relatively new phenomenon in the Netherlands Indies, became more 
frequent in the cities and on the estates. The reasons for such strikes were man-
ifold. Equal pay irrespective of race was one reason. Other strikes could be 
occasioned by derogatory remarks about the Sarekat Islam or Tjokroaminoto 
by the staff and by dissatisfaction with the distribution of land and water to 
the sugar estates. Other strikes started when demands for a cost-of-living 
compensation were not met, when the customary advances during the Fasting 
Month were not paid, or when wages were not paid in time. The high costs-
of-living which it was said had made people touchy and ‘hunger’ were also 
put forward as reasons. Java had entered upon what Neratja called a season 
of strikes. 
In view of the wave of strikes, estate managers decided to cooperate in July 
1918. They pledged to help each other out. They would provide labour for 
those estates where the workforce was on strike and refuse to employ persons 
who had played a leading role in strikes elsewhere.
In the countryside of Java unrest seemed to reign, especially in the second 
half of 1918. The European press began to bandy the word ‘terror’ about. In 
Kediri to the fright of Europeans it turned out that the local police was inad-
equate to repress unrest on a somewhat larger scale quickly. In Semarang, in 
reaction to the disturbances in its hinterland, fully armed policemen were put 
on patrol. In Majalaya the relationship between Chinese and Javanese was 
tense. Some Chinese had fled to Bandung. In the same region it was rumoured 
that a large uprising was nigh and that Tjokroaminoto would soon be crowned 
King of Java.4 The government decided to send three hundred soldiers to the 
area at the end of September. In Bantul, a region where attacks on estates were 
especially frequent, houses of Javanese went up in flames. In Kudus racial riots 
1 De Locomotief, 4-1-1917, cited in De Indische Gids 1918, I:-.
 Neratja, 4-4-1918.
 Soerabaiasch Handelsblad, cited in Neratja, 19-10-1918.
4 Assistent-Resident Bandung to Resident Preanger, 1-9-1918, NA, Kol. Geheim, Mr. 
1918/x.
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erupted in October 1918. In Demak angry Sarekat Islam villagers armed with 
clubs, spears, sickles, and machetes besieged the house of a village headman. 
When troops had to be sent to restore order, it were white European soldiers 
who were deemed suitable to perform this task, added occasionally by the 
odd soldier from the Moluccas and the Minahassa. Restlessness seemed on the 
rise. Commenting on the Kudus riots, Idenburg spoke about ‘the irritability of 
the mind, which originated from Semarang’. Abdoel Moeis’s Neratja blamed 
the war. Neratja claimed that all over the world the war had made people hot-
tempered and susceptible to agitation. This mood had also taken hold of the 
Javanese, who now could easily be provoked to quarrel among themselves 
and fight one another.7
The authorities and the public put the blame for the upsurge in rural 
 The Kudus riots were also an embarrassment to Batavia. In another way, Chinese protested 
about Batavia’s failure to protect the Chinese population and demanded that the government 
should cover the damage. To underline the claim Sin Po drew a comparison with the compensa-
tion the Dutch government had received after the Boxer Rebellion. The Chinese Consul General in 
Batavia agreed. He called to mind that after anti-Chinese riots in Mexico, the Mexican government 
had promised that it would pay indemnity to the Chinese government.
 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1918-19:080; McVey 19:. 
7 Neratja, 7-4-1918.
Veldpolitie in Rembang (Van Gent, Penard and Rinkes  
19: Photo )
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unrest and the defiance Javanese showed towards the Dutch on Sarekat Islam 
agitation and by extension on people like Sneevliet and Baars. From their side 
activists of the ISDV and Sarekat Islam stressed that one of the reasons for the 
strikes and other militant actions was the fact that the high cost-of-living had 
touched people on a raw nerve. Semaoen used a similar argument to deny 
that the Sarekat Islam leaders were the puppets of Sneevliet. In April 1918 
in a letter to the editor of De Locomotief he explained that the European com-
munity had convinced themselves so thoroughly that Sneevliet was behind 
all the unrest that there was almost no point in denying it. Yet he had to do 
so. By blaming all on Sneevliet people underestimated the intelligence of the 
ordinary people and could disregard all the abuses to which they were sub-
jected. Semaoen stressed that all Sarekat Islam actions originated among the 
people themselves ‘BECAUSE THE PEOPLE HARDLY CAN ANY LONGER 
BEAR THE PRESSURE OF TIME’. There was the duurte. This was the root and 
branch of the unrest. People had become irritable, and it was no longer pos-
sible to convince them that they should protest in an orderly manner (as the 
Dutch community stressed they should) and not resort to strikes and other 
undisciplined actions.8 
To deny the accusations Tjokroaminoto, Semaoen, Sneevliet, Tjipto 
 Mangoenkoesoemo and others would travel to trouble spots to investi-
gate the causes of the unrest. When they arrived in such regions, the local 
authorities treated them with distrust. Occasionally, as happened to Tjipto 
Mangoenkoesoemo when he visited Majalaya and to Tjokroaminoto when he 
went to Kudus, they were met by a detachment of soldiers or policemen.9 In 
their reports about what had transpired Tjokroaminoto and the others stated 
that Europeans, civil servants and ordinary citizens alike, had misrepresented 
the causes of the unrest. They had exaggerated the reports which highlighted 
unruly activities of Sarekat Islam members, or had credulously taken incred-
ible stories at face value. Enemies of leftist or Islamic agitation remained 
unmoved. They saw what took place as a clear demonstration of how dam-
aging Sneevliet’s agitation was. Another reason they ventured, although less 
frequently, was religious fanaticism. As a consequence, indigenous civil serv-
ants were asked to keep an eye on the activities of zealous Islamic religious 
leaders.0
The pupil clearly was no longer behaving in the way the mentor wanted. 
Malay newspapers assumed an increasingly belligerent tone. The Sarekat 
Islam had made, what Idenburg later called, a ‘strong shift towards the left’. 
It had begun to side with the enemies of the state. Idenburg blamed Semaoen, 
8 De Locomotief, 1-4-1918.
9 Volksraad 1918-19:1-4.
0 Neratja, -10-1918, 9-10-1918.
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‘that pur-sang disciple of Mr. Sneevliet’.1 The ‘Semarang extremists’, that is 
the Indonesian ISDV members, were propagating hatred and distrust of the 
government. They did so without taking into account – as Idenburg and other 
Dutch people were not tired of stressing – the ‘immaturity’ of the popula-
tion.
One of the ways in which the authorities in the Netherlands Indies reacted 
to the apparent revolutionary spirit that seemed to have gripped many was 
by tightening their control over the nationalist movement. At times, although 
there does not seem to have been a general pattern in this respect, local Dutch 
civil servants refused permission to hold meetings protesting about the high 
cost of living or against the Indië Weerbaar movement. Others delayed the 
start of meetings, or decided that public meetings held by certain organiza-
tions such as the ISDV were not allowed. The consequence of such harass-
ment was that at some meetings the chairman not only thanked the audience 
for attending, but also the local authorities for allowing the meeting to take 
place.
Were such and other gatherings grudgingly allowed there was a second, 
more frequently used mechanism to assure that the harm done was minimal: 
setting limits on who were allowed to attend and on what was said. Only 
those persons who could show their membership card were allowed in, or 
only two or three representatives of other organizations invited were allowed 
to attend. Once a public meeting had started a variety of Dutch authorities 
– the local Dutch civil servants, representatives of the police, and members of 
the PID – would be present. They did not hesitate to intervene and to forbid 
speakers to continue if Dutch rule (or the belligerents) were criticized in what 
they considered to be an unwarranted way. Sneevliet was to remark during his 
trial that police commissioners had ‘an epidemic inclination’ to call meetings 
to order and to interrupt (Baars and Sneevliet 1991:4).
Such actions also baffled members of the Dutch Parliament. Speaking 
about the presence of three superintendents of police, the local head of the 
PID, and an agent of the PID at a VSTP meeting in Surabaya where the 
cost-of-living allowance was discussed, one of them, SDAP MP M. Mendels, 
remarked that when ‘at every sentence which does not please these gentlemen 
it is said you are not allowed to speak about this, then I thank heaven for the 
fact that I do not live in the Netherlands Indies, because I would not possess as 
1 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1918-19:080.
 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1918-19:080.
 In June 1918 Muurling denied in the People’s Council that the PID kept track of nationalist 
organizations. The fact that PID members were present at their meetings he explained by point-
ing out that, in the early days of the PID’s existence, its staff had had to make itself familiar with 
the political climate in the colony. They had done so by visiting meetings and reading periodicals 
(Volksraad 1918:08).
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much self-control as these speakers to be able to speak under such a Russian 
supervision’.4 The number of authorities present at the VSTP meeting was 
actually rather modest. The record in this respect perhaps goes to the mass 
meeting organized by the Sarekat Islam in December 1917. It was attended 
by the Assistent-Resident, the public prosecutor, the local head of the PID, the 
chief superintendent of police, six chief constables, and a score of police offic-
ers. It also does not seem to have been an exception that armed policemen 
attended meetings of nationalist organizations. Abdoel Moeis complained in 
the People’s Council about the presence of members of the armed police or 
ordinary policemen armed with Beaumont rifles when he addressed public 
meetings. 
There was one specific development which made everything appear even 
more threatening in the eyes of the Dutch authorities and those of the general 
public. As Sneevliet’s triumphant entry into Semarang indicated, the ISDV had 
succeeded in catching the ear of soldiers and sailors. There was much to worry 
about. The army and police were undermanned; and at that moment seriously 
affected by the Spanish influenza. In Kudus  out of a total of 0 policemen 
had been ill at the time of the riots. Even more serious, discontent in the army, 
Navy, and probably also the police, was rife. The spirit affected both officers 
and lower ranks, and Europeans and non-Europeans.
For European policemen in Batavia, we can read, the war could not end 
soon enough. They wanted to return to Europe. In the army, even before the 
outbreak of the war, officers had been displeased – according to some very 
displeased – with the fact that plans to improve their financial position had 
been shelved for years. They earned less than people in the business sector 
and people with a comparable education or rank in the colonial civil service. 
War had blocked any possibility of a significant increase in salary, and this at 
a time when in their daily lives they had to cope with increasingly high living 
costs. Officers had started to study in their spare time to prepare for a civilian 
career, it was reported in 1918.7 
Non-commissioned officers also had their complaints. A report from 
Surakarta in July 191 spoke about discontent on all sides among the three 
thousand non-commissioned officers. One of the reasons was said to be the 
privileges given to married non-commissioned officers in an effort to combat 
4 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1917-18:147-8.
 Volksraad 1918:147.
 De Locomotief, -1-1917.
7 De Locomotief, -1-191, 4-1-191; Van Heekeren 1919b:14; Nieuwe Soerabaia Courant, cited in 
De Indische Gids 1919: 1.
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concubinage.8 It were not just privileges, such as better housing (also for mar-
ried non-European soldiers) and an extra crossing’s premium (when the wife 
indeed travelled along). Concubinage was forbidden in the barracks. 
Civilians were well aware that resentment ran deep in the army. Desertion 
among European soldiers had, in the words of a military journal, taken on 
‘really serious dimensions’ in 1917.9 One reason adduced for this was the 
presence of recruitment agents of the belligerents in the Archipelago. But even 
if such persons really existed – there was no actual proof of this – they were 
not the major cause. Many other reasons were not difficult to find. The food 
was bad, the housing in the barracks was a cause of complaint, the medical 
service was inadequate, and pay had not kept pace with rising prices.
Discipline in the army was strict and brutal. Punishments included caning 
with rattan (there was a special rank of korporaal stokkenknecht, corporal lathy), 
having to carry a heavy metal ball weighing twenty-six kilogrammes, and being 
bound with barbed wire. Most notorious of all was the so-called kromsluiten, 
shackling a person tightly in such a way that he was forced to remain in a bent 
position for hours at a stretch. Though the regime had become more humane 
over the years, the most extreme forms of punishment were only abolished 
after the war. That they were no longer meted out was partly in response to the 
agitation by members of the ISDV, Insulinde, and the Sarekat Islam. In part the 
reform was brought about by what was described as the urge for action on the 
part of Van Limburg Stirum who ignored protests by the army command.70 
Before the punishments were abolished army authorities stressed that some 
had only rarely been administered, and others were obsolete. To illustrate that 
conditions had improved, it was mentioned that the chain to which metal ball 
was attached had been lengthened, which allowed the miscreant to carry the 
ball over his shoulder.71 Civil critics were not convinced that the army officers 
spoke the truth or suggested that they did not know how their underlings, the 
prison guards, acted in actual practice. 
The sorry state of affairs in the army led to the demise of its commander, 
General W.R. de Greve. In May 191 De Greve had succeeded Michielsen, who 
had died two months earlier during one of the first trials in the Netherlands 
Indies of a military aeroplane when the plane he had boarded crashed. De 
Greve was held responsible for the troubles in the colonial army. His successor 
was Lieutenant General C.H. van Rietschoten. Van Rietschoten had been sent 
to Java by Pleyte in June 1917. Officially he was to assist in the reorganization 
8 De Locomotief, 1-7-191.
9 Algemeen Militair Weekblad, cited in De Locomotief, 4-11-1917.
70 Sumatra Post, cited in De Indische Gids 1919, I:4.
71 The ball had been made heavier. It now weighed thirty-six pounds. The chain weighed six 
pounds (Volksraad 1918-19:47). 
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of the colonial army and the preparations for the setting up of a militia. In 
reality he was to be prepared to take over from De Greve as commander of the 
colonial army.7 De Greve was given to understand by Van Limburg Stirum 
that he had to go in January 1918 and was honourably discharged at his own 
request in May 1918. 
By this time Dutch-language and Malay newspapers had started to report 
on incidents in the army and the Navy in which soldiers and sailors diso-
beyed orders or testified to their leftist sympathies. Even more frequent were 
reports about arrests of European and Indonesian soldiers who had deserted. 
Dissatisfaction in the colonial army and Navy had reached an unprecedented 
level. What a discontented army and Navy might mean had been shown by 
developments in Russia, as what was happened in Germany and Austria. In the 
Sumatra Post it was pointed out that Russia had learned that people eager for 
a revolution could best begin by trying to get the army on their side. Though 
the newspaper considered the chance that soldiers in the Netherlands Indies 
would refuse to obey orders slight, the conclusion was that ‘an army, made up 
of sections constantly sulking and grumbling and embracing passive resist-
ance’ was not a force to be relied upon. The situation was all the more alarm-
ing as the army and Navy might have to act ‘any moment’.7 In the spring of 
1918 other Dutch-language newspapers – De Locomotief, the Preangerbode, and 
the Bataviaasch Handelsblad – called for extraordinary government measures to 
prevent strikes by soldiers and labourers.74 All laid the blame at the door of 
Sneevliet and his friends. It had not escaped their attention that Sneevliet had 
called it the duty of the ISDV to convince soldiers not to take up arms against 
the population and ‘to make these mercenaries unreliable for Her Majesty, 
unreliable for the propertied class’.7 As a consequence he asked soldiers and 
sailors to display a spirit of resistance. 
One of the outcomes of the discontent in the army was that, as in many 
other places in the world, soldiers’ councils and unions were formed in the 
cities on Java which had a military garrison. Again Sneevliet was the alleged 
culprit. In fact, the motor behind the movement to radicalize the soldiers 
was another ISDV member, J.A. Brandsteder, a major champion in the cam-
paign to improve the living conditions for the soldiers in the colonial army. 
Brandsteder, a former sailor, was the administrator and leader of the Bond 
van Minder Marine-Personeel (Union of Lower-Ranking Naval Personnel) in 
the Netherlands Indies, the organization which had been so patriotic at the 
outbreak of the war. The union had taken the lead in giving expression to the 
7 Pleyte to Wilhelmina, --1917, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. --1917 V8.
7 Sumatra Post, cited in De Indische Gids 1918, II:89.
74 Neratja, 18-4-1918, -4-1918.
7 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1918-19:080.
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feelings of frustration of sailors in an organized way and its members wanted 
the soldiers to follow suit. At the end of 1917 and in 1918 the Union of Lower-
Ranking Naval Personnel often now referred to as the Matrozenbond (Sailors’ 
Union) started to try to win soldiers over to join in their agitation. At the 
end of January 1918 when sailors marched through Surabaya after they had 
attended a meeting addressed by Sneevliet, one of the slogans they carried 
read: ‘Soldiers join us!’7 On the instigation of the Union of Lower-Ranking 
Naval Personnel, a Soldiers’ Union was founded in the garrison city of Malang 
in March. Soldiers in almost every barrack flocked to join in. Within three 
months the union claimed a membership of ,000 (Perthus 19:8). In many 
garrisons vocal local soldiers’ unions began to stir. 
The propaganda spread among soldiers by Sneevliet, Brandsteder and 
others and the blatant manifestations of discontent turned public attention to 
conditions in the army. In the closing months of 1917 Dutch-language newspa-
pers published numerous pleas to improve the lot of the ordinary soldiers. An 
additional incentive to do so was the knowledge that soon the first recruits for 
the European militia would be called up. The new recruits, already unhappy 
with their fate and hence thought to be extra susceptible, should not be infect-
ed by the immoral habits of the professional soldiers and should not be influ-
enced by ISDV agitation. Various solutions were contemplated to improve the 
atmosphere in the army. The most impressive initiative was the establishment 
of a Vereeniging ter Verbetering van den Maatschappelijke Staat van den 
Militair (Society for the Improvement of the Social Status of the Soldier) at the 
end of 1917. Patron was Van Limburg Stirum. The board consisted of thirty-
eight members, many of whom were pillars of society. Besides a clergyman, a 
priest, a district nurse, and the obligatory army officers, it had among its illus-
trious members J.H. Carpentier Alting, President of the High Court; his wife 
(née Deibel, in her capacity as President of the Women’s Council, an umbrella 
organization for women’s organizations in the Netherlands Indies founded 
after the example of its Dutch counterpart in the middle of 191); L. Engel, 
President of the NHM; s’Jacob of the Batavia Chamber of Commerce; Koning 
of the KPM; and Muurling of the PID. Van Rietschoten, soon to become the 
commander of the colonial army, also joined. The society observed that sol-
diers were in fact outcasts and that their life had been reduced to the ‘greatest 
possible frugality’. The result had been ‘bitter resentment’ which manifested 
itself in ‘acts in violation of order and discipline’, and in a despairing flight to 
liquor and in the ‘dark hideaways of society’. Faced with this conclusion a plan 
of action was hammered out. Concubinage and dipsomania were the evils to 
be combated. Housing should be improved. In their spare time soldiers should 
7 Neratja, --1918.
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be presented with opportunities for ‘sound work and decent repose’.77
The Dutch-language press commented that the founding of the society 
was a futile gesture which had come far too late. Agitation by the ISDV and 
by the Union of Lower-Ranking Naval Personnel struck a much more favour-
able chord. It was not difficult to reach this conclusion. Soldiers had started to 
vent their anger against the rich, white Europeans, who had made no secret of 
the fact that they despised the lower ranks in the past. In Bandung a fusilier 
threw his food into the car of a European. It was remarked in Parliament in 
The Hague by a sympathizer of the ISDV that this of course was a pity for the 
dress of the lady in the car who caught the full blast. In Semarang a soldier 
shouted to a lady in a car that she and those of her kind would soon be thrown 
out of the colony and that then he and his friends would be driving around 
in motor cars. In Semarang the mood among the soldiers in the local garrison 
had become so implacable that the commander decided to set up secret patrols 
in the city on a regular basis in May 1918.78
At first Van Limburg Stirum did not give the impression that he was par-
ticularly upset. He wired Pleyte at the end of May that the social democratic 
movement among soldiers should not be seen as too great a tragedy. It was 
‘symptomatic of the present world circumstances’.79 Army staff also pre-
tended that there was not much amiss. Its members spoke about ‘a few regret-
table facts’ and claimed that the ‘bad spirit’ was confined to a small section of 
the European soldiers.80 Belying these words army command did all it could 
to prevent the proper functioning of soldiers’ unions. It was made clear that 
unions ‘which go into or make propaganda for a purely anarchistic goal’ were 
unacceptable.81 The colonial authorities also left no room to doubt that they 
were set to combat ‘the brewing of propaganda for revolutionary principles 
in the barracks’.8
As a consequence, soldiers were not allowed to attend public meetings 
addressed by radical leftist orators. Initially no names were mentioned. It was 
left to the discretion of the local army commanders to identify the leftist trou-
ble-makers. In March 1918 the army commander in Surabaya forbade soldiers 
to attend meetings of the Union of Lower-Ranking Naval Personnel, or any 
other meetings whatsoever at which Brandsteder, Sneevliet and others who 
called themselves ‘friends and defenders’ of the ordinary soldiers were among 
the speakers.8 In early April a general order went out forbidding European 
77 De Indische Gids 1918, II:848-.
78 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1918-19:08; De Locomotief, 11-4-1918; Neratja, 1--1918.
79 Van Limburg Stirum to Pleyte, 9--1918, NA, Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 17--1918 .
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and native soldiers to attend ISDV meetings. SDAP meetings, whose members 
in actual fact tried to counter ISDV propaganda by promoting a soldiers’ asso-
ciation with a less radical course of action, were also declared out of bounds. 
Occasionally Sarekat Islam meetings and even celebrations were also off limits 
to soldiers. When contested events took place, patrols were sent out to assure 
that no soldiers or sailors attended. Meetings at which Sneevliet and other 
ISDV members were among the speakers were raided by the police if soldiers 
attended. It was not unknown, as happened at a meeting in the City Theatre 
of Batavia on  November 1918 where Sneevliet was one of the speakers, for 
the premises to be cordoned off by soldiers.
In the People’s Council Van Rietschoten stressed that such measures were 
not taken out of fear that soldiers would be influenced by the wrong ideas. 
The reason for the directive had been his ‘sincere efforts to protect people 
from thoughtless acts’.84 He added that he did not fear the influence of 
anarchistic soldiers’ unions. He had another reason for not tolerating them. 
Soldiers’ unions did not ‘serve the well-being of the simple soldier’.8 Even 
the Protestant Church came to the assistance of the authorities. In Surabaya 
during a service in June for soldiers from the Moluccas and the Minahassa the 
minister appealed to his congregation not to join the soldiers’ union. 
Van Rietschoten’s words obfuscated the whole truth. The authorities appear 
to have been scared to death of soldiers criticizing conditions in the army in 
public. They made a distinction between public meetings and closed meetings. 
Batavia claimed that soldiers were free to speak their minds at closed meetings 
which no outsiders were allowed to attend.8 With public meetings it was dif-
ferent. These were off limits when it was suspected that they were intended 
to stir up agitation or were held preliminary to establishing soldiers’ unions. 
If the ban was ignored such meetings were disbanded. Following their own 
agenda, sailors and soldiers met in restaurants, houses of ISDV members and 
elsewhere to discuss plans to organize soldiers and to coordinate action. When 
army command were able to learn about such intentions in advance, patrols 
were sent out to prevent the meeting, especially if Brandsteder or Sneevliet 
were to be present. Soldiers who played a role in the founding of unions were 
arrested, as were those who attacked conditions in the army at public meet-
ings. At times the officers’ corps had to act to keep soldiers who had been 
angered by such acts in check. 
In Surabaya the building of the Union of Lower-Ranking Naval Personnel, 
which had also been frequented by soldiers in search for recreation in the 
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the building had become a centre of agitation and a place where soldiers 
hatched subversive plans. Soldiers who tried to enter the building by disguis-
ing themselves as sailors were sentenced to detention if they were caught. In 
Surabaya three members of the board of a Corporals’ and Other Ranks’ Union 
got two weeks’ close arrest for dodging the ban at the end of April. Two weeks’ 
detention seems to have been the normal punishment for such offences, often 
repeated in the months to come. In what amounted to paternalistic censor-
ship action was taken to prevent the reading of leftist literature. The authori-
ties tried to ban Het Vrije Woord, the Soldaten- en Matrozenkrant, Soldiers’ and 
Sailors’ Paper, of which Brandsteder was the editor, and other socialist peri-
odicals and pamphlets from places frequented by soldiers and sailors. Such 
publications were strictly forbidden on board warships. Inexorably reading 
these journals could result in detention.87
Another, perhaps cleverer, way to keep soldiers and sailors away from 
revolutionary meetings was by organizing alternative events. On  May a 
naval review was held in Surabaya to make it impossible for the sailors to 
attend an ISDV meeting in the building of the Union of Lower-Ranking Naval 
Personnel. The stratagem failed. Sailors informed the union leaders who saw 
to it that the date of the meeting was put forward by one day. About four hun-
dred people, sailors and others, were present. The local police commissioner 
had to abandon his plan to dissolve the gathering when angry sailors who 
were present insisted that the meeting should proceed. Sneevliet addressed 
his audience with the words ‘Fellow party members, friends, red guard of the 
Indies fleet’.88 The authorities tried to repeat the same trick more often, seem-
ingly without any success. To take the wind out of the local soldiers’ union 
sails, the army commander in Semarang convened a meeting in the Club for 
Soldiers and Corporals to discuss their ‘improvement of position’. Nobody 
came.
Impeded by the repressive measures taken by the military authorities, 
the soldiers’ movement remained fragmented, without much coordination. It 
was more difficult for army command to put a stop to the blatant discontent 
in the army. Not without a certain degree of pleasure the editors of Oetoesan 
Hindia concluded in the middle of May that the seeds of danger were grow-
ing into something big.89 There were problems in the barracks, soldiers took 
part in anti-Indië Weerbaar manifestations, and expressed their support for 
strikes. One such latter incident which attracted plenty of public attention 
happened in Semarang in April 1918. During a strike at the local gas-works 
the authorities decided that soldiers should replace the striking workers. A 
87 Tichelman 198:8; De Indische Gids 1918:997; Neratja, 0--1918, 4-1-1918.
88 Neratja, --1918; Perthus 19:8.
89 Oetoesan Hindia, 1--1918.
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Dutch private called upon his fellow-soldiers not to act as blacklegs. When 
he was punished, the Semarang Sarekat Islam wanted to reward him with a 
watch for his courage, paid for by the members of the board. This gave rise to 
a dilemma. The Dutch authorities summoned Semaoen and Darsono (a person 
who had become an avowed socialist after he had attended Sneevliet’s court 
case) and told them that presenting the private with a watch would be consid-
ered an attempt to undermine order and discipline among the soldiers. They 
also threatened the soldier in question with severe punishment if he were to 
accept the gift. Implacably Semaoen realized that giving in would make a bad 
impression. It was decided to let the Sarekat Islam members settle the matter. 
They voted overwhelmingly in favour of presenting the watch. The words 
of one person who argued against were greeted with shout of takoet, takoet, 
afraid, afraid.90 Unfortunately history does not tell us what followed next, but 
probably a watch was never presented.
With relief the Ministry of the Colonies had concluded from the reports it 
had received from Batavia about Sneevliet’s return to Semarang that native 
soldiers had not joined in the demonstrations.91 There may have been relief 
in The Hague but this did not mean that native soldiers were immune to 
the spirit of the day. Semaoen even claimed a large following for the Sarekat 
Islam among the Indonesian soldiers.9 Differences in payment, pension, and 
treatment added to the resentment of Indonesian soldiers. This was especially 
so among Javanese soldiers, who stood on the lowest rung of the ladder, and 
received less pay than the soldiers from the Minahassa and the Moluccas. 
Minahassans and Moluccans were not without their complaints. One was that 
they were paid less than their European equals. Another had to do with the 
conditions in the barracks. They had increasingly come to detest the degrada-
tion caused by the fact that a group of soldiers, each with his wife and chil-
dren, had to live in one chambrée, one common room, in the barracks, virtually 
without any privacy.
In the course of 1918 the Indonesian soldiers started to organize themselves 
too. In Batavia a union of native soldiers, Djawa-Setia (Faithful Java), was 
formed in April. The initiative had been taken by a gunner, Raden Soedarsono. 
Within days Djawa-Setia boasted a membership of over 800. Djawa-Setia 
demanded higher pay, equal status with European soldiers (Javanese were not 
allowed a hammock), and better education for themselves and their children. 
Other demands were a shorter time in military service and a better pension. 
Djawa-Setia also aimed at improving the moral standards and health of the 
90 De Locomotief, -4-1918, 1--1918, --1918; Morriën 1984:79.
91 Van Limburg Stirum to Pleyte, 9--1918; note State Department A, 17--1918, NA, Kol. 
Openbaar, Vb. 17--1918 .
9 Sinar Hindia, cited in De Indische Gids 1919:4.
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Javanese soldiers. They should be prevented from taking to the bottle as 
Europeans soldiers did. Their marriage partners were also a point of discus-
sion. Javanese soldiers should not ‘marry as they wish, because the offspring 
of such marriages are very bad and when the native offspring are bad then the 
name of the Javanese is also dragged through the mud’.9
In reporting about the activities of Djawa-Setia, Neratja stressed that a 
native soldiers’ union was very different from its European counterpart. It did 
not undermine army discipline and morale.94 Nevertheless, among Indonesian 
soldiers desertion was also frequent. To collect the enlistment premium was 
one thing, to remain in the army another. It frequently happened that sol-
diers ran away to become estate labourers. To prevent Indonesians deserting 
immediately after they had cashed in their recruitment premium, the sugges-
tion was made that new recruits be finger printed. To catch such culprits the 
fingerprints plus a photo of the person in question in his ‘native dress’ had to 
be sent to the recruitment offices of the estates.9 Others deserted and enlisted 
again to cash in a second or third premium. To prevent this, around the same 
time it was suggested that fresh recruits be vaccinated in such a way that the 
scar left no doubt that they were soldiers.9 When deserting was made impos-
sible more drastic action was resorted to. At the end of 1917 a warning had 
to be issued against dripping gonorrhoea fluid into the eyes in an attempt to 
be declared medically unfit for military service.97 The fluid inflamed the eyes. 
The results could be disastrous. The warning was issued after it had come to 
the attention of army headquarters that many Indonesian soldiers in Malang 
had been discharged because they had gone blind.
In spite of all the indications to the contrary, in public Van Rietschoten 
vehemently denied that the civilian assessment that there was ‘general unrest’ 
in the army was true. He admitted that living conditions in barracks were 
deplorable, and that the food soldiers had to eat left much to desire. This was 
as far as he was prepared to go. Grousing was second nature to soldiers. He 
attributed the increase in manifestations of discontent to trouble-makers who 
tried to impress upon the soldiers that they were being treated unfairly. Van 
Rietschoten claimed that their propaganda had not exerted an influence on the 
‘experienced soldier’. Only the ‘many inexperienced men and weaklings, and 
not least the bad elements’ were infected.98
While this may have been its public face, army command made some 
9 Neratja, 1--1918.
94 Oetoesan Hindia, 4-4-1918; De Locomotief 11--1918; Neratja, 1--1918, 1--1918, 19--1918.
9 Soerabaiasch Handelsblad, cited in De Indische Gids 1917, II:148.
9 De Locomotief, --191.
97 Nieuwe Soerabaia Courant, cited in De Locomotief 14-1-1917.
98 Volksraad 1918-19:4, 481-.
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efforts to remove the causes of discontent. Recreation rooms were set up in 
barracks. Initially only European soldiers profited. By the end of 1918 no such 
facility had yet been offered to Indonesian soldiers. European soldiers were 
even moved en bloc to garrisons outside Java. It was hoped that a change in 
environment would make the men less discontented.99 Material circumstances 
were also improved. In July 1918 Van Rietschoten instructed the local com-
manders to announce that it had been suggested to the government the pay 
of soldiers and corporals be increased by five cents per day. The pay increase 
was intended to kill two birds with one stone. It should diminish the unrest in 
the army and should stimulate recruitment of new soldiers. Simultaneously 
vague promises were made to abolish the difference in treatment between the 
European soldiers and their Manadonese and Ambonese counterparts. This 
had to be done gradually. Otherwise it would have cost too much money.100 
Javanese, earning twelve cents a day less than the Ambonese, were not yet 
considered to deserve the same advance in status. They were still written off 
as too poor a soldier. Yet another measure was to open up the opportunity for 
Indonesian soldiers to learn Dutch.101
In the Navy discontent, at times finding its expression in acts of sabotage on 
board of Dutch warships, was even greater. European sailors were perhaps 
even more despised by the civilian European society than soldiers were 
(Tichelman 198:1). They were definitely better organized and displayed 
a strong sense of solidarity. Their union, the Bond van Minder Marine-
Personeel, was also far more radical than its mother organization in Holland. 
By the end of the war Brandsteder and the union had earned the deep distrust 
of the authorities. According to the Minister of the Colonies the union showed 
‘very anarchical’ tendencies.10 In Batavia the commander of the Navy, J.A.M. 
Bron, by now promoted from rear admiral to vice admiral, agreed.10
What the European sailors were capable of had already become evident 
when they had staged a protest about the bad conditions in the military hos-
pital in Surabaya in May 191. It was a wild-cat action. Brandsteder had not 
endorsed it because he had had no time to consult with other members of 
the union board. Four hundred sailors – rumour had it that half of them car-
ried arms – staged a march in Surabaya on Sunday morning 7 May. As they 
marched the sailors sang socialists songs and carried banners with texts like 
‘To the hospital’, ‘We protest about the filth’, ‘We protest about the bad food’, 
99 Van Heekeren 1919b:17; Neratja, 10-10-1918.
100 Volksraad 1918:8.
101 Volksraad 1918:41; Neratja, 7-7-1918, --1918.
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and ‘We protest about the bedbugs’.104 Another banner showed money-bags 
with the text ‘War profits’ written below them. The police reacted resolutely. 
Pistol shots were fired and policemen charged brandishing naked klewangs. 
The following day warships could not sail because 00 sailors had refused to 
board. They roamed through the city in small groups.10 Among the sailors 
who did report were seven, among them one who had been hurt the previ-
ous day, who had discharged themselves from the military hospital ‘because 
they were tormented there by hunger and wanted a chance to eat’. The seven 
sailors, still in their hospital clothes and bare-foot, were cheered by the other 
sailors.10 The incident, in The Hague the newspaper the Nieuwe Courant spoke 
of the ‘Navy rebellion’, formed the occasion to draw attention to the ‘recalci-
trant feelings’ of the sailors and the ease with which these had been aired in 
acts of vulgar protest and sabotage.107
In The Hague, the government, already somewhat apprehensive about 
morale in the Navy, decided to close a loophole in naval legislation, but it 
did not yet go as far as forbidding gatherings of naval ratings. Pinke was 
alarmed. He concluded that there was a malaise prevalent in the Navy which 
was ‘absolutely incompatible with the objectives of a military naval force’. The 
malaise had resulted in ‘gross unmilitary conduct, yea even in some instances 
in the foulest acts of sabotage’.108 There could only be one response. Rigid 
disciplinary measures had to be taken. All shore leaves were cancelled. Within 
days 9 sailors were told that they were no longer welcome in the Navy in 
the Netherlands Indies. They were shipped to Holland where the Ministry 
of the Navy had to decide whether they would be dishonourably discharged 
or not. To replace them fifty conscript sailors from Holland were shipped to 
the Netherlands Indies, an indication of how dire the shortage of professional 
sailors had become. The decision elicited a protest from the conscript sailors’ 
union. Those who went loudly protested their fate when they left Holland in 
July. Of these fifty conscript sailors nineteen deserted. Nor was this the end of 
the story. On their return to Holland the sailors from the Netherlands Indies 
created a small riot. Without seeking any permission a dozen of them marched 
104 Afterwards the Dutch government disclosed that an earlier investigation into the conditions 
in the hospital had revealed that the sailor’s complaints were exaggerated. The commander of the 
colonial army blamed much of the excitement on the fact that sailors were not used to paillasses. 
The Governor General pointed out that the majority of the ‘naval patients suffer from venereal 
diseases, does not feel ill, and is bored’ (De Locomotief, 1-9-191). 
10 De Locomotief, 8--191, 9--191.
10 De Locomotief, 10--191.
107 Nieuwe Courant, cited in De Locomotief; 19--191, Soerabaiasch Handelsblad, cited in De Loco-
motief, 1--191. 
108 De Locomotief, 1-9-191.
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into the small town of Hellevoetsluis, singing songs and resisting arrest.109 
Pinke himself was one of the victims. In The Hague, J.J. Rambonnet, no friend 
of Pinke, disapproved of the way in which he had handled the protests. He 
should have been even more resolute and have instituted criminal proceed-
ings against the ringleaders.110 Pinke was replaced as commander of the Dutch 
fleet in the Netherlands Indies. Van Limburg Stirum accepted the change in 
command ‘à contrecœur’.111 
Dissatisfaction in the Navy came sharply to the fore once again in the 
 middle of 1918. The crew of the Koningin Regentes – who had sent a telegram 
to the annual meeting of the ISDV wishing it success a few days earlier – went 
on strike on  June 1918. They refused to report for duty after the captain had 
disregarded protests about having to eat brown instead of white rice at break-
fast. Officers had to draw their revolvers to push the sailors back into line 
again. Food that was not the only gripe. Socialists condemned the ‘Prussian 
behaviour’ of the captain and depicted him as a person who loathed the 
sailors’ union.11 It was also pointed out that he had commanded the Zeeland 
on her trip from Holland to the Netherlands Indies and that it was his rigid 
command which had induced so many sailors to desert in the United States. 
The Navy presented a different picture. Bron depicted him as a wise, almost 
ideal commander.
Eighty-five crew members were sentenced to between three and twelve 
months’ imprisonment. Because such a large number of prisoners could not 
be accommodated elsewhere, they were interned on the island of Onrust. This 
led to a scandal when one of the internees, J. Bezema, had to be taken into 
hospital in Surabaya where he died of dysentery two weeks after his release. 
It was alleged that his death had been caused by the inferior food on Onrust, 
which contained less fat than the food sailors were used to on board. Idenburg 
was not impressed. He told Parliament that sailors were ‘difficult about their 
food’.11 Bezema’s death also occasioned a debate about the climate of Onrust. 
In the past the island, where Jambi insurgents had also been brought, had 
earned itself a reputation as an extremely unhealthy place. In those days 
Onrust had been described as a graveyard for the labourers in its shipyard. 
After Bezema’s death stories about the bad physical conditions on Onrust 
abounded. In the People’s Council Bron and the Director of Justice denied the 
stories. Praising the fresh sea breeze the Director of Justice called the impris-
onment of the sailors on Onrust ‘a trouvaille’. The island was influenza- and 
109 Thirteen did later report and were sent to the Netherlands Indies at a later date.
110 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 191-1:4.
111 Teitler 198:xvii; De Locomotief, 4-1-191, citing the Java-Bode.
11 Volksraad 1918-19:49.
11 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1918-19:1.
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malaria-free and a transfer to Onrust had cured prisoners of pneumonia. His 
conclusion was that Onrust was a much healthier place than Batavia.114 Such 
remarks prompted Cramer to suggest that Onrust could become a sanato-
rium for TB patients. He wondered why he and many other inhabitants of 
Batavia had not known that they lived so close to ‘such a convalescent haven’. 
Otherwise, ‘plans would have been made for the building of a large hotel; 
maybe a new Scheveningen might have arisen’.11 In The Hague, Idenburg 
also put his oar in. He pointed out that Onrust was a quarantine station for 
returning hajis and that a few years earlier large sums of money had been 
invested in improving its hygienic conditions. To underline this, he cited 
from a telegram he had received from Bron. Onrust must have been paradise: 
‘Island very healthy, no malaria, no mosquitoes, good water, cool climate, is 
used as a health resort for prisoners’.11 
Those interned there were inclined to think differently. Thirty-four of them 
were discharged from the Navy after they had served their sentence. Unable 
to show that they had found employment in civilian society or owned at least 
00 guilders, they were classified as destitute persons, and consequently were 
not allowed to remain in the Netherlands Indies. They were forced to spend 
an extra month on Onrust before they were shipped back to Holland on board 
the Noordam, the first shipping opportunity to Holland that presented itself. 
The Navy had refused to allow them to take up temporary residence in the 
building of the sailors’ union in Surabaya, which had also offered to pay for 
their upkeep. Permission had been withheld because the union was not a legal 
association. In a letter to the Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad the sailors complained 
about this and about the conditions on Onrust. They wrote that their health 
had been undermined by dirt and undernourishment and that many of them 
had suffered from abdominal illnesses.117 An additional reason for the sailors 
to be angry was that their treatment stood in sharp contrast to that of German 
sailors who the colonial authorities had been forced to intern on nearby 
Kuyper Island. The Dutch sailors could not leave Onrust to travel to Batavia 
to look for work. The German sailors were allowed a three days’ trip to Batavia 
once a month to look for a job. 
The affair had a sting in its tail. Brandsteder and Baars let it be known that 
they wanted to attend Bezema’s funeral. The announcement fortified naval 
command’s fear that ‘revolutionary elements’ would seize upon the occasion 
to demonstrate. Only seventy sailors received permission to attend. They were 
marched to and from the ceremony in tight formation. All the other sailors in 
114 Volksraad 1918-19:00-.
11 Volksraad 1918-19:49, 0.
11 Handelingen 1918-19, Aanhangsel: 14, 17.
117 Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad, -10-1918, cited in Volksraad 1918-19:49-4.
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Surabaya were refused leave. No wreaths with red ribbons were allowed to be 
carried in the procession, but this instruction was ignored. Speeches were also 
inappropriate. In defiance of the ban, one of Bezema’s comrades, D. Kraan, 
stepped forward, coming within one step of the officer-in-charge after the 
order to march off had been given. Facing the grave and with his back to the 
officer – which was considered a grave insult – he held a speech. Kraan men-
tioned the word graveyard in relation to Onrust and said that Bezema was a 
victim of the conditions on the island. He added: ‘This is the way in which the 
government treats you men!’118 Kraan was silenced at once by the duty officer. 
The Director of Justice, Kraan’s superiors, and Idenburg all agreed that what 
Kraan had done had been ‘most grievous and insulting’.119 Kraan should be 
punished. This was not simply because of what he had done, the mood in the 
Navy weighted in very heavily. Bron pointed out that it should not be forgot-
ten what kind of persons were being dealt with. This consideration forced him 
to nip any manifestation of revolutionary fervour in the bud.10
Sailors protested. On the evening of Bezema’s funeral, 400 of them attended 
a meeting in Surabaya. They lamented the fact that Kraan had not been 
allowed to continue with his speech and called the internment of sailors on 
Onrust after they had served their sentence ‘in violation of the most elemen-
tary feelings of humanity’. They pleaded that the sailors who were still held 
on the island should be given better food and should be allowed to read what 
they wanted.11
Indonesian sailors also had their grudges. Differences in racial and ethnic 
background created animosities. Some Dutch officers had a low opinion of 
the seamanship of the Javanese. Crew from the Minahassa certainly looked 
down on the Javanese. They protested when the differences in treatment (and 
food) between Minahassan and Javanese sailors were abolished in October 
1914 because of the Great War. There was no justice in the Navy one Javanese 
sailor wrote in May 191, complaining about the treatment of Javanese sail-
ors.1 Among Indonesian sailors propaganda put about by the Union and 
by the Sarekat Islam had left an indelible mark. The same Indonesian sailor 
revealed that he had been punished for having in his possession Het Anker, 
the journal of the Bond van Minder Marine-Personeel, the rules of the Sarekat 
Islam, and other seditious literature, but this he could endure. He knew that 
those who were right dared and those who were wrong feared.1 Indonesian 
118 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1918-19:1; see also Volksraad 1918-19:494-.
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sailors could not join the Union of Lower-Ranking Naval Personnel, this was 
an exclusively European association, but they had their own organization, the 
Sinar Laoetan (Light of the Seas). Sinar Laoetan had been founded by an able 
Javanese seaman, M. Argawidjaja. Its leaders had wanted Sinar Laoetan to 
become part of the Sarekat Islam, but naval command had made it clear that it 
wanted nothing of the sort. Instead, Tjokroaminoto was its adviser.
In 1918 red had already been in fashion as a favourite colour for more than 
a year. ‘We live in the red century’, it was proclaimed at a meeting in Kudus. 
In Rampah in the north of Sumatra, the authorities forbade a new design 
for the Sarekat Islam flag: the crescent and stars on a red (and not a green) 
background. Similarly, at the mass meeting of the Semarang branch of the 
Sarekat Islam in the City Gardens at the end of December 1917, all members 
had donned hats adorned with a red piece of paper on which were written the 
initials S.I. The podium was decorated with red draperies, protest signs were 
coloured red.
The radicalization also manifested itself in the language used. There were 
two developments. One was that Indonesians began to loathe the use of Dutch 
in organizations with a mixed European-Indonesian membership. It had 
started innocently. About sixty Javanese members of Insulinde (the Javaantjes, 
those little Javanese, De Expres called them, a qualification not infrequently 
used by the newspaper) had held a separate meeting in Surabaya and elected 
their own board in June 1914. The move was welcomed in De Expres. At ordi-
nary meetings it was difficult to have to speak in both Dutch and Malay. In 
The Hague Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo attacked the decision. It was not in the 
spirit of Douwes Dekker. The gap between the races had to be bridged, not be 
re-instituted.14
Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo fought a losing battle. The editors of Goentoer 
Bergerak were criticized by readers who wanted to get rid of its Dutch section 
the following year. Opposition to bilingual publications assumed such propor-
tions that Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo had to make concessions. He published 
De Voorpost in December 191 and transformed Modjopait from a bilingual 
magazine into a Malay one. In the VSTP leftist Indonesians took control. It 
became an almost exclusively Indonesian organization. The Indo-European 
members, many supporters of Insulinde, had become a liability. So had the 
Dutch language. True to the multi-racial membership, Dutch and Malay were 
the languages of communication. Irrespective of the composition of the audi-
ence at all meetings each point on the agenda had to be discussed in both 
languages. Each speech was translated into the other language. The long-
14 De Expres, --1914; De Indiër 1-9.
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drawn-out practice had begun to irritate Indonesian members, who wanted to 
do away with it. The Semarang branch, by far the most radical one, was split 
in two in June 1918: one VSTP for Indonesian members with Malay as the 
medium of communication; and one for Indo-European members with Dutch 
as the language.1
The language battle reached its zenith in 1918 when the Djowo Dipo move-
ment gathered momentum. In an advertisement in Oetoesan Hindia, its founder 
announced his intention. In future he would address everybody in ngoko. 
Djowo Dipo members, recognizable by a triangle insignia with in Javanese 
the words Djowo Dipo written on it, stressed that kromo, the refined variant of 
Javanese in which superiors had to be addressed, was a language of ‘cowards, 
slimers, mock-humble people, and those spoiling the race’.1 Kromo was ‘poi-
son’. All signs of deference had to be abolished. Kromo was rejected by ‘the non 
arrogant (The Egalitarians or Democrats) and the rebels’.17 Djowo dipo, that is 
ngoko, the language used to address a person of lower or equal rank, should 
be used in private conversations and at public meetings. Some even had the 
nerve to address Europeans in ngoko. Egalitarianism was the aim. Javanese 
titles should no longer be mentioned. Those who came out in defence of kromo, 
and who had founded special organizations to combat the Djowo Dipo move-
ment in reaction, were represented as persons who blocked the advancement 
of the Javanese and supported their exploitation.
The movement gained great popularity. In the pages of Oetoesan Hindia 
its activities received plenty of attention and much was made of the fact that 
at Sarekat Islam and even at VSTP meetings Djowo Dipo was used. It was 
explained on one such occasion Djowo Dipo was used to assure that every-
body could understand what was being discussed. A great many branches of 
the Sarekat Islam established Djowo Dipo committees. Speaking ngoko was 
presented as the duty of a Muslim. Speaking kromo, thereby humbling oneself, 
implied a humiliation of Islam. Calls to speak only ngoko went hand in hand 
with pleas to provide children with a sound religious education and not as 
was the wont of the members of the Javanese civil service, to train them in 
sinfulness.18
Race had definitely become a mark of distinction in the nationalist move-
ment. In February 191 Tjipto had already complained that the Javanese dis-
trusted him because of his contacts with people of mixed race.19 In 1918 even 
Dutch ISDV members were forced to take the rap. In a weekly, described by the 
1 De Locomotief, 1--1918.
1 Oetoesan Hindia, 8-10-1918, 1-11-1918.
17 Sarekat-Islam Congres 1919:; Oetoesan Hindia, -10-1918. 
18 Oetoesan Hindia, 1-8-1918.
19 De Locomotief, --191.
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Dutch authorities as extremist, it was postulated that Baars was a European, a 
foreigner, and that he could well be motivated by the desire to make himself 
indispensable as a leader of and adviser to the natives. Everybody was intent 
on seeking his own advantage. Baars claimed that he lived and fought for the 
small man, but he had proved this? Could he live as the small man lived, could 
he eat what the small man ate?10
The rebuke to Baars was an exception. The prime victim of the radicali-
zation in the Indonesian nationalist movement was Insulinde. The unity of 
all Indiërs it championed was attacked as amounting to dreams of Indo-
European rule and nothing else. The fact that De Indiër, the newspaper of 
Insulinde was written in Dutch did not help. Taking this tack Insulinde 
could never reach out to Kromo.11 The divide had become greater because 
Insulinde had achieved more than a modicum of moderation and because 
of the perceived threat from abroad was more appreciative of the govern-
ment than before. Insulinde leaders pleaded for moderation in the present 
difficult circumstances (and were also a little bit afraid that Douwes Dekker 
might try to radicalize Insulinde again after his return). They condemned 
the rash strikes which sometimes ended in disaster. Calling strikes the last 
resort, when every other means had failed, Insulinde lashed out at people 
who ‘drove the workman-minimum wage-earner to desperation’ only to gain 
an image of courage and compassion for the people.1 Even a militia was no 
longer a taboo, though Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo hastened to explain that 
what Insulinde had in mind was different from what was being propagated 
by the Indië Weerbaar movement. Van Hinloopen Labberton and his friends 
wanted a militia to defend the interests of the rulers, of the ‘sugar lords’; 
Insulinde wanted a militia to defend the Netherlands Indies in the interests 
of its population (Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo 1917:0). The colonial authorities 
for their part no longer distrusted Insulinde. Muurling even went so far as to 
praise it in June 1918.1
Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo exacerbated the estrangement with the radical 
nationalist movement by rejecting the Djowo Dipo ideals. In October 1918 
he enraged the audience at Djowo Dipo meetings in Surabaya by addressing 
them in kromo. He was laughed at and had scorn heaped on his head. The 
conclusion was that people like him were no longer the real leaders of the 
nationalist movement and of the people.14 Douwes Dekker, full of plans to 
start a new weekly and then a Malay daily newspaper, was also to blame. 
10 Medan Boediman, 0-10-1918.
11 Sri Diponegoro, 8-10-1918.
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He was unprepared for the turn the nationalist movement had taken dur-
ing his absence. Douwes Dekker reverted to his old habit and embarked 
upon a propaganda tour, this time by car, throughout Java. Accompanied by 
European and Indonesian party leaders he visited about twenty cities in Java 
between  October and 1 November. Speeches were delivered in Dutch and 
Malay. In expounding his political ideas, Douwes Dekker followed the line 
Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo and Soewardi had already stressed. He said he gave 
priority to a national revolution, not to the class struggle. This also caused him 
to remark that Insulinde welcomed national capitalists, who belonged to the 
oppressed in a colonial society. A class struggle should not be fought before 
the Netherlands Indies had gained independence, especially not if it stressed 
race differences and distracted people from the ideal of reaching an independ-
ent state for the Indiër.1
By airing such opinions Douwes Dekker only succeeded in alienating the 
Indonesians who had fallen under the spell of the ISDV. His debating style 
contributed to this. Indonesians complained that Douwes Dekker treated them 
condescendingly during debates, and that he acted ‘coarsely and roughly’. As 
an example Djawa Kondo reported that Darsono, who only had a primary 
school education, had been called not mature enough for a debate by Douwes 
Dekker because of this. Insulinde should ensure that in future Douwes Dekker 
spoke about ‘Nasi in de maag’ (Rice in the stomach), and no longer about ‘Natie 
in de maak’ (Nation in the making).1 Darsono for his part wondered what rev-
olution Douwes Dekker aspired to. Was it one by Kromo, the little man, or by 
the middle classes? Douwes Dekker was a talker. He should understand that 
when revolution came it would be stomach-driven. It would not come about 
as the result of Douwes Dekker’s political theories. It would be better were 
Douwes Dekker to explain to Kromo how much he was being exploited by 
taxes, compulsory labour, factories, banks, pawnshops and the like, and how 
some of his richer compatriots assisted in his exploitation.17 Douwes Dekker 
also succeeded in insulting Semaoen. When Semaoen asked Douwes Dekker, 
for whom Western attire was a sign of emancipation of the Indo-Europeans, 
whether his nationalism went so far that he was prepared to dress in a sarong 
and head-cloth, Douwes Dekker dismissed this as a childish question.18
Exclusiveness seemed unavoidable. Movements sprang up which aimed at 
preventing people from taking a spouse from another race. According to their 
proponents, such a stand was justified by Islam.19 Indonesian members of 
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the ISDV also stressed the racial divide. Discussing the racial riots in Kudus, 
Semaoen, who must have been aware of growing anxiety in the European and 
Chinese communities, warned the Chinese and Europeans that they had come 
to Java only in small numbers and that they should stop trampling on the feel-
ings of the Javanese.140 Fortunately, a Chinese-Malay newspaper responded, 
there was still the Dutch army to quell unrest.141 Semaoen’s assessment of 
the Kudus riots provided Abdoel Moeis with the moment to get even. What 
Semaoen had written was exactly what he had said in Zurich and Holland. He, 
too, wanted to ‘free Kromo from the leeches of Capitalism’.14 Angrily Dutch 
members of the VSTP also reacted to an article by Semaoen in Si Tetap in which 
he had argued that with only one or two exceptions Indo-Europeans despised 
the Javanese. Semaoen was steadfast. At a VSTP meeting he stated that Indo-
Europeans only considered their own interests. He saw proof of this in a cost-
of-living allowance for railway personnel of only 8 per cent, which was all 
right for the Indo-European employees, but not for their poorly-paid Javanese 
fellow-workers. His words were greeted with rapturous applause.14
At meetings and in the press Mas Marco, Darsono and others suggested 
that Insulinde was an Indo-European organization which strove for a kind of 
self-government in which the natives would be assigned only a subordinate 
position.144 Bluntly Darsono, who on another occasion took great pains to 
underline that he did not agree with Semaoen’s racialist remarks about the 
Kudus riots and that socialists did not think in terms of either race or creed, 
told Douwes Dekker that unity of the races was impossible. Natives and Indo-
Europeans had conflicting interests.14 Elsewhere Douwes Dekker was given 
to understand that fraternity between Indo-Europeans and the natives was a 
chimera. It was unlikely to be accomplished as long as most Indo-Europeans 
continued to consider themselves superior (or as it was put on another occa-
sion were equalized to Europeans).14 Douwes Dekker could only counter this 
by stressing that Indo-Europeans who behaved in this way did not belong to 
Insulinde, and that various of its branches were headed by Indonesians.147 
Occasionally he could score a better point. At one meeting an Indonesian 
member of the ISDV, Soegono, pointed out that what Douwes Dekker wanted 
was excellent, but that, as not many of his race shared his ideals, it would be 
better were he to become a native. The remark was greeted with loud applause 
140 Oetoesan Hindia, 18-11-1918.
141 Pewarta Soerabaja, cited in Oetoesan Hindia, 18-11-1918.
14 Neratja, 9-11-1918.
14 Oetoesan Hindia, 1-8-1918.
144 Wasisir-Oetama, -11-1918.
14 Darma Kondo, -11-1918; Oetoesan Hindia, 18-11-1918.
14 Darma Kondo, 0-10-1918; Kaoem Moeda, 4-11-1918.
147 Kaoem Moeda, 4-11-1918.
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by the audience. Douwes Dekker reaped a similar applause when he replied 
that Insulinde was a party of Indiërs, and that in Zurich he had enrolled as a 
Javanese student.148 




Revolutionary fervour reached an unprecedented intensity in the Netherlands 
Indies in 1918. In Holland in retrospect the Ministry of the Colonies spoke in its 
annual report for 1918 about ‘a certain restlessness’ in the colony as a result of 
the activities of Sneevliet and others. This was an understatement. Unrest had 
been widespread.1 Again taking a backward glance the editor of De Indische 
Gids, E.A.A. van Heekeren, noted ‘serious happenings’. One was ‘a progres-
sive spirit of resistance in native society, which manifested itself in a mounting 
insecurity of persons and goods, in attempts made on Europeans’. The other 
was that the army was ‘affected by a spirit of disobedience’ (Van Heekeren 
1919b:13). In the Netherlands Indies the question of whether or not the indig-
enous population, and the other population groups perhaps as well, had lost 
faith in the government had emerged as an earnest subject of debate. In the 
People’s Council various members – J.J.E. Teeuwen, Achmad Djajadiningrat, 
Sastrowidjono, and Abdoel Rivai – repeatedly pointed out that large segments 
of the population from the highest level to the lowest echelon distrusted the 
government. A ‘spirit of discontent’ reigned. They argued that the anti-Dutch 
mood had been exacerbated by the poor economic conditions and by the high-
handed and conservative way in which Dutch people, civil servants, and staff 
of the estate in the vanguard, continued to treat Indonesians. Spokesmen for 
the colonial government denied that this was indeed the case.
The mood thus discerned coupled with doubts about the capability or 
even willingness of the colonial army to suppress large-scale popular unrest 
engendered renewed reservations about the creation of a native militia among 
Europeans. Arming natives under such circumstances might be danger-
ous (Van Heekeren 1919b:14). Cogently, many of the nationalist leaders 
continued to oppose a militia. Attacking Indië Weerbaar had become one 
of the ways for the ISDV activists to wrest control of the Sarekat Islam from 
Tjokroaminoto, Abdoel Moeis and other moderate leaders. To achieve their 
1 Koloniaal verslag 1919:47-8.
 Volksraad 1918:176, 186, 1918-19:35.
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purpose they hammered away at the argument that a militia was only of ben-
efit to no one but the capitalists, and that the Javanese population did not have 
much to fear if the Netherlands Indies were conquered by a foreign nation. 
Only the Dutch would lose their jobs, one of the ISDV members, B. Coster, a 
schoolteacher in Malang, for instance, stated at an ISDV meeting in Semarang 
in early September.3
Indië Weerbaar assumed the shape of the catalyst for a confrontation 
between the left and the right, which also set people in the European com-
munity at odds. Indië Weerbaar was intensely promoted by the colonial 
government and part of the white establishment. They did so with a certain 
urgency, afraid that it might not be long before war would be declared on the 
Netherlands because of the complications about the Dutch position which had 
arisen in Europe. A new Indië Weerbaar Association had been formed on 31 
August 1917. It united local Indië Weerbaar branches which were still extant 
or had been newly formed. A telegram was sent to Queen Wilhelmina to 
congratulate her on her birthday and to inform her about the founding of the 
new association. The chairman was K.A.R. Bosscha. Among the other mem-
bers of the board were G.J.C.A. Pop, one of the driving forces behind the new 
association, Koning of the KPM, and Muurling.4 A number of Indonesians 
also joined the board: R.A.A. Achmad Djajadiningrat, J.A. Soselisa, Pangeran 
Raden Soerio Atmodjo, Raden Temenggoeng Sosrowerdojo, and Raden A.A. 
Tirtokoesoemo. Lieutenant General H.N.A. Swart, adjutant to the Queen and 
Civil and Military Governor of Aceh, became honorary chairman. An Orgaan 
der Vereeniging ‘Indië Weerbaar’ (Organ of the Association The Resistant Indies) 
began to be published in February 1918. Initially Malay and Javanese trans-
lations of some of the articles were included. Later it would become a fully 
bilingual Malay-Dutch journal. A few months later a march, the Indië Weerbaar 
Marsch was composed by F.H. Belloni. A postage stamp was designed as 
well.
Initially the aim of the founders had been ‘military defence’. When this 
caused opposition – a few people wanted to do away with the term completely 
– the goal was changed to ‘economic and military defence’. Branches took 
the non-military part of the drive seriously, linking it with the development 
of the indigenous population. One example was the Banyuwangi branch. It 
funded a ‘domestic science school for native girls’ and a seedling farm for 
rice and ‘native crops’. The human body was not forgotten. As Bosscha said: 
‘the labourer and the soldier should be physically strong and possessed of the 
3 IPO 1917 no. 36, citing Kaoem Moeda, 6-9-1917.
4 When a general meeting was held in August 1918, the KPM promised a reduction in the fare 
for people who wanted to attend.
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stamina to be able to maintain our nationality’.5 Physical education should be 
promoted. True to this spirit, one of the many committees the board founded 
was a hygiene or health committee. What ‘use is the battle cry of the last few 
years “Indië Weerbaar” if it is not proceeded by “Indië gezond”’ (the Indies 
healthy), it was stated in an article about hookworm disease in 1919.6
The association claimed to have twenty-seven branches spread over the 
Archipelago in early 1918, with the promise of the founding of twenty-eight 
other branches. Not much later it was said that the association had 14,000 
members. A great deal of emphasis was placed on the fact that Indonesians 
had also joined and that in many places it had been they who had taken the 
initiative to found branches. It was too rosy a picture. An Indië Weerbaar 
meeting held in Yogyakarta in July 1918 was a failure. Almost nobody turned 
up and none of those who did come wanted to sit on the board of the local 
branch.7
The main objective of the new association was fund-raising. One of the 
suggestions made at the foundation meeting was to raise money especially 
for ‘a submarine for the Indies’. Opponents were of the opinion that the aim 
was unrealistic. The coastline of the Netherlands Indies was vast. One sub-
marine would cost at least two million guilders. Presenting only one was a 
mere trifle, as good as admitting the level of incapacity. If a gesture were to be 
made at least six or twelve submarines should be given. This would require an 
enormous amount of money. ‘Machine guns, for instance, would only cost a 
few thousand guilders’ or ‘aeroplanes which cost about Dfl. 40,000 a machine’ 
would be a much better proposition.8 Twenty-five aeroplanes would be a nice 
gift. Others suggested raising money for the defence of ports or for wireless 
communication with Holland. Money should also go to ‘volunteer motorbike- 
or bicycle-riders, and defence corps, shooting clubs, etc.’ and to the organiza-
tion of first-aid courses. The men who had founded the association seemed to 
have thought about almost everything, even about ‘the planning of factories 
and industries, which are suitable to be turned into munition factories within 
a short space of time in the event of war’.9
One of the achievements the new association did make was the organiza-
tion of an Indië Weerbaar Week in September 1918. The idea had come from 
the Batavia branch. This time there was no talk of buying armaments. The 
national board had rejected this option. It also had come to the conclusion 
that armaments were difficult to purchase. Instead, money should be raised to 
5 Orgaan der Vereeniging ‘Indië Weerbaar’ 1-:5.
6 Orgaan der Vereeniging ‘Indië Weerbaar’ -1:5.
7 Neratja, 7-7-1918.
8 Orgaan der Vereeniging ‘Indië Weerbaar’ 1-1:6.
9 Orgaan der Vereeniging ‘Indië Weerbaar’ 1-1:-4.
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improve the social position of the ordinary soldier and to build up a ‘central 
cash point’ to support the activities of local branches and other organizations 
with similar aims. The disruption of sea traffic had left its mark. In presenting 
the plans special emphasis was put on the fact that the present circumstances 
had shown how important it was that the Netherlands Indies made itself less 
dependent on imports, especially food. Economic development should be the 
catchword. True to this conviction, the Orgaan held articles about improving 
stock and other economic subjects. Industry, agriculture, and animal husbandry 
should be promoted to increase the self-sufficiency of the Netherlands Indies. 
One of the offshoots of the stress on economic development was the founding 
of a Nederlandsch-Indische Tentoonstelling Vereeniging (Netherlands Indies 
Fair Association).
The association had done its utmost to make the week a grand mani-
festation. Planning had started in April. In May a special committee had 
been formed to organize the festivities. Among its members were Koning, 
Muurling, J.A. Soselisa, and the patih of Batavia. Honorary chairman was 
A.C.D. de Graeff, the Deputy Chairman of the Council of the Indies. Other 
honorary members were Bron, Van Rietschoten, J.C. Koningsberger (chairman 
of the People’s Council), and Swart.
For one reason or another festivities started in Sumedang. Here the Indië 
Weerbaar week was held as early as the middle of July. In Sumedang Rhemrev, 
‘the father’ of the Indië Weerbaar movement, as the local Assistent-Resident 
Announcement of Indië-Weerbaar days in Bandung stressing the new goal of  
the movement: economic resilience (Orgaan der Vereeniging ‘Indië Weerbaar’ 1-6:3)
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chose to address him, played an active role. Rhemrev seemed to have under-
gone a volte-face. In the speech he gave he said that the new movement was dif-
ferent to the one first founded. It was no longer ‘purely militaristic’ but aimed 
especially at building up the economic resilience of the colony. Consequently 
an exhibition arranged in Sumedang stressed industry, agriculture, and stock-
breeding. The military aspect was confined to a demonstration with a military 
carrier pigeon.10 
In the first week of September other cities followed Sumedang’s example. 
All kinds of economic fairs were organized which highlighted agriculture, 
animal husbandry, and domestic production. Among the items prominently 
featured were such dire necessities as tinned food, cigars, soap, and products 
of the indigenous industry such as wajang puppets, textiles, and pottery. To 
add to the festive atmosphere, houses and vehicles were adorned with Dutch 
flags. During the festivities no population group was forgotten. There were 
attractions for everybody. In a great many cities in Java and elsewhere, the 
Indië Weerbaar week was the occasion for the usual festive events which had 
also coloured the independence celebrations: parades; military tattoos; early 
morning musical interludes by schoolchildren; all kinds of balls, open-air 
film showings; and European, Javanese and Sundanese theatre. The Javanese 
were entertained by wayang shows, and ronggeng and serimpi performances. 
People could also watch egg-and-spoon races on bicycles, soccer games for 
natives and Europeans, sack races, and fireworks. As in 1913, members of 
all population groups flocked to the events. In Saparua, the Indië Weerbaar 
Week even turned out to be an almost exclusively indigenous feast. Only five 
Europeans lived on the island, and two of them did not participate. One of 
the events on Saparua contemporaries deemed worth mentioning was the 
singing of an Indië Weerbaar song composed by a ‘native schoolteacher’.11 
In Java the Regents’ houses were a favourite venue to organize festivities for 
the indigenous Indonesians. Barracks held open days. Near Bandung sol-
diers acted out a mock battle. Before battle commenced, the audience could 
have a look at the weapons used, the mobile canteen, the wireless system, 
and the trenches that had been dug. Money was raised by asking entrance 
fees to events and by selling flags and cockades. The proceeds went to Indië 
Weerbaar, and also to charity. Patriotic speeches were held, the national 
anthem was sung, and telegrams were drafted to be sent to the Governor 
General or to Holland. 
The festivities in Batavia formed the climax. They lasted for eleven days. 
During the Indië Weerbaar week in Batavia ‘the sweetest of young ladies’, as 
10 Orgaan der Vereeniging ‘Indië Weerbaar’ 1-3:19.
11 Orgaan der Vereeniging ‘Indië Weerbaar’ 1-4/6:1.
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De Locomotief described them, sold Dutch pea soup, which also was a favourite 
treat in other cities, and, again according to De Locomotief, expensive little Indië 
Weerbaar flags.1 How many were sold is not mentioned. The number may 
not have been staggering. To commemorate the Indië Weerbaar week, 44,040 
poster-stamps had been distributed, but of these only 5,57 were sold, bring-
ing in 76.34 guilders.13
There were many activities in Batavia. People could admire a gymnastic 
display by soldiers, figure cycling, and a gymkhana, and attend all kinds of 
martial demonstrations. Among the latter were a military tattoo, flying shows, 
and demonstrations of the assembling of a mountain cannon and a mortar, 
and in loading machine guns. Van Limburg Stirum attended all these martial 
events. The public cheered. For the colonial elite there was a formal ball in 
the military club Concordia, a rare occasion because Van Limburg Stirum had 
continued the policy of his predecessor, Idenburg, of not holding such festive 
events at his palaces. It would only be on 4 March 1919 that the first ball was 
held at the Governor General’s palace in Buitenzorg, though this would still 
be a chaste occasion as ‘Steps’ were considered slightly immoral and thus 
were not allowed (Bijl de Vroe 1980:166). Ordinary soldiers were placated with 
leave or a Sunday duty roster.
Opponents of Indië Weerbaar were equally passionately busy. Among them 
were the members of the Batavia SDAP. Cramer called the Indië Weerbaar move-
ment the ‘Indies Junker Party’.14 He and other antagonists had likewise done 
their best to make the Indië Weerbaar week a memorable occasion. Everywhere 
in the city posters formulating the demands of the soldiers had been pasted up: 
better food, a better legal position, no more corporal punishments, and leave 
in Europe. Pamphlets were distributed and demonstrations planned. The reac-
tion of the military authorities was uncompromising. One of the victims was 
the chairman of the Batavia Branch of the Soldaten Bond (Soldiers’ Union). He 
was held responsible for one of the pamphlets which drew attention to the sol-
diers’ demands. His punishment was demotion from bombardier to ordinary 
gunman. He was also transferred from his relatively comfortable job at the 
warehouses of the Department of Defence to active military service. To make 
the punishment more provoking he was not allowed to leave the barracks, 
which made it impossible for him to continue his job on the side (many soldiers 
had such an additional source of income) as a cobbler. Cramer pointed out in 
the People’s Council that this punishment was made even more callous as the 
person in question suffered from ‘severe chronic rheumatism’ which made it 
1 De Indische Gids 1918, I:93.
13 Koloniaal verslag 1919:76.
14 Volksraad 1918-19:10
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impossible for him to participate in military exercises.15
Another pamphlet which attracted plenty attention was a call in Malay by 
the Batavia SDAP to attend a protest meeting organized in conjunction with 
Insulinde and the Sarekat Islam in the Deca Park on 1 September, the first day 
of the Indië Weerbaar Week. The pamphlet began by reminding Indonesians 
of earlier occasions on which the government had made them part with 
their money: Princess Juliana’s birth, the celebration of the Netherlands’ 
Independence, and the Onze Vloot drive. It was pointed out that people had 
obeyed a perintah haloes, a gentle order, not to mention less gentle hints, had 
‘stifled their curses’, and had donated. This time once again they were asked to 
sweat cash. Indië Weerbaar wanted the people’s money to finance the training 
of soldiers and to buy rifles. In the pamphlet it was suggested that it was the 
Indonesians who had to pay for these soldiers and rifles and that it was these 
very same Indonesians against whom the weapons would be used: 
Will it strike you that the projectile, bought with your money, hit you or your 
brother in the body? Make your wife a widow, your children orphans? But what 
more do you black wretches want to have than the honour of being a loyal subject. 
The people of Indië Weerbaar will toast your loyalty with champagne.16
The message was clear. Not a farthing should be given. The fine talk of Indië 
Weerbaar advocates about the development of the colony would only serve 
to ensure the continuation of Dutch rule. They did not bother themselves 
about the real needs of the population. The small Dutch flags which could be 
bought were but symbols of bondage. During the meeting itself the ISDV was 
conspicuously absent, though Alimin addressed the crowd. The soldiers were 
also absent. They had been forbidden to attend. Those who had disregarded 
the order were ejected by the police. In spite of these precautions European 
soldiers, the authorities estimated about one hundred, staged protest marches 
on 1 and  September. Fearing more protests the military authorities decided 
to act. Instead of enjoying leave or a Sunday duty roster soldiers and NCOs 
were confined to the barracks. Dutch officers kept watch to prevent any mis-
chief. Armed patrols were out on the street.
Much went wrong in Batavia during the Indië Weerbaar Week. Cavalrymen, 
machine-gunners and other soldiers had trained for two days for a military 
tattoo on  September. De Locomotief described the parade which passed the 
palace of the Governor General as ‘marvellous’. Nevertheless, it was not ‘the 
buglers, drummers, staff music, battalion music, fife players’ who were the 
cynosure of all eyes and excited colonial society.17 Demonstrating soldiers 
15 Volksraad 1918-19:464.
16 De Indische Gids 1919, I:89-90.
17 De Indische Gids 1918, I:93
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singing the Internationale who preceded the tattoo stole the show. The cavalry 
had to disperse them.
Not everything that happened could be ascribed to the machinations of the 
anarchists and ellendelingen, wretches, to borrow the words Bijl de Vroe used 
to describe people like Baars, Sneevliet, Brandsteder, and Schotman (one of the 
organizers of the meeting in the Deca Park), whom he held responsible for the 
protests. Two flying shows were held in the mornings of 1 and  September 
at the Koningsplein, the present Medan Merdeka, on the northern side of 
which the palace of the Governor General was located. During the second, the 
engine of one of the aircraft failed. The plane crashed. The pilot was seriously 
wounded and died a few days later. The accident had consequences for the 
defence of the colony. As Bijl de Vroe noted: with one more plane down, half 
the colonial air-force of four planes was out of action (Bijl de Vroe 1980:16).18 
Neratja drew a different lesson from the incident: it was a clear indication that 
‘Nature’ did not want the Indië Weerbaar movement in the Netherlands Indies 
18 Little more than a week later yet another plane crashed.
Cakalele dance at the Indië Weerbaar exhibition in Bandung in 1918 (Orgaan der 
Vereeniging ‘Indië Weerbaar’ 1-4/6:15)
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to continue in its present militaristic form. Economic development and educa-
tion should come first.19 Among the restless soldiers, the accident almost led 
to a fight between Moluccan or Manadonese soldiers (the source was unable 
to make up its mind which of the two groups was involved) and the police. 
It started when policemen stopped the soldiers who were running into the 
direction of the plane wreck. One of the soldiers protested. This was followed 
by an exchange of abuse and him being hit on the head by a mounted police-
man. His friends joined a verbal ‘attack’. Policemen had to draw their pistols 
to keep the soldiers at a distance. The soldiers vented their anger by pelting 
the policemen with stones.0
The establishment of the People’s Council with twenty-one European, fifteen 
Indonesian, two Chinese and one Arab member had not made the opposition 
to Indië Weerbaar less vehement among Indonesians. Batavia and The Hague 
were well pleased with the quasi-parliament they had bestowed on the colony 
and never ceased speaking about the new political relationship that had taken 
shape. In a telegram to Van Limburg Stirum Pleyte called the opening of the 
People’s Council on 18 May 1918 ‘the most memorable day’ of his ministerial 
life.1 Van Limburg Stirum had sent an equally jubilant telegram to The Hague. 
Nationalist leaders likewise welcomed the creation of the People’s Council. 
Neratja even launched a campaign for a People’s Council Monument. Tjipto 
Mangoenkoesoemo, critical as ever, concluded that by establishing the People’s 
Council ‘the government got so many feathers in its cap’ that it resembled an 
Indian with his cock’s feathers as head-dress’.3 Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo 
was exaggerating. From the start, and this for a variety of reasons, the People’s 
Council met with fierce opposition from within all population groups. One of 
the major points of criticism, also shared by its members, was that the powers 
of the People’s Council were limited, even too limited for some Dutch people 
who wanted greater independence for the colony. Consequently it had gar-
nered all kind of nicknames. Volksraad palsoe, False People’s Council, Barnum 
and Bailey People’s Council, couveusekindje, premature baby, are just of few of 
these (Van Heutsz 1917b:3). It was a real representative parliament with real 
powers, which even the more moderate faction in the Sarekat Islam argued, 
whose task it was to decide on the institution of a militia.4
If anything, Abdoel Moeis and others who had initially supported Indië 
19 Neratja, 1-9-1918.
0 Neratja, 3-9-1918.
1 De Locomotief, 9-5-1918.
 Neratja, 8-1-1917.
3 Volksraad 1918-19:159.
4 Oetoesan Hindia, -10-1918.
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Weerbaar had sharpened their critical faculties. Probably they were also disil-
lusioned by the fact that their earlier campaign to obtain concessions from 
The Hague in return for a militia had borne no fruits. Though less radically 
than the opponents from the left, Abdoel Moeis began to stress that he could 
not consent as long as the Indonesians had nothing worthwhile to defend, in 
short had no ‘fatherland’. To show how little was done for the development 
of the Indonesian population, he pointed out that expenditures on defence 
accounted for between 0 and 30 per cent of the colonial budget, that for edu-
cation only between .5 and 5 per cent.5
Diminishing support for Indië Weerbaar went hand in hand with dete-
riorating relations in the Sarekat Islam between its Islamic and leftist wings. 
In October 1917 Sneevliet had stated that the members of the central board 
of the Sarekat Islam had turned away from the masses and had destroyed 
the ‘fresh, young movement’ the Sarekat Islam once had been. They should 
forsake their policy of ‘no action, no agitation’, a course of action Rinkes had 
asked them to follow, and should no longer rely only on consultation with 
colonial government and the submission of requests.6 In their turn in Oetoesan 
Hindia Sneevliet and the other Dutch radical propagandists of the ISDV were 
accused of having sown discord in the Sarekat Islam by their relentless agita-
tion against the Indië Weerbaar movement. They were said to have succeeded 
in convincing the ‘stupid and less educated element among the Natives’ that 
their leaders were ‘traitors to the people’; a qualification Baars denied as ever 
having used.7 Neratja spoke about the rotten influence – boesoek was the word 
that was used – of Sneevliet and Baars on the Sarekat Islam.8 Aversion in the 
Boedi Oetomo was perhaps even stronger. During a debate in Surakarta with 
Dwidjosewojo in September 1918 Baars accused the Boedi Oetomo of being 
supported by the capitalists so that they could continue to exploit the people 
in September 1918. One of the members of Boedi Oetomo responded to this 
insult in Darmo Kondo. He ended his article with the Dutch words: ‘Leave us 
alone! Leave all that concerns our land and people completely to us, we our-
selves will carry the ups and downs of our own future in the name of God.’9
Since then the antagonism in the Sarekat Islam had only increased. The 
moderate leaders refused to let control slip from their hands. They could still 
count on plenty of support. Members made it clear where their loyalty lay by 
shouting ‘Follow the Sarekat Islam! Follow the Sarekat Islam!’ when presented 
with the choice between the Sarekat Islam and ISDV. Briefly it appeared that 
5 Volksraad 1918:148, 543.
6 Het Vrije Woord, 0-10-1917 (Tichelman 1985:67).
7 Oetoesan Hindia, 14-9-1917, 15-9-1917, 17-9-1917 (Tichelman 1985:636, 64).
8 Neratja, 13-11-1918.
9 Neratja, 6-10-1918.
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unity had been restored. This happened at the third national Sarekat-Islam 
Congress which was held in Surabaya at the end of September and the begin-
ning of October 1918. It was deliberately convened just in advance of the next 
session of the People’s Council, so as to be prepared if the native militia were 
to come up for discussion. Behind closed doors a truce was reached between 
Abdoel Moeis, who had been attacked even more vehemently by the European 
and Indonesian members of the ISDV after his debate with Baars in September 
1917. Even the fact that Abdoel Moeis owned a motor car was used as a 
powerful argument against him. Abdoel Moeis’s Neratja, in turn, questioned 
Sneevliet’s, using his past employment by the Soerabaiasch Handelsblad and the 
Semarangsche Handelsvereeniging to argue that Sneevliet had always been 
a tool of the capitalists.30 The immediate cause to talk matters over had been 
that Neratja had called Sneevliet and Baars divisive elements in the indigenous 
movement. In reaction the Semarang branch of the Sarekat Islam called for 
Abdoel Moeis’s resignation. After Abdoel Moeis had defended himself spiritly, 
a compromise was reached. Abdoel Moeis, Darsono, and Semaoen, all three 
pledged to uphold the principles of the Sarekat Islam. They also promised not 
to fight out their differences in the press but to try to talk it out in the board 
of the Sarekat Islam. They would refrain from personal attacks and would 
criticize only one anothers’ deeds.
It was the congress which afterwards was so much hated by Idenburg for its 
radicalism. The leftist members as usual lashed out against the Indië Weerbaar 
movement. They gained some success. As late as October 1917 Tjokroaminoto 
had still threatened to step down if the Sarekat Islam would condemn the Indië 
Weerbaar movement. A year later a motion rejecting a militia was accepted by 
the congress. Abdoel Moeis supported it.31 Tjokroaminoto assumed a more 
radical tone. Provoked by Semaoen, he indicated that if the government was 
not prepared to carry out political reforms, the Sarekat Islam itself would insti-
tute representative bodies. Not much later, in a speech in the People’s Council, 
he would accuse the government of having misunderstood the pro-Indië 
Weerbaar motion of the Sarekat Islam of August 1916 and of having started 
preparations for a militia without granting the population more rights.3 On 
top of all this, Semaoen gained a seat in the central board of the Sarekat Islam. 
He became commissioner for the northern part of Central Java.
Baars was jubilant about the congress’s outcomes. He concluded in Het Vrije 
Woord, predicting turbulent times when hunger or a ‘sugar debacle’ would 
come about, that Tjokroaminoto’s words meant that Tjokroaminoto, though 
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According to Baars what had transpired at the congress showed that the 
Sarekat Islam had become a revolutionary organization, prepared to act, and 
much more revolutionary than its counterparts in British India. Proudly he 
claimed that all this had been brought about by the Indonesian members of 
the ISDV. Baars concluded that the Sarekat Islam had made an important step 
forward in becoming a ‘class-organization of labourers and farmers’.33 Less 
radical Europeans drew a similar conclusion: Tjokroaminoto had come under 
the spell of the ISDV leaders and the Sarekat Islam would in future follow the 
course of action propagated in Het Vrije Woord and in the radical indigenous 
press.
Semaoen was also pleased. He concluded that his inclusion in the board 
and the other decisions taken were proof that his revolutionary socialist 
opinions prevailed in the Sarekat Islam and were highly appreciated by the 
board.34 Indeed, the central board announced at the end of the month that 
strikes which aimed at improving the circumstances of labourers, or started to 
33 Sarekat-Islam Congres 1919:71.
34 Oetoesan Hindia, 18-10-1918.
Indië Weerbaar festivities in Tapanuli in 1918 (Orgaan der Vereeniging ‘Indië Weerbaar’  
1-4/6:18)
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fight for their rights or to combat arbitrary treatment should be endorsed.35
Within days the unity achieved at the congress broke up. Trouble started 
when Neratja published an editorial ‘To Canossa’ on  October. The author 
probably was the newspaper’s other editor R. Djojosoediro. It certainly was 
not Abdoel Moeis, who was still in Surabaya. Later Abdoel Moeis apologized 
for what had been written and pledged that all articles in Neratja about the 
Sarekat Islam in future would be signed.36 In ‘To Canossa’ Semaoen was called 
a splijtzwam, a divisive element, and a person influenced by Sneevliet and 
Baars. Triumphantly it was observed that by accepting the agreement with 
Abdoel Moeis Semaoen had backed down. Semaoen reacted by writing ‘Tidak 
berobah’ (Unchanged) published in Soeara Ra’jat on 1 October. In it Semaoen 
wrote that his ideas were lakoe, popular, while Neratja was not. He asserted 
that the course of the Sarekat Islam was much closer to his own one than that 
of Abdoel Moeis and that it was easy for revolutionary socialists to strive for 
the principles of the Sarekat Islam. Again he stressed that he was not under 
the influence of Sneevliet and Baars. Such an assessment was an insult to the 
Javanese. It suggested that they were more stupid than Europeans.
In an atmosphere of unrest and agitation, news about the socialist revolutions 
in Europe sent a shockwave through the Dutch community in the Netherlands 
Indies. Rumours did the rounds about ‘the proclamation of a republic of 
Holland’ and about Troelstra proclaiming that ‘the socialists would have no 
scruples about resorting to violence’. In their news telegrams, newspapers 
frequently reported about the activities of Republican movements in Holland, 
Germany and the rest of Europe, and about the many strikes which were 
taking place all over Europe. One of these reports stated that in Holland the 
population wanted to stage large-scale disturbances.37
Some feared that something similar could happen in Java. There was plenty 
to worry about. Rice prices on the international market had risen steeply since 
September. One of the reasons for this was that Japan, itself threatened by a 
food shortage, had been forced to make emergency purchases abroad. Siam 
had to ban the export of rice in October because of a disappointing harvest. 
Rice imports from French Indochina and Burma also dried up. In the Straits 
Settlements the transport of rice to the Netherlands Indies was no longer 
allowed.
The export bans came at an unfortunate moment. In the Netherlands Indies 
the prospect of a shortage of food had re-emerged. The production of rice and 
maize was threatened by an exceptionally long drought. In June in the People’s 
35 Sarekat-Islam Congres 1919:64.
36 Neratja, -10-1918, 15-10-1918.
37 Bijl de Vroe 1980:164; Neratja, 16-11-1918, 18-11-1918.
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Council Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo and Tjokroaminoto had spoken about 
hunger in Central and East Java, West Borneo, and Sumbawa.38 The colonial 
administration prepared for the worst. The export of sago, sago products, peas 
and beans, and chickens from the Netherlands Indies was forbidden. In the 
Priangan the cassava acreage was expanded.
In retrospect the annual report of the Ministry of the Colonies concluded 
that the future had looked worrisome.39 It also noted an extraordinary rise in 
the price of rice in certain parts of the colony.40 Idenburg himself described the 
food situation as ‘very sad and gloomy’.41 Large parts of Java, as Talma was 
to say in the Volksraad on  December, had become ‘completely dependent’ 
on government hand-outs of rice, edible roots, and maize on the market.4 
From 15 October part of the Priangan cassava harvest had been distributed in 
other parts of Java to alleviate food shortages. With the same aim in mind the 
government had to distribute lentils in villages near Surabaya. In Yogyakarta 
measures had to be taken to assure the supply of food for the workers on the 
estates. In Madura rice was rationed. Yet another measure taken was to change 
the diet of soldiers. They were expected to eat less rice and more bread and 
potatoes.43 Ambonese soldiers complained that they were no longer served 
bread but sago at breakfast.44 In order to have distribution proceed smoothly 
Batavia informed the railways that it intended to transport large quantities 
of food by rail in early November. The transportation of other commodities 
would have to cede priority. The advance warning could not prevent the short-
age of engines and wagons delaying the distribution of food. 
The trade in a number of foodstuffs was again subjected to government 
control. The most important of these were rice, maize, cassava, and sago. The 
transportation of rice was forbidden from between Residencies, except under 
special licence. In November 1918 the Residents in Java once again were given 
the authority to fix a maximum price for food, not only for staples but also for 
such products as tinned milk. Rice also had to be shipped to regions outside 
Java. In the East Coast of Sumatra the government created a special Office 
for Foodstuffs with branches in the subdistricts, which acted as the buyers of 
rice and sago and sold cheap ‘government rice’. An ordinance to force estate-
owners outside Java to grow food-crops for their labourers was issued in 
September 1918.
Malay and European newspapers in the Netherlands Indies speculated 
38 Volksraad 1918:15, 318.
39 Koloniaal verslag 1919:61-.
40 Koloniaal verslag 1919:61-.
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about a pending food crisis. One of them, the Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad, sug-
gested a novel solution: the ‘native associations’ should promote the growing 
of rice outside Java, that is should encourage Javanese to migrate to other 
islands.45 Malay-language newspapers were full of reports about how expen-
sive rice had become and about hunger. Sections with headings like‘ Perkara 
makanan’, Food cases, and ‘Lapar Hindia’, Hunger in the Indies, at times cov-
ered a page or more. When it became known that Rangoon had stopped the 
export of rice, Neratja announced the news under the headline ‘Moelai lagi’, 
It is starting again.46 At the end of October Kaoem Moeda wrote that ‘Kromo 
shouts, Kromo cries, because his stomach is empty and he is on the brink of 
death, but the money devils do not worry about this’.47 Again there was also 
some good news about new foodstuffs having been invented. In Buitenzorg 
a teacher at the secondary agricultural college invented what he called kwak, 
dollop, made from cassava. It could be eaten raw, could be stored for months, 
and was said to taste like a biscuit.48
There was one difference with earlier food scares: the Spanish influenza. It 
climaxed in November 1918 and claimed an unprecedented toll of victims in 
that month. The Spanish influenza was mentioned as an additional reason for 
the food shortage. The rice-fields of peasants with influenza remained untilled. 
Others who had just recovered from the illness were still too weak to work the 
fields. People were disturbed by the fact that malnutrition made everybody 
more vulnerable to the epidemic and exacerbated the effects. People who 
had caught influenza were unable to work, and therefore to earn an income 
for themselves and their families large enough to buy adequate amounts of 
healthy food. A plethora of committees was formed to provide financial and 
food aid to influenza sufferers and to distribute medicines among them. They 
operated alongside others which aimed to help the poor and the hungry. The 
link was also perceived by the Civilian Medical Service. In a circular letter 
published in December 1918, the service stressed that medical treatment by 
itself was not enough. On its own it was not enough to combat the illness if 
the patients were weak or undernourished. Poor families had to be provided 
with food. The service suggested that Batavia should set up a network which 
reached down to the villages to provide care and food for the needy.
Though some peasants profited from the increasing price of food, worsen-
ing living conditions set the stage for growing agitation. In sugar-producing 
areas the farmers began to complain about the rent they received for their 
land, which, they argued, was too low in view of the high prices of almost 
45 Volksraad 1918-19:365.
46 Neratja, 19-10-1918.
47 Kaum Moeda, 8-10-1918.
48 Neratja, 4-11-1918.
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all the goods and foodstuff they had to buy.49 The rural unrest fortified some 
Dutchmen in their long-standing suspicion that members of the Sarekat Islam 
were out to kill the Europeans and Chinese.50 In the cities leftist soldiers and 
sailors, under the impression of the revolutionary developments in Europe 
joined in demonstrations and held meetings to voice their demands and 
protests. In Surabaya, Batavia, and Semarang especially the leftist movement 
among soldiers and sailors made its mark. Troops had to be confined to bar-
racks. In naval circles there was talking about a mutiny.51 The editor of De 
Indische Gids, Van Heekeren, drew the right conclusion when he wrote that the 
Dutch means of exercising power were weak (Van Heekeren 1919b:140).
Because of their anti-Indië Weerbaar agitation coupled with what was hap-
pening in Europe, no socialist, even not those who had deplored the revolu-
tionary agitation of Sneevliet in the past, was any longer trusted. Discussing 
49 Oetoesan Hindia, 6-6-1918.
50 Neratja, 6-11-1918.
51 Bijl de Vroe 1980:6; McVey 1965:3; De Indische Gids 1919:89-91.
Opening of the Volksraad by Governor General Van Limburg Stirum, 18 May 1918  
(KITLV 4513)
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the revolutions in Europe was a taboo subject at public meetings of leftist 
organizations.5 Upset by stories that socialists in the Netherlands Indies 
would ineluctably follow the European example, the authorities even put a 
close watch on their leader, Cramer. His only fault was that he was a social 
democrat and that he did not hide the fact that he was pleased with the turn 
political developments had taken in Europe. Rumours were rife that Cramer 
would lead a march to the palace of the Governor General to demand a trans-
fer of power.53 
The political developments in Europe gave a boost to the revolutionary 
élan of the leaders of the Indonesian nationalist movement. Semaoen was 
impressed. In Sinar Hindia, the new name of Sinar Djawa, he published an 
article about what would happen if Batavia were to refuse to recognize the 
socialist government in Holland and he ventured into the possibility of a social-
ist government in the colony. Semaoen remarked that because the number of 
Indonesian socialists was small, the assistance of Sneevliet, Baars, Brandsteder 
and other Dutch ISDV members would still be essential. European socialist 
soldiers and sailors were also indispensable to the new socialist country. Their 
role would be to protect it against an assault by capitalist states such as Great 
Britain and Japan.54 A Dutch translation appeared in De Indiër. In Soeara Ra’jat 
(Voice of the People, which had superseded Soeara Merdika as the Malay-lan-
guage newspaper of the ISDV, and called Soeara Baars, the Voice of Baars, by its 
enemies) Darsono urged his fellow-countrymen to rise up in rebellion. ‘What 
can stop the common man once he rebels? Let the red flag wave!’ (McVey 
1965:3.) Elsewhere, in a letter to De Locomotief, Darsono wrote that he and other 
revolutionary socialists wanted ‘action, resistance’ and that they would fan up 
‘the glowing hatred, which is beginning to be kindled in the hearts of Kromo, 
so that our fight against capitalism, against economic oppression, grows even 
more bitter and the day of victory will soon be there’.55 Even Tjokroaminoto 
warned that if the ‘enemy did not change its course large-scale disturbances’ 
would be the result. He stressed that hurt feelings and hunger were weapons 
in the hands of the Sarekat Islam.56 W. van Ravesteijn, a Communist member 
of the Dutch Parliament, concluded that the Netherlands Indies were living 
through ‘eventful times’. He observed among ‘the native population tremen-
dous unrest and commotion which are the consequence of the social develop-
ments which have taken place and still are taking place all over the world’.57
5 Volksraad 1918-19:19.
53 Volksraad 1918-19:3; McVey 1965:31.
54 Sinar Hindia, cited in De Indische Gids 1919:643.
55 De Locomotief, 9-11-1918, cited in Volksraad 1918-19:.
56 Oetoesan Hindia, 17-11-1918, 18-11-1918.
57 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1918-19:01.
The Netherlands Indies and the Great War596
In the People’s Council Cramer tried to impress upon the government the 
need for change and far-reaching reforms, including the transformation of 
the People’s Council into a true parliament. He and like-minded spirits in the 
People’s Council argued that the revolutions in Austria, Germany, Hungary 
and elsewhere in Europe had demonstrated that repression did not work and 
in the end would only begin a revolution. Reforms were all the more neces-
sary because the Netherlands Indies might be teetering on the threshold of a 
food crisis. Cramer warned that the government should not think that matter 
would not come to this pass: 
We live in a time of great events, in which all the thrones in Europe are tottering, 
in which militarism, we hope, is finished, in which nobody can say in advance 
whether we are standing on the threshold of a social revolution. [...] It is certain that 
among soldiers as well as among the general population the revolutionary spirit is 
not lacking.58
These were ‘stirring times’. Asia would not remain unscathed by the political 
developments in Europe.59
Speaking in the People’s Council on 16 November, Cramer announced 
that the present circumstances necessitated a ‘concentration of the pro-
nounced democratic Native and European elements’ to strive for reforms 
which were ‘necessitated by the events which had taken place in Europe’.60 
Five members of the People’s Council – Cramer, who had taken the initiative, 
Tjokroaminoto of the Sarekat Islam, A. Sastrowidjono of Boedi Oetomo, and 
Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo and J.E.E. Teeuwen of Insulinde – met to discuss 
how to use the occasion to press for political reforms. Promising that they 
would do all they could to keep their followers under control, they urged for 
the establishment of a real parliament.
Van Limburg Stirum was among those Dutch people in the Netherlands 
Indies who thought it very likely that Holland might go the way of Germany 
and Russia. He had even discussed about how to proceed should a social-
ist revolution succeed in Holland with his advisers. It would mean a break 
with the fatherland. The Netherlands Indies would continue on its own 
(Locher-Scholten 1981:87). Van Limburg Stirum could relax somewhat after 
he was informed about developments in Holland by Idenburg in a wire of 
15 November. The telegram contained some alarming news. It spoke about 
‘[w]idespread nervousness caused by Troelstra’s speeches [...] urging imme-
diate transfer government to socialists following German example’. The 
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Beerenbrouck, had declared that the government ‘will resist all violence and 
attempts overthrow constitutional powers’ and that ‘this declaration was fol-
lowed by general movement [in] all quarters to resolutely resist revolutionary 
movement’. Fortunately, the telegram ended on a reassuring note: ‘Yesterday 
nervousness considerably allayed Troelstra declared no intention use vio-
lence’.61 The telegram was received in Batavia on 17 November with much 
relief. Its contents were published immediately. Nevertheless, newspapers 
still contained reports about Troelstra’s demand that as in Germany a socialist 
government should be formed in Holland (and that women’s suffrage should 
be introduced) on 18 November.6
No revolution took place in Holland and Queen Wilhelmina had not abdi-
cated as was rumoured in Batavia (Locher Scholten 1981:87-8). This reality 
did nothing to dissuade Cramer, Stokvis, and Teeuwen from pleading for fun-
damental changes. Teeuwen expressed the hope that Batavia and The Hague 
would learn a lesson from the collapse of governments in Europe which 
‘relied on the power of the military, relied on censorship, on the restriction of 
associations, on the imprisonment and banishment of political enemies and 
so on. Mr Chairman! Where are these governments now? Does one want to 
go the same way here?’63 Oppression was dangerous. Only a policy based on 
justice and cooperation with all population groups could save colonial rule. 
Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo, other Indonesian nationalists, and the vernacular 
newspapers also continued to give dissertations about a revolution and what 
changes were needed to prevent this.
The news from Holland was, of course with some exceptions, greeted with 
delight by the Dutch community. When Koningsberger opened the new ses-
sion of the People’s Council at nine o’clock in the morning of the 18 November, 
he started by expressing his gratitude that ‘no turn about of affairs has taken 
place of such an abrupt nature as would make it difficult to reconcile with the 
well-understood, permanent and true interest of the Mother Country’.64 
Talma made a surprise appearance in the same session. His words mir-
rored the relief with which the authorities had received Idenburg’s first tel-
egram. Talma began by saying that the reports received from the Netherlands 
were a source of gratitude, especially so because they clearly showed that the 
people in Holland did not intend ‘to be robbed by violence of their national 
treasure of constitutional institutions by a minority’.65 He also called it gratify-
ing that the government in The Hague wanted to ‘implement with full speed 
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social reforms, following the legal road, and maintaining order’.
Evidently international developments and the domestic threats of a severe 
food shortage, an unruly labour force and mutinous soldiers and sailors, and 
growing discontent among the population had upset the Governor General 
and his advisers. They showed themselves prepared to make far-reaching 
concessions to gain broadly based support in society in an effort to avert the 
danger of a break-down in law and order. After his opening remarks Talma 
added that the ‘new direction which the most recent world-shattering affairs 
have prescribed also laid down the course which also has to be followed here’. 
Having said this, he added the qualification that what Batavia had in mind 
was ‘less a change of course than an acceleration of tempo’. Nevertheless, 
he mentioned new relationships and shifts in powers between the colonial 
government and the People’s Council. Talma announced that ‘in these tense 
days’ the government desired closer contacts with the People’s Council, and 
intended to discuss with its members how this could be achieved; all this to 
secure ‘domestic peace’ and to ‘keep the spectre of a bitter food shortage out-
side the door’.
Another reason Talma adduced to explain why Batavia strove for ‘hearty 
cooperation’ with the People’s Council was its effort ‘to raise the general level 
of prosperity’. Because this implied the removal of ‘abuses’ in the sugar indus-
try, Talma announced the establishment of a committee of inquiry into such 
evils. Tjokroaminoto had been invited to sit on it. (Among its members would 
also be J. Schmutzer, who had spoken out in defence of the estate industry in 
the People’s Council.) While denying that there was ‘general discontent’ in 
the army, Talma also promised improvements in the living conditions of the 
soldiers and in the military criminal code. And he had more good news: Van 
Limburg Stirum had asked The Hague for a Royal Decree to specify the exist-
ing general ban on associations and meetings of a political nature.
On the day Talma made his speech in the People’s Council, Idenburg 
could wire still more reassuring news from Holland: ‘Today enormous crowd 
demonstrating against revolution cheered queen royal family Malieveld 
Hague’.66 The telegram referred to a huge manifestation in the afternoon of 
the same day on the Malieveld in The Hague. At the entrance to the park 
soldiers had unharnessed the horses from the royal carriage in which Queen 
Wilhelmina, her husband, and Princess Juliana were seated. Amidst the cheers 
of a large crowd they had pulled the carriage along. Idenburg’s telegram was 
received in Batavia on 0 November (Van Miert 1995:144). Following the news 
from Holland, reports quoting from Dutch appeared in newspapers in the 
Netherlands Indies recounting the failure of any revolutionary plan the social-
66 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1918-19:086.
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ists in Holland might have had. They stated that ‘the danger of a revolution 
had passed’, that ‘Holland was safe again’, and informed their readers about 
massive demonstrations of loyalty to the Queen in Holland.67
Talma had not voiced a totally new opinion about the future of the People’s 
Council on 18 November. In May, at the opening of the People’s Council, Van 
Limburg Stirum had already alluded to a semi-independent colony governed 
by his administration in cooperation with the People’s Council. At that time 
Van Limburg Stirum had spoken about an ‘unwritten constitutional law’ 
which would develop and about the shifting of competence from the moth-
erland to the colony.68 The crux of the matter was how long it would take 
before the population was considered mature enough to take such a step in 
his eyes and in those of the policy-makers in Holland. A second indication 
that Van Limburg Stirum was in favour of at least some political reform had 
come in June 1918. Talma had noted that the discussion of the colonial budget 
had given the government the strong impression that the ‘development proc-
ess’ of the People’s Council had gone faster than expected. He indicated that 
political concessions, albeit modest ones, might be made, though he refused to 
state what form these would take. He had said that the government deemed 
a ‘development process’ desirable, and had coupled this with the caution that 
matters should not be rushed. Efforts should be concentrated on developing 
the People’s Council within the legal boundaries set.69
In his 18 November speech Talma elaborated on the same theme. He 
did not promise the People’s Council full parliamentary powers in the near 
future, but this did not matter. From all sides this was how his words were 
interpreted. What Talma had said was grist to the mill of Indonesians and 
Europeans dreaming of the greater independence of the colony. Neratja, of 
which Abdoel Moeis was no longer an editor since 14 November, even wrote 
that Van Limburg Stirum had promised self-government. It concluded that 
developments in Europe had induced a turn to a more democratic political 
structure all over the world and that the colonial government did not want to 
lag behind and therefore intended to follow the same course.70
European and Indonesian members of the People’s Council jumped at 
Talma’s suggestions, and asked for significant reforms in the near future. In 
the morning of 0 November, members of the People’s Council met in a closed 
session to discuss Talma’s speech. The answer they formulated was accepted 
on 5 November. The People’s Council promised to cooperate in the efforts to 
avert the ‘spectre of bitter food shortage’. The members of the People’s Council 
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clearly also wanted to seize the opportunity presented. They asked to be 
informed as quickly as possible about the reforms Van Limburg Stirum would 
suggest to The Hague and inquired whether these reforms also concerned the 
relationship between the colonial administration and the People’s Council. To 
make it all the more clear what they had in mind, at the end of the reply it was 
observed that Batavia should be given the power to decide on measures taken 
to improve the political and economic situation in the Netherlands Indies 
independently of The Hague.
Members of the People’s Council wanted to move fast. Tjokroaminoto, 
Sastrowidjono, Dwidjosewojo, Radjiman, Cramer, Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo, 
Abdoel Moeis, Teeuwen, and Thajeb proposed a motion urging for a ‘parlia-
ment elected from and by the People, with full, legislative power and the estab-
lishment of a government accountable to this parliament’ on 5 November.71 
The new constellation should be realized before the mandate of the People’s 
Council expired in 191. When the motion was submitted Koningsberger 
revealed that he knew that Batavia was ‘spontaneously’ preparing measures 
which were in concert with the motion, and that a special committee would be 
formed headed by J.H. Carpentier Alting, President of the Supreme Court.7
Batavia’s answer came on  December. Talma, clearly satisfied with what 
he was to say and with the impression his November speech had made, reaf-
firmed Van Limburg Stirum’s intention. Once again Talma drew attention to 
the impact of the political developments in Holland and the rest of Europe: 
‘Everywhere radical reforms of Public Institutions on the basis of new prin-
ciples are deemed essential, or – when these had already been accepted – in 
a faster tempo’.73 This time Talma recalled how the People’s Council, envis-
aged as a ‘mere advisory body [...] with a very limited task’, had grown 
in importance ‘at very vast tempo’ in the previous six months. ‘Unwritten 
constitutional law’ had developed much faster than expected. Talma agreed 
that this achievement could partly be attributed to the People’s Council itself, 
but Batavia also took some credit. It had consciously tried to stimulate this 
development. Talma used this observation to deny the opinion that Batavia 
had watched the growing influence of the People’s Council with alarm. He 
also said that Batavia regretted the doubts voiced about its sincerity when it 
spoke about reforms. Mutual trust and cooperation was what the Netherlands 
Indies needed, and this applied to the government and the People’s Council. 
To stimulate this, a special government commissioner would be appointed to 
serve as a liaison officer between the colonial administration and the People’s 
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of part of the European and Malay press a threat to the unity of all groups; a 
condition it deemed essential to be able to weather the difficult times ahead. 
Talma even called what he said about the press a warning. He revealed that 
a number of times Batavia had considered sterner regulations to act upon 
stirrings of agitation in the press. In the end, it had decided against pursuing 
these. The reasons Talma gave were that Batavia did not want to impede the 
development of the indigenous society and that the remedy would be worse 
than the disease, and would only result in bitterness. 
Talma promised that more reforms were in store. These would be realized 
soon, ‘now that the general political current is running in a direction which 
places in the vanguard, as the number one demand, a greater say of those 
ruled in the government of the country’. The ultimate goal was ‘a central gov-
ernment with participation by and accountability to the native population’. 
Observing that reforms were impossible without a ‘substantial extension of 
the competence of the People’s Council’, Talma announced the formation of a 
Commissie tot Herziening van de Grondslagen van den Staatsinrichting van 
Nederlandsch-Indië (Commission of Inquiry into the Form of Government 
of the Netherlands Indies). It would be chaired by Carpentier Alting. Among 
the persons invited to sit on the Herzieningscommissie were s’Jacob, H.H. 
Kan, R.M.T.A. Koesoemo Oetoyo, W.M.G. Schumann, Teeuwen, and A.L. 
Waworoentoe. The commission was installed on 0 December. This time it 
was Van Limburg Stirum himself who spoke about the changed relationship 
between the People’s Council and the colonial administration, and the need for 
legal reform (Van Helsdingen 196:6).
There were even more goodies in store. Talma’s speech was laden with 
promises. Local councils would be given more responsibilities. The relation-
ship between mother country and colony would have to change ‘possibly with 
a shift in centre of gravity’. When the People’s Council wanted to use the right 
of inquiry, Batavia would do all it could to assist. All legal or administrative 
discrimination based on religion and race would be abolished. Only on rare 
occasions in future would the government resort to detention on remanding 
in future. Batavia also intended to mitigate the ban on political organizations 
and meetings, and considered it a ‘painful deficiency’ that because of difficulty 
in communicating with Holland, no new rules had yet been promulgated. 
Talma also announced a committee, headed by Schumann, which would have 
to study working conditions and labour relations in the Netherlands Indies. 
Refining on this, Talma said that it was the duty of the government to draft 
labour legislation to protect the economically weak.
As a word of caution Talma took up the familiar theme that the popula-
tion was not yet mature enough for a true democracy. The political reform 
Batavia had in mind could only be realized if there was ‘a broad population 
group with sufficient development and moral strength to call its own leaders 
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to account for the policy they pursued as representatives of the population’. To 
reach this stage, a schooling in ‘the responsible exercise of authority’ would be 
necessary. The government was prepared to provide this through ontvoogding, 
decreasing the role of the Dutch as the voogd, guardian, of Indonesian society, 
giving the Indonesians a greater share in regulating their own lives and soci-
ety. Another way would be through the creation of provincial councils to act 
as bodies of indigenous authority. 
The following day Achmad Djajadiningrat and five others submitted a new 
motion. One of their points was that there should be a Rijksraad (Empire coun-
cil) in which all parts of the empire, each with its own government should be 
fairly represented. All members of the People’s Council had to be elected. The 
People’s Council itself should be given legislative power and should decide on 
the budget of the Netherlands Indies, and no longer have merely an advisory 
function.
Van Limburg Stirum had yet even more surprises in store. On 8 November 
Koningsberger had adjourned the debate in the People’s Council to allow R. de 
Kat, Director of theDepartment of Government Enterprises, to make a state-
ment. De Kat announced that the government intended to establish a ‘Bureau 
for Social Affairs in State Enterprises’. It would be headed by someone with 
practical experience in the field, ‘who has sympathized with the social progress 
in Western countries’. To attract such a person, the government was prepared 
to pay a high salary. The task of the bureau was to promote good industrial 
relations, especially in such vital government enterprises as the public rail-
ways and the post, telephone, and telegraph services. It should formulate 
proposals about working hours, pensions, health services, and other financial 
support for people in temporary appointment. De Kat also announced that by 
improving conditions of employment in the state mines Batavia hoped that 
the labour force of contract labourers and convicts could be replaced by one 
consisting of professional miners in permanent employment.74
Soldiers were not forgotten in this orgy of promises. In November Batavia 
established a committee of advice to look into their pay. Van Rietschoten, 
while still stressing that there was nothing wrong with the morale in the 
colonial army was suddenly prepared to make some concessions when he 
addressed the People’s Council on 3 December. He promised better food, bet-
ter housing, and an amendment of the military penal code. Teeuwen saw this 
not only as an opportunity to stress once again that the Netherlands Indies 
did not need soldiers from Europe. He hammered home that Indonesians 
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The aversion of the socialist danger was also the moment to stage a show of 
loyalty in the Netherlands Indies. Impressed by the massive display of royal-
ism in Holland, influential figures in the Dutch community organized a peti-
tion among Dutch citizens in the Netherlands Indies and the Straits Settlements 
to express their loyalty to and love for the Queen at the end of November. The 
initiative for what the Malay press called the Comite Memoeliakan Radja 
(Committee for the Glorification of the Queen) had been taken by J. Schaap, 
editor-in-chief of the Java-Bode. Koning, Berretty of ANETA, Zaalberg (who had 
left the Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad in June), E.A. Zeilinga (President of the Javasche 
Bank), and J.H. Houtsma of the NHM were among the persons who backed the 
initiative. Support was also pledged by R.A.A. Achmad Djajadiningrat, S. Ismail 
bin Abdoellah Alatas (an Arab), J.A. Soselisa (an Ambonese), Waworoentoe 
(from the Minahassa), and O.H. Kouw (a Chinese).
The movement was well planned. Agents of the NHM, KPM, and the 
Javasche Bank were instructed to assist in the drive to collect signatures. The 
cooperation of European and Indonesian civil servants was also enlisted. 
Newspapers were asked to promote the drive for signatures. Lists circulated 
in government offices, European schools, cinemas, and restaurants. Even in the 
Zoological Garden of Batavia people could sign a list to testify to their loyalty 
to the Queen. Within days the committee could wire to Van Limburg Stirum 
that the number of people who had signed was ‘enormous’.76 The European 
Dutch reacted with enthusiasm. The will to sign tapered off among the indig-
enous population and could not be compared with the wave of the declara-
tion of loyalty in the closing months of 1914. The Minahassa, parts of North 
Sumatra and other Christian regions formed an exception.77 At times – in East 
Sumatra and in Penang in the Malay Peninsula – the expression of loyalty was 
coupled with the demand that Troelstra should be banished from Holland. 
Batavia was not fated to bathe in total, uncritical glory. Some Indonesian 
nationalists received the November promise with scepticism. Indonesian 
members of the People’s Council were upset that Van Limburg Stirum had 
extended his hand to them individually, but had not made any gesture of 
goodwill towards the organizations they headed, which were still treated with 
distrust. People were also aware that politicians and the business community in 
Holland would never agree to fundamental reforms. The Indonesian members 
would not refrain from expressing their surprise about the reforms suggested. 
They rightly surmised the reasons for the sudden change in policy. Abdoel 
Moeis concluded that fear had once again been effective.78 Nevertheless, he 
76 Neratja, 3-1-1918.
77 Neratja, 3-1-1918; De Indische Gids 1919, I:387.
78 Volksraad 1918-19:530.
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observed that if he read the intentions of the colonial government correctly, 
independence might only be gained in ‘the far, far distant future’.79 He also 
expressed the worry that what Van Limburg Stirum might have in mind was 
the independence of the colony and not independence of the autochthonous 
population. Abdoel Moeis and others were fully conscious of the fact that the 
colonial authorities suddenly no longer considered them too ‘unripe’ to have a 
share in the governing of the colony. Batavia even gave the impression that it 
appreciated their nationalist activities, which not so long before it had roundly 
condemned. 
Many Dutch people were outraged. Talma’s suggestions occasioned a 
storm of protests in the Netherlands Indies, where the Dutch-language press 
in its usual savage style lashed out against Van Limburg Stirum, and this 
action was repeated in Holland after the news had reached Europe. The Dutch 
people in the Netherlands Indies were usually not averse to greater political 
independence. Some even dreamed of a dominion status. Van Limburg Stirum 
(or his principal advisers, who according to some were most to blame), how-
ever, had gone too far, even in the eyes of some who viewed the nationalist 
movement with some degree of sympathy. De Locomotief commented that the 
population was not yet mature enough for political change. Motivated by the 
‘revolutionary epidemic’ in Europe, Batavia had embarked on an ‘abnormal 
passion for reform’.80
In Holland there was yet a second reason to tear a strip off Van Limburg 
Stirum. Talma had also announced the intention to decrease the acreage 
planted with sugar and tobacco on European estates in 1919. Talma said that 
Batavia was prepared to go as far in this as the food situation demanded.81 
Van Limburg Stirum, who earlier in 1918 when he had issued the exports 
bans had been praised for his determination, came under attack for the way 
he handled the situation. His critics accused him of having bowed to the 
pressure exerted by the nationalist movement. In Holland, the Netherlands 
Indies, and abroad the opinion was voiced that Van Limburg Stirum had 
panicked. Especially the promise to reduce the production of sugar in 1919 
– if necessary by 30 per cent – in anticipation of a possible shortage of food 
did not go down well. The conclusion was that Van Limburg Stirum had suc-
cumbed to ‘a few hot-headed members of the People’s Council’, to the ‘wild 
demands of a revolutionary party’. He had shown excessive lenience towards 
‘a few Native fanatics’.8
D. Fock, the chairman of Parliament, and from 1905 to 1908 Minister of the 
79 Volksraad 1918-19:50.
80 De Locomotief, 3-11-1918.
81 Volksraad 1918-19:440.
8 Regeering 1919:3, 8; De Indische Gids 1919, I:393.
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Colonies described Van Limburg Stirum’s stand as very peculiar, inexplicable, 
and incomprehensible.83 He was angry. Van Limburg Stirum had acted on his 
own initiative without informing Idenburg in advance about his intention to 
set political reforms in motion. Discussing the powers of People’s Council was 
a prerogative of Parliament in Holland. A Governor General should never on 
his own initiative publicly air his personal opinions on the subject. The time 
had not yet come for fundamental changes. Idenburg reassured Fock. The 
Dutch government might consider some minor changes in the functioning of 
the People’s Council, but no significant extensions of its powers were foreseen. 
Later, the announcement about a possible reduction in the sugar acreage was 
enough reason for Fock to take an almost unprecedented step. In April 1919, 
when it had finally become clear what had transpired in Batavia in November, 
he addressed Parliament about Van Limburg Stirum’s mistakes and the bless-
ings brought by the sugar industry to Java and attacked the crude political 
campaign against the estates. It was the first time in forty years that a chair-
man of Parliament had taken the floor to speak. Fock’s criticism and the way 
he expressed ‘deeply wounded’ Van Limburg Stirum’s feelings (Van Anrooij 
001:16).
In Holland the independence the Netherlands Indies had raised some heck-
les. The Algemeen Handelsblad commented that the expectations Van Limburg 
Stirum had created with his headstrong and weak policy could lead only to 
bitter disillusionment. It would make Holland’s heavy task even more bur-
densome.84 Van Limburg Stirum had lost his head, even the communist D.J. 
Wijnkoop concurred.85 Yet others depicted Van Limburg Stirum as spineless. 
Both in Holland and in the Netherlands Indies people called for Van Limburg 
Stirum’s resignation. Advanced as a good candidate to replace him was Colijn, 
who had made no secret of the fact that he thought the People’s Council with 
its ‘tribunes of the people’ could best be abolished, and that no time should be 
wasted in reacting to ‘hyper-criticism’.86 The harsh judgements passed on Van 
Limburg Stirum annoyed Idenburg. He explained that Van Limburg Stirum 
had acted for economic reasons, not because he had felt pressured by dem-
onstrations and protests: ‘This Governor General is not a man to be cowed. 
He is not under the thumb of the capitalists, nor is he under the thumb of the 
leaders of the people.’87
The political developments in Holland allowed the authorities in the 
colony to breathe more easily. With the wind out of the sails, the fine words 
83 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1918-19:014.
84 Algemeen Handelsblad, cited in De Indische Gids 1919, I:607.
85 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1918-19:070.
86 De Indische Gids 1919, I:63-3.
87 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1918-19:078.
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and the promises of reform did not bring about any lasting changes. It was 
even denied that there had ever been any such intention. Repression now set 
in. The first victims were the ISDV activists. Up to then the authorities had 
done no more than keep Sneevliet and Baars under close surveillance. As late 
as the middle of November Cramer had still praised the government because 
it had informed the People’s Council that it did not intend to banish Sneevliet 
and Baars. The reason, Batavia had explained on 16 November, was that it ‘did 
not want to hamper the exposure of abuses, nor the organizing of actions to 
obtain better living conditions’.88 Two days later, in his 18 November speech 
Talma announced the decision to ban Sneevliet; though he did not mention 
him by name, simply referring to a person who ‘in spite of serious warnings 
even in such days as these tries to paralyse the organs of public authority’.89 
Talma said that the colonial government had acted with regret.90 His words 
may well have been mere window-dressing. The decision to banish Sneevliet 
probably would have been taken earlier had shipping between Holland and 
the Netherlands Indies not come to a standstill. The arrival of the Noordam and 
Tabanan had now opened the opportunity to get rid of Sneevliet. In Augustus 
1918 Sneevliet’s friend, J.C. Stam, one of the ISDV members who had been 
active in organizing soldiers and sailors, had already reported from Java to De 
Tribune in Holland that such a step was being prepared by the colonial authori-
ties (Morriën 1984:77-8).
On 18 November, in one and the same breath, Talma suggested that simi-
lar measures might well be taken against ‘persons stepping into the limelight 
who are playing with fire by flirting with extreme elements’.91 A few days 
later Brandsteder was detained in the military prison in Batavia. In Het Vrije 
Woord he had exposed the cruelty and arbitrariness of military punishments 
and had urged soldiers to refuse to administer corporal punishment, or, as 
Neratja chose to phrase this, to beat up their fellow-soldiers. Brandsteder was 
accused of inciting wilful disobedience.9 The Court of Surabaya had sen-
tenced him to three months’ imprisonment, nine months fewer than had been 
demanded. At the hearing Brandsteder had brought along the heavy metal 
ball prisoners had to carry and the iron fetters and manacles used for kromslu-
iten. When his appeal was turned down Brandsteder was arrested without 
any advance warning, when he happened to be in Batavia to advise the local 
Soldiers’ Union. Soldiers and sailors protested. One of their actions drew tre-
mendous public attention. Enraged about the arrest of Brandsteder, probably 
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no more than twenty-five soldiers and sailors met in the building of the Bond 
van Minder Marine-Personeel on the evening of 0 November. They decided 
to strike in protest of Brandsteder’s arrest. The participants in the meeting 
were arrested, but the following day a small group of soldiers did indeed go 
on strike. They walked out of the gate of the barracks and roamed through 
the city. Some returned to the barracks in the course of the day. The diehards 
assembled in the union building. Carried away by revolutionary fervour they 
discussed taking the city by force. Eighteen soldiers were arrested and imme-
diately transported to the punishment detachment in Ngawi.93
Once again it was one of his articles which ultimately prompted Batavia to 
take action against Sneevliet. Het Vrije Woord published ‘Honger en machts-
vertoon’ (Hunger and displays of power) on 16 November. In it Sneevliet 
addressed himself to the soldiers of the colonial army. Recalling the display of 
force used to suppress unrest in Java, he wondered whose power the soldiers 
were representing. His conclusion could be foreseen. It was that of the govern-
ment which was acting in the interests of the ruling class, the owners of banks, 
factories, and estates; persons who were strangers to hunger and lived a life 
of luxury; people, who 
using all kinds of subterfuges seized control of the land for their sugar factories, 
diverted the irrigation water that makes the land fertile to it, who even in times of 
imminent food shortage preferred to grow sugar instead of returning the sawahs to 
the people for the planting of rice. 
Sneevliet urged European soldiers, who themselves came from urban work-
ing class and poor farmers’ families, to show the same understanding for 
the Javanese they were ordered to suppress as soldiers in Holland had dis-
played towards the riots by the members of their own class. Referring to 
the Indonesian soldiers, Sneevliet noted that they were extremely capable of 
understanding why Kromo refused to take it any longer. Soldiers from Ambon 
and the Minahassa should understand that ‘Kromo does not ask for bullets 
and death, but that he has every right to stand up for his life’. Soldiers who 
were aware of the conditions in the Netherlands Indies – ‘hunger, disease, 
deprivation, the burden of taxation, unfathomable misery, luxury, flashiness, 
making a profit at all costs’ – should execrate the task they were ordered to 
perform. In Europe soldiers showed their solidarity with the people. This 
should guide them when orders were given which could make them the mur-
derers of their own brothers, whose only crime it was that they did not want 
to die silently of starvation, that they longed for a little more freedom, a little 
more happiness in life. In conclusion Sneevliet suggested the soldiers turn to 
93 Neratja, 3-11-1918; Soerabaiasch Handelsblad, cited in De Indische Gids 1919, I:58.
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the Soldiers’ Union, the Sarekat Islam, and the ISDV to contrive the means to 
ensure themselves a decent existence.94
The authorities considered ‘Honger en machtsvertoon’ a blatant appeal 
to refuse to undertake military duties. They saw it as an outright attempt to 
sow hatred. Sneevliet’s appeals to join soldiers and sailors unions, or soviets 
as these were sometimes also referred to in the vernacular press, were consid-
ered subversive. As could be expected the announcement that Sneevliet was 
to be banned was highly acclaimed in European circles. For months people in 
Holland and the Netherlands Indies had been demanding Sneevliet’s expul-
sion. Among those who made such a plea was the editor of De Locomotief 
who was alarmed by the strikes and the unruly behaviour of the soldiers. 
Vowing to respect human rights, he argued that the rights of an individual 
were constrained by public interest. This was all the more true under present 
conditions. Only a ‘strong regime’ could safely guide the Netherlands Indies 
‘through a period in world history of which not many realize the tremendous 
gravity’.95 Sneevliet and other agitators should not be allowed to sow disorder. 
It did not matter that no crimes had been committed. What counted was that 
they resorted to dangerous methods to incite ‘a primitive population’.96 Some 
went even further. Recalling the fate of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, 
it was hinted in Jahns Advertentieblad, published in Malang, that if the govern-
ment did not act ‘the citizens will be ready to give the instigator to murder, 
arson and rape what is coming to him’.97
Abdoel Moeis and other Indonesians had voiced the same demand. Some 
leaders of the Sarekat Islam condemned the actions of Sneevliet and Baars 
as detrimental to the interests of the Indonesian population. They wondered 
why the colonial authorities had not yet taken any action. There was even 
more reason to banish Sneevliet and Baars than there had been in the case 
of Douwes Dekker. In the same breath they accused not only a number of 
European newspapers, which still wrote in the same insulting tone as they 
always had done about the natives and the nationalist movement, but also Het 
Vrije Woord, Soeara Ra’jat, and Sinar Hindia of sowing hatred. Some added the 
Chinese newspaper Djawa Tengah, and curiously enough also Oetoesan Hindia 
to the list.98 The compromise that had been reached between the Islamic and 
leftist factions at the party congress had temporarily put an end to the calls 
within the Sarekat Islam to banish Sneevliet. True to this spirit, in the People’s 
Council in November Tjokroaminoto stated categorically that the Sarekat 
94 Het Vrije Woord, 16-11-1918.
95 De Locomotief, 1-4-1918.
96 De Locomotief, 13-4-1918.
97 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1918-19:070.
98 Neratja, 5-11-1918, 13-11-1918.
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Islam was against the expulsion of Sneevliet and Baars.99 
 Nevertheless, after the decision to ban Sneevliet had been announced, 
some Indonesians could not conceal their delight. Neratja welcomed the 
news. In an editorial printed in larger type Neratja stigmatized Sneevliet as 
an anarchist who had set up Indonesian organizations against one another to 
serve the interests of his own small group, and who had planted the seeds of 
discord and mutual resentment in the nationalist movement. Praising him for 
his ability to expose abuses, Neratja pointed out that of late Sneevliet had done 
so without taking the interests of the indigenous population into account and 
without accomplishing a change for the better.100 
Support for Sneevliet from within the nationalist movement seems to 
have been more widespread. There were letters to the editor of European 
newspapers and other forms of protest. The secretary of the Sarekat Islam 
sent an address to Parliament in The Hague to protest about the decision to 
banish Sneevliet. A number of local branches of the Sarekat Islam – Semarang, 
Salatiga, Surabaya, Gondong, Demak, Babat, Cirebon, and Tegal – sent tel-
egrams to the People’s Council. The Union of Rail- and Tramway Personnel 
in Semarang, Pekalongan, and Surakarta did the same. The Sarekat Islam 
branch in Surabaya set up a fund for organizing financial assistance to victims 
of government repression. Sneevliet was to be the first recipient of its ben-
efactions (Van Heekeren 1919b:138). The Semarang branch sent Van Limburg 
Stirum a telegram informing him that Sneevliet’s banishment had caused so 
much frustration, the word used was sakit hati, that people had been poised 
on the brink of a riot, but that the board had succeeded in calming down emo-
tions, thereby preventing disturbances. Such words caused perturbations in 
the European community. A number of European newspapers perceived the 
telegram as a threat. Leaders who could calm people down could also incite 
them.101 Naturally ISDV branches protested.
Some Dutchmen also disagreed. In the People’s Council Teeuwen said 
that the government ‘should allow this man to stay in the Indies. He makes 
a good living here and he is not dangerous enough to ruin.’10 Yet another 
argument was advanced in the Nieuwe Courant in Semarang. What Sneevliet 
really wanted was a revolution in Europe. Banning him from the Netherlands 
Indies meant that he could return to Holland on the first available shipping 
opportunity, and would not have to wait for months like others.103 Another 
daily, the Sumatra Post, suggested Sneevliet’s banishment was a sign of weak-
99 Volksraad 1918-19:184-5.
100 Neratja, 18-11-1918.
101 Bataviaasch Handelsblad, cited in Neratja, 7-11-1918.
10 Volksraad 1918-19:46.
103 Nieuwe Courant and Sumatra Post, cited in De Indische Gids 1919, I:381.
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ness. Sneevliet should be allowed to continue with his rash actions and wild-
cat strikes. In the end ‘the masses’ would realize that such a course only hurt 
them. Van Heekeren, the editor of De Indische Gids, was appalled by such 
reactions. He himself applauded the banishment and mildly criticized Batavia 
for waiting too long. In a colony with a still largely uneducated population, 
Van Heekeren argued, actions against Sneevliet and other demagogues were 
a matter of self-preservation. From Van Heekeren’s perspective, Sneevliet and 
his political associates had shown sure aim. They had targeted ‘the pillar of 
our rule in those extensive territories: the army’ (Van Heekeren 1919a:67).
The authorities were determined to put an end to the ISDV agitation once 
and for all. ISDV branches were so frequently refused permission to hold 
meetings, that even a political adversary like Teeuwen protested. Teeuwen 
had an additional point to make. He wondered why the ISDV meekly sub-
mitted to the government’s power to forbid meetings. It made the ISDV ‘a 
placid, legal association, in its acts completely non-revolutionary’.104 Such 
an attitude contrasted sharply with what the Indische Party had done in the 
past. European members of the ISDV and soldiers who distributed ‘Honger 
en machtsvertoon’ and other pamphlets among soldiers and sailors were 
apprehended. Those who were found guilty were sentenced to three months’ 
imprisonment instead of the six months demanded. Semaoen, who had made 
a Malay translation, was given two weeks. Repression seemed to work. A lec-
ture by Baars on  November on ‘Bolshevikisme’ had to be cancelled because 
almost nobody turned up.105
Investigations were also started against authors of both recent and older 
articles in Sinar Hindia, Soeara Ra’jat and other leftist publications. In the eyes 
of both Dutch people and Indonesians these investigations were clearly linked 
to the ‘Sneevliet press offence’. Quizzed were Semaoen, Mas Marco, Darsono 
and other Indonesians. Semaoen was sentenced to four months’ imprisonment 
in 1919. He used the opportunity to write a novel: Hikayat Kadiroen (Semaoen 
000:ix). Another victim of the harsher mood among the Europeans was 
Tirtodanoedjo, an editor of Oetoesan Hindia. He was accused of having incited 
its readers to resist the police; that is policemen who acted incorrectly. He was 
sentenced to six months’ imprisonment.106 
Sneevliet, Brandsteder, and Baars all were externed and left the Netherlands 
Indies. Sneevliet demanded to be brought before the court instead of being 
expelled. It was to no avail. He was questioned by the Resident of Semarang, 
who was especially interested in his appeals to establish soldiers’ and sailors’ 
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train to Batavia, and shut in the military prison. Sneevliet was served with the 
decision of the Governor General to exile him on 5 December 1918. He left the 
Netherlands Indies aboard the Noordam on 0 December. In the early 190s he 
acquired fame as a member of the Executive Committee of the Communist 
International and founder of the Chinese Communist Party. In April 194 
he was executed by a German firing-squad in Amsterdam (see Tichelman 
1974). Baars was determined to leave the Netherlands Indies. The Mayor of 
Semarang had offered him a job as municipal engineer, but he refused. Baars 
left for Holland in the spring of 1919. The following year he returned to the 
Netherlands Indies and was employed as an engineer by the municipality of 
Semarang, only to be banished in May 191 (Tichelman 1985:8). Brandsteder 
served his three month’s prison sentence. Remembering Sneevliet’s recep-
tion in April the previous year, the authorities had a military guard at the 
railway station when he returned to Surabaya after he had been released in 
February 1919. As it was only a few sailors turned up to meet him. A welcom-
ing party was organized in the building of the Sailors’ Union. Brandsteder 
was banned from the Netherlands Indies in September 1919. The main stated 
reason to expel him was his articles in the Soldaten- en Matrozenkrant. He left 
the Netherlands Indies the following month and moved to Russia. In 197 
Baars returned to Holland. He died in Auschwitz in 1944.107 Brandsteder, who 
was also sacked by the headquarters of the Union of Lower-Ranking Naval 
Personnel in 1919, went to live in Holland. He died in 1986.108
Members of the ISDV who were in government service were transferred to 
outposts. Van Limburg Stirum had concluded a few months earlier that expel-
ling all the social democrat teachers, some of whom had made no secret of 
the fact that they sympathized with the protesting soldiers and sailors, would 
have been impossible.109 One of the first victims had been G. van Burink, a 
teacher at the Dutch-Chinese School in Semarang. To punish him for his agita-
tion among the soldiers he was transferred in June 1918. The government had 
planned to post him in Gorontalo. When Van Burink protested Batavia decid-
ed on the small island of Banda Neira in the Moluccas. Van Burink resigned to 
become a private teacher.110 
107 Tichelman 1985:8, http://www.iisg.nl/archives/nl/files/b/1079033full.php.
108 http://www.iisg.nl/bwsa/bios/brandsteder.html.
109 Morriën 1984:80; Van Heekeren 1919b:146; Van Limburg Stirum to Pleyte, 9-5-1918, NA, 
Kol. Openbaar, Vb. 17-6-1918 6. 





The armistice on the Western front on 11 November 1918 rendered some of 
the measures the colonial government superfluous. The ban on reporting on 
troop movements was lifted before the end of the month. Foreign consuls were 
again allowed to send telegrams in code after February 1919. Muurling’s PID, 
formally created to gather information about activities which might endan-
ger neutrality, was disbanded in April 1919. During its brief existence it had 
acquired such notoriety that the abbreviation continued to be used in popular 
speech for years after to refer to the gathering of political intelligence by the 
colonial authorities (Poeze 1994:231).
A native militia never saw the light of day. Batavia and The Hague refused 
to take the final step which would have permitted it to be raised. To arm a large 
section of the population was too dangerous. Perhaps the only Indonesians 
ever called to arms were the son of the Regent of Semarang and another 
Javanese pupil of the HBS in Utrecht, about whose fate Soewardi reported in 
Het Volk. They contacted the Minister of the Colonies in their efforts to escape 
conscription. The only advice the latter could give was that the best course for 
them to take would be to arrange their passage back to Java.1
In the Sarekat Islam the different factions continued to quarrel. During its 
national congress in October 1918 no decision had been taken about the ques-
tion of whether the party should concentrate on its religious aims or should 
give preference to the economic and political emancipation of the Indonesian 
population. It had also not decided which tactics should be adopted: the ‘revo-
lutionary’ road propagated by Semaoen and Darsono, or the parliamentary 
route advocated by Tjokroaminoto and Abdoel Moeis. When these points 
came up again, the contention sounded the death knell of the already troubled 
cooperation between the leftist and the Islamic leaders of the Sarekat Islam. 
1 Neratja, 16-11-1918.
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The leftist members founded the Indonesian Communist Party in 1920 and 
they were gradually forced out of the Sarekat Islam between 1921 and 1923. 
The sugar estates remained a major source of agitation. Events in the clos-
ing months of 1918 and early 1919 were a repeat of those at the beginning 
of 1918. Sugar and rice dominated the news in the press in the Netherlands 
Indies. Between February and December the government had still been able 
to import 2 million piculs of rice worth 17 million guilders, but the stock of 
government rice would suffice only till March, and this only if imports from 
abroad were not to dry up completely. Batavia did not preclude the eventual-
ity that the moment might come at which rationing would be required. In its 
efforts to avert a serious food crisis, it even arranged for the import of soya 
beans from Manchuria in early 1919.
The upshot of the new food crisis was that the sugar estates once again 
became the target of an intense campaign propagated by both the radical and 
the more moderate wings of the nationalist movement. The Sarekat Islam 
wanted to ‘wage a war fought in a way which was legally permissible’ against 
the sugar factories.2 Much to the horror of the Dutch authorities, a reduction in 
the sugar acreage had become a subject about which leaders of the nationalist 
movement among them Tjokroaminoto were contemplating calling a strike. In 
the People’s Council, he stigmatized private sugar estates as obsolete.3 
As in the previous years, again there were pleas by the government to 
intensify the growing of alternative food crops. Estates were asked to expand 
their food crop acreage. Initially the response had been positive. The chairman 
of the Landbouw Syndicaat (Agriculture Syndicate), T. Ottolander, travelled 
round Java in the first weeks of November 1918, appealing to estate manag-
ers to comply. Some decided to plant rice on their land as a secondary crop. 
Such initiatives did not prevent the outbreak of a bitter war of words about 
whether or not the estates had been doing enough to assist in preventing the 
onset of a food crisis. In regions where water was scarce, it was intimated that 
estates refused to relinquish the part of the irrigation water they depended on 
for the growing of sugar cane, thereby preventing the growing of secondary 
crops on a large scale. The suspicion was also rife that rice and other second-
ary crops were planted only on waste land and not on the fields of farmers on 
their estates, who consequently also did not profit. A more serious outcome 
was that farmers who had listened to the exhortations of the government and 
had planted rice as a secondary crop saw their harvest fail through lack of 
irrigation water. In some places this was an additional reason why the harvest 
though not totally ruined was so poor. The government blamed the farmers. 
2 Neratja, 13-11-1918.
3 Oetoesan Hindia, 15-7-1918.
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They had disregarded the voice of cautious warning that a shortage of irriga-
tion water set limits on the acreage which could be planted.4 
In early 1919, when the export of sugar was resumed, the sugar companies 
were less enthusiastic about lending a willing ear. They condemned the plan 
to reduce the sugar acreage as unrealistic and dangerous. Agitators who had 
campaigned against the sugar industry for years would reap the fruits. Batavia 
and the estates would be blamed for the loss of income. Theft and unrest 
would be rife. Some were quick to point out that experiences in 1918 had 
shown that not much could be expected of any efforts to turn sugar fields into 
rice-fields. In various places people had even asked the estates to quash the 
reduction of the cane acreage. Among the ‘defenders of capitalism’, as Neratja 
chose to describe them, who spoke out against a reduction in the sugar acreage 
was Rhemrev supported by his nationalist Orange Union of Law and Order.5 
The ‘sugar newspaper’, the Soerabaiasch Handelsblad, calculated that Batavia’s 
plan would cost the state 18 million guilders in taxes. The sugar estates would 
forfeit 42 million guilders.6 To the indignation of politicians in The Hague, 
the management of the sugar companies in Holland, angry that they had 
not been consulted in advance, hinted that they might ignore instructions of 
the Governor General to reduce the area under cultivation. Simultaneously, 
estate managers prepared for unrest and strikes, which they feared would 
be organized by the Sarekat Islam if the area of production was not cut back. 
Apprehension even extended abroad. Sugar from the Netherlands Indies was 
again in great demand. Great Britain was so eager to buy it negotiations were 
launched to see whether, in spite of a bad harvest in British India, Rangoon 
rice could be supplied to Java in an amount equal to the extra harvest the 
authorities hoped to reap if there were a decrease in sugar production.7
In a reaction, in an article headed ‘A refined, intellectual pack of murder-
ers’, the editors of Sinar Hindia had no compunction in calling the sugar 
planters ‘cold blooded murderers’ because they refused to decrease the sugar 
acreage in January 1919.8 In February 1919 such articles prompted the Sugar 
Syndicate to ask the colonial administration to check the inflammatory rheto-
ric in the Malay press.9 Inevitably, the recalcitrant attitude of the sugar 
industry resulted in protests from the nationalist movement. The issue was 
important enough to unite Sarekat Islam, Boedi Oetomo, and ISDV, which 




7 De Indische Gids 1919, I:759.
8 Sinar Hindia, 25-1-1919 (Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1918-19:2017).
9 De Locomotief, 25-2-1919, 26-2-1919.
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leftist Dutchmen that Batavia was in earnest its intention to have estates 
reduce their cane acreage was not boosted by the appointment of J. Sibinga 
Mulder as Director of Agriculture in December 1918. He replaced Lovink who 
had not been averse to a reduction in the sugar acreage or to the promotion of 
an indigenous industry. Sibinga Mulder was cut from different cloth. He was 
generally known as a toean goela, a sugar lord, a ‘sugar fanatic’, as De Locomotief 
called him, or, as Cramer expressed it a protagonist à tort en à travers of the 
sugar industry. He was, a speaker at the Sarekat-Islam Congress concluded, 
an unvarnished capitalist.10 Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo predicted that as far 
as Sibinga Mulder was concerned the native could be no more than a ‘rough 
worker destined to produce a dividend for the shareholders in Holland’.11 
Talma let it indirectly be known that Van Limburg Stirum was far from happy 
with the choice, taking pains to stress that Sibinga Mulder’s appointment was 
solely the responsibility of The Hague.12 
By March it had become clear Batavia would not enforce a reduction in the 
sugar acreage. The harvest of maize and other of secondary crops had been 
excellent and a normal rice harvest was expected.
Initially, after the uncertainty of the first months of the World War, the colonial 
export economy had done well. The export of a number of colonial products 
exceeded that of previous years and excellent prices were fetched. Sugar 
especially was in great demand. Contributing to the success was the accident 
in disguise that wartime conditions had forced exporters to find new export 
markets and that the war had also opened these up when long-established 
international trading relations between the warring powers and other coun-
tries were cut off. New-found trade with the United States and Japan more 
than compensated for a drop in trade with Europe. In the closing months of 
1916 conditions deteriorated. By 1917 the picture had changed drastically. The 
economic war fought by the Allied Powers, the perils of the sea in wartime, 
the decrease in shipping opportunities, aggravated by the Allied and later the 
Associated Powers’ demand for tonnage, brought the colony to the brink of 
economic disaster. A concomitant factor was that in South Asia Allied colonies 
were also confronted with the Associated Powers hunger for ships to sustain 
the war effort in Europe. In British India the lack of shipping opportunities, 
compounded by the danger U-boats and mines posed, affected sea trade and 
sea traffic with the motherland. Life was affected in a similar way to that in the 
Netherlands Indies. The well-off colonial élite, for instance, could no longer 
send their sons home for education at prestigious schools in Great Britain as 
10 Sarekat-Islam Congres 1919:7; De Indische Gids 1918, II:1493; Volksraad 1918-19:212.
11 Volksraad 1918-19:160.
12 Volksraad 1918-19:442.
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its members had been used to doing, but had to enrol them at ‘war schools’ 
in India (Buettner 2004:105-6). The British Indian need of ships threw weight 
behind the demands to put Dutch tonnage at the disposal of the Associated 
Powers. 
Disruption of international sea traffic hurt not only the colonial export and 
import sector in the Netherlands Indies. Throughout the war, but especially 
towards the end, the colonial authorities were greatly worried by the fact that 
the Netherlands Indies was not self-sufficient in the production of rice. For 
adequate supplies of its staple, it needed imports from Burma, Indochina and 
Thailand. Disruption of sea traffic and export bans abroad raised the spectre 
of food shortages, famine, and social unrest, forcing the Governor General and 
his staff to contemplate a reduction in the acreage planted by the sugar facto-
ries to allow a concomitant increase in the production of food crops.
By the autumn of 1918, confidence in the economic future of the Netherlands 
Indies had been somewhat restored. One reason for hope had first been per-
ceptible in September when the prospect of peace was in the air. This was 
indeed followed by the armistice, and then the peace talks. Each of these events 
had stimulated trade and speculation in rubber, copra and a few other com-
modities produced in the Netherlands Indies. Thanks to this recovery in prices, 
the Cultuur-Hulpbank did not have to come to the assistance of any estate.13 
What the economic future would bring nobody knew in 1918. Some were 
optimistic. They expected old markets to be restored and foreign trade to 
accelerate to satisfy pent-up demand. Others were pessimistic. Peace might 
also mean that a belligerent mentality might come to dominate international 
economic relations. The prospect of trade-blocks loomed. As 1918 wore on, 
many had predicted an intensification in the economic war once the military 
battle had been won by the Associated Powers. In the People’s Council in June 
1918 D. Birnie warned that the Netherlands Indies was especially vulnerable 
to this because it was so heavily dependent on foreign trade.14 The greatest 
cause for apprehension was uncertainty about how the United States and 
Great Britain would enforce their economic interests. Germany was also left 
out of the equation. The German economic threat was considered even more 
real because the German merchant Navy was thought to have survived the 
war almost undamaged, safely sheltered in German and neutral ports. Early 
in 1918 Loudon had confided to Parliament that, during negotiations with 
Germany, it had emerged that Berlin was highly interested in the economic 
state of affairs in the Netherlands Indies. Loudon had gained the impression 
Germany wanted to make Dutch shipping subservient to post-war German 
13 Koloniaal verslag 1919:201-2.
14 Volksraad 1918:323.
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interests.15 The defeat of Germany banished all such fears. To compensate for 
the damage German U-boats had inflicted, Germany was forced to surrender 
all German merchant ships of 1,600 tons and more, half of its ships of between 
1,000 and 1,600 tons, and a quarter of all other ships to the Allies (Van der 
Mandere n.d.:85).
As of the beginning of February 1919, the Dutch ships held in British 
and American ports were gradually released. London and Washington even 
promised to assist in their return to sea by facilitating their intake of coal and 
provisions. In the same month, Nederland, Rotterdamsche Lloyd, and Oceaan 
decided to lower their freight tariffs by 30 per cent. In May the first ship to sail 
the usual route through the Suez Canal left Tanjung Priok. Shipping restric-
tions imposed by the Associated Powers were not lifted immediately. The mail 
service to Europe was restored, but initially letters and parcels still had to be 
sent by British Mail. The first Dutch ships which sailed from the Netherlands 
Indies to Europe in December 1918 – the Noordam and the Tabanan – still 
had no Dutch mail on board. In July 1919 the censorship Great Britain had 
imposed on telegraphic communications was ended. A transmission station 
for wireless messages to replace the provisional one was sent to Java in 1919. 
The station became operational in 1922.16
Trade with the motherland was not liberalized immediately. The sea block-
ade had remained in force after the armistice. In an economic agreement con-
cluded with the Associated Powers by The Hague, a new quota system was 
proposed, which limited the volume of exports from the Netherlands Indies 
to Holland between October 1918 and October 1919. In return, The Hague 
promised to lend the United States 120 million guilders (including the pro-
ceeds of confiscated and sold freight), Great Britain 75 million guilders, France 
30 million guilders, and Italy 11 million guilders. The shipments of colonial 
wares to the Netherlands had to be addressed to the NOT, which had lost 
much of its influence when shipping to and from the Netherlands had dwin-
dled. The trust had to decide which portion was allowed to be exported to the 
motherland in the first half of the period and which in the second one. The 
agreement covered about twenty-five products including tea, coffee, tobacco, 
rice, sago, maize (including maize for fodder), kapok, cotton, oil, and tin. Once 
more the NOT appeared all powerful. In the Netherlands Indies a Ladies Aid 
Committee, made up of women who were worried by reports about hunger in 
Holland, collected food to be shipped to the motherland. Idenburg was grate-
ful for the gesture, but pointed out that the NOT had to be consulted before 
the aid could be shipped.17 The NOT was disbanded before the end of the year. 
15 De Locomotief, 13-6-1918.
16 Gerdus Oosterbeek 1927:340. 
17 Neratja, 22-1-1919.
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Bringing to an end what the Ministry of the Colonies reporting on the event 
chose to call the NOT ‘tutelage’.18
The black list was abolished in April 1919. The Associated Powers also 
gradually began to lift their import restrictions. In the Netherlands Indies itself 
export bans were lifted in 1919: those on kapok, wood, tobacco, sugar, and 
rubber in June, those on tin, tea, coffee, and copra in August, that on pepper 
in September, and that on synthetic dyes in October. Export products would 
fetch spectacular prices in the course of 1919, the only exception being tobacco. 
Prospects seemed bright. In its annual report over 1919 the Ministry of the 
Colonies wrote about ‘relief and recovery’ and of a ‘lively demand for almost 
all colonial products in Europe and elsewhere which made prices jump and 
reach a level never known before.’19 The assessment was too optimistic. Also 
1920 started well but by the middle of the year an economic crisis loomed. It 
turned out that it took the Netherlands Indies and the world longer to recover 
than people had foreseen. Poverty in Europe, a depression in Japan, and 
Washington fighting inflation caused prices and demand drop. Stocks were 
piling up again. The high prices fetched earlier had been mainly attributable to 
speculation. Worst affected were rubber, sugar and tea.20 It was not before the 
end of 1922 that the situation changed for the better for colonial export trade.
The effect of the imminent peace on consumer behaviour had been the 
opposite to what trade in export products initially experienced. In the expec-
tation that retail prices would soon drop, consumers postponed purchases. In 
January 1919 the Associated Powers benevolently promised that they would 
not hinder the import of goods of which they themselves had enough into 
the Netherlands Indies, providing that the latter did not restrict the export 
of goods needed by the Associated Powers. Despite such promises imports 
remained expensive, not least because cargo space was still at a premium. At 
first shortages appeared to have become more acute. As at other times of eco-
nomic depression and high prices, people noted the increase in beggars and 
vagrants. The economic decline experienced by the population, which had 
already caused the authorities alarm before the war, would continue well into 
the 1920s (Carpentier Alting and De Cock Buning 1928:96-8).
After the armistice one cause for anxiety was that the Dutch had the impres-
sion that elsewhere in Associated countries a misconception about the Dutch 
role during the war reigned. The Netherlands might have to pay for its neu-
trality. The new Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, H.A. van Karnebeek, tried 
to make a confident impression at the end of 1918. Addressing Parliament, 
18 Koloniaal verslag 1920:291.
19 Koloniaal verslag 1920:291.
20 Koloniaal verslag 1921:251.
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he said that the behaviour of the Netherlands between 1914 and 1918 had 
been so impeccable that the Dutch could be confident about the outcome of 
the negotiations with the Associates.21 Privately Van Karnebeek must have 
had misgivings. He requested Idenburg to ask Van Limburg Stirum for an 
assessment of the damage caused by the war and about the measures the 
colonial government had been forced to take. The picture entertained of the 
Netherlands by the Associates should be put right. Van Karnebeek wrote that 
abroad it was ‘generally not sufficiently realized what great sacrifices the war 
has demanded’ from the Netherlands. It was ‘even not infrequently thought 
that the Netherlands had profited economically from the war’.22 He need not 
have bothered. In Paris, the leaders of the Associated Powers had too much 
on their minds, worrying about the rampant unrest in Europe, trying to cre-
ate new states, redrawing boundaries, and dividing up German colonies and 
part of the Ottoman Empire, under heavy fire from all the protests and violent 
reactions this elicited, to worry about the Netherlands. 
When the Peace Conference, to which the Netherlands was not a party, 
commenced in Paris in January 1919, new fears loomed. For a long time, at 
least since 1916, there had already been talk that Belgium would claim part of 
Dutch Limburg and Zeeland Flanders at the peace conferences. Some rumours 
went even further and stated that Belgium would also demand parts of the 
Netherlands Indies. As it happened, the Dutch did not have any reason to 
worry. The leaders of the Associated Powers were not greatly concerned with 
a small and powerless country like Belgium. Belgian interests and wishes, 
including those with regard to the border with the Netherlands, were paid so 
little attention that at one point the Belgian delegation in Paris even threatened 
that it would not sign the peace treaty (Macmillan 2001:285-6).
Another rumour was somewhat embarrassing. Some anxiety had been 
caused by the vague references the American President, Woodrow Wilson, 
had made about the right to self-determination of nations and the develop-
ment of backward regions under colonial rule for the good of the international 
community. Wilson might well want to press such issues at the peace confer-
ence. Fearing that this might indeed be so, and that a Colonial Power might be 
forced to develop certain regions, and even worse, to accept the participation 
of the contemporary World Powers in the People’s Council, s’Jacob pressed for 
the development of the non-Javanese part of the Netherlands Indies, in order 
to forestall foreign countries using yet another excuse for interference in Dutch 
colonial affairs.23
An additional cause for discomfort was the prospect, that as the rumour 
21 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1918-19:786.
22 Van Karnebeek to Idenburg 4-2-1919, NA, Kol. Geheim, Vb. 21-2-1919 G1.
23 Volksraad 1918:314.
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had it, Chinese in the Netherlands Indies wanted to seize the opportunity of 
the peace talks to have the representative of the Chinese government draw 
attention to the discrimination against Chinese in the Netherlands Indies. 
It was hinted he had been given the task of achieving a decision by which 
Chinese who had settled in the Netherlands Indies would be treated as sub-
jects of China and no longer as Dutch subjects. Since 1911 restrictions on travel 
and residence had gradually been lifted, only to be abolished completely in 
November 1918, but since 1910 a new source of discontent had presented 
itself. A new act on citizenship made Chinese born in the Netherlands Indies 
of parents who had settled there Dutch subjects. The Chinese government had 
protested in 1910. It had recalled its Ambassador from The Hague (Han Tiauw 
Tjong 1919:952). In the Netherlands Indies the new act had not been well 
accepted. Protests peaked at the time of the peace talks in Paris. Instrumental 
in mobilizing Chinese discontent was Sin Po. This newspaper launched a 
campaign coupling a rejection of compulsory service with a rejection of Dutch 
nationality. The Sumatra Post claimed that 28,789 Chinese families and 300 
Chinese associations had rejected the idea of becoming Dutch subjects (Oei 
Kiauw Pik 1919:960). In the end it was not the Chinese but the Japanese who 
were to raise the point of racial discrimination. The Japanese delegation gained 
wide support for insisting on the inclusion of a clause on racial equality in the 
Preamble to the Covenant of the League of Nations, but it ran up against a 
brick wall of opposition erected by the Americans and British, afraid of losing 
political support at home and, in the British case, especially in Australia and 
New Zealand which like the United States wanted to bar Japanese immigrants 
(MacMillan 2001:329).
When the Treaty of Versailles was signed on 28 June 1919, on the same 
date in the same palace Wilhelm I had been crowned Emperor of Germany, 
Germany lost all its telegraph cables. Its Navy and a good part of its com-
mercial fleet had to be handed over to Great Britain. Germany also had to 
part with its colonies and protectorates. Brutal German colonial rule was the 
justification given for such a decision. The argument was the umpteenth rea-
son for some Dutchmen to torment themselves. Associated propaganda had 
contributed to this bad image of German rule, and passionate speeches in the 
People’s Council making the most of abuses in the Netherlands Indies might 
well create the impression abroad that the Dutch did not behave much better 
in their colony than the Germans had done in their Asian and African colonies 
(Van Renesse 1920:316-7).
Although the Netherlands Indies emerged intact from the Great War and the 
Peace Conference, it was a different colony from what it had been in 1914. 
In pre-war years there were signs that the mood among the population had 
already been changing. The Ethical Policy introduced after the turn of the 
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century facilitated the calls for emancipation, but the internal dynamics in 
the Indonesian, Indo-European, Arab, and Chinese communities also had 
contributed. The emergence of a popular nationalist movement in the early 
1910s had prompted Dutch people to question the loyalty of the indigenous 
population were the Netherlands become involved in the Great War. To their 
relief Indonesians shouted ‘Long live the Queen’ and not ‘Down with the 
Dutch’ during meetings organized in the months following August 1914. 
What remained was a certain unease about the pro-German sympathies of 
Indonesians who clearly sided with their fellow-Muslims in the Ottoman 
Empire, Germany’s ally, and later in the war, about a radicalization of the 
nationalist movement. Stimulated by the native militia discussion, the nation-
alist movement grew increasingly vocal and self-confident (and according to 
some extremist) in tone between 1914 and 1918. Nationalist and Islamic lead-
ers called for political concessions in exchange for Indonesian conscripts to 
assist the Dutch in defending the colony, demanding equal treatment, a truly 
representative body in the colony, and better education. 
Increasingly communist leaders also made their voices heard and Marxist 
jargon became fashionable among nationalist of all denominations. The advance 
of Indonesian communist leaders spelled the demise of the leaders of the pre-
war Indische Partij and their disregard for racial differences. Understandably 
in a society in which race was one of the real and also perceived markers 
of social status and occupational group, racial antagonisms influenced the 
course of the nationalist movement. The VSTP became an almost exclusively 
Indonesian organization; an indication that Indo-Europeans and the Dutch 
language had become a liability in the nationalist movement. Indonesian 
members of the ISDV stressed the racial divide. The Chinese who seemed to 
arouse negative feelings among colonial administrators, part of the European 
community, and the indigenous population also suffered. Abdoel Moeis’s 
remarks in Europe about Chinese middlemen who exploited the small man, 
Semaoen’s lashing out against the Chinese after the Kudus riots and his attack 
on Indo-Europeans in Si Tetap testify to the significance of racial sentiments. 
In a sense the failure of Douwes Dekker, Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo, and 
Soewardi Soerjaningrat to win support for their ‘Indiër nationalism’ can be 
considered a missed opportunity, though now it is only possible to speculate 
about what the consequences for racial relations would have been had they 
been able to win over at least part of the nationalist leaders, especially those 
of the Sarekat Islam.
Taking post-war development into account, it is easier to speak about pros-
pects which were not realized in the field of political and economic relations. 
In the course of the Great War, it had become increasingly difficult to commu-
nicate between motherland and colony. The regular mail and passenger serv-
ices of pre-war years proved impossible to maintain. Commercial sea traffic to 
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and from Rotterdam and Amsterdam broke down when the dangers of war 
at sea intensified or when Allied pressure on tonnage became too great. Even 
any idea of a direct shipping link between Holland and the Netherlands Indies 
had to be abandoned after Berlin decided to resume an all-out submarine war 
in January 1917, while the requisitioning of all the Dutch ships in the ports 
of the Associated Powers put an end to all Dutch international sea traffic in 
March 1918. Such a decline in Dutch sea traffic was first and foremost an eco-
nomic disaster. It also hampered communications between Holland and the 
Netherlands Indies, but what had been of even greater influence was that right 
from the outbreak of the war the Allied Powers had aimed to control the flow 
of mail and goods between motherland and colony. Incontrovertibly this was 
part of the Allied endeavour to bring down the German economy and to isolate 
German commercial interests in the rest of the world. Another reason for the 
tight control kept on Dutch mail was the fear for what might be accomplished 
by a Germano-Indian conspiracy to undermine British rule in Asia by inciting 
unrest among indigenous soldiers from the British colonies and fomenting a 
rebellion in India. In the schemings of the plotters, the Netherlands Indies had 
a vital role to play as a transit station for arms and seditious pamphlets; inevi-
tably such suspicions necessitated close British supervision of all shipping to 
and from the Netherlands Indies. Telegraphic communications had also been 
at the mercy of the British who had even temporarily denied the Dutch access 
to a cable system when London instituted the British Telegram Interruption to 
punish the Netherlands for the way its government interpreted its duties as a 
neutral country in October 1917. 
The break-down in communications between colony and motherland which 
had been the result of the problems encountered in keeping shipping, the mail 
service, and telegraphic connections functioning smoothly had given the colo-
nial administration and the business community the chance to act with some 
independence (and at certain moments with complete independence) from 
directives from the Netherlands. Pessimism that the end of the war might see 
the restoration of the pre-war economic relations and make the mother country 
all powerful once again had persisted throughout the war. This would halt the 
modest steps the colony had set on the road to industrialization. After the war 
company headquarters in Europe and politicians in The Hague indeed again 
took control. Company headquarters tried to regain lost ground. The ‘old 
battle’ between the economic interests and status considerations of those in 
Holland and those in the Netherlands Indies was resumed (Ligthart 1923:432). 
The first indication of this had already emerged to the full light of day in 
August 1918 when the sugar companies in Holland had founded their own 
organization to regulate trade, the United Java Sugar Producers Association, 
and the Advisory Committee on Sugar and consequently the Association of 
Java Sugar Producers and Exporters had to be dissolved a few months later. 
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Some companies even succeeded in having Holland once again become the 
place where the colonial export products were traded and have such wares 
shipped to Holland on consignment (Ligthart 1923:432). It was an outcome 
much deplored in the colony and one which even made Emil Helfferich con-
clude that the Netherlands Indies had more freedom in the political than in the 
economic field (Taselaar 1998:1-2). Companies based in Holland even regarded 
with distrust trade missions abroad sent by the government to stimulate the 
sale of colonial products, afraid that such missions could result in direct trade 
relations with the Netherlands Indies bypassing the Netherlands.24 Despite 
being assailed by such threats, the new system which had taken shape during 
the war was too practical and too cost-effective to be abolished completely. The 
sugar market remained located in Java (but the United Java Sugar Producers 
Association was firmly in control) and the sale of Bangka tin still took place in 
Batavia. Tea was sold in Amsterdam and Batavia (and in London).25 
Any thought about the political autonomy of the Netherlands Indies or 
a certain degree of self-rule remained a dream. The prospect of a famine in 
1919 had been one of the motives for Van Limburg Stirum to have Talma call 
for unity and cooperation in his speeches to the People’s Council. Talma had 
addressed himself specifically to the ‘native associations’ in his speech of 2 
December 1918. He had asked for the assistance of their leaders in attempts 
to explain the measures taken by the government to avert a food crisis to the 
population. Significantly, he also asked them to help in ‘urging the population 
to spare the crops, already in the ground, so that they could be used to benefit 
society’.26 On the same occasion and true to the spirit of the day, Talma had 
announced the establishment of local advisory councils on food production. 
The members were to be drawn from all population groups, but not from the 
civil service. By adopting this course Batavia hoped to make good use of the 
expertise of the population. Talma promised that the members of such com-
mittees could turn to the Head of the Department of Agriculture, Trade and 
Industry if they had the impression that their suggestions were being ignored 
or were not being properly implemented. It all fizzled out.
In May 1919, when he opened a new year of sessions of the People’s Council 
Van Limburg Stirum spoke of ‘the transfer of powers to representative bodies’ 
but left no doubt he was talking about a long-term project: ‘Where an abrupt 
transformation from a bureaucratic form of government to its antipode, the 
modern Western one, would only give a semblance of reality, what is called 
for is to pave the way for a gradual transfer’.27 His speech made it clear that 
24 De Indische Gids 1922, I:160.
25 Ligthart 1923:432; Koloniaal verslag 1920:296-7.
26 Volksraad 1918-19:441.
27 De Indische Gids 1919, II:993.
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the development of local representative bodies was what the government 
had in mind, not a change in the political relationship between colony and 
motherland. Consequently, the motions submitted in the People’s Council on 
25 November and 3 December calling for far-reaching political reform came 
to nought. First, discussion was postponed till the Herzieningscommissie 
(Commission of Inquiry) had submitted its report, which it did in June 
1920. One of its proposals was to change the name the Netherlands Indies 
to the Indies. This was suggested to do justice to the fact that the colony was 
‘a separate, as much autonomous as possible part of the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands’ (Carpentier Alting 1920:144). Another was to give the People’s 
Council (for which it invented the awful name Landsstaten, National Council) 
the status of a real co-legislative body, and virtually to remove the authority 
of Parliament in The Hague in matters concerning the Netherlands Indies. The 
Committee also suggested that in The Hague when important decisions con-
cerning the Indies were to be made a deputation of Members of the People’s 
Council and of the colonial administration could travel to Holland where its 
members would have ‘a consultative voice’ in the deliberations in the States 
General (Carpentier Alting 1920:73). Yet another suggestion was that Queen 
Wilhelmina should visit the Indies: ‘no other personal deed of Her Majesty 
could so strengthen the tie between the Indies and the Netherlands as a visit 
to these territories’ (Carpentier Alting 1920:286). 
Such recommendations were too outlandish for Dutch politicians to accept 
them. In the Netherlands Indies no discussion of the 25 November and 3 
December motions in the People’s Council followed the publication of the 
Commission’s bulky, over 600 page-thick report. The deadline set by the 
Members of the People’s Council who had proposed the November motion, 
1921, passed. The appointment of a new Governor General, D. Fock, in 
September 1920 did not inspire hope either. As Chairman of Parliament he had 
reacted angrily to the November promises and had praised the sugar industry 
in the same breath. Moreover, before being appointed Governor General he 
had left no doubt that ‘retention of the Dutch authority in the Indies would be 
the basis of his policy’ (Van Anrooij 2001:135). It is no surprise that at the end 
of 1921 De Locomotief concluded that Fock was less a proponent of political 
reform than Van Limburg Stirum had been.28
The reluctance of Batavia and The Hague to act prompted the founding 
of a Comité voor de Autonomie voor Indië (Committee for Autonomy for 
the Indies).29 Its aim was, to quote its secretary A.F. Folkersma, to create ‘an 
28 De Locomotief, 31-12-1921.
29 Chairman of the committee was H.C. Kerkkamp, a member of the People’s Council. Among 
the other members of the People’s Council who sat on the committee were M.Ng. Dwidjosewojo 
and A.L. Waworoentoe. 
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autonomous Indies, in accordance with the principles of the Commission of 
Inquiry’.30 The Sarekat Islam, Boedi Oetomo, the Regents’ Union, the Indische 
Sociaal-Democratische Partij, and the National Indische Partij (National Indies 
Party, the new name borne by the Indische Partij since 1919) were among the 
organizations the Committee could count on for support. In the opinion of 
some, the Committee did not go far enough. It did not, as communists were 
inclined to do, champion the more radical Los van Holland (Separated from 
Holland) demand. Another not satisfied with mere autonomy was Tjipto 
Mangoenkoesoemo. At an Autonomy Meeting in Bandung he demanded that 
the colony should become lepas dari Nederland.31 In all probability taking the 
militia campaign as an example, the Committee organized meetings all over 
the Netherlands Indies on 29 January 1922. It also considered the sending to 
Holland of a deputation to be chaired by Achmad Djajadiningrat, Regent of 
Serang. There was one big stumbling block. In contrast to the militia campaign 
the aims of the Committee could not count on any sympathy from the colo-
nial administration. It was intimated to the Regents that Fock did not want 
them to support the campaign. This spelled the end of any idea of Achmad 
Djajadiningrat heading the deputation. The Regents’ Union distanced itself 
from the Committee, while the three Regents who had been members of the 
Committee resigned (Stokvis 1922).
The political participation of Indonesians in the running of the colony 
and even the freedom to manoeuvre of the nationalist movement suffered 
a commensurate if not worse fate. November 1918 had made the difference. 
There had been no revolution in Holland or the Netherlands Indies, and the 
matter of involvement of Indonesians in the defence of the colony had lost 
its urgency. In Parliament in April 1919 Wijnkoop stated that after November 
1918 ‘the most rampant reaction’ reigned supreme in the Netherlands Indies.32 
Yet other Dutch people showed themselves pleased with the harsher policy 
embarked upon by the colonial authorities. In his survey of developments in 
the Netherlands Indies in 1919, the editor of De Indische Gids, Van Heekeren, 
exclaimed that ‘[f]inally the government of the Netherlands Indies has dis-
carded its lenient attitude and has taken very rigorous action against the 
zealots who tried to set the population against the legal authorities with their 
wild theories’ (Van Heekeren 1920:96). Grossly misjudging the actual situa-
tion, another Dutch person observed in the Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad that the 
indigenous movement was quiet. He attributed this to the fact that ‘the iron 
had entered the soul’ of its leaders’.33 The implication of the actions taken by 
30 De Indische Gids 1922, I:355.
31 De Indische Gids 1922, I:433.
32 Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1918-19:2069.
33 De Indische Gids 1922, I:48.
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Batavia was that the thriving political climate of the 1910s gradually faded 
away. In keeping with the new policy the Malay-language press also was 
brought under control. With the Press Ordinance of 1931, popular known as 
the Press Curb Ordinance, Batavia appropriated the power to deal directly 
with newspapers which had displeased it, bypassing the judiciary. The ordi-
nance was issued, as is stated in its text, to safeguard public order against 
undesirable periodicals. 
It was not just political repression. The opinions and advice of Indonesians, 
which Batavia not so long before had explicitly said it welcomed, seemed no 
longer to count. This new course of action assumed a firmer outline during 
the term in office of Governor General Fock from March 1921 until September 
1926. Fock was well aware of the aversion his policy had aroused in nationalist 
circles. At the end of his term, he observed that some of the Indonesian intel-
ligentsia had gained the impression that they were no longer taken seriously, 
that their contribution to the development of the Netherlands Indies was 
rejected, and that consequently they distrusted the colonial administration 
(Van Anrooij 2001:1). The final straw which broke the camel’s back presented 
itself just after Fock’s term had ended: the ill-fated communist rebellions of 
November 1926 in West Java and January 1927 in West Sumatra. In spite of 
the name under which they have gone down in history, they were inspired 
as much by religious as by communist sympathies. These ushered in the end 
of what M.C. Ricklefs has called the ‘first stage of national revival’ (Ricklefs 
1981:170). In reaction to the rebellions, the notorious prison camp Boven-Digul 
was constructed in an inaccessible and insalubrious part of Papua. Any ten-
dency to emerge as a key figure in the nationalist movement became danger-
ous. Douwes Dekker, Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo, and Soewardi Soerjaningrat 
had been banned and ‘irresponsible’ journalists had been punished, but at 
times the colonial authorities – the senior ones at least – had regretted that 
such steps had to be taken and, at least till the middle of 1917, had looked upon 
the emancipation movement growing among the indigenous population with 
a certain degree of sympathy. The Governors General and their staff may well 
have agreed with what Sir Edward Grey, the then British Foreign Secretary, 
wrote in 1908 to his Envoy in Istanbul, Sir Gerard Lowther: ‘Hitherto, wher-
ever we have had Mahometan subjects, we have been able to tell them that 
the subjects in the countries ruled by the head of their religion were under a 
despotism which was not a benevolent one; while our Mahometan subjects 
were under a despotism that was benevolent’.34 After the Great War, the tol-
erance and understanding had evaporated. The new leader of the nationalist 
movement who entered the stage in the 1920s, Soekarno, was arrested in 1929. 
34 Grey to Lowther, 31-8-1908, PRO FO 800 79.
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He was sentenced to four years’ imprisonment in 1930. In December 1931 he 
was released, only to be re-arrested again in August 1933 and exiled first to 
Flores and then to Bengkulu. Two other important leaders, Mohammad Hatta 
and Soetan Sjahrir, were banned to Boven-Digul in February 1934, from where 
they were moved to Banda in 1936.
Sarekat Islam leaders also found to their cost that the wind was chang-
ing. At the end of 1918 Abdoel Moeis was prosecuted. The crux of the charge 
against him was a speech he had given during a Sarekat Islam meeting in 
Ciawi earlier in the year. The Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad, quoting from a report 
said to have been made by the Sundanese District Chief of Ciawi, claimed 
that Abdoel Moeis had made an appeal for civil disobedience. He is alleged 
to have urged people not to appear when summoned to court. Abdoel Moeis 
was furious. He called the district chief ‘one of those stupid priyayi who think 
that he serves the government by libel’. Abdoel Moeis apologized in Neratja 
after the district chief had written to him saying that his report had differed 
Mas Marco and his wife in the prison camp Boven Digul, 1932 (KITLV 4452)
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from the version published in the Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad.35 Nevertheless, 
the district chief took Abdoel Moeis to court for slander. The result was that 
Abdoel Moeis was arrested in December. He was accused of contempt of court 
for refusing to answer a summons. Abdoel Moeis blamed his failure to appear 
on a misunderstanding. He had asked for the postponement of the court ses-
sion because he had to address the People’s Council. Abdoel Moeis had been 
sure that his request had been granted, but it turned out that the session had 
not been adjourned. The court in Buitenzorg sentenced Abdoel Moeis to two 
months’ imprisonment. As so often happened, the Indonesian nationalists 
had a good case to show how racially biased the administration of justice 
in the Netherlands Indies was. They contrasted the judicial sentences in the 
cases against Semaoen, Abdoel Moeis and others against that of one Van Metz 
van Enghuizen, a planter, who had ordered the binding with barbed wire 
and the flogging with the same material of a female employee. Van Metz van 
Enghuizen was sentenced to a mere one month’s imprisonment. 
Soon Abdoel Moeis got in trouble again. He was once more arrested after 
a Dutch civil servant was murdered in Toli-Toli in North Sulawesi shortly 
after Abdoel Moeis had visited the region on a propaganda tour in May 1919 
(Ricklefs 1981:165). In 1923 he abandoned national politics and moved to West 
Sumatra, his native region, where he continued his nationalist campaign. 
The colonial administration acted promptly and displayed its unforgiving 
memory. In January 1924 Abdoel Moeis was banned from Sumatra and was 
not allowed to live anywhere other than in Java and Madura. His ‘agitation’ 
in Toli-Toli was one of the reasons adduced by Batavia for taking this decision 
(Petrus Blumberger 1931:79-80). Abdoel Moeis chose Garut as his residence. 
He died in 1959.
The other key Sarekat Islam leader, Tjokroaminoto, found himself into 
trouble a few weeks after the Toli-Toli disturbances when violence erupted in 
Garut and rumours flew thick and fast that a secret B department of the Sarekat 
Islam was planning a rebellion. He was arrested for perjury when being cross-
examined as a witness in the Garut court cases in August 1921, preventing him 
from attending an important Sarekat-Islam Congress in Surabaya in October. 
Tjokroaminoto was released in April 1922 and acquitted in May of that same 
year. In 1927 he refused an appointment to the People’s Council; an indication 
of the growing rift between the colonial government and the nationalist move-
ment (Petrus Blumberger 1931:75, 312). Tjokroaminoto remained the most 
important leader of the Sarekat Islam till his death in 1934.
Of the three Indische Partij leaders, Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo was banned 
from living in Central and East Java in 1919. Worse was to come for him. After 
35 Neratja, 20-12-1918.
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the Communist rebellion in Java he was arrested and subsequently was exiled 
to Banda in 1927, and from there, just before World War Two, to Makassar. In 
1940 he was allowed to move to Sukabumi in West Java for health reasons. 
Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo died in 1943. Soewardi Soerjaningrat was finally 
given permission to return to Java in 1919. In 1922 he acquired new fame as 
the founder of a nationalist school system, Taman Siswa or Garden of Pupils. 
He also changed his name in Ki Hadjar Dewantara. He died in April 1959, 
after having served among other functions as the first Indonesian Minister 
of Education. Douwes Dekker assumed the Indonesian name of Danudirdjo 
Setiabudhi. Shortly before the Japanese invasion he was arrested on suspicion 
of being a Japanese spy and was transported to Suriname. He returned to 
Indonesia in 1946 and died in 1950. 
Of the other persons who played such an important role in nationalist 
movement in the Netherlands Indies during World War One, Semaoen was 
exiled in mid-1923. He went first to Holland and thereafter moved to Russia. 
He was active in the Executive Committee of the Communist International. 
Semaoen returned to Indonesia in 1956, where he died in 1971. Darsono was 
exiled from the Netherlands Indies in 1926, after which he went to live in 
Russia, where he became an alternate member of the Executive Committee 
of the Communist International. In 1935 he moved to Holland. Darsono 
returned in Indonesia in 1950, He died in 1975.36 Mas Marco Kartodikromo 
was arrested again in 1926. He was sent to Boven-Digul where he died in 1932 
(Chambert-Loir 1974:205).
The whirligig of time has taken its revenge. The Dutch persons who fig-
ure in this book have largely faded like thin air from the consciousness of 
Indonesia but the merits of the once unsung heroes have been recognized 
in Indonesia. Abdoel Moeis, Soewardi Soerjaningrat, Tjokroaminoto, Tjipto 
Mangoenkoesoemo, and Douwes Dekker have been declared national heroes 
by the Indonesian government. For various reasons communists have never 
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